Aita, M. v. NCB Mngmt, Ser.

J-A26002-22
2023 PA Super 82MARCELO AITA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. :
:
Appellant : No. 510 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2019-00981
MARCELO AITA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. : No. 615 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2019-00981
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
DISSENTING OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2023
In this cross-appeal, NCB argues that Aita could not institute an action
for liquidated damages once he was paid because, at that time, he was no
longer someone to whom any wages were payable. The Majority rejects this
argument as “not in accord with the statutory scheme or its legislative
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A26002-22
purpose.” Majority at 10. Since I conclude that under the plain language of
the statute, a plaintiff must be due wages at the time of filing a suit pursuant
to the WPCL in order to sustain an action seeking either unpaid wages or
unpaid wages plus liquidated damages, I respectfully dissent.
The crux of the parties’ dispute and my disagreement with the Majority
concerns the statutory interpretation of the WPCL. This Court’s standard of
review for issues involving statutory interpretation is well-settled:
When the question is one of statutory interpretation, our scope of
review is plenary and the standard of review is de novo. Under
the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, our paramount
interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of our General
Assembly in enacting the particular legislation under review. We
are mindful that the object of all statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly
and the best indication of the legislature’s intent is
the plain language of the statute. When the words of a statute
are clear and unambiguous, we may not go beyond the plain
meaning of the language of the statute under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit. [O]nly when the words of the statute are
ambiguous should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent
of the General Assembly[.]
In re D.M.W., 102 A.3d 492, 494 (Pa.Super. 2014) (cleaned up). A term is
ambiguous if, “when read in context with the overall statutory framework in
which it appears, [it] has at least two reasonable interpretations[.]” Snyder
Bros., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 198 A.3d 1056, 1073 (Pa.
2018) (citation omitted). Crucially, “[i]t is axiomatic that in determining
legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in
conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire
-2-
J-A26002-22
statute.” Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa.
2009) (cleaned up).
As is the case in any appeal concerning statutory interpretation, I begin
with the plain language of the statute.1 The pertinent section, § 260.9a, was
added to the WPCL in 1977 to address civil remedies and penalties. It provides
as follows:2
(a) Any employee or group of employees, labor organization or
party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute actions
provided under this act.
(b) Actions by an employee, labor organization, or party to whom
any type of wages is payable to recover unpaid wages and
liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction, by such labor organization, party to whom any type
of wages is payable or any one or more employees for and in
behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent
____________________________________________
1 The Majority begins its analysis with, and places much stock in, the intent
behind the WPCL. See Majority at 6. However, it is axiomatic that the proper
starting point is the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Koken v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 70, 81 (Pa. 2006) (“Generally, the best
indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Thus, it is
well settled that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they
are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” (cleaned
up)). Were I to reach the intent behind the WPCL, however, I would echo this
Court’s prior agreement with the following observation of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals: “This court has also attempted to review the legislative
history of the [WPCL] to further determine the purposes underlying the law.
Unfortunately, there are no substantive remarks included in the history of this
law which would instruct this court.” Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24
A.3d 875, 954 n.25 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Barnhart v. Compugraphic
Corp., 936 F.2d 131, 134 n.5 (3d Cir.1991)).
2The WPCL uses only one “e” at the end of the word employee throughout its
provisions. I modify the text in my discussion to employ the more common
spelling.
-3-
J-A26002-22
or representative to maintain such action or on behalf of all
employees similarly situated. Any such employee, labor
organization, party, or his representative shall have the power to
settle or adjust his claim for unpaid wages.
(c) The employee or group of employees, labor organization or
party to whom any type of wages is payable may, in the
alternative, inform the secretary of the wage claim against an
employer or former employer, and the secretary shall, unless the
claim appears to be frivolous, immediately notify the employer or
former employer of such claim by certified mail. If the employer
or former employer fails to pay the claim or make satisfactory
explanation to the secretary of his failure to do so within ten days
after receipt of such certified notification, thereafter, the employer
or former employer shall be liable for a penalty of ten percent
(10%) of that portion of the claim found to be justly due. A good
faith dispute or contest as to the amount of wages due or the good
faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim shall be
deemed a satisfactory explanation for nonpayment of such
amount in dispute or claimed as a set-off or counter-claim. The
secretary shall have a cause of action against the employer or
former employer for recovery of such penalty and the same may
be included in any subsequent action by the secretary on said
wage claim or may be exercised separately after adjustment of
such wage claim without court action.
(d) In any civil action brought under the provisions of this act, the
Secretary of Labor and Industry may require the employer to post
bond or security to secure payment of the entire claim of the
employee with credit in the amount of any good faith assertion of
a right of set-off or counter-claim. Such bond or security shall be
posted in the court where the civil action is brought. The request
for bond or security shall be signed by the secretary and shall
provide that such bond or security in the amount stated shall be
posted within 30 days of service thereof on the employer. If such
bond or security is not posted within the 30-day period, the
employer will be deemed to have admitted his liability and
execution may immediately ensue.
(e) If the secretary determines that wages due have not been paid
and that such unpaid wages constitute an enforceable claim, the
secretary shall, upon the request of the employee, labor
organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable, take
an assignment in trust, from the requesting party of such claim
-4-
J-A26002-22
for wages without being bound by any of the technical rules
respecting the validity of any such assignments and may bring any
legal action necessary to collect such claim, subject to the right
by the employer to set-off or counter-claim against the assigning
party. Upon any such assignment, the secretary shall have the
power to settle and adjust any such claim to the same extent as
might the assigning party.
(f) The court in any action brought under this section shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow costs for reasonable attorneys’ fees of any nature to be paid
by the defendant.
(g) No administrative proceedings or legal action shall be
instituted under the provisions of this act for the collection of
unpaid wages or liquidated damages more than three years after
the day on which such wages were due and payable as provided
in sections 3 and 5.
43 P.S. § 260.9a (footnote omitted). With respect to liquidated damages, the
WPCL further provides in § 260.10 as follows:
Where wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the regularly
scheduled payday, or, in the case where no regularly scheduled
payday is applicable, for sixty days beyond the filing by the
employee of a proper claim or for sixty days beyond the date of
the agreement, award or other act making wages payable, . . .
and no good faith contest or dispute of any wage claim including
the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim exists
accounting for such non-payment, the employee shall be entitled
to claim, in addition, as liquidated damages an amount equal to
twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount of wages due, or
five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.
43 P.S. § 260.10 (emphasis added).
In applying this statutory scheme to the facts at hand, both parties rely
on this Court’s decision in Yablonski v. Keevican Weiss Bauerle & Hirsch
LLC, 197 A.3d 1234 (Pa.Super. 2018). NCB argues that Yablonski “confirms
that liquidated damages due to an employee are based on the amount of
-5-
J-A26002-22
wages that are owed when the plaintiff is forced to resort to the courts to
recover that which he previously earned.” NCB’s brief at 25. On the other
hand, Aita contends that Yablonski stands for the proposition that once the
violation of the WPCL has occurred, later correction by the employer does not
extinguish the claim for liquidated damages.” Aita’s brief at 7.
The learned Majority does not address Yablonski. I, on the other hand,
find it instructive. In Yablonski, this Court considered, inter alia, the
appropriate amount of liquidated damages where the employer, KWBH, made
partial payments towards the wages that were payable to Yablonski after the
WPCL suit was initiated. KWBH argued that “the trial court erred by awarding
liquidated damages based upon the amount claimed in the amended complaint
because after Yablonski filed the amended complaint, KWBH and Yablonski
entered into a settlement agreement reducing the amount of claimed wages.”
Yablonski, supra at 1241. In other words, KWBH contended that § 260.10
requires that liquidated damages be calculated based upon the amount due,
and since some of the amount due had been paid following initiation of the
suit, the liquidated damages should only be based upon the amount still owed.
Id.
This Court disagreed with KWBH’s argument:
[B]ecause the WPCL provides for liquidated damages when wages
remain unpaid thirty days past payday, paying the May-August
2016 wages in December 2016 did not eliminate KWBH’s liability
pursuant to [§] 260.10. KWBH’s argument ignores the trial
court’s explicit finding that at the time Yablonski filed his
amended complaint, KWBH owed Yablonski all of the
-6-
J-A26002-22
wages he claimed, plus interest. The only reason Yablonski
was not awarded $63,949.91 at trial was because KWBH had
already paid him $7,336.13 prior to trial, but that payment does
not change the fact that $63,949.91 of wages plus interest were
overdue pursuant to [§] 260.10. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in awarding Yablonski 25% of $63,949.61 as liquidated
damages.
Id. at 1242 (citation omitted). Thus, we affirmed the trial court’s award of
liquidated damages for the amount claimed in the complaint because
Yablonski was owed those wages, plus interest, at the time he filed the
complaint. Later payment did not extinguish his entitlement to that relief.
Here, Aita was not owed any wages at the time he filed his complaint.
Indeed, because Aita had already been paid, with interest, at the time he
initiated the instant suit, he solely sought liquidated damages under the WPCL.
The Majority finds that liquidated damages comprise a separate claim apart
from unpaid wages based upon § 260.9a(g), which provides as follows: “No
administrative proceedings or legal action shall be instituted under the
provisions of this act for the collection of unpaid wages or liquidated damages
more than three years after the day on which such wages were due and
payable as provided in sections 3 and 5.”3 43 P.S. § 260.9a(g) (footnote
omitted). I disagree.
____________________________________________
3 The Majority places great weight on the ordinary usage of “or” to support its
conclusion. See Majority at 12. While I believe that reading the WPCL as a
whole provides sufficient clarity on this issue, I note that, if it did not,
ambiguity may arise when “or” is used to separate nouns in a sentence
involving prohibition. See Kenneth A. Adams & Alan S. Kaye, Revisiting the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-7-
J-A26002-22
Reading all sections of the WPCL together, our courts have interpreted
the provisions for civil remedies and liquidated damages such that “the
statute’s liquidated damages provision is available to only a subset of
those prevailing plaintiffs who can also prove that they are entitled to
damages as a result of an employer having no good faith defense to wages
remaining unpaid for a set amount of time under the statute.” Andrews v.
Cross Atl. Cap. Partners, Inc., 158 A.3d 123, 136 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en
banc) (emphasis added). As this Court has explained,
The WPCL is not only a vehicle for recovery of unpaid wages;
it also provides for damages in the event an employer withholds
compensation in the absence of good faith. 43 P.S. § 260.10.
Thus, for instance, if an employer withholds wages based on a
dispute with the employee that would result in a set-off, the
employer’s reliance on the set-off must be held in good-
faith. Id. Otherwise, the employee is entitled to additional,
liquidated damages pursuant to the statute[.]
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565, 574 (Pa.Super. 2006)
(emphases added).
Thus, in context, § 260.9a(g) merely provides that, beyond the statute
of limitations period provided, (1) proceedings shall not be instituted for
unpaid wages withheld in good faith, and (2) proceedings shall not be
instituted for unpaid wages withheld in the absence of good faith and the
commensurate additional liquidated damages. It does not support a separate
____________________________________________
Ambiguity of "And" and "Or" in Legal Drafting, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 1167,
1184 (2006).
-8-
J-A26002-22
cause of action solely for liquidated damages. Indeed, based upon the plain
language of the statute and this Court’s interpretation thereof, to be entitled
to liquidated damages, a plaintiff must first be eligible to file an action
pursuant to the WPCL.4
In determining whether Aita was eligible to file an action under the
WPCL, I again begin with the plain language of the statute. Section 260.9a(a)
provides that actions may be filed under the WPCL by any employee “to whom
any type of wages is payable[.]” 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a). Our courts have not
interpreted “payable” in the WPCL context and our legislature chose not to
include a definition for “payable” within the definitions section of the WPCL.
See 43 P.S. § 260.2a. As observed by the Majority, Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “payable” as “(Of a sum of money or a negotiable instrument) that is
to be paid. . . . An amount may be payable without being due. Debts are
commonly payable long before they fall due.” PAYABLE, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
The Majority posits that “‘payable’ denotes ‘when’ something should be
paid.” Majority at 10 (citation omitted). Based upon this premise, the Majority
____________________________________________
4 While not binding, it bears mentioning that the Department of Labor and
Industry has interpreted the WPCL in the same fashion, namely, as providing
that “[a]ny employee or group of employees, labor organization or party to
whom any type of wages is payable may take legal action to recover wages
due plus liquidated damages.” Summary of the WPCL, Department of Labor
and Industry, https://www.dli.pa.gov/Individuals/Labor-Management-
Relations/llc/Documents/llc-2.pdf (emphasis added).
-9-
J-A26002-22
concludes that “‘to whom any type of wages is payable’ means that an
employee’s wages are payable on his or her regular payday, i.e., once the
statutory grace period has expired, and an action can be maintained for
liquidated damages thereafter.” Id. at 10-11. Indeed, the Majority states,
without citation to any authority, that liquidated damages are available
“regardless of whether they are paid before an action under the WPCL is
filed[.]” Id. at 7.
I cannot agree. Had the legislature intended this interpretation, it could
have written § 260.9a(a) in the past tense, to provide for an action to be
available to any party to whom any type of wages were payable or “had been
payable.” Instead, the legislature chose to write it in the present tense: “Any
employee . . . or party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute
actions provided under this act.” 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the term “payable” must be read in conjunction with the
remainder of the act, which makes it clear that actions may be brought only
when wages remain unpaid as demonstrated by the following pertinent
subsections:
(a) Any employee or group of employees, labor organization or
party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute
actions provided under this act.
(b) Actions by an employee, labor organization, or party to
whom any type of wages is payable to recover unpaid
wages and liquidated damages may be maintained in any
court of competent jurisdiction, by such labor organization,
party to whom any type of wages is payable or any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other
- 10 -
J-A26002-22
employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may
designate an agent or representative to maintain such action or
on behalf of all employees similarly situated. Any such employee,
labor organization, party, or his representative shall have the
power to settle or adjust his claim for unpaid wages.
(c) The employee or group of employees, labor organization or
party to whom any type of wages is payable may, in the
alternative, inform the secretary of the wage claim against an
employer or former employer, and the secretary shall, unless the
claim appears to be frivolous, immediately notify the employer or
former employer of such claim by certified mail. If the employer
or former employer fails to pay the claim or make
satisfactory explanation to the secretary of his failure to do
so within ten days after receipt of such certified notification,
thereafter, the employer or former employer shall be liable for a
penalty of ten percent (10%) of that portion of the claim found to
be justly due. A good faith dispute or contest as to the amount of
wages due or the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or
counter-claim shall be deemed a satisfactory explanation for
nonpayment of such amount in dispute or claimed as a set-off or
counter-claim. The secretary shall have a cause of action against
the employer or former employer for recovery of such penalty and
the same may be included in any subsequent action by the
secretary on said wage claim or may be exercised separately after
adjustment of such wage claim without court action.
(d) In any civil action brought under the provisions of this act, the
Secretary of Labor and Industry may require the employer to
post bond or security to secure payment of the entire claim
of the employee with credit in the amount of any good faith
assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim. Such bond or
security shall be posted in the court where the civil action is
brought. The request for bond or security shall be signed by the
secretary and shall provide that such bond or security in the
amount stated shall be posted within 30 days of service thereof
on the employer. If such bond or security is not posted within the
30-day period, the employer will be deemed to have admitted his
liability and execution may immediately ensue.
(e) If the secretary determines that wages due have not
been paid and that such unpaid wages constitute an
enforceable claim, the secretary shall, upon the request of the
employee, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages
- 11 -
J-A26002-22
is payable, take an assignment in trust, from the requesting party
of such claim for wages without being bound by any of the
technical rules respecting the validity of any such assignments and
may bring any legal action necessary to collect such claim,
subject to the right by the employer to set-off or counter-claim
against the assigning party. Upon any such assignment, the
secretary shall have the power to settle and adjust any such claim
to the same extent as might the assigning party.
43 P.S. § 260.9a (emphases added).
If the WPCL, which has not been amended since 1977, meant to provide
a mechanism for setting forth claims whenever an employee is paid late, it
would stand to reason that such a case would have made its way to our
appellate courts before now. The Majority does not cite any such case, and
my research has revealed none. The passage of nearly fifty years without the
occurrence of any instance where an employee instituted a WPCL action in
our courts after being paid all outstanding late wages suggests the WPCL was
not intended to operate in this fashion and need not do so in order to
accomplish its goals.5
____________________________________________
5 I note that my research revealed two federal cases of limited value. One
case apparently proceeded to trial in federal court based upon a WPCL claim
for liquidated damages where the “[d]efendants had fully paid the claimed
back wages by the time this case was filed, leaving only the propriety of
liquidated damages at issue.” Bair v. Purcell, No. 1:04-CV-1357 (M.D.Pa.
Aug. 17, 2010) (memorandum disposing of plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’
fees). I note that “[w]e are not bound by federal district court opinions
interpreting Pennsylvania law, but may use them for guidance where their
analysis is sound.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Am. Water Co.,
850 A.2d 701, 705 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Indeed, outside
of this sentence, the court does not discuss the propriety of pursuing solely a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 12 -
J-A26002-22
Indeed, this Court has held that “the WPCL is intended to provide a
vehicle for successful plaintiffs to be compensated for unpaid back wages
____________________________________________
liquidated damages claim under the WPCL when no wages are due, and thus
there is no pertinent analysis, sound or otherwise. Accordingly, this case
provides zero guidance on the issue presently before this Court.
The other case of minimal persuasive value is a recent federal decision
addressing whether a plaintiff was barred from adding a WPCL claim to a
lawsuit after the parties had reached a settlement agreement regarding the
underlying breach of contract claim, which included the defendant satisfying
the unpaid back wages. Despite the back wages being satisfied before the
complaint was amended to add the WPCL claims, the court noted that at that
time, plaintiff “was still owed additional salary continuation payments by [the
defendant] such that he was undoubtedly a ‘party to whom any type of wages
is payable.’ Hence, the statute authorizes him to bring an action to ‘recover
unpaid wages and liquidated damages.’” Viancourt v. Paragon Wholesale
Foods Corp., No. CV 20-628 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 31, 2023) (cleaned up). In its
discussion, the court found the plaintiff was not barred from asserting its WPCL
claim for liquidated damages because the defendant did not cite any authority
that a plaintiff can waive a WPCL claim by settling the underlying breach of
contract claim, nor did it present evidence that the parties intended for the
settlement to preclude a WPCL claim, and WPCL claims may not be waived by
private agreement. See id.In its discussion, the Viancourt court noted that the plaintiff cited Bair,
supra in support of his ability to amend the petition to raise a WPCL claim
after having been paid for the back wages. This mere mention of Bair did not
impact the court’s holding in the least bit. Rather, the court held that the
WPCL claim for liquidated damages was not barred because the plaintiff was
authorized to bring a WPCL action as he was still owed other types of wages,
and the settlement regarding the back wages did not bar pursuing a WPCL
claim for liquidated damages pertaining to those back wages. In other words,
the plaintiff was due wages at the time he filed the suit and he could therefore
pursue liquidated damages. Insofar as Viancourt holds any persuasive hold
over this Court, it aligns with my interpretation that a plaintiff must first be
eligible to file an action under the WPCL before seeking liquidated damages.
- 13 -
J-A26002-22
based upon an existing contractual obligation[.]” Andrews, supra at 136;
see also Ely v. Susquehanna Aquacultures, Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 13
(Pa.Super. 2015) (“[T]he primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again
employees whose wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers.”
(cleaned up)); Braun, supra at 897 (“The WPCL is a statute permitting
employees to recover unpaid wages.” (citation omitted)); Belcufine v. Aloe,
112 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The WPCL arms Pennsylvania employees
with a statutory vehicle for the collection of unpaid wages and benefits and
provides for penalties to be imposed for non-compliance.”).
Ascribing to the statutory language of § 260.9a(a) its plain and ordinary
meaning, I find the legislature’s intent is clear and unambiguous. An
employee may file an action under the WPCL if there are any type of wages
payable to him, that is, any type of wages that are “to be paid” to him. See
PAYABLE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Stated yet another way,
an employee may file an action under the WPCL if there are any type of wages
that are outstanding at the time a suit is initiated.
However, if no suit has yet been initiated and an employer pays the
outstanding wages, at that point there are no longer any wages to be paid,
such that the employee is no longer one “to whom any type of wages is
payable[.]” 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a). Indeed, under such circumstances the
employee has been made whole and, thus, no longer needs to resort to the
courts to obtain full payment. See Andrews, supra at 136 (noting that “the
- 14 -
J-A26002-22
WPCL is intended to provide a vehicle for successful plaintiffs to be
compensated for unpaid back wages based upon an existing contractual
obligation”). Phrased simply, wages are not payable if they have already been
paid.
I maintain that my interpretation is consistent with the WPCL’s purpose
while not expanding the scope of the WPCL beyond the relief explicitly
provided. As noted by the Majority, the WPCL requires employers to pay their
employees on time. If an employer fails to do that, an employee may file an
action under the WPCL and, if the employer withheld wages without good
reason, the employee may seek liquidated damages to cover those
unexpected losses incurred as a result of the late payment.
Additionally, the employee will be able to recover attorneys’ fees so that
the award of their unpaid wages will not be immediately lost in paying for the
attorney who brought the claim to obtain those unpaid wages. This mandatory
entitlement to attorneys’ fees is the mechanism by which our legislature
sought to ensure that such employees, i.e., those who have to resort to the
courts in order to be paid, are made whole again. See Grimm v. Universal
Med. Servs., Inc., 156 A.3d 1282, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[T]he primary
goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose wages were
wrongfully withheld by their employers. Consequently, to ensure that
employees who are successful in their actions against an employer are made
whole again, the statute mandates an award of attorneys’ fees in addition to
- 15 -
J-A26002-22
any judgment awarded to a plaintiff.” (cleaned up)); id. at 1291 n.9 (“The
award [of attorneys’ fees] clearly supports the purpose of the WPCL; namely,
permitting [the employee] to collect the severance payment which he was
owed without causing him to incur the costs associated with the collection.”
(cleaned up)). In addition, those employees whose wages were withheld
without a good-faith reason may seek liquidated damages, regardless of
whether the employer pays the wages due after the filing of the WPCL
complaint.
Indeed, the mandatory nature of attorneys’ fees in this context further
supports my interpretation of the term “payable”:
After considering § 260.9a(f) in the context of the entire statute,
keeping in mind the statute’s purpose of protecting employees and
the remedial relief it seeks to provide, we conclude that the
legislature intended a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees for a
plaintiff who prevails on a claim pursued under the Act. This
interpretation is consistent with the general import of the statute,
and goes to the very essence of its goal of making an employee
whole again. Otherwise, employees who are unjustly deprived of
their wages by their employers may be deterred from filing suit
because of burdensome legal costs. Similarly, employees who do
file suit and are successful would be subjected to payment of a
substantial part of their award (which represents earned
compensation) as attorneys’ fees. This would clearly undermine
the intent of the statute; because employees who are unable to
retain their wages will not be made whole. Without an award of
attorneys’ fees the end result would be only a partial recovery
under the statute. Therefore, under the WPCL, an employee who
has prevailed on a claim for past wages due, is entitled to
attorneys’ fees as a matter of entitlement.
Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 674 A.2d 720, 722 (Pa.Super. 1996)
(cleaned up, emphasis added).
- 16 -
J-A26002-22
Accordingly, I would conclude that under the plain language of the
statute, a plaintiff must be due wages at the time of filing a suit pursuant to
the WPCL in order to sustain such an action seeking either unpaid wages or
unpaid wages plus liquidated damages. If the legislature had intended for the
WPCL to provide a cause of action for any time an employee was paid in an
untimely manner, it could have done so. However, it did not choose language
that did so, and it is beyond our purview to look past the plain the language
of the statute to expand the scope of the WPCL to provide for such a cause of
action.
Consequently, insofar as the court granted Aita’s motion for summary
judgment and denied NCB’s motion for summary judgment based on this
expansion of the scope of the WPCL, I believe it erred. Since it is undisputed
that no wages were payable to Aita at the time he filed the instant suit under
the WPCL, I would conclude as a matter of law he was not entitled to relief
under the WPCL, and the trial court should have then granted NCB’s motion
for summary judgment and denied Aita’s motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand for the
court to enter judgment in favor of NCB and against Aita on the WPCL claim.
In light of this disposition, I would not reach NCB’s remaining claims on appeal
nor the issue raised in Aita’s cross-appeal.
- 17 -