Term. of Par. Rights to E.L.M.T.W., a Minor

J-S19034-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO : PENNSYLVANIA
E.L.M.T.W., A MINOR :
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 233 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-758
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J.J.M., A : PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR :
:
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APPEAL OF: S.L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 234 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-00760
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO J.E.M., A : PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR :
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 235 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-00761
J-S19034-23
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
TO Z.K.C.M,. A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: S.L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 236 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-759
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO : PENNSYLVANIA
J.O.M.T.W., A MINOR :
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.L.T., MOTHER :
:
:
: No. 244 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-00762
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2023
S.L.T. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to five of her children: her daughters, J.O.M.T.W. (born in
August 2017), and E.L.M.T.W. (born in September 2021); her twin daughter
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and son, J.J.M. and J.E.M. (born in June 2018) (“the twins”); and, finally, her
son, Z.K.C.M. (born in June 2020) (collectively “the Children”).1 We affirm.
The family first became known to Lebanon County Children and Youth
Services (“CYS”) in August 2020 due to reports alleging substance abuse and
physical abuse. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 8-9. Specifically, CYS received reports
relaying concerns that, inter alia, that Mother and Father (collectively
“Parents”) were “smoking marijuana while driving with J.O.M.T.W. in the car
. . ..” Id. CYS also received a report alleging physical abuse of J.J.M. See
id. Additionally, in September 2020, CYS received a report that Mother and
V.E.M. were, inter alia, inappropriately disciplining and injuring the Children
by “grabbing [them] by the arms and picking them up by the arms.” Id. at
9. J.O.M.T.W., the twins, and Z.K.C.M. were adjudicated dependent in
November 2020, but not placed. See id. at 12-13. Mother was indicated as
a perpetrator of child abuse in the order adjudicating the four eldest children
dependent. See id. at 12. Following an incident in June 2021 where Mother
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1 The court additionally involuntarily terminated the parental rights of T.W.
(“Father”) to E.L.M.T.W. and J.O.M.T.W. We address Father’s appeals
separately at Nos. 136, 137 MDA 2023. The court also terminated the parental
rights of any unknown father of E.L.M.T.W. No unknown father filed a
separate appeal. The father to Mother’s other three children, V.E.M., did not
participate in the proceedings below. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 7-8; see also
N.T., 1/9/23, at 151; Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 5. Neither V.E.M. nor
any unknown father appealed from the termination of his parental rights. See
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 5. Lastly, Mother has a sixth child not subject
to this appeal and who did not have a dependency or termination matter open
at the time of these proceedings. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 76.
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fled with the Children, as well as allegations of physical abuse of J.E.M.,2 CYS
obtained emergency protective custody for J.O.M.T.W. and her siblings, all of
whom were placed in June 2021. See id. at 15-17. The female siblings were
placed together in a foster home, and the male siblings were placed together
in a separate foster home. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 52. In August 2021, the
court established permanency goals of return to parent or guardian with
concurrent goals of adoption. See, e.g., N.T., 9/26/22, at Ex. 7, p. 6.
CYS received reports thereafter about domestic violence between
Parents, who were expecting another child:
. . . [Mother] had reported an incident to [CYS] where [Father]
had choked her, cocked a gun and shot it towards her. She also
had . . . marks and bruising on her belly while she was pregnant
with [E.L.M.T.W.,] and she admitted they were from [Father].
[Mother] [got] a [Protection From Abuse Act order] against
[Father], but then dropped it to talk with him about the baby.
N.T., 9/26/22, at 18. In October 2021, CYS obtained emergency custody of
E.L.M.T.W., approximately a month after her birth, and placed her with her
older sisters. See id. at 21-23, 25.3 Father was incarcerated at the time.
See id. at 20-21, 24, 82.4 The court adjudicated E.L.M.T.W. dependent in
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2 The CYS caseworker described bruises and scratches to J.E.M.’s face and
forehead. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 16.
3 Mother failed to notify CYS of E.M.L.T.W.’s birth, and CYS had difficulty
locating the child thereafter. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 21.
4 Father has an extensive criminal history, including convictions for, inter alia,
simple assault, accidents involving death or personal injury, defiant trespass,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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November 2021, and established a permanency goal of return to parent or
guardian and a concurrent goal of adoption. See N.T., 9/26/22, at Ex. 11,
p.7.
In furtherance of the permanency goals of reunification, CYS established
goals for Parents, including, inter alia: meet and cooperate with the CYS
caseworker and follow all recommendations; maintain involvement with the
Children’s placement programming and follow all recommendations; meet and
cooperate with service providers regarding the Children’s wellbeing and
development and follow all recommendations; cooperate and follow all
recommendations of approved in-home service providers; maintain a safe and
clean home with “appropriate sleeping arrangements for a minimum of [six]
months”; cooperate with domestic violence services and follow all
recommendations; and obtain counseling services “to address emotional
needs and ability to cope with anxiety[,] aggression[,] frustration[,]
depression[,] etc[.], and follow recommendations of provider.” N.T., 1/9/23,
Ex. 14 at 16; see also id. at 43, 46, 50.
In September 2022, CYS filed petitions for the involuntary termination
of Parents’ parental rights. The trial court held bifurcated evidentiary hearings
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summary harassment, and fleeing or attempting to elude an officer. See,
e.g., N.T., 9/26/22, Ex. 5. Notably, he was incarcerated from August 30,
2021, until October 22, 2021. See id. at 20-21. He was again incarcerated
from March 16-21, 2022 on charges of simple assault, which remained
outstanding at the time of the subject proceedings. See id. at 26.
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on September 26, 2022, and January 9, 2023. By the September date,
J.O.M.T.W. and E.L.M.T.W. were five years’ old, and one year old,
respectively; J.J.M and J.E.M. were four years’ old; and Z.K.C.M. was two
years’ old. Parents were present and represented by counsel. The Children
were represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel.5 At the
conclusion of the first termination hearing, the court continued the matter “to
allow the parents to further prove that they can complete all necessary goals.”
Id. at 233. While transition to partially unsupervised visitation occurred in
December 2022, visitation returned to fully supervised shortly thereafter. See
N.T., 1/9/23, at 7, 22, 25-26, 29-30.
At the second termination hearing, on January 9, 2023, CYS presented
the testimony of Barry Stewart, a family therapist with Pressley Ridge, as well
as foster care supervisor, Angelica Farrisi. Parents again each testified on
their own behalf. Ms. Farrisi testified that Parents had made no progress since
the prior hearing. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 50. While Parents had completed
some goals, Ms. Farrisi noted that multiple goals still remained outstanding or
incomplete. Mother, among other things, had failed to complete the following:
meet and cooperate with CYS and follow all recommendations; maintain a safe
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5 At the September 2022 hearing, CYS presented the testimony of CYS foster
care caseworker, Ashley Weaber, and Liz Rojas-Gomez and Scott Birchman of
Youth Advocate Programs Incorporated, who supervised visits between
Parents and the Children. Parents each testified on their own behalf.
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and clean home with appropriate sleeping arrangements;6 cooperate with
domestic violence intervention; and complete counseling. See id. at 62-63.
Ms. Farrisi further noted that the Children were not being fed the appropriate
foods. See id. at 65-67. She stated, “Nearly every visit they’re given an
extreme amount of sugar and sweets and high-sugared juices, despite
recommendations against that.” Id. at 66.
Ms. Farrisi further testified that she had been the intake worker when
concerns about J.O.M.T.W. first came in, which was approximately two-and-
a-half years before the January 2023 hearing, and throughout the pendency
of the case, and she stated her observations of Parents’ cooperativeness as
follows:
I would say throughout this case since I’ve had it, there have been
times where they’ve been humble and [they’re] willing and
receptive. [However,] recently it’s been indicative of their initial
behavior. They’re refusing to follow recommendations, fighting all
of the recommendations, accusing CYS of a number of
maltreatment concerns. . . ..
Id. at 42. Ms. Farrisi further described Parents as “combative” and
unreceptive to suggestions at a December 2022 meeting. Id. at 33.
Mr. Stewart, the family therapist, testified that he commenced in-home
services, which included a domestic violence curriculum, with the family on
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6 Regarding the housing goal: Parents failed to have the appropriate
separation and/or partition between their bed in the living room and the
Children’s bedrooms, and to have appropriate mattresses and clean sheets for
the Children. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 48, 63, 65.
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August 17, 2022. See id. at 6. He explained, “We had started that with a
power and control wheel that talks about dynamics between a couple and what
that looks like and areas that need to be addressed in terms of control, things
like that . . ..” Id. at 8. However, Mr. Stewart testified that he ceased his
services in December 2022 after a session at Parents’ home during which he
learned that Parents were videotaping the meeting, and Father exhibited
behavior which Mr. Stewart viewed as attempting to intimidate him. See id.
at 9-10, 132, 137. A subsequent meeting including Parents, Mr. Stewart, and
CYS “didn’t go well,” and Mr. Stewart did not resume services. Id. at 11. Mr.
Stewart explained, “[W]e tried to talk about some things we needed to see in
terms of just what respect looks like. [Father] was escalated. That was
pointed out several times. He continued to talk over people and was not really
-- I didn’t feel he was able to listen to the feedback that we had and what we
needed.” Id. Mr. Stewart indicated that he observed this “controlling”
behavior directed toward providers or “authority figures.” Id. at 16, 18. As
a result, for the first time in twenty-five years, Mr. Stewart required a behavior
contract in order to continue services with Parents. See id. at 12-13, 20,
132.7
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7 As to the behavior contract, Mr. Stewart testified, “I need things to be very
clear about what’s expected and about what won't be tolerated, including
videotaping.” N.T., 1/9/23, at 12. Ms. Farrisi’s observations confirmed the
conflict between Parents and Pressley Ridge. Id. at 69.
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Additionally, although Parents indicated that they were receiving
counseling through their church, Ms. Farrisi noted their resistance to
counseling and refusal to provide any information. See id. at 34. Mother had
difficulty recalling the name of the church and pastor. See id. at 88-89.
Father provided the name of the pastor but also had difficulty recalling the
name of the church. See id. at 122. He testified that he and Mother had not
participated in a session since November 2022. See id. at 140.8
At the conclusion of the subject proceedings, J.O.M.T.W., J.E.M., J.J.M.,
and Z.K.C.M. had been placed for over year and a half, and E.L.M.T.W. for
over a year, in pre-adoptive foster homes. See id. at 53; see also N.T.,
9/26/22, at 17-18. Ms. Farrisi testified that the Children were happy to see
Parents, whom they referred to as “Mom” and “Big Wolf,” respectively. See
N.T., 9/26/22, at 53-54, 102; see also N.T., 1/9/23, at 16-18, 22 (Mr.
Stewart testifying to his observations of Parents’ affection toward the Children,
and recollecting that “one of the younger[]” Children was sad or upset to have
to leave Parents).9 Further, Ms. Farrisi, as well as Liz Rojas-Gomez of Youth
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8 Mother had also previously asserted that she “didn’t need to sign a release
for the couple’s counselor . . . because no matter what they talk about in
couple’s counseling, it was not CYS’s business either.” N.T., 1/9/23, at 37.
9 Father “prefers to be called Big Wolf.He considers the [C]hildren his pack
and calls them cubs.” N.T., 9/26/22, at 108. While the Children who could
speak, including J.O.M.T.W. referred to their foster parents by their first
names, they occasionally slipped and called their foster mothers “Mom,” or
Mother and Father by their first names. See id. at 76, 102.
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Advocate Programs Incorporated, acknowledged expressions or inquiries by
the Children related to returning home. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 53-54; see also
N.T., 9/26/22, at 106-07. However, Ms. Weaber opined that foster parents
provide the Children “stability and permanence” and “ensur[e they] get their
necessary services or evaluations.” N.T., 9/26/22, at 61. Ms. Farrisi further
stated that, following visitation with Parents, the Children are happy to see
their foster parents. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 53-54. Ms. Rojas-Gomez observed
similarly. See N.T., 9/26/22, at 106. (“They did not seem sad [to leave their
parents’ home]. They would be happy when they’d see the foster parents and
hug the foster parents[] and hug . . . [P]arents goodbye.”). Further, the
Children are in close proximity and see each other frequently. As Ms. Farrisi
explained, “They are friends, the foster parents, so they do see the children
outside of visits, at least two to three times a week outside of the visits.” N.T.,
1/9/23, at 52-53.
In addition, Ms. Farrisi related concerning behaviors by the Children,
particularly the boys, following visits and telephone calls, as well as instigating
behavior by Parents. Ms. Farrisi testified:
Q. Do any of the [C]hildren exhibit behaviors before or after visits
that require extra support or are of concern?
A. I would say the behavior of the boys has reportedly gotten more
intense after visits. Specifically [J.E.M.], and [Z.K.C.M.] as
well. [Z.K.C.M.] started exhibiting head banging after visits,
more breakdowns. [J.E.M.] gets more emotional, more revved
up after calls and after visits and during calls sometimes. It’s
been noted that bio parents seem to provoke behavior, such as
spitting or taking items from each other during visits. During
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one of the calls [Z.K.C.M.] had -- [J.E.M.] had taken something
from [Z.K.C.M.]. Parents had encouraged him to take it, and
then [Z.K.C.M.] was crying and they were essentially making
fun of [Z.K.C.M.] for crying.
N.T., 1/9/23, at 41.
Ms. Farrisi ultimately opined that it was in the Children’s best interests
to terminate parental rights:
Q. And based on your entire experience with [Parents], and
everything you have seen, at this point do you think it’s in the
[C]hildren’s best interest to move forward with the
termination?
A. I think they deserve permanency. I think the back and forth is
really hard for them. And at this time, I don’t think [P]arents
have shown that they can comply with what needs to be
complied with. Given that, I would say yes.
Id. at 53.
By decrees issued January 9, 2023, the trial court involuntarily
terminated Parents’ rights to J.O.M.T.W. and E.L.M.T.W, and, additionally,
Mother’s rights to the twins and Z.K.C.M. Thereafter, on February 3, 2023,
Mother, through appointed counsel, filed timely notices of appeal from the
orders terminating her parental rights, along with concise statements of errors
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complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). 10 The
trial court likewise complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.11
Mother raises the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court erred when it entered an order on January
9, 2023 terminating [Mother’s] parental rights?
Mother’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review is as follows:
[I]n cases involving involuntary termination of parental rights[,
our review] is limited to determining whether the trial court’s
determination is supported by competent evidence. When
applying this standard of review, an appellate court must accept
the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
if they are supported by evidence of record. Where the trial
court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion is found where there is a demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. It matters
not that an appellate court might have reached a different
conclusion, as it is well-established that absent an abuse of
discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for
the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand.
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10 Mother’s appeals were consolidated by this Court sua sponte on March 6,
2023.
11 We note with disapproval that neither the GAL nor legal counsel filed a brief
with this Court. However, at the conclusion of the subject proceedings, the
GAL recommended that the court grant CYS’s petitions with respect to
Parents. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 144-46. The Children’s legal counsel was
unable to ascertain a preference. See id. at 146-47. However, presently, the
Children’s legal counsel, while declining to file a brief, has opined that the
Children would concur with Mother’s assertion of error. See Letter, 4/10/23.
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In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021) (internal citations
omitted).
In her sole appellate issue, Mother challenges the termination of her
parental rights. Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary
termination of parental rights proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.
Subsection 2511(a) provides grounds for the involuntary termination of
parental rights. If the trial court finds clear and convincing evidence
supporting the existence of one of the grounds for termination set forth in
subsection (a), the court must then consider whether termination would best
serve the child under subsection (b). See id. § 2511(b). This Court need
only agree with one of the grounds set forth in subsection (a) to affirm,
provided subsection (b) is also satisfied. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Here, the trial court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to
the Children pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). See Trial
Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 23. As we need only agree with the trial court’s
determination as to any one section of 2511(a), we limit our discussion to
sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
****
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
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essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
****
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2)
due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those
grounds may also include acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental
duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated
on other grounds by In re K.T., --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL 4092986 at *16 n.23
(Pa. 2023). Section 2511(a)(2) “emphasizes the child’s present and future
need for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being,” especially “where disruption of the family has
already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” In re
Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citation and emphasis
omitted). We have long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
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responsibilities. See In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.
Super. 2017). At a termination hearing, the trial court may properly reject as
untimely or disingenuous a parent’s vow to follow through on necessary
services when the parent failed to cooperate with the agency or take
advantage of available services during the dependency proceedings. See In
re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105.
Mother argues that she “worked to the best of her ability” to complete
her goals, and asserts that her parenting of the Children was satisfactory as
evinced by the fact that no dependency or termination matters were open vis-
à-vis her youngest child. See Mother’s Brief at 24-25. Mother argues she
had no concerns for her safety at the hands of Father, and she found
counseling with Mr. Stewart and with her pastor “helpful.” See id. at 25. She
contends she has “consistently maintained her desire to resume the parental
responsibilities for her children.” Id. at 24.12
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12 We note, initially, that despite the trial court finding grounds for termination
pursuant to several subsections—which the court noted in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion which preceded Mother’s brief—Mother, in her argument, does not
analyze any particular subsection of 2511(a). See Mother’s Brief at 22-26.
We could thus conclude that any assertion of error as to section 2511(a)(2) is
waived for failure to address this issue in a meaningful way with citation to
pertinent legal authorities in his brief. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3
(Pa. Super. 2011) (holding that where an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived);
see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(explaining this Court will not review an appellant’s claim unless it is included
in both the concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and statement
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In concluding that CYS satisfied the statutory grounds to terminate
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to, inter alia, section 2511(a)(2), the trial
court found as follows:
. . . [W]hile [Parents] completed some of their goals such as being
employed and Father completing a parenting class, [Parents]
failed to follow recommendations, failed to complete many
important goals, and were unwilling to complete them. [Parents]
were not sufficiently involved in the placements. [Parents] were
not setting a good example for behavior. [Parents] did not feed
the [] Children appropriately. While [Parents] made significant
progress on their housing situation, the goal remained
uncompleted. Father has a concerning anger issue that has not
been resolved. . . . [CYS] was concerned about the severity of
Father’s usage of marijuana. There are concerns of possible
domestic violence and dishonesty in these cases. Lastly, [Parents]
were resistant to couples counseling. Again, th[e c]ourt notes that
[Parents’] overall unsatisfactory conduct persisted over the whole
history of these cases; at least thirteen months had passed since
E.L.M.T.W. was adjudicated dependent and twenty-six months
had passed since the rest of the [] Children were adjudicated
dependent.
****
. . . [A]ll of the . . . Children have . . . been waiting in the legal
and physical custody of [CYS] for at least thirteen months by the
January 9, 2023[] hearing. [Parents] did not make much progress
regarding [CYS’s] overall main concerns for [them] when
considering the totality of the record. Additionally, no goals had
been completed since September [] 2022[,] when [the c]court
gave [Parents] additional time to try to improve the situation.
[Parents’] resistance to making improvements that [CYS]
recommended troubled th[e c]ourt. [Parents] . . . could have . .
replaced the . . . Children’s sheets and mattresses, signed the
behavioral contract to resume [Mr.] Stewart’s services, and signed
the release for the alleged pastor to speak with [CYS] about these
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of questions involved and developed in his or her argument and supported by
citation to relevant legal authority).
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cases. However, [Parents] chose to not comply with any of these
recommendations . . ..
****
Th[e c]ourt notes that [Parents] did make progress on some
of their goals[,] and th[e c]ourt considered their progress. This
[c]ourt was pleased that [Parents] were both employed, that
Father completed a parenting class, that [Parents] almost had a
sufficient home, and that [Parents] had a bond with the []
Children. [. . .] However, [Parents] did not make much progress
on important goals that mattered and failed to follow
recommendations; the overall major concerns of [Parents] not
following recommendations, being dishonest, and possibly
violent[,] remained.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 24-25, 29-30 (citations to the record
omitted).
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court
in concluding that grounds existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). Mother, inter alia, did not complete the
domestic violence intervention; exhibited a lack of cooperation with the
family’s counselor, Mr. Stewart; and failed to follow agency recommendations,
including, for example, obtaining appropriate bedding and food for the
children. The record thus demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and continued
incapacity, neglect or refusal to comply with their permanency plan
reunification goals has caused the Children to be without essential parental
care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being.
Further, despite the trial court continuing the matter from September 2022 to
January 2023, no additional goals were completed, which demonstrates that
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the conditions and causes of this refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). As this
Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent
attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.
2006).13
Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to section
2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under
section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d
at 267. Regarding the section 2511(b) best interest analysis, this Court has
explained:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
____________________________________________
13 Regarding Mother’s argument that her ability to parent her infant evinces
her ability to appropriately parent the Children, subsection (a)(2) covers
incapacity, neglect, and refusal; here, the supra evidence amply
demonstrates Mother’s refusal to parent the Children, notwithstanding her
asserted capacity to parent her then-newborn child. Cf. In re S.K.L.R., 256
A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021) (holding that a parent’s ability to parent a
younger sibling is relevant and admissible in termination of parental rights
proceedings for older siblings, but that the fact-finder must, as with other
admitted evidence, determine the appropriate weight to assign to that
evidence).
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The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. Rather, the [trial] court must
examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship. . . ..
In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations,
quotations, brackets, and indentation omitted). Furthermore, our Supreme
Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering
termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive
home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). In weighing the bond considerations pursuant
to section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in
mind.” Id. at 269. Children “are young for a scant number of years, and we
have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts
fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
As our Supreme Court recently explained in K.T.,
a court conducting a [s]ection 2511(b) analysis must consider
more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from
severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the
parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b)
analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is
necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the
bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare.
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2023 WL 4092986 at *18 (emphasis added). In addition, the K.T. Court
explained that the inquiry must consider and weigh certain evidence if it is
present in the record, including, but not limited to, the child’s “need for
permanency and length of time in foster care . . .; whether the child is in a
preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster
home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs,
including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id.(footnote omitted).
Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that
termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the Children
pursuant to section 2511(b). Mother’s argument hinges on the Children’s
bond to her. See Mother’s Brief at 25. She notes her own enjoyment of
“doing [the Children’s] hair,” and that she has provided clothing and
appropriate housing for them. See id. at 25-26. She lastly expresses
“concern[] about the [C]hildren[’s] separation from each other and their
parents.” See id. at 26.
In concluding that termination of Parents’ parental rights best serves
the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare
pursuant to section 2511(b), the trial court stated:
This [c]ourt notes that [Parents] do share a bond with the []
Children, but th[e c]ourt does not find that this bond is necessary
or beneficial. Th[e c]ourt . . . notes that the [] Children are happy
to see [Parents]. However, this [c]ourt found that the termination
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of [Parents’] parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the [] Children because of the following[:] The []
Children are also happy to see the foster parents. [. . .] The
current foster parents are adoptive resources. While the boys are
in one home and the girls are in another, the foster parents of
both homes are friends, so the [] Children see each other many
times each week. The caseworker who worked on the case for
approximately two-and-one-half years testified that it is in the []
Children’s best interest to terminate the parental rights. The []
Children deserve permanency, and moving back and forth is really
difficult for them. Lastly, [Parents] have not shown that they can
comply with [CYS’s] require[ments]. . . . [Parents’] parental
rights to the custody and rearing of the [] Children were
converted, upon the failure to fulfill their parental duties,
[considering] the [] Children’s rights to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of their potential in a permanent, healthy, and safe
environment. E.L.M.T.W. had been involved with [CYS] for at
least thirteen months by the January 9, 2023, hearing, and
[J.O.M.T.W. was] involved with [CYS] for at least twenty-six
months by that date. The developmental, physical, and emotional
needs as well as the welfare of the [] Children are all being
addressed better by the foster parents.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/23, at 28-29 (citations omitted).
Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
As CYS foster care supervisor Ms. Farrisi testified to, while Children have a
bond with Parents, they are also bonded to their preadoptive foster parents,
who are better able to provide for the Children’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs, and facilitate contact among the siblings; whereas Mother
has, despite ample opportunity, failed to show she can provide the requisite
stability. As Mother has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in
finding grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), or in its
determination that termination of her parental rights best serves the
Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant
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to section 2511(b), she is due no relief. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
the termination decrees.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/11/2023
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