Com. v. Patterson, J.

J-S07027-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSEPH PATTERSON :
:
Appellant : No. 581 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 15, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006519-2012.
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2023
Joseph Patterson appeals from the order denying his first petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
46. We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
On May 14, 2012, at approximately 3:45 [p.m.], [the
complainant] was walking home when she noticed [Patterson]
following her on the 1200 block of Wagner Avenue in Philadelphia.
The two had been involved in a personal relationship which had
ended shortly before the events in this case.
Patterson attempted to speak with [the complainant] but
she did not want to talk. Patterson abruptly pulled out a knife and
shouted “I don’t care if I get life in jail. I’m going to kill you”. He
then stabbed [the complainant] in her throat and fled. [The
complainant] collapsed but was able to make it insider her home
where she grabbed a towel, applied pressure to the stab wound,
and screamed for someone to call 911.
J-S07027-23
EMS transported her to Albert Einstein Medical Center’s
Trauma Unit where surgery was performed. Before the operation,
Philadelphia police officers spoke to her and she mentioned
[Patterson] by name and gave police a description of his
appearance and clothing. Approximately three hours later, police
observed Patterson standing on the 5000 block of Broad Street in
Philadelphia. He matched the description. Police approached
[Patterson] and he immediately admitted he was the man police
were searching for. Patterson also blurted out that he had
discarded the knife at Einstein Hospital earlier that day. Police
went to the hospital and found the knife.
PCRA Court Opinion, 7/20/22, at 1-2.
On September 18, 2012, Patterson entered a negotiated guilty plea to
attempted murder and possession of an instrument of crime. The court
immediately proceeded to sentencing and imposed the negotiated, aggregate
sentence of twelve to twenty-four years of incarceration.
The PCRA Court summarized the subsequent procedural history as
follows:
[Patterson] did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did
he file a direct appeal to the Superior Court. On August 22, 2013,
he filed a pro se PCRA petition claiming that his guilty plea was
unlawfully induced and that counsel was ineffective. On
December 31, 2013, [the PCRA court appointed counsel]. On June
20, 2016, [Patterson] filed an addendum to his pro se PCRA
petition in support of his ineffective counsel claim, explaining more
clearly his position that mental health illness caused his guilty plea
to be a product of duress. This pro se addendum caught our
attention.
On July 7, 2016, Patterson filed pro se a motion for new
counsel. On October 20, 2016, [PCRA counsel] filed a Finley
letter which this court rejected on January 19, 2017 after a
hearing. [PCRA counsel] had not pursued the mental health issue
raised by Patterson. This court removed [PCRA counsel] and
appointed [current counsel].
-2-
J-S07027-23
On October 18, 2017, [current counsel] filed an amended
petition and memorandum of law and raised four claims: (1) the
guilty plea was unlawfully induced; trial counsel was ineffective
for (2) causing [Patterson] to enter an involuntary or unknowing
guilty plea, (3) unjustified failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of sentence, and (4) failure to properly represent
[Patterson] at sentencing. On June 7, 2018, this court issued a
Rule 907 notice [of] intent to dismiss the PCRA but on October 4,
2018, having read correspondence from Patterson, we decided to
schedule an evidentiary hearing on the mental health issue.
This took place on January 31, 2019[.] Patterson was
present in person. Patterson’s testimony was followed by his trial
attorney[.].
Following the hearing, on March 15, 2019, the court
dismissed Patterson’s PCRA amended petition on a finding that
Patterson’s negotiated guilty plea was neither coerced nor
otherwise involuntary, nor the product of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
For reasons related to an unfounded fear that Patterson had
not received timely notice of his right to appeal, we vacated our
March 15, 2019 order and entered a new dismissal order dated
June 27, 2019.
[Patterson] filed a timely notice of appeal on July 12, 2019.
On October 22, 2020, the Superior Court remanded with
instructions to file a supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion to
explain why the dismiss had been vacated by our March 15, 2019
order. Having not heard directly from this PCRA court within thirty
(30) days, the Superior Court quashed [Patterson’s] appeal as
untimely but ordered this PCRA court to permit a nunc pro tunc
appeal.
PCRA Court Opinion, 7/20/21, at 2-3 (excess capitalization, footnote and
citation omitted). This appeal followed. Both Patterson and the PCRA court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Patterson raises the following two issues on appeal:
I. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding the guilty
plea of [Patterson] was not unlawfully induced.
-3-
J-S07027-23
II. Whether the PCRA court erred in not finding trial
counsel was ineffective for causing [Patterson] to
enter an involuntary or unknowing guilty plea.
Patterson’s Brief at 8.
This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition
is to ascertain whether the order “is supported by the evidence of record and
is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless
there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth
v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
To be eligible for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must plead and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence
resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects in 42 Pa.C.S.A.
section 9543(a)(2), and that the issues he raises have not been previously
litigated or waived. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 725 A.2d 154, 160 (Pa.
1999). An issue has been "previously litigated" if the highest appellate court
in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled
on the merits of the issue, or if the issue has been raised and decided in a
proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. Carpenter, 725
A.2d at 160; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2), (3). If a claim has not been
previously litigated, the petitioner must then prove that the issue was not
waived. Carpenter, 725 A.2d at 160. An issue will be deemed waived under
the PCRA “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial,
at trial, during unitary review, on appeal, or in a prior state post-conviction
proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
-4-
J-S07027-23
In his first issue, Patterson asserts that the trial court erred in accepting
his guilty plea due to a deficient colloquy. See Patterson’s Brief at 12-14. As
the PCRA court noted, Patterson did not seek to withdraw his plea before the
trial court, or raise such a claim on direct appeal. Thus, Patterson’s first issue
is waived. Carpenter, supra.
In his second issue, Patterson asserts the ineffectiveness of plea
counsel. To obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel
was ineffective, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that counsel’s ineffectiveness so undermined the truth determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009).
“Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to be constitutionally
adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient
showing by the petitioner.” Id. This requires the petitioner to demonstrate
that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the
petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's act or omission. Id. at 533. A finding
of "prejudice" requires the petitioner to show "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Id. A failure to satisfy any prong of
the test for ineffectiveness requires rejection of the claim. Commonwealth
v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010).
-5-
J-S07027-23
Patterson asserts that plea counsel’s “ineffectiveness and coercive
actions played a large role in the unlawful inducement of [his] guilty plea.”
Patterson’s Brief at 16. According to Patterson, plea counsel “never ensured
that [he] was given a proper colloquy prior to entering his plea and [never]
had him examined for mental stability.” Id. Regarding claims of
ineffectiveness in relation to the entry of plea, we note:
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from the plea
bargaining-process are eligible for PCRA review. Allegations
of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty
plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused the defendant to enter into an involuntary or
unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters his plea on
the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends
on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
The standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas
dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements
for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea
counsel, . . . under which the defendant must show that
counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest
injustice, for example, by facilitating the entry of an
unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea. This standard
is equivalent to the “manifest injustice” standard applicable
to all post-sentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea.
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012-13 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(citations omitted).
Moreover, “[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty
plea was aware of what he was doing,” and “[h]e bears the burden of proving
otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citations omitted).
-6-
J-S07027-23
The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a
defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that
he lied while under oath, even if he avers that counsel
induced the lies. A person who elects to plead guilty is bound
by the statements he makes in open court while under oath
and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea
which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.
Id. On appeal, this Court evaluates the adequacy of the plea colloquy and
the voluntariness of the resulting plea by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.
Super. 2011).
Here, the PCRA court found no merit to Patterson’s claim. The court
first summarized the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and
assessed its credibility:
At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, [Patterson’s] testamentary
claim was that he had not understood the guilty plea because he
had been “too much out [of my] reality.” We find [Patterson’s]
incompetence claim is not credible based on the transcript of the
guilty plea colloquy, [Patterson’s] other statements at the PCRA
evidentiary hearing and [plea counsel’s] testimony.
[Patterson] testified that he had understood the plea deal
was for “12 to 24” years, but he wanted [plea counsel] to do
better. This court notes the plea agreement was indeed for 12 to
24 years and accordingly we find that Patterson understood the
deal when it was offered and knew its ramifications. Guilty plea
transcripts are clear that [Patterson] went through with a guilty
plea to attempted murder in exchange for a promised 12 to 24
year sentence, and did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
[Plea counsel] testified credibly that he tried to procure a
shorter deal for [Patterson] but could not. [He] also testified
credibly that when he returned to [Patterson], having been unable
to negotiate shorter prison time, he explained to [Patterson] that
his risk of an aggravated [] guideline sentence for attempted
murder was real based on the evidence accumulated against him.
[Plea counsel] also told [Patterson] that the chances of a
-7-
J-S07027-23
conviction for attempted murder were very high whether the
factfinder was a jury or a judge because the crime involved a neck
stabbing. Without a cap on a potential sentence of attempted
murder, [plea counsel] advised [Patterson] that the nature of the
crime could prompt a court to impose a sentence in the
aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines which would be
greater than the 12 to 24 years offered in the plea bargain.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/22, Exhibit A, at 2-3 (formatting altered).1
As to Patterson’s mental health issues, the PCRA court summarized the
pertinent testimony as follows:
On consideration of the testimony at the hearing, this PCRA
court finds counsel was prepared throughout his handling of
[Patterson’s] defense. Specifically, [plea counsel] knew that
Patterson had a history of serious mental illness. He testified
there were notations in his trial file from his office’s Mental Health
Unit about [Patterson’s] illness. He testified his office mental
health professionals had concluded that [Patterson] was
competent to stand trial. Based on his own meetings with
[Patterson] in preparation for trial, [plea counsel] testified that he
agreed with the Mental Health Unit that [Patterson] was
competent.
[Plea counsel] also testified that he believed a jury would
not have found [Patterson] either insane, or guilty but mentally
ill. [Plea counsel] stated his belief is based on his review of
discovery provided by the prosecutors. During the PCRA
evidentiary hearing, we ordered [plea counsel] to produce this
discovery for PCRA court review. We find the discovery
information corroborates [plea counsel’s] strategic assessment of
[Patterson’s] options and we find [plea counsel] had a reasonable
____________________________________________
1 At the PCRA hearing, plea counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s statement
that, given his prior record score, Patterson’s standard guideline sentence “of
186 months to the statutory limit [or] “15 and a half to 31 years.” N.T.,
1/31/19, at 35. He further agreed that the plea bargain Patterson accepted
was a mitigated sentence. Id. Patterson later acknowledged that he could
have faced a maximum 40-year prison term if convicted of attempted murder.
Id. at 45
-8-
J-S07027-23
basis to advise [Patterson] to give up his right to trial and accept
the best available plea offer.
Id. at 3-4.
Based on the above comments, the PCRA court concluded that Patterson
failed to meet his burden of establishing the three-prong ineffectiveness test.
Johnson, supra. As to the “arguable merit” prong, the court explained:
Based on the facts of this case, the first prong is not met,
since [Patterson] was not incompetent when he entered his guilty
plea. The transcript records from the guilty plea colloquy and the
PCRA evidentiary hearing are clear that [Patterson] understood
what he was doing when he entered his guilty plea and why. He
accepted the best deal available and did so knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily to avoid a risk of a longer sentence.
The plea bargain that he accepted was below the standard range
of the sentencing guidelines for an aggravated assault
[considering Patterson’s] previous aggravated assault
delinquency.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/22, Exhibit A, at 6 (formatting altered).
Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. As a
matter of credibility, the PCRA court believed trial counsel’s version of the
contested facts. We cannot disturb this determination. See Commonwealth
v. Harmon, 738 A.2d 1023, 1025 (Pa. Super. 1999) (explaining that when a
PCRA court’s determination of credibility is supported by the record, it cannot
be disturbed on appeal).
Patterson’s claims to the contrary are unavailing; Patterson’s claim that
his plea was unlawfully induced is belied by the record. Moreover, Patterson’s
assertion that plea counsel should have considered a “plea of guilty but
-9-
J-S07027-23
mentally insane” fails because the PCRA court credited plea counsel’s
testimony that such a plea would not have been successful.2 Finally, our
review supports the court’s statement that Patterson’s PCRA petition “is
motivated by a desire to win a shorter sentence but without legal cause.”
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/22, Exhibit A, at 5. This conclusion is supported by
Patterson’s own testimony at the PCRA hearing: “I don’t mind taking the deal,
it is just the deal that is coming is too much time.” Id. (citing N.T., 1/31/19,
at [23]).
In sum, given the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, the PCRA
court correctly determined that Patterson’s ineffectiveness claim lacked merit.
We therefore affirm the order denying him post-conviction relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2023
____________________________________________
2 Patterson claims he has “a myriad of records, throughout the course of his
life, detailing his struggles with mental illness and personal tragedies which
have affected his mental stability.” Patterson’s Brief at 18. Patterson did not
present any of these records at the PCRA hearing.
- 10 -