Com. v. Taylor, D.

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
V. :CP -
23 -
CR-
0000410 -
2022
DEANDRE R TAYLOR, 11
Catherine Kiefer, Esquire, for the Commonwealth
Stefanie McArdle, Esquire, for the Defendant
OPINION
Brennan, J. November. 9, 2022
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
After aBench trial on June 21, 2022, Deandre R. Taylor, II
(Defendant/Appellant) was convicted of Driving Under the Influence, General
Impairment, Incapable of Driving Safely B 1st Offense, 1and acquitted of the
summary traffic offense. On August 15, 2022, Appellant was sentenced to six [6]
months' probation, ordered to undergo adrug and alcohol evaluation, to attend a
safe driving program, to pay a $300 fine and $ 100 in costs. On September 7, 2022,
Defendant filed atimely Notice of Appeal from imposition of sentence.
The following facts were presented at trial. Trooper Betancourt is employed
75 P.S. ' 3802 " Al
1
by the Pennsylvania State Police. At the time of this incident, he was in the patrol
unit. The entire incident was recorded on the State Police MVR device affixed to
the windshield of the marked patrol vehicle. On August 29, 2021, Trooper
Betancourt was on Exit boff-ramp of I-95 when he observed the Defendant did not
use his turn signal when changing lanes and then accelerated to 75mph in a55mph
zone. After the stop, Trooper Betancourt smelled the odor of alcoholic beverage
emanating from the vehicle. The defendant was ordered to exit the vehicle. As the
Defendant stepped away from the vehicle, Trooper Betancourt smelled the odor of
alcohol coming from his person. Trooper Betancourt could see into Defendant's
eyes and observed that they were blood-shot and glassy. Trooper Betancourt then
administered field sobriety tests. On the walk and turn test, Trooper Betancourt
observed four out of the eight validated clues. Scoring two validating clues is an
indication the person is . 08 or higher. Trooper Betancourt next administered the
one-legged stand test. On that test, Trooper Betancourt observed three of the four
validated clues. Based on the totality of his interaction with the Defendant, Trooper
Betancourt formed the opinion he was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to
adegree that rendered him incapable of safely operating amotor vehicle.
II. DISCUSSION
z
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of
Driving Under the Influence. The standard of review in Pennsylvania for
sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled:
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict
winner, to see whether there is sufficient evidence to enable [the factfinder] to find
every element of the crime beyond areasonable doubt. This standard is equally
applicable to cases where the evidence is circumstantial rather than direct so long as
the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime beyond areasonable
doubt. Although aconviction must be based on "more than mere suspicion or
conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to amathematical certainty."
Commonwealth v. Coon, 695 A.2d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 1997) Moreover,
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an Appellate Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder; if the record contains support for
the convictions they may not be disturbed. Commonwealth v. Marks, 704 A.2d
1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212,
1213 (Pa., 1986)). An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner and must draw all reasonable
3
inferences favorable to the Commonwealth to determine if the factfinder could
reasonably have concluded that all of the elements of the crime were established
beyond areasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 839 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa.
2003). Circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to convict aperson of a
crime. Commonwealth v. Watkins, 843 A.2d 1203, 1211 (Pa. 2003). In evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence where aconviction is based on circumstantial
evidence, the circumstantial evidence must be considered in light of all the
inferences and conclusions that reasonably and logically can be drawn therefrom.
Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. 1994). The factfinder is free to
accept all, part, or none of the witnesses' testimony. Watkins, supra. Where the
evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in
contravention to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is
insufficient as amatter of law. Commonwealth v. Santana, 333 A.2d 876 (Pa.
1975).
In this case, sufficient evidence existed to sustain Defendant's conviction for
DUI, general impairment. To be convicted of DUI, the Commonwealth must prove
that the Defendant was rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in
actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 75 Pa. C.S. Section
4
3802(a)(1). Thus, the Commonwealth must prove:
(1) that the defendant was the operator of amotor vehicle and (2) that while
operating the vehicle, the defendant was under the influence of alcohol to such a
degree as to render him or her incapable of safe driving. To establish the second
element, it must be shown that alcohol has substantially impaired the normal mental
and physical faculties required to safely operate the vehicle. Substantial impairment,
in this context, means adiminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise
judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing circumstances and
conditions. Commonwealth v. Smith, 831 A.2d 636, 638 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Defendant does not dispute he was driving. Rather, he alleges the evidence
was insufficient to establish that he imbibed enough alcohol to render him incapable
of safe driving. He contends he did not exhibit any evidence of alcohol impairment,
that he reacted appropriately, and was cooperative with arresting Officers.
Defendant's argument lacks merit. The focus of subsection 3802(a)(1) remains on
the inability of the individual to drive safely due to consumption of alcohol, not on
aparticular blood alcohol level. Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (Pa.
2009); see also Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 145 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations omitted). A blood alcohol test is not necessary to prove general
s
impairment under this statute. Commonwealth v. Eichler, 133 A13d 775, 790 (Pa.
Super. 2016).
There are numerous cases substantially similar to the instant case where the
Superior Court found evidence sufficient to convict defendants of DUI General
Impairment. In Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887 (Pa: Super. 2009), the
Court found sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction for DUI where
the defendant failed four field sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, and proceeded to
coast though astop sign despite apolice officer being in plain view. In
Commonwealth v. Rishel, 658 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. Super. 1995) the Court upheld a
conviction of adefendant for DUI where, an hour after acar accident, officers
noticed the defendant exuded an odor of alcohol, the Defendant's speech was
slurred, she failed two field sobriety tests, and stated she had drunk two
sixteen- ounce beers in an evening. In Commonwealth v. Palmer, 751 A.2d 223 (Pa.
Super. 2000), the Court held that the evidence was sufficient to support aconviction
for driving while under the influence of alcohol to adegree that rendered defendant
incapable of safe driving. In that case, the arresting officer testified that the
defendant exuded the odor of alcohol, that the defendant had glassy, bloodshot
eyes, and that the defendant failed field sobriety tests. Id. at 228
6
Further, in Commonwealth v. Feathers, 660 A.2d 90 (Pa. ,Super. 1995),
appeal granted in par,t 543 ,Pa. 401, 672 A.2d 279, affirmed 683 A.2d 289, 546 Pa.
139, the Court found that evidence that the driver was not in control of herself, such
as failing to pass the field sobriety test, can establish that the driver was under the
influence of alcohol to adegree which rendered her incapable of safe driving. Id. In
that case, the defendant had astrong odor of alcohol on her breath and about her
person and that she had trouble in producing her license and insurance card.
Additionally, the defendant had bloodshot eyes, had difficulty standing and
producing documentation, and failed field sobriety tests. Id.It should be noted that in Palmer and Feathers, the arresting officers did not
observe any erratic driving on the parts of the defendants. In Commonwealth v.
Kowalek, 647 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super 1993), the Court found that acharge of driving
under the influence, alleging the driver incapable of safe driving, is not precluded
merely because at the time of arrest the driver was not observed to drive unsafely.
Erratic driving is but one factor to consider. Thus, the absence of erratic driving is
not determinative as to whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a
conviction for DUI.
Like Mobley, the Commonwealth offered evidence and testimony that, by its
totality, establishes sufficient evidence to sustain averdict of guilty of driving under
the influence, general impairment. Trooper Betancourt smelled an odor of alcohol
coming from the vehicle. After the Defendant exited the vehicle, Trooper
Betancourt smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the Defendant. The Defendant
failed two sobriety field tests and showed signs of impairment on athird. Trooper
Betancourt observed the Defendant's eyes were watery and glassy. Finally, the
Defendant refused achemical blood test.
To prove adefendant incapable of safe driving, the Commonwealth must
show that the defendant is "substantially impaired" by the presence of alcohol.
Substantial impairment, in this context, means a "diminution or enfeeblement in the
ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing
circumstances and conditions." Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 237 A.3d 462 at *2
(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Substantial impairment does not imply an
extreme lack of control, but only a " diminution or enfeeblement." Commonwealth v.
Griscavage, 517 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. 1986). A finding of substantial impairment
is not based on aparticular factor, but aconfluence of circumstances that suggest a
suspect to be incapable of safe driving. "[A] police officer may utilize both his
experience and personal observations to render an opinion as to whether aperson is
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intoxicated." Commonwealth v. Kelley, 438 Pa. Super. 289, 652 A.2d 378, 382
(Pa.Super. 1994) ( citing Commonwealth v. Bowser, 425 Pa. Super. 24, 624 A.2d
125 (Pa.Super. 1993)).
As noted above, in this case, multiple indicia of substantial impairment were
present. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was clearly
sufficient evidence given the factors outlined above to show Defendant was
substantially impaired by the presence of alcohol, and thus incapable of safe
driving. The evidence is sufficient to sustain averdict of guilty for driving under the
influence, general impairment.
Judgment of sentence should be affirmed on appeal.
BY THE COURT:
MARY ALICE : RENNAN, J.
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J-S23025-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
DEANDRE RAMEL TAYLOR, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 2372 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 15, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000410-2022.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2023
Deandre Ramel Taylor, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposing six months of probation after the trial court convicted him of driving
under the influence (general impairment).1 We affirm.
In the early hours of August 29, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police stopped
Taylor’s vehicle on Interstate 95. During the stop, Trooper Seth Betancourt
smelled alcohol in the vehicle and on Taylor. Taylor’s eyes were bloodshot
and glassy. He failed two sobriety tests and refused a request to test his blood
alcohol content. The troopers arrested him for DUI.
After a bench trial, the court convicted and sentenced Taylor as stated
above. This timely appeal followed.
Taylor raises one appellate issue:
Whether the evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law,
to support the conviction for [DUI] where the evidence at
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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
J-S23025-23
trial failed to establish that [Taylor] had imbibed a sufficient
amount of alcohol such that he was rendered incapable of
safely driving, operating, or being in actual physical control
of the movement of the vehicle?
Taylor’s Brief at 4. He claims insufficient evidence, because “there was no
objective forensic evidence presented to support the [trooper’s] testimony
. . . that Taylor was incapable of safely operating his vehicle due to alcohol
intoxication.” Id. at 8.
The learned Judge Mary Alice Brennan of the Court of Common Pleas of
Delaware County authored a detailed, well-reasoned, 1925(a) Opinion, which
correctly disposes of Taylor’s claim of error. We therefore adopt it as our own.
The trial court explained that, under this Court’s precedents, forensic
evidence is not needed to convict for the DUI count that the Commonwealth
charged. Taylor’s refusal of a blood-draw test deprived the Commonwealth of
the evidence that could have supported its claim; Taylor now suggests that
this lack of evidence means his conviction should be set aside. However,
where, as here, a person refuses a blood-draw test, refusal “may be
introduced in evidence along with other testimony concerning the
circumstances of the refusal.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(e). Hence, Taylor’s refusal
of blood-draw testing, rather than exculpating him, is a fact from which the
trial court could (and did) infer his guilt. As the trial court noted, multiple
indicia of substantial impairment were noted.
The parties shall attach the trial court’s Opinion of November 9, 2022,
to this decision in all future filings.
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J-S23025-23
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/29/2023
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