Com. v. Shower, T., Jr.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TONY BRENT SHOWER, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1248 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 5, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-67-CR-0007642-2018
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JUNE 7, 2023
Appellant, Tony Brent Shower, Jr., appeals from the order denying his
first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)1 alleging claims
of ineffective assistance by the attorneys who represented him at his jury trial
and on direct appeal. We affirm.
This Court previously set forth the following summary of the evidence
presented at trial:
On November 22, 2016, a van struck and killed four-year-old D.W.
in front of her home in Hanover Borough, York County. The van’s
driver did not stop at the scene of the accident. . .
At trial, Natalie Meckley (Meckley), D.W.’s older half-sister,
testified that she drove to York with two of her friends and D.W.
on the day of the accident. When the group returned just after
7:00 p.m., Meckley parked across the street from her parents’
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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home. Meckley saw a van “fly past” in the opposite direction as
she got out of the car, unaware that D.W. was no longer in the
backseat. Meckley then heard a “loud noise” that she described
as “an impact sound.” At first, she thought that the van hit a
“trash can or something.” However, when she saw D.W. laying in
the roadway, Meckley realized that the van had struck her sister
and rushed inside her parents’ home to get help.
Matthew Markle (Markle), a neighbor down the street, testified
that he heard a “loud crunch” and thought it was a garbage can.
Turning toward the noise, Markle saw a white utility van driving
toward him and noticed that it had a roof rack with a ladder.
Despite it being dark out, Markle saw that the van’s driver was a
white male with a dark “scruffy beard or goatee” and had no
passenger with him.
Sergeant Matthew Waltersdorff was the first to arrive. After an
ambulance left with D.W., he secured the scene and began
reconstructing the accident. Based on his review, he made several
findings. First, there were no skid marks on the road, suggesting
that the driver did not take any evasive actions or brake before or
after the accident. Second, there was a trail of blood on the road
that included several smears typical of a person being dragged by
a vehicle. By mapping the blood marks, Sergeant Waltersdorff
determined that the van dragged D.W. over three car lengths from
the area of impact to the final resting place. Finally, using footage
from a neighbor’s security camera, Sergeant Waltersdorff
determined that the van was going 22 miles per hour just before
the accident.
Within minutes of the accident, the police issued a “be on the
lookout” (BOLO) for the van. Officer John Carbaugh testified that
he was on patrol in a neighboring township when he saw a van
matching the BOLO around 7:30 p.m. After pulling over the van,
Officer Carbaugh questioned the driver, Stephen Gambal
(Gambal) and his passenger, Shower. Gambal was evasive at first
in answering questions. However, when the officer told him the
reason for the stop, Gambal became more relaxed and denied
being in an accident. After finding no fresh damage on the van,
Officer Carbaugh released Gambal and Shower. A few hours later,
however, the police pulled over Gambal again. Gambal was in the
van by himself and had crack cocaine and drug paraphernalia.
After failing field sobriety tests, he was arrested for DUI and drug
possession. As a result, the police towed his van and inspected it
again. This time, the police found blond hair in the driver’s side
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headlight, leading to a search warrant for the van; DNA testing of
the hair later matched it to D.W., confirming that Gambal’s van
was involved in the accident.
Lieutenant Scott James, a detective with the District Attorney’s
office, testified about the damage to the van. First, there was a
long scratch on the front bumper that, according to him, matched
the zipper on the jacket D.W. was wearing at the time of the
accident. He also found several distinct marks on the bumper that
he believed were “finger marks” and an apparent fabric transfer
pattern on the van, explaining that such transfers are common
when a person is struck by a vehicle and their clothing pattern is
visible on the car. Moving to the front grill, he testified that the
driver’s side portion was pushed in while the passenger’s side
stuck out. Additionally, after he removed the grill, he discovered
that there were several pieces of plastic that had broken off and
were missing. When he then removed the headlight, he
discovered the plastic pieces. In his view, the accident caused
this damage, stating that he would not have expected to find the
loose pieces if the damage had not been recent.
. . . Gambal [then] recounted what happened the day of the
accident[, testifying] that he was a contractor and that Shower
worked for him. On the morning of the accident, he picked up
Shower in his van and drove to a job site in Hanover. At the site,
the two smoked crack cocaine together. The two then drove to
Baltimore to get more crack cocaine. After doing so, the two
returned to Pennsylvania in the afternoon but soon drove back to
Baltimore, this time buying crack cocaine and heroin. While there,
Shower ingested the heroin.
The two left Baltimore around 5 or 5:30 p.m. As they drove home,
Shower took over driving because he wanted to go to his
methadone clinic. When he realized the clinic was closed, Shower
drove back to Hanover and wanted to get more drugs. Because
he needed to go alone to get the drugs, Shower dropped Gambal
off at a local bar and drove off in the van.
According to Gambal, Shower came back about 20 minutes later.
As soon as he returned, Shower told Gambal that he needed to
drive the van. Gambal assumed Shower had drugs on him and
took over driving the van. Not long after, however, the police
pulled the van over. Gambal recalled he was nervous at first but
was fine after the police told him the reason for the stop. After
the police released them, Shower wanted to go home. As they
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drove, the two did not discuss what happened. When they finally
arrived, Shower got out of the van without waiting for Gambal to
come to a complete stop. . . Gambal then went back to Baltimore
to get more crack cocaine before returning to Pennsylvania and
being arrested.
The Commonwealth’s final witness was the lead investigator,
Officer Jared Auman. In October 2018, he re-interviewed Mathew
Markle about seeing the van’s driver after the accident. Officer
Auman showed Markle two photo arrays—one with Gambal in it,
the other with Shower in it. Markle made no identification in the
first array that included Gambal. In the second array, however,
Markle selected four individuals as possibly being the driver,
including Shower.
Officer Auman further testified about Shower’s post-accident
statements. Shower gave his first statement the day after the
accident. In that statement, he claimed that he was asleep while
Gambal drove the van and that he never heard anything. Officer
Auman re-interviewed Shower in May 2017 after obtaining a
prison phone call in which Gambal told his mother that Shower
dropped him off to get drugs. Shower again denied that he drove
the van the night of the accident. In August 2017, however,
Shower reached out to the police to give a third statement.
Though he still denied driving the van, Shower now claimed that
he heard a thud while Gambal was driving. When Shower asked
what happened, Gambal responded that he hit something.
Gambal then pulled over farther down the road. According to
Shower, Gambal was “pale white” and said, “I believe I just hit a
kid.”
Commonwealth v. Shower, No. 1071 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 2395955, *1-3
(Pa. Super. filed June 9, 2021) (unpublished memorandum).
For the purpose of our present analysis, we additionally highlight the
evidence at trial specifically touching upon Appellant’s drug use and
intoxication on the date of the accident. As discussed above, Gambal testified
that he and Appellant smoked crack cocaine when they first arrived at the
construction site in the morning, the two then smoked crack cocaine during a
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morning excursion to Baltimore, and they smoked crack cocaine again when
they visited Baltimore in the afternoon; Appellant also used heroin
intravenously during the afternoon trip. N.T. Trial at 389-95, 428. According
to Gambal, after returning to Pennsylvania, Appellant left Gambal at a bar and
drove in Gambal’s van to buy more drugs in Hanover, returning 20 minutes
later. Id. at 399-405, 430.
Upon Appellant’s return, Gambal then drove away with Appellant in the
passenger seat, but they were pulled over just after leaving the bar. Id. at
406-07, 244-45. Officer Carbaugh initiated the traffic stop at 7:30 p.m.,
approximately 21 minutes after the crash that caused D.W.’s death. Id. at
242-46. During the traffic stop, Officer Carbaugh concluded that Appellant
“was extremely intoxicated” after observing Appellant seated in the passenger
seat and attempting to have a conversation with him. Id. at 248-51. Officer
Carbaugh related that Appellant was “very difficult to speak with, very difficult
to get words out of him at the time,” and he kept repeating to the officer
“aren’t you cold, aren’t you cold.” Id. at 251. Officer Carbaugh stated that
the only information he obtained from Appellant in response to questions
about whether he had driven in the vicinity of the scene of the accident was
Appellant’s statement that he and Gambal had traveled to Maryland to obtain
methadone. Id. at 251-52, 265.
Finally, we note that Officer Jared Aumen, the lead investigator who
spoke with Appellant on several occasions during the course of the
investigation, testified that Appellant stated during a November 15, 2018
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interview that the reason that his account was shifting during the course of
the interviews was because he was “high as shit and it was coming back to
[him] in pieces.” Id. at 501-02.
Following trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of accidents involving
death or personal injury and driving under the influence (DUI)—controlled
substances.2 The trial court then sentenced Appellant to serve 5 to 10 years’
imprisonment for accidents involving death or personal injury and a
consecutive 1 to 5 years’ imprisonment for DUI, resulting in a 6-to-15-year
aggregate sentence. On direct appeal, we first rejected Appellant’s claim that
there was insufficient evidence to show that he knew or should have known
that he was involved in an accident that resulted in death or personal injury.
Id. at *3-5. Addressing his second claim that he was not given proper credit
for 415 days he spent in pre-trial detention, we vacated Appellant’s judgment
of sentence and remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether this
time should be allocated to his sentence on the instant charges or towards a
probation violation on a prior case. Id. at *5-6.
On September 20, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. On
September 21, 2021, the trial court held a hearing and then issued an order
that same day reimposing the term of imprisonment discussed above and
crediting the 415 days towards the sentence in the instant case. On October
25, 2021, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant. On July
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2 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3742(a) and 3802(d)(2), respectively.
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14, 2022, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition, raising the ineffective
assistance of counsel issue that is the subject of this appeal. A hearing was
held on August 5, 2022, at which Appellant’s trial counsel, Eric White, Esquire
(trial counsel), and direct appeal counsel, Brian McNeil, Esquire (appellate
counsel), testified. On the same date as the hearing, the PCRA court entered
an order denying Appellant relief under the PCRA. Appellant then filed this
timely appeal.3
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the PCRA court erred in denying postconviction collateral
relief based on the claim that trial counsel and/or appellate
counsel was ineffective for failure to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence at trial, and to support the guilty verdict, to establish
that Appellant[] was under the influence of a drug, or combination
of drugs, to a degree that impaired his ability to safely
drive/operate the vehicle for the offense of driving under the
influence of controlled substances 75 Pa.[C.S. §] 3802(d)(2)?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Prior to reaching the merits of this appeal, we must address whether
the PCRA court had jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Pursuant to the PCRA, a petition “shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes
final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
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3 In compliance with the PCRA court’s directive, Appellant filed a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal on September 22, 2022. The
PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 31, 2022.
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Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).
Appellant filed his pro se PCRA petition on September 20, 2021, the day
before the trial court entered its order addressing the proper computation of
Appellant’s time-credit for pre-trial detention, the issue to be addressed on
remand from our decision in Appellant’s direct appeal. Therefore, on the date
Appellant filed his pro se petition there was no judgment of sentence in effect,
as we had vacated the original judgment of sentence in our decision on direct
appeal. See Shower, 2021 WL 2395955, *6.
Clearly, Appellant’s September 20, 2021 pro se PCRA petition was
premature as he did not wait until a new judgment of sentence was imposed,
let alone until it became final upon the expiration of the time period for seeking
direct review. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (appeal
from judgment of sentence must be taken within 30 days); Commonwealth
v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019) (when a timely direct
appeal is not filed, the one-year period for filing a PCRA petition “commences
upon the actual expiration of the time period allowed for seeking direct review,
as specified in the PCRA”) (citation omitted). A premature PCRA petition is a
legal nullity, over which a court of common pleas lacks authority to consider.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 244 A.3d 13, 17 (Pa. Super. 2020). As this Court
has explained, the proper course for a court facing a premature PCRA petition
is to dismiss the petition without prejudice to allow the petitioner the
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opportunity to file a petition once the time for direct appeal has expired. Id.
at 16-17; Commonwealth v. Seay, 814 A.2d 1240, 1241 (Pa. Super. 2003).
In the present case, the PCRA court did not dismiss Appellant’s
premature petition. Nevertheless, while the pro se petition is a nullity, we
conclude that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the PCRA court
properly addressed Appellant’s claims for PCRA relief. On October 25, 2021,
following Appellant’s premature petition and after Appellant’s 30-day appeal
period had run, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant in
the PCRA proceeding.4 Appellant’s appointed counsel then filed a petition on
his behalf on July 14, 2022, which was within one year of the date that his
September 21, 2021 judgment of sentence became final. 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(3). Thus, while improperly titled an amended petition as the original
petition had no legal effect, the July 14, 2022 petition constituted a timely first
petition on Appellant’s behalf. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); see also
Commonwealth v. Kubis, 808 A.2d 196, 198, 201 & n.4 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(premature petition was not cognizable under PCRA and therefore
subsequently filed counseled petition constituted first petition). Accordingly,
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4 The Rules of Criminal Procedure direct that counsel is to be appointed when
a petitioner files a first PCRA petition. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C), Comment.
Because Appellant’s premature petition was a legal nullity, his right to
assistance of counsel was thus not yet triggered. See Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 458 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (noting that the
rule-based right to counsel attaches when the petitioner files a first PCRA
petition). However, appointment of counsel was not improper as a PCRA court
has the discretion to appoint counsel to represent a defendant “whenever the
interests of justice require it.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(E), Comment.
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the PCRA court was not without jurisdiction when it ruled on Appellant’s claims
set forth in his counseled, timely PCRA petition. Cf. Smith, 244 A.3d at 15-
17 (quashing appeal from dismissal of PCRA relief where pro se petition was
filed while direct appeal was pending, appointed counsel filed petition to
withdraw and no-merit letter after appeal became final, and petition was
dismissed after Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice was provided). We therefore may
proceed to address the substantive issues raised in this appeal.5
Appellant argues that trial counsel and appellate counsel were
ineffective for failing to raise a claim of insufficient evidence as to his DUI—
controlled substances conviction because the Commonwealth did not show
that he was incapable of safe driving at the time of the accident that resulted
in D.W.’s death. Appellant asserts that there was no testimonial or other
evidence regarding his unsafe driving or his physical demeanor at the time of
the accident, no chemical testing after the accident, and no expert evidence
to establish his impairment. Appellant acknowledges that Gambal’s testimony
and his own statements established that he had consumed cocaine and heroin
earlier in the day, but he maintains that this evidence showed that he was no
longer impaired at the time of the accident as he was on his way to acquire
more drugs. Further, Appellant contends that Officer Carbaugh’s testimony
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5We remind the lower court that, in future cases where it receives a premature
PCRA petition, it should follow the procedure set forth in Smith and dismiss
the petition without prejudice and with instructions that a timely petition may
be filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final. 244 A.3d at 16-17.
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that he appeared highly intoxicated during the traffic stop after the accident
was devoid of any specific observations as to Appellant’s behavior that led to
the officer’s conclusion. Appellant avers that trial and appellate counsel lacked
any reasonable basis for not raising this appellate challenge as it has clear
arguable merit and that he was prejudiced as this claim could have provided
him relief on direct appeal through the vacation of his conviction on the DUI—
controlled substances count.
We review the denial of PCRA relief to decide whether the PCRA court’s
factual determinations are supported by the record and its legal conclusions
are free of error. Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa.
2020). When supported by the record, the PCRA court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations are binding on this Court, but we review the lower
court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review. Id. Our scope
of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
record, which we view in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
party who prevailed below. Id.In assessing a claim of ineffective assistance under the PCRA, we begin
our analysis with the presumption that counsel has rendered effective
assistance. Commonwealth v. Reid, 259 A.3d 395, 405 (Pa. 2021). To
overcome the presumption, the petitioner must show that:
(1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2)
counsel did not have a reasonable basis for his or her act or
omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of
counsel’s deficient performance, that is, a reasonable probability
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that but for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The defendant must satisfy all
three prongs of this test to obtain relief under the PCRA. Id.In this case, the PCRA court concluded that there was no arguable merit
to Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness by trial or appellate counsel in not
raising a sufficiency challenge to the DUI conviction, noting there was “not
only sufficient but substantial evidence” demonstrating Appellant’s
impairment due to the influence of drugs. Order, 8/5/22, at 2-4.
Furthermore, citing the PCRA hearing testimony of trial and appellate counsel,
the PCRA court found that both attorneys had a reasonable basis for not taking
“a kitchen sink approach” and instead “focus[ing] on the issues with the most
merit with impairment due to drugs at the time of the incident being one on
which [Appellant] would not prevail.” Id. at 4-5; see also N.T., 8/5/22, at
8-19, 27-39.
Upon review, we first quickly dispose of Appellant’s claim of trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness as lacking arguable merit. Appellant does not allege
any deficiency in trial counsel’s strategy or his performance during trial, but
instead Appellant solely targets the issue of whether trial counsel should have
preserved the DUI sufficiency claim as an appellate issue. This claim must fail
because a defendant is under no obligation to raise a sufficiency claim at trial;
instead, a sufficiency claim may be argued on appeal even where counsel does
not raise the issue at trial or file a post-verdict or post-sentence motion. See
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(7) (“A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a conviction of one or more of the offenses charged
[through, one of various methods, including] a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence made on appeal.”); accord Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 151
A.3d 1117, 1121 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. Gezovich, 7
A.3d 300, 302 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2010). Furthermore, while a defendant must
raise a sufficiency claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, identifying the
specific elements that he wishes to challenge, see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Ellison, 213 A.3d 312, 320-21 (Pa. Super. 2019), trial counsel handed the
case off to appellate counsel prior to the filing of the Rule 1925(b) statement.
N.T., 8/5/22, at 6, 21-22, 25-26. Therefore, trial counsel cannot be ineffective
for not raising the DUI sufficiency claim.6
Turning to the ineffectiveness claim concerning appellate counsel, we
conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s determination that the DUI
sufficiency claim lacked arguable merit. A challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence presents a question of law and is subject to plenary review under a
de novo standard. Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether
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6 Although the PCRA court did not base its decision that this claim lacked
arguable merit on the fact that trial counsel was not required to preserve the
sufficiency claim for appeal, we may affirm the PCRA court’s decision on any
basis apparent on the record. Commonwealth v. Elliott, 249 A.3d 1190,
1193 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2021); Commonwealth v. Pou, 201 A.3d 735, 740 (Pa.
Super. 2018).
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the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, were sufficient to
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “[T]he
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude
every possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730,
740 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (citation omitted). “The Commonwealth may
sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, we note that the trier of fact has the authority to determine the weight
of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses and is free to believe all, part,
or none of the evidence. Id. at 741.
Appellant was convicted of DUI under Section 3802(d)(2) of the Vehicle
Code, which provides as follows:
An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical
control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following
circumstances:
* * *
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). In order to obtain a conviction under Section
3802(d)(2), the Commonwealth must show “that [the defendant] was under
the influence of a drug to a degree that impairs his or her ability to safely
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drive[] or operate a vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Williamson, 962 A.2d
1200, 1204 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Section 3802(d)(2) “by its plain text does not require that a drug be
measured in the defendant’s blood, nor does it specify any particular manner
by which the Commonwealth is required to prove that the defendant was
under the influence of a drug.” Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 1231,
1239 (Pa. 2011); see also Williamson, 962 A.2d at 1204. This provision
“requires only proof that the driver was under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree that the ability to drive is impaired.”
Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, expert testimony is not required to establish impairment
under Section 3802(d)(2). Griffith, 32 A.3d at 1238; Commonwealth v.
Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). A “lay witness[] may
testify to someone’s readily observable physical condition or appearance that
does not require medical training.” Gause, 164 A.3d at 538 (citation
omitted). Likewise, “[e]vidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor
to a finding” that an individual is incapable of safe driving under the DUI
statute. Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted); see also Gause, 164 A.3d at 541.
We discern no legal error in the PCRA court’s conclusion that there was
no arguable merit to a potential appellate argument that the evidence was
insufficient to show to show Appellant’s impairment under Section 3802(d)(2).
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First, we note that there was substantial evidence of Appellant’s drug use
throughout the day on November 22, 2016. This included Appellant’s use of
crack cocaine upon arriving at the work site in York County, his subsequent
use of crack cocaine during two separate trips to Baltimore in the morning and
afternoon, and his intravenous use of heroin during the second Baltimore visit.
N.T. Trial at 389-95, 428. Upon their return to Hanover, Appellant then drove
in Gambal’s van to a local dealer to purchase more drugs. Id. at 399-403.
Appellant also admitted in later conversations with the police that he was “high
as shit” around the time of the accident. Id. at 501-02. While Appellant
argues that the local trip shows that he had sobered up, see Appellant’s Brief
at 22, 27-28, his argument is belied by his own statement to police. In any
event, such a reading of the trial record runs counter to our standard of review
of sufficiency claims requiring that we view the evidence and any reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most reasonable to the Commonwealth.
Smith, 234 A.3d at 581. The jury could reasonably infer based upon
Appellant’s all-day crack cocaine and heroin binge that he remained “under
the influence of a drug or combination of drugs,” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2),
when he drove past D.W.’s house.
The evidence also supported a determination beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant’s drug use “impair[ed his] ability to safely drive, operate or be
in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” Id. Officer
Carbaugh personally observed Appellant’s impairment during a traffic stop
that commenced at 7:30 p.m. on November 22, 2016, only 21 minutes after
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D.W. was struck by the van, which was established by surveillance video to
have occurred at 7:09 p.m. Id. at 135, 137-38, 147-48, 242-46. Officer
Carbaugh determined that Appellant was “extremely intoxicated,” noting that
Appellant could not answer basic questions regarding where he had been that
evening, while repeating the phrase “aren’t you cold.” Id. at 248-52, 265.
The officer’s lay opinion of Appellant’s condition during the traffic stop was
properly allowed as evidence to demonstrate Appellant’s impairment just
minutes after he had been driving. See Gause, 164 A.3d at 538-39 (noting
that “lay witnesses may testify to someone’s readily observable physical
condition or appearance that does not require medical training” and that
“staggering, stumbling, glassy or bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech” were
the type of “ordinary signs of intoxication discernable by a layperson”)
(citation omitted); see also Griffith, 32 A.3d at 1238 (expert witness is not
required to establish impairment in a prosecution under Section 3802(d)(2)).
As further evidence of Appellant’s compromised state, the jury was also
free to consider the fact that Appellant made no effort to stop or return to the
scene of an accident in which he knew or should have known that he struck
and, at a minimum, injured a child. N.T. Trial at 161-63 (witness observed
van continue to drive for at least 8 seconds after accident, with no effort to
stop or turn around); id. at 211-12 (collision reconstructionist expert testified
that absence of tire marks showed no attempt to brake or take evasive action
before or after van struck D.W.). In addition, as noted above, Appellant
admitted that he was “high as shit” at the time of the accident resulting in
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memory lapses concerning the events of the evening of the date in question.
Id. at 501-02.
Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant could not have
prevailed on a direct appeal claim of insufficiency of the evidence as to his
DUI—controlled substances conviction and therefore appellate counsel was
not ineffective for raising that claim. We therefore affirm the order denying
Appellant relief under the PCRA.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/2023
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