O.H. Bel Air v. Hinton, J.

J-S13017-23
2023 PA Super 93O.H. BEL AIR PARTNERS LP : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMAL HINTON :
:
Appellant : No. 147 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 21, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No. 210801992
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MAY 31, 2023
Jamal Hinton (Appellant) appeals pro se1 from the $3,946.75 judgment
entered in favor of his former landlord, O.H. Bel Air Partners LP (Bel Air). After
careful review, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
In November 2015, Appellant leased a studio apartment (premises)
owned by Bel Air. Appellant’s lease ran from November 23, 2015, to
November 30, 2016. Pertinently, the lease agreement provided:
(i) This lease does not end on the ending date indicated above
unless Landlord or Tenant gives written notice to the other not
less than Sixty days in advance of ending date.
(k) Renewal length of this lease if not ended by either party as
require [sic] in paragraph (i) Month-to-month with a 60-day
notice[.]
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Appellant has appeared pro se throughout the proceedings.
J-S13017-23
Lease Agreement, 11/23/15. The lease required Appellant to pay monthly
rent of $625, and a $35 late charge if the rent was not paid within five days
of the due date (the first day of each month). Id. ¶ 3.
On August 26, 2020, Bel Air notified Appellant that his lease would
expire on October 31, 2020, and would not be renewed. At the end of the
lease, Appellant refused to tender possession and continued to occupy the
premises as a holdover tenant.
Bel Air filed a complaint for possession of the premises and the balance
of unpaid rent on December 10, 2020. The case proceeded to a hearing in
Philadelphia Municipal Court on April 1, 2021. The municipal court entered
judgment for Appellant because Bel Air did not have a rental license on the
day of the hearing.2 Bel Air did not appeal.
On July 1, 2021, Bel Air filed a second complaint against Appellant for
possession of the premises and unpaid rent. On August 13, 2021, the
municipal court awarded Bel Air possession and $1,276.75 in back rent, based
upon the lease termination and Appellant’s nonpayment of rent. Bel Air gained
possession of the premises on September 10, 2021. See N.T., 6/27/22, at
18. Appellant timely appealed to the trial court.
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2 Bel Air’s rental license expired on February 28, 2021, and Bel Air did not
renew the license until April 6, 2021. See Phila. Code § 9-3901(4)(e)
(providing property owner may not recover possession or collect rent “during
or for the period of noncompliance” with the licensure requirement).
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Following a June 27, 2022, bench trial, the trial court awarded Bel Air
$3,946.75 for Appellant’s nonpayment of rent and termination of the lease.3
Appellant filed an appeal with Commonwealth Court, which transferred the
case to this Court. We quashed the appeal, but permitted Appellant 10 days
to file a post-trial motion. O.H. Bel Air Partners LP v. Hinton, 2584 EDA
2022 (Pa. Super. Nov. 30, 2022) (order). Appellant thereafter filed a post-
trial motion titled as a motion for reconsideration.4 The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion, and Appellant timely appealed.5 Appellant and the trial
court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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3 Appellant had vacated the premises.
4 Appellant alleged the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing [Bel Air] to keep rental payments for March and April of
2021, wherein [Bel Air] did not have a[] rental license at the time
….
Motion for Reconsideration, 12/7/22, ¶ 7. Appellant’s motion complied with
this Court’s directive to file a post-trial motion. See, e.g., Bennett v. Rose,
183 A.3d 498, 503 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (holding that motion for
reconsideration is a post-trial motion where a specific allegation of trial court
error is made); Green v. Trustee of Univ. of Pa., 265 A.3d 703, 710 (Pa.
Super. 2021) (citing Bennett and holding that the nature of the requested
relief controls the styling of the motion).
5 On February 14, 2023, this Court directed Appellant to praecipe for
judgment. The trial court entered judgment on February 21, 2023, and thus
the appeal is properly before us for disposition. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before
the entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and
on the day thereof.”).
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J-S13017-23
Appellant presents the following issues for review:
1. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion by fail[ing] to uphold
the Philadelphia Municipal Court Civil Rule 109(4)[6]?
2. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion by not allocating paid
rent of March and April of 2021 [t]o the months of August and
September of 2021?
3. Did the [trial c]ourt abuse its discretion by allowing [Bel Air] to
falsely claim [A]ppellant’s Lease was terminated?
4. Did [Bel Air] make false claims of back rent owed?
5. Did [Bel Air] violate and breach contract law?
Appellant’s Brief at vi (footnote added).
At the outset, we recognize:
Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether the findings of
the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether
the trial court committed error in the application of law. We must
grant the court’s findings of fact the same weight and
effect as the verdict of a jury and, accordingly, may disturb
the non-jury verdict only if the court’s findings are
unsupported by competent evidence or the court
committed legal error that affected the outcome of the
trial. It is not the role of an appellate court to pass on the
credibility of witnesses; hence we will not substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not whether
we would have reached the same result on the evidence
presented, but rather, after due consideration of the evidence
which the trial court found credible, whether the trial court could
have reasonably reached its conclusion.
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6 Appellant cites Municipal Court Civil Rule 109(4) for the proposition that Bel
Air cannot collect rent during periods it lacked a valid rental license. As we
discuss infra, Appellant is referring to Phila. Code § 9-3901(4)(e).
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Leb. County Hous. Auth. v. Landeck, 967 A.2d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super.
2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added).
Furthermore,
the factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence,
and the Superior Court will not disturb the trial court’s credibility
determinations. Assessments of credibility and conflicts in
evidence are for the trial court to resolve; this Court is not
permitted to reexamine the weight and credibility determinations
or substitute our judgments for those of the factfinder.
Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Grp., Inc., 165 A.3d 908, 916 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Appellant’s first and second issues are related and dispositive. Appellant
first claims the trial court abused its discretion by not upholding Philadelphia
Municipal Court Civil Rule 109(a)(4). Appellant’s Brief at 1. Appellant argues:
[Bel Air] did not have a valid rental license for the months of March
and April of 2021. [Bel Air] never filed an appeal from the Order
of April 1, 2021, Judgment for [Appellant], [and] therefore they
were not permitted to collect rent and other fees for the months
of September, October, November, and December of 2020, and
January, February, March, and April of 2021, pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 341, 902 and 903[,] which states failure to file an appeal
in a timely manner will result in any issues raised in a claim from
those issues [to] be deemed waived[.]
Id. Bel Air counters that the trial court found no rent was collected for March
and April 2021. Appellee’s Brief at 7.
In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court improperly allocated
Appellant’s rental assistance payments to March and April 2021. Appellant’s
Brief at 4. Appellant argues the trial court erred “by allowing [Bel Air] to keep
rent that they were not permitted to collect.” Id.-5-
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Appellant cites “Philadelphia Municipal Civil Rule 109(4),” which states:
Where the claim is based upon a writing, a copy of the writing or
pertinent portions thereof shall be attached. If the writing is not
available, it is sufficient to so state, together with the reasons,
and to set forth the substance of the writing.
Phil. Cnty. Pa. Rule 109(a)(4). However, Appellant apparently refers to the
law stated in Section 9-3901(4)(e) of the Philadelphia Code, which provides:
Non-compliance. Any owner who fails to obtain a rental license
as required by § 9-3902, or to comply with § 9-3903 regarding a
Certificate of Rental Suitability, or whose rental license has been
suspended, shall be denied the right to recover possession
of the premises or to collect rent during or for the period of
noncompliance or during or for the period of license suspension.
In any action for eviction or collection of rent, the owner
shall attach a copy of the license.
Phila. Code § 9-3901(4)(e) (emphasis added).
This Court addressed Section 9-3901(4)(e) and its prohibition on
recovering rent or possessing a property in the absence of a valid rental
license in Frempong v. Richardson, 209 A.3d 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019). We
explained:
… “While the Statutory Construction Act is not expressly applicable
to the construction of local ordinances, the principles contained
therein are nevertheless useful.” Phila. Eagles Football Club,
Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 573 Pa. 189, 823 A.2d 108, 127
n.31 (Pa. 2003).
Our state appellate courts have consistently held that when
“applying [the] normal rules of statutory construction, [the]
presence of disjunctive word ‘or’ in [a] statute indicates that
elements of statute are met when any particular element is
satisfied, regardless of whether other elements are also
met.” See Wagner v. Wagner, 887 A.2d 282, 286 (Pa. Super.
2005). See also Ben. Consumer Disc. Co. v. Vukman, 621 Pa.
192, 77 A.3d 547, 555 (Pa. 2013).
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… [T]he trial court in this case found that “the plain language of
[Subsection § 9-3901(4)(e)] denies a non-compliant
owner either the right to possession or the right to collect rent.”
Trial Court Opinion, 11/2/18, at 14. It thus found that awarding
possession of the property to Landlords, where unpaid rent was
not awarded, was proper. After careful review, we disagree, and
conclude that under Section 9-3901(4)(e), Landlords were
prohibited from recovering rent as well as possession of the
property.
***
We acknowledge that the word “or” generally connotes a
disjunction. However, we emphasize that the statue is written in
the passive voice (“shall be denied”) and in reading the entire
context of the statute, we interpret Section 9-3901(4)(e) to
mean that a noncompliant owner may not recover
possession “or” collect rent, meaning he cannot receive
either. … Section 9-3901(4)(e) does not allow recovery of
rent or possession….
Frempong, 209 A.3d at 1010-11 (emphasis added).
Instantly, Bel Air averred that on June 9, 2021, Appellant was approved
for $3,125 in Philadelphia rental assistance,
and [the rental assistance] was applied to [Appellant’s] balance of
unpaid rent. After this payment, [Appellant] still carried a balance
of $4,806.12 in overdue rent.
Complaint, 9/1/21, ¶ 15. Bel Air did not indicate whether it applied the rental
assistance payments to March and April 2021, the period of time Bel Air lacked
a valid rental license.
The trial court found Bel Air did not collect rent for March and April 2021.
The trial court stated:
The only witness brought forth during the bench trial in this matter
was [Bel Air]’s property manager, Cheryl Campbell [(Ms.
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Campbell)]. During cross examination, Appellant asked Ms.
Campbell about [Bel Air] receiving rental assistance payments
from the Philadelphia Housing Authority on behalf of Appellant on
June 9, 2021, in the amount of $3,125. See [N.T., 6/27/22,] at
pp. 11-12[,] Attached as Exhibit 5. Appellant asserted during his
questioning that rent for March and April would be included in
these payments[,] which Ms. Campbell denied. Ms. Campbell
testified that the payments went to Appellant’s outstanding
balance due to [Bel Air] from previous months of unpaid rent. See
[id.] at pp. 16-18, 23. Further, Ms. Campbell testified during
direct examination that potential rent claims for March and
April of 2021 were not included in [Bel Air’s] claim for
damages due to [Bel Air’s] admission that during those two
(2) months they were prohibited from collecting rent from
Appellant due to the lapse of their rental license. Id.Appellant did not produce any evidence to contradict this
testimony.
… Based on the evidence adduced, this court came to the
conclusion that rent was not collected by [Bel Air] from Appellant
for the months of March and April of 2021. [Bel Air] did not violate
Philadelphia Municipal Court Rule 109(4).
Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/22, at 2-3. Our review discloses otherwise, as the
record lacks evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
At trial, Ms. Campbell confirmed that Bel Air did not have a rental license
from February 28, 2021 to April 6, 2021. N.T., 6/27/22, at 15. Ms. Campbell
testified that Bel Air sent Appellant a notice to quit the premises on June 17,
2021, and filed this action on August 13, 2021. Id. at 17. Critically, Ms.
Campbell testified that Appellant received rental assistance which paid
Appellant’s rent for March and April 2021, when Bel Air was unlicensed. Id.
at 22. Ms. Campbell testified that Appellant vacated the premises on
September 10, 2021. Id. at 18. Ms. Campbell reiterated that Bel Air accepted
rental assistance payments for dates through and including May 2021. Id. at
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19. On cross-examination, Ms. Campbell expressly confirmed that on June 9,
2021, Bel Air received five payments of $625 in rental assistance for Appellant,
which were attributed to March, April, May, June, and July of 2021. Id. at 22.
Based on Ms. Campbell’s testimony, Bel Air allocated Appellant’s rental
assistance payments to March and April 2021, when Bel Air was not licensed.
See Frempong. As the record indicates the trial court’s findings “are
unsupported by competent evidence,” we are constrained to vacate the
judgment and remand for further proceedings, so the trial court may
determine what amount, if any, Appellant owes to Bel Air, consistent with
Section 9-3901(4)(e).7
Judgment vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/31/2023
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7
Given our disposition, we do not address Appellant’s remaining issues.
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