Adoption of: N.C.H., Appeal of: T.M.H.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: N.C.H., MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.M.H., THE MOTHER :
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: No. 1335 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 17, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-00052
IN THE MATTER OF: THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: P.G.T.H., MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.M.H., MOTHER :
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: No. 1336 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 17, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 52 In Adoption 2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: June 23, 2023
T.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees dated October 13, 2022, and
entered October 17, 2022, in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas,
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her son, N.C.H., born in
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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January 2022, and her daughter, P.G.T.H., born in June 2020 (collectively,
“the Children”).1 Further, counsel for Mother, Emily M. Merski, Esquire
(“Counsel”), has filed petitions to withdraw and briefs pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).2 After review, we grant the petitions to withdraw and
affirm the termination decrees.
Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“the Agency”) obtained
emergency protective custody of P.G.T.H. on July 2, 2021, due to concerns
regarding the family’s homelessness, as well as Mother’s untreated mental
health and substance abuse, and placed P.G.T.H. in kinship care. See Order
(Emergency Protective Custody), 7/2/21. The court adjudicated P.G.T.H.
dependent on July 16, 2021, and maintained her commitment and placement.
See Recommendation for Adjudication and Disposition, 7/16/21, at 1-2.
During P.G.T.H.’s dependency, Mother gave birth to N.C.H., who was declared
dependent in March 2022, shortly after his birth.
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1 By separate decrees, also dated October 13, 2022, and entered October 17,
2022, the court terminated the parental rights of N.C.H.’s and P.G.T.H.’s
respective fathers, C.L.J. and K.R.L. Neither father filed a separate appeal,
and neither are a participating party to the instant appeals.
2 This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from decrees
involuntarily terminating parental rights in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275
(Pa. Super. 1992).
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On July 27, 2022, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary
termination of parental rights as to the Children.3 Specifically, the Agency
sought termination as to N.C.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (6), and (b), while requesting termination regarding P.G.T.H. pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held a
hearing on the petitions on October 13, 2022, wherein Mother, who arrived
late, was represented by counsel. N.C.H. and P.G.T.H., then nine months and
twenty-eight months old, respectively, were represented by Steven George,
Esquire.4 The Agency presented the testimony of caseworker Kayla Stewart
and introduced Exhibits 1 through 14, which were admitted into the record
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3The Agency filed an amended termination petition as to N.C.H. on August
17, 2022. Upon review, we do not discern any distinction.
4 Attorney George, the Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) in the underlying
dependency proceedings, was appointed to serve as legal counsel on August
1, 2022. Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua sponte
that the court appointed counsel to represent a child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2313(a), and if counsel served in a dual role, that the court determined
before appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s best and legal
interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020).
However, if a child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the
outcome of the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and
best interests, and a child’s subsection 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by
an attorney- GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s best
interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018). At the hearing,
Attorney George indicated that the Children were “too young to express a
preference as to what their preferred outcome is.” N.T., 10/13/22, at 37. As
such, we conclude that their statutory right to counsel was satisfied by the
dual appointment of Attorney George.
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without objection. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 4. Finally, Mother testified on her
own behalf.
Pursuant to decrees dated October 13, 2022, and entered October 17,
2022, the court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights as to N.C.H.
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), and (b), and terminated
Mother’s parental rights as to P.G.T.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed timely notices of appeal in both cases. In
lieu of a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Counsel
submitted accompanying statements of intention to file an Anders brief
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).5 See re J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa.
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5 Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) provides:
(c) Remand.
...
(4) If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal case
pursuant to Anders/Santiago or if counsel intends to seek to
withdraw in a post-conviction relief appeal pursuant
to Turner/Finley, counsel shall file of record and serve on the
judge a statement of intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a
Statement. If the appellate court believes there are arguably
meritorious issues for review, those issues will not be waived;
instead, the appellate court shall remand for the filing and service
of a Statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), a supplemental
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), or both. Upon remand, the
trial court may, but is not required to, replace an appellant’s
counsel.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
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Super. 2009) (holding that the decision of counsel to follow Pa.R.A.P.
1925(c)(4) procedure in a termination of parental rights case was proper).
This Court subsequently consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte on and the
orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 9, 2023.
Counsel filed petitions to withdraw, as well as Anders briefs, in both
cases. By order of February 14, 2023, this Court vacated the existing briefing
schedule and struck Counsel’s Anders brief and directed Counsel to file briefs
that comply with all of the relevant procedural and substantive requirements
of Anders and Santiago, or submit advocate’s briefs on or before February
21, 2023. On February 16, 2023, Counsel filed new Anders briefs and
petitions to withdraw.6
When counsel files an Anders brief, this Court may not review the
merits of the appeal without first addressing counsel’s request to withdraw.
See Commonwealth v. Washington, 63 A.3d 797, 800 (Pa. Super. 2013).
To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:
1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
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6Despite the consolidation of Mother’s appeals and the orphans’ court filing of
a singular Rule 1925(a) opinion, Counsel filed separate Anders briefs and
petitions to withdraw.
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Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citation omitted). Counsel must also “attach to their petition to
withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their
rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following requirements
for Anders briefs:
counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history
and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the
record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set
forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Instantly, Counsel filed petitions to withdraw certifying her conscientious
review of the record and determination that Mother’s appeals are frivolous.
Counsel further attached copies of Millisock letters informing Mother of her
rights with respect to her petitions. Likewise, Counsel has filed Anders briefs
that substantially comply with the requirements set forth in Santiago,
supra.7 While we note with displeasure Counsel’s failure to cite to the certified
record, we remain cognizant that the framework of Anders and Santiago
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7 Mother has not responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw
and Anders/Santiago brief. Further, the Agency filed letter briefs with this
Court joining in the opinion of the orphans’ court.
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require substantial, not perfect performance. See Commonwealth v.
Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Having concluded that Counsel complied with the procedural
requirements of Anders/Santiago, we must next “conduct a review of the
record to ascertain if on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel,
intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188
A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).
Counsel raises challenges as to the sufficiency of the evidence in the
Anders briefs. Counsel’s Anders brief as to N.C.H. presents the following
issues:
A. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), & (6)]?
B. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?
Anders Brief (N.C.H.) at 3 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers
omitted).
Similarly, Counsel’s Anders brief as to P.G.T.H. presents the following
issues:
A. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), & (8)]?
B. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
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parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?
Anders Brief (P.G.T.H.) at 3 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested
answers omitted).
We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,
which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of
whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When
applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings
of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may
not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or
abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021)
(citation omitted). An abuse of discretion in this context exists only upon
“demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section
2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the
conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if the
court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination under
Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section
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2511(b), which involves an assessment of a child’s needs and welfare. See In
re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental
rights, the petitioner must prove grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b)
by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct,
weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,
255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental
rights to N.C.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), and (b),
and, likewise, terminated her parental rights to P.G.T.H. pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm a termination
of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one
subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). Instantly, we will analyze the court’s
termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
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...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), we have
indicated that
the following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). Parental incapacity is not limited to affirmative misconduct. See In
re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021). “To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” Id. (citations omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities.” Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As such, “A parent’s vow to cooperate, after
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a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re S.C.,
247 A.3d at 1105 (citation omitted).
In concluding that CYS satisfied the statutory grounds to terminate
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to, inter alia, Section 2511(a)(2), the
orphans’ court emphasized Mother’s failure to complete those goals aimed at
reunification and services offered. The court stated:
A review of the evidence details a mother either incapable
or refusing, or both, to take an active role in seeking the return of
her children. All the programs designed specifically to address
[Mother]’s personal and parenting deficiencies were rejected by
her. [M]other continues to deny a drug or alcohol problem even
though she tested positive prior to a court hearing after she
requested the test. [Mother] was unwilling to participate in
random drug testing and refused on 103 occasions to show up.
Her excuse-she was “angry[,”] even though that refusal meant
she could not visit her baby. The simplest way to alleviate the
invalid concerns over drug use, as [Mother] characterized them,
was to attend the testing to prove the Agency wrong. [Mother]
refused.
[Mother] complained her treatment programs were
overwhelming and that no one person could do all that was
ordered and succeed. There were numerous components of the
plans. However, [M]other just got “angry” and did nothing. The
plans were implemented to put her in a position to parent two
children safely. There are innumerable challenges to parenting
young children. The treatment plans were developed so [Mother]
would have the mental stability, a drug free life, and stable
environment to meet [] all those challenges. Support systems
were offered in order to put [M]other on a path to achieving the
return and safe upbringing of her young children. [Mother]’s
response-it’s too much so I’m going to do nothing.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/9/23, at 14.
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A review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds
for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Significantly, the record reveals
that Mother has a history of unstable housing, unresolved substance abuse,
and untreated mental illness. Stewart testified that P.G.T.H. came into the
Agency’s care in July 2021 due to these specific issues. See N.T., 10/13/22,
at 6. Thereafter, N.C.H. also came into care in February 2022, after Mother
tested positive for methamphetamines at a court hearing on February 16,
2022. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 9, 33.
Throughout the underlying dependency matters, Mother missed over
100 total requested urine screens. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 8, 33, 35; see also
Exhibit 13 (urine screens). Further, although Mother obtained mental health
and drug and alcohol assessments, she failed to follow through with suggested
treatments as she only attended two follow-up appointments thereafter. See
N.T., 10/13/22, at 11, 13, 26, 28. In addressing her failure to comply with
and submit to urine screens as requested, Mother acknowledged her serial
failures and indicated that she was angry and overwhelmed. See N.T.,
10/13/22, at 24, 27, 33, 35.
While the record reveals a period of compliance and negative screens,
from October 26, 2021, to January 12, 2022, the Agency was then unable to
corroborate her lack of substance use due to her lack of testing. See Exhibit
13 (urine screens); see also Exhibit 8 (Court Summary (6/8/22)), at 14.
Furthermore, Mother missed over 40 urine screens since February 16, 2022,
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alone. See Exhibit 13 (urine screens); see also N.T., 10/13/22, at 8, 33-35.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding her
compliance had not improved.
As such, Stewart testified, “[Mother] has not secured stable housing. . .
. [S]he has still untreated and unstable mental health and has not [sought]
sobriety.” N.T., 10/13/22, at 13; see also id. at 14. Further, Stewart averred
that Mother flatly refused the Agency’s efforts to assist her in obtaining help
with her substance abuse and mental health issues. See id. at 18.
Moreover, Mother declined all accountability and denied the existence of
any substance abuse issues. Mother testified:
Q. Ma’am, I guess, can you help shed some light. Is it your
position that you never had a drug problem or that -- I guess, just
let me ask that. Do you have a drug and alcohol problem?
A. I don’t. I have done drugs. I did have an alcohol problem in
2016.
Q. While this case was open, did [you] have a drug and alcohol
problem?
A. No.
Q. So your assertions are that, though it was a basis for your
children being removed, drug use concerns, those were never
valid and you never had any drug use concerns?
A. No. . . .
Id. at 32. Relatedly, Mother denied she was using drugs in February 2022,
despite testing positive for methamphetamines, incredulously blaming
P.G.T.H.’s father. Mother stated, “[T]he week of the court hearing, I have
numerous messages from [P.G.T.H.’s father] stating that that was going to
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happen and that my son was going to be taken because of it. So. . . . I feel
like he had everything to do with it[.]” Id. at 25.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court
in concluding that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) is warranted
with respect to the Children. Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity due
to unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues is evident from the
face of the record, which caused the Children to be without essential parental
care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being.
Further, given Mother’s refusal to acknowledge these concerns, it is evident
that the conditions and causes of Mother’s incapacity cannot or will not be
remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. We remain
mindful that, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts
to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The
court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for
permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under
Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re T.S.M., 71
A.3d at 267. The emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly
interpreted to include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.
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See id. The determination of the child’s needs and welfare requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. Id. The
utmost attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. Id.
The evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an easy task. “In cases
where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is
reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis,
therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). Nevertheless, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment
of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination
petition.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In weighing the bond considerations
pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood
ever in mind.” Id. at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years,
and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When
courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted
children.” Id.
Moreover,
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while a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the trial court recognized the lack of a bond between Mother and
the Children. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/9/23, at 15. The court stated:
[T]he testimony provided by Kayla Stewart, the Agency’s
evidence, and [M]other’s attitude expressed in her testimony,
established that there is no parental bond between [M]other and
[the C]hildren. The [C]hildren are in [a] good, stable home and
have bonded well with the potential adoptive parents. The
termination of [Mother]’s parental rights is in the best interest of
[the Children] consistent with the guidelines established in 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (b).
Id.
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The record supports the
finding that the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare favor termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See
T.S.M., supra at 267.
Significantly, as noted supra, Mother had no visits with N.C.H. following
his removal. See N.T., 10/13/22, at 11-12. Further, while Mother participated
in fourteen total visits with P.G.T.H. through JusticeWorks from November
2021 through May 2022, see Exhibit 14 (JusticeWorks reports), following the
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court changing the Children’s permanency goals to adoption in June 2022, the
Agency was no longer required to offer any services, including visitation, see
Permanency Review Orders, 6/13/22. Stewart testified that there have been
no negative effects since the Children stopped having contact with Mother.
See N.T., 10/13/22, at 21.
Moreover, Stewart testified that the Children were placed together in a
pre-adoptive foster home where they were doing “exceptionally well.” Id. at
12. She indicated that N.C.H. was in a “tracking program to ensure that he
develops appropriately.” Id. Nevertheless, she stated, “[h]e’s thriving. He’s
gaining weight. He’s starting to crawl, figure out those movements.” Id.
Stewart also noted that P.G.T.H. was adjusting well to daycare. Id. As
a result, she opined that it was in the Children’s best interests for Mother’s
parental rights to be involuntarily terminated. See id. at 12-14. She further
testified that there would be no negative consequences to the Children. See
id. at 13-14. Accordingly, the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that termination best serves the Children’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Based on the foregoing independent analysis of the orphans’ court’s
termination of Mother’s parental rights, we agree with Counsel that the appeal
from the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2) and (b) is wholly frivolous and our review of the record does not
reveal any overlooked non-frivolous issues.
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Counsel’s petitions to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2023
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