Com. v. Pratt, J.

J-S14021-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JHENEA PRATT :
:
Appellant : No. 1060 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 10, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0013630-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 6, 2023
Appellant, Jhenea Pratt, appeals from the post-conviction court’s August
10, 2022 order denying her timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.
The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not pertinent to her
instant appeal. We need only note that on June 4, 2019, a jury convicted
Appellant of involuntary manslaughter, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504, and endangering
the welfare of a child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1), based on evidence that her
infant daughter died of fentanyl poisoning while in Appellant’s care. Former
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark Tranquilli presided over
Appellant’s jury trial. Tranquilli also presided over Appellant’s sentencing
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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hearing on September 25, 2019. There, Tranquilli imposed an aggravated-
range sentence of 5 to 10 years’ incarceration.
Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, solely arguing that Tranquilli had
abused his discretion by imposing an aggravated-range sentence despite the
substantial mitigating evidence Appellant had presented. See
Commonwealth v. Pratt, No. 1769 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum
at *4 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 22, 2020). We disagreed, quoting Tranquilli’s
lengthy discussion of his reasons for Appellant’s sentence, id. at 11-16, and
concluding that Tranquilli had considered all the requisite, statutory factors
and “did not impose an unreasonable sentence….” Id. at 16. Accordingly,
we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s subsequent petition for allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Pratt, 240 A.3d 952 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 256 A.3d 420 (Pa. 2021).
On July 7, 2021, Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition underlying her
present appeal. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended
petition on Appellant’s behalf. Therein, Appellant asserted that Tranquilli had
been racially biased in sentencing her. In support, she attached to her petition
a “[c]omplaint filed by the Court of Judicial Discipline at 4 JD 2020, which cites
instances of prejudicial[ and/or] racial bias” by Tranquilli. Amended PCRA
Petition, 11/29/21, at 6. Appellant also attached a “Stipulation and Waiver
filed by … Tranquilli, wherein he stipulated to the facts alleged in the
Complaint[,]” as well as a “November 19, 2020, Order of the Court of Judicial
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Discipline which adopted the stipulations as findings of fact and imposed
sanctions.” Id. Appellant alleged that these documents “[e]stablish that
[she] proceeded to sentencing before a Judge who, in all probability, is racially
biased. This racial bias prevented … Tranquilli from presiding over
[Appellant’s] sentencing in an impartial manner.” Id. at 7. Accordingly,
Appellant insisted that her “sentence … was the result of bias and must be
vacated.” Id.1 Appellant also claimed that her trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to argue (and/or preserve in a post-sentence motion) that she was
eligible for the Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive Act (RRRI), and that her
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.
Id. at 10-11.
On July 20, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of
its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a
response, but on August 10, 2022, the court issued an order dismissing her
petition. She filed a timely notice of appeal, and she timely complied with the
PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. The PCRA court subsequently issued a “Statement
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1 We note that Appellant stated her claim was cognizable under the PCRA
because her “sentence resulted from a constitutional due process violation
which so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Amended PCRA
Petition at 5. She also maintained that she could not have asserted Tranquilli’s
“judicial bias and inherent prejudice … until after the Judicial Review Board
proceedings were concluded. Thus, [Appellant] could[ not] have raised the
claim involving Tranquilli until this collateral attack.” Id.
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in Lieu of Opinion” declaring that it was relying on the reasons set forth in its
Rule 907 notice for denying Appellant’s petition.
Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:
I. The PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying relief because [Appellant]
was denied due process where the presiding trial judge at
[s]entencing was not impartial, and the unreasonable
sentence imposed was the result of judicial bias.
II. The PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying relief where sentencing
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that [Appellant]
was RRRI eligible, and for failing to raise this issue in post-
sentence motions or on direct appeal.
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Initially, we note that:
“In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA
relief, an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the
record supports the determination of the PCRA court and whether
the ruling is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, …
966 A.2d 523, 532 ([Pa.] 2009). We pay great deference to the
findings of the PCRA court, “but its legal determinations are
subject to our plenary review.” Id.Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Appellant first contends that the PCRA court erred in dismissing her
petition because “she was sentenced in a courtroom where judicial bias was
established after her direct appeal was concluded.” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
In support, she points to the documents attached to her PCRA petition, which
she claims demonstrate that Tranquilli “harbored a fixed bias regarding illegal
drugs and people of color that he assumes deal in drugs….” Id. at 16.
Because she is a woman of color and her case involved illegal narcotics,
Appellant insists that “[t]here is no doubt … [she] proceeded to sentencing
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before a [j]udge who, in all probability, was racially biased” and impartial. Id.
at 14.
As evidence of Tranquilli’s alleged bias, Appellant points to his statement
at sentencing that if she were “granted probation, there would be an undue
risk during that period of probation that [she] would commit another crime.”
Id. at 15-16 (citing N.T. Sentencing, 9/25/19, at 12). Given the fact that
Appellant had a zero prior record score and had never served or violated a
term of probation, she insists that “[t]he conclusion that [she] was a person
to be considered unduly risky to commit another crime while on probation was
based upon the sentencing judge’s biased mindset toward a person of color”
and/or the fact that her crimes involved narcotics. Id. at 16.
Appellant also minimizes the fact that this Court reviewed her sentence
on direct appeal. She stresses that on direct appeal, she argued that “the
sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion in light of substantial mitigating
evidence[,]” and “[t]he prior Superior Court panel was not asked to consider
whether … [Tranquilli] was biased, nor whether the sentence imposed was
impacted by [his] bias.” Id. at 16-17. In sum, Appellant maintains that
“Tranquilli’s actions while on the bench were so extreme that he failed to
promote public confidence in the judiciary, and failed to avoid impropriety.”
Id. at 17. Thus, she concludes that her “aggravated range sentence must be
vacated because it was imposed under circumstances that shakes one’s
confidence in the integrity of the proceedings.” Id. at 18.
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In assessing Appellant’s arguments, we have reviewed the
Commonwealth’s responsive brief, the certified record, and the applicable law.
We have also considered the well-reasoned discussion set forth by the
Honorable Bruce R. Beemer of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
in his Rule 907 notice. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 7/20/21, at 2-6. For the
reasons set forth by Judge Beemer, we agree that Appellant’s first issue is
meritless.2 Additionally, we adopt Judge Beemer’s sound rationale for
dismissing Appellant’s second issue, in which she claims that her trial and
appellate attorneys were ineffective for not arguing that she is eligible for the
RRRI program. See id. at 6-9. Therefore, we affirm the PCRA court’s order
denying her petition.
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2 We note, however, that we agree that Appellant would be entitled to a new
sentencing hearing if the underlying due process claim were established. See
generally Commonwealth v. Koehler, 229 A.3d 915, 929-932 (Pa. 2020).
However, the core flaw in her position is that Tranquilli’s bias in an unrelated
case does not establish bias in this case. For example, in 1997 the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s office released a videotape of a training given
by one of its assistant district attorneys, “which instructed prosecutors to
manipulate the jury selection process in order to minimize the seating of
African–American jurors[.]” Commonwealth v. Rollins, 738 A.2d 435, 443
n.10 (Pa. 1999). However, “the existence of the tape does not demonstrate
that there was discrimination in his case.” Id. (italicized emphasis in original;
bolded emphasis added). Similarly, the fact that Tranquilli exhibited bias
against another defendant does not establish bias in this case. The fact that
a panel of our Court discerned no abuse of discretion in imposing the
aggravated range sentence does not, of course, foreclose the existence of bias
on Tranquilli’s part. But the independent review and identification of an
adequate basis to support the sentence undermines Appellant’s implicit
assertion that the only possible explanation for the aggravated-range
sentence is racial bias.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/6/2023
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