Com. v. Valentin, N.

J-A12045-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NEFTALI VALENTIN :
:
Appellant : No. 3125 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0000957-2006
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2023
Neftali Valentin appeals the dismissal of his request for relief under the
Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. He argues that the court erred in rejecting his claim that he pleaded
guilty to an offense that does not exist. We affirm.
Valentin entered an open guilty plea in October 2006 to two counts of
attempted criminal homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2501(a), and one count
of arson endangering persons, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a)(1)(i). He was
sentenced in February 2007 to an aggregate term of 21 to 42 years in prison.
His post-sentence motion was denied by operation of law on July 6, 2007. See
Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1),
filed 10/28/22, at 1 n.1 (unpaginated). Valentin did not file a direct appeal.
On February 12, 2021, Valentin filed what he styled as a “Petition for
Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Pennsylvania
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Constitution.” He claimed that he was “illegally confined on the basis of a guilty
plea to two counts of criminal attempt 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a), first degree 18
Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) that do not exist because the Pennsylvania General
Assembly never enacted any such criminal statute to define the conduct which
constitutes the offense.” Pet. for Habeas Corpus Relief, filed 2/12/21, at 2.
The court treated the petition as a PCRA petition and appointed counsel.1 See
Order, filed 1/19/22, at ¶ 2, n.1. Valentin’s petition did not address the PCRA’s
time-bar, nor did it reference any time-bar exception.
Counsel filed a Turner/Finley letter, concluding that Valentin’s petition
was untimely, and he requested to withdraw as counsel.2 See Appl. to
Withdraw as Counsel of R., filed 9/19/22, at Ex. A. The PCRA court issued
notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. It concluded that
the petition was facially untimely, and Valentin had failed to plead any time-
bar exception. See Notice of Intent to Dismiss at 1 n.1 (unpaginated). Valentin
filed a response stating “[a] petition raising the fact that an offense does not
exist should not be barred on the grounds that it is untimely[.]” Answer to
Ct.’s Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 11/9/22, at ¶ 6. Valentin’s response did
____________________________________________
1 We conclude that the PCRA court properly treated Valentin’s “Petition for
Habeas Corpus Relief Pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution” as a PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA
encompasses all other remedies including habeas corpus).
2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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not address any time-bar exception. The court denied Valentin’s petition and
granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Order, filed 11/21/22.
Valentin presents the following issue: “Whether the Trial Court abused
its discretion in dismissing [Valentin’s] Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief
alleging he is illegally confined on the basis of a Guilty Plea to two counts of
Criminal Attempt 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a), First Degree 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) that
do not exist[?]” Valentin’s Br. at 3.
When reviewing the denial or grant of relief under the PCRA, this Court
must determine “whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by
the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free of legal error.”
Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020).
We do not address the merits of Valentin’s claims because his petition
was properly subject to the strictures of the PCRA and Valentin failed to meet
the PCRA’s time requirements. See Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d
911, 913-14 (Pa. 2000). The thrust of Valentin’s claim is that there was no
statutory support for the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. Such a claim goes
to the legality of the sentence. See Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d
554, 563 (Pa. 2022). Challenges to the legality of a sentence are cognizable
under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543. They are therefore subject to the
PCRA’s time restrictions. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223
(Pa. 1999) (concluding that “[a]lthough legality of sentence is always subject
to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA time limits
or one of the exceptions thereto”).
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The PCRA’s time limitations are jurisdictional in nature. See
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014). A petitioner
has one year after the judgment of sentence becomes final to seek relief that
is cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of
sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.” Id. at § 9545(b)(3). If a petition seeks PCRA relief beyond that
deadline, the petitioner must plead and prove at least one of the PCRA's time-
bar exceptions. These exceptions include:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Valentin’s judgment of sentence became final on August 6, 2007, when
the time to file a direct appeal expired. See Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692
A.2d 158, 159 (Pa.Super. 1997) (stating judgment of sentence does not
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become final until the disposition of post-sentence motion or the denial of it
by operation of law); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing that when last day of
period of time set forth in statute falls on Saturday or Sunday, that day is
excluded from computation). Therefore, the one-year deadline elapsed on
August 6, 2008, and the instant petition, which Valentin filed in February
2021, is facially untimely. Thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction unless
Valentin pleaded and proved at least one of the time-bar exceptions. See
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Valentin did not attempt to raise any time-bar exception before the
PCRA court. The PCRA court properly determined that the petition was
untimely and that it lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if Valentin’s
petition were timely, his claim is meritless. He pleaded guilty to criminal
attempt, which is a codified crime embodied in a statute setting forth the
elements of the offense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901. We affirm the order of the
PCRA court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2023
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