In Re: Adoption of R.L., minor, Appeal of: R.L.-K.

J-S24014-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF R.L., (MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHILD) : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: R.L.-K., FATHER :
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: No. 1550 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 63-16-0278
IN RE: ADOPTION OF R.L., (MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHILD) : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: R.L-K., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1551 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 63-16-0277
IN RE: ADOPTION OF O.L., (MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CHILD) : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: R. L.-K., FATHER :
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: No. 1552 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 63-16-0273
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BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 18, 2017
R.L.-K. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on September 13,
2016, terminating his parental rights to his children, twin sons, R.L. and
R.L., (born in July 2011); and daughter, O.L., (born in October 2012)
(collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (b).1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court set forth the factual background and
procedural history of this appeal, including describing Mother’s involvement
as it is important to Father’s claims. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 1-
5.2
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The trial court terminated the parental rights of the Children’s mother, V.C.
(“Mother”). Mother has not filed an appeal from the termination of her
parental rights to the Children, nor is she a party to the instant appeal.
2
In its opinion entered with the termination orders, the trial court noted that
Mother has five children who were subjects of the termination proceedings.
Only the three children at issue here were fathered by Father, however.
Their two siblings who were subjects of the evidentiary hearing are not
subjects of this appeal. C.R. is the father of K.R., a female born in
September 2008, and K.C., a male born in October 2010, who is blind and
autistic. See N.T., 5/24/16, Vol. I, at 14. In addition, Mother and Father had
a male baby, R.L., born in December 2015, who is not part of these
proceedings. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/16, at 1-2; see also N.T.,
5/24/16, Vol. I, at 14.
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On March 2, 2016, Washington County Children and Youth Social
Services Agency (“CYS” or “the Agency”) filed a petition to involuntarily
terminate Father’s parental rights with regard to each of the Children. On
May 24, 2016, June 21, 2016, and June 22, 2016, the trial court held
evidentiary hearings on the termination petitions. Mother and Father were
present and represented by counsel. C.R., the father of two of Mother’s
children, did not appear. The Children were represented by a Guardian ad
Litem (“GAL”). CYS, Mother, Father, and the GAL submitted suggested
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the trial court.
The trial court stated its findings of fact with regard to the evidentiary
hearings as follows.
CYS first became involved with this family in 2008. The
[C]hildren were previously adjudicated dependent and the case
subsequently successfully closed in 2013. In January of 2015,
the case was opened again after CYS received a report that
Mother was using cocaine and not caring for the [C]hildren
properly. The [m]other accepted voluntary services. On April 9,
2015, CYS was asked by the police to come to the home. The
[m]other and [f]ather were engaged in a verbal domestic
dispute; when the police arrived, the [m]other appeared under
the influence and the [f]ather was being aggressive. The house
was in poor condition. The [C]hildren were removed from the
home and have been in placement since. The [C]hildren were
adjudicated dependent on April 30, 2015. The [C]hildren were
initially placed with the [f]ather’s mother; they were removed in
July of 2015 due to the grandmother’s positive drug test. [K.C.]
was placed with [D.P.], [Father’s] aunt and foster mom. The
other four children were placed in the foster home of [D. and M.
C.], where they have remained.
At the dependency hearing, the Juvenile Court judge ordered the
Mother and both [f]athers to obtain a drug and alcohol
evaluation and follow through with any recommended treatment,
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to obtain a mental health evaluation and follow through with any
recommended treatment, and to participate in a parenting
program and to maintain stable housing.
[C.R.], the father of the two oldest children, has had no contact
with his children since they have been in placement. When the
children were placed, CYS attempted to contact [C.R.] and were
unable to do so. They spoke with [C.R.’s] mother, who told them
[C.R.] wanted nothing to do with the children or with CYS.
[C.R.] has no relationship with the children.
Recognizing the special needs of [K.C.] and the good care that
[D.P.] is providing and acknowledging the strong bond between
[D.P.] and [K.C.], the [m]other has voluntarily relinquished her
parental rights to [K.C.]. [D.P.] is supportive of continued
contact between [K.C.] and the [m]other[,] and maintains a
close relationship with the foster family and with [K.C.’s] four
siblings. The baby [R.L.] is also placed with Ms. [P.]
Since the children were removed from her care in April of 2015,
the [m]other has engaged in the services asked of her but has
not successfully completed any of them. For drug and alcohol
treatment, the [m]other initially attended Wesley Spectrum. In
July of 2015, she began a parenting program through Justice
Works. Mother was evicted in June of 2015 and was homeless
until February 2015. In August of 2015, Mother moved to
Florida, hoping to get housing and employment and wanted to
have the [C]hildren placed with her there. She returned to
Pennsylvania in early October. In the interim, the drug and
alcohol and parenting program had discharged her for non-
compliance. The [m]other and [f]ather obtained housing
together in February of 2016. It is a two[-]bedroom apartment.
The [m]other and [f]ather’s relationship appears to be stable
and close.
The [m]other obtained a mental health evaluation in March of
2016. Mother was asked to participate in an interactional
evaluation with the [C]hildren. It was initially scheduled for
November 2015 and December of 2015[,] and Mother failed to
attend. She finally met with Dr. Rosenblum on March 18, 2016.
Dr. Rosenblum reported that Mother displayed patience with the
[C]hildren and that the [C]hildren were happy to see her and
have an attachment with her. He also reported that Mother
provided no structure during this time together, did not initiate
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any play or exchange with the [C]hildren and lacked focus. Dr.
Rosenblum found the [C]hildren to be very challenging with
significant behavior issues and the [m]other failed to
acknowledge or understand any of the [C]hildren’s issues. Dr.
Rosenblum supported the goal of adoption; he opined that the
[C]hildren have already experienced the grief and loss of
separation from their mother[,] and no substantial harm would
be caused by a termination at this time.
After Mother returned from Florida, she again began parenting
services with Justice Works but was non-compliant and
discharged in February 2016 with minimal progress noted. She
restarted services with them at the direction of Juvenile Court on
March 27, 2016[,] and has been participating with the program
two times a week at her home.
Mother received a mental health evaluation on March 8, 2016.
She was recommended to participate in a dual diagnosis
program (drug and alcohol and mental health). The [m]other
denies having a drug problem and denies the use of illegal
drugs, except for trying cocaine with a friend in January 2015.
Since March 2015, CYS has tested 17 times; three times the
[m]other has refused, which is considered a positive test. The
last refusal was February 24, 2016.
The [f]ather admits to a history of opiate dependency. He
participated in an inpatient program through Greenbriar in
September of 2015 and was successfully discharged to
outpatient treatment with Wesley Spectrum. He now is in
treatment with Freedom Health Care since February 2016.
There are no reports of relapse. Father is receiving Suboxone
treatment. His counselor reports that he is doing well and taking
responsibility and is hopeful yet guarded on his prognosis.
Father has not tested positive for opiates. He has tested positive
for marijuana twice.
The [f]ather did not participate in the interactional evaluation
with Dr. Rosenblum. Father did not participate in the Family
Group Decision Making meeting offered by CYS. Father was
working with Justice Works in the parenting program in the fall
of 2015. When Mother returned from Florida, Father became
non-compliant and was discharged in November 2015. He has
begun services again with Justice Works in April 2016.
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The visits between the [C]hildren and Father go well. The
[f]ather is active and involved with the [C]hildren. The visitation
aide reported that the children are very affectionate with Father
and that they interact well. The twins have had issues with food
and will gorge themselves. The parents have been asked to bring
to bring healthy snacks to visits, but they continue to bring only
Oodles of Noodles and candy.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/16, at 2-5.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found clear and
convincing evidence to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Children.
Father timely filed notices of appeal with concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) with
regard to the orders terminating his parental rights to each of his three
children. This Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.
In his brief on appeal, Father raises the following issues:
I. Whether the trial court improperly terminated Father’s
parental rights when evidence was presented that Father had
made significant efforts to overcome his drug addiction and to
remedy the conditions which led to the removal of the Minor
Children and, therefore, it was reasonably possible that the
conditions which led to the removal of the Minor Children would
be remedied by Father so that he could be reunited with the
Minor Children[?]
II. Whether the trial court improperly terminated Father’s
parental rights when evidence was presented that Father has a
close bond with the Minor Child and that the Minor Child would
suffer detrimental harm if the parent-child bond were severed[?]
Father’s Brief, at 7.
Father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental
rights under § 2511(a) and (b) of the Adoption Act. He contends that the
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trial court failed to recognize the significant efforts that he made, before and
during the termination proceedings, to overcome his addiction to drugs and
to remedy other conditions that necessitated the removal of the Children.
Father also asserts that the trial court erred in finding a lack of a strong
bond between him and the Children and/or that termination of that bond
would not be detrimental to the Children given the “contradictive and
incomplete evidence” presented by the Agency on this issue. See Father’s
Brief, at 13.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
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hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite
result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases,
an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial
court and impose its own credibility determinations and
judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as
the factual findings are supported by the record and the court’s
legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse
of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066
(Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained that
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of §
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). We will focus on subsections (a)(2) and (b), and review the evidence
concerning Father and Mother together, as did the trial court, as it is
important to determining whether the termination of Father’s parental rights
was warranted. Section 2511(a)(2) and (b) provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
To satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(2), the moving party must
produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental
rights under § 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
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remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties. See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Here, in its opinion, the trial court stated the following with regard to §
2511(a):
“Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a
child. A child needs love, protection, guidance and support …
parental obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance … parental duty requires that a parent exert himself
to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.” In
Re: Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (1977). The
[C]hildren have been out of the care of the parents for over one
year. Neither parent is performing any day-to-day parental
duties. Only during visitation do the parents have any
responsibilities for their children. The visitation has been limited
to supervised contact for a few hours per week. The [C]hildren
were removed from the parents due to drug and alcohol abuse,
ongoing domestic conflict, poor housing and inadequate
parenting abilities. When children are placed outside of the home
by the dependency court, the parents have a duty to work
towards the return of the [C]hildren by cooperating with CYS to
obtain the services necessary to become capable of performing
parental responsibilities. In Re: G.-P.-R., 851 A.2d 967 (Pa.
Super. 2004). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts
toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities.” In the Interest of A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326 (Pa.
Super. 2002).
The [m]other has not worked for the return of her four
children with any haste. The [m]other started services, then
became homeless, moved to Florida, returned, [and] remained
homeless when a women’s shelter was available and could assist
with services. For one year after the [C]hildren’s placement, the
[m]other failed to complete any of the services asked of her.
Only since March of 2016 has she been in services with any
regularity. The [m]other’s overall parenting ability is marginal at
best. She has failed to recognize any of the behavior and
emotional problems of the four children, stating that none of
those behaviors existed when they were in her care. However,
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Dr. Rosenblum’s diagnoses of the [C]hildren belie that
contention. The [C]hildren have been subjected to extreme
neglect. When Mother was caring for five children, one of whom
is blind and [requires] total care, understandably she was
overwhelmed, but she sought no assistance and did not
adequately attend to her children’s needs.She received parenting
education when the case opened earlier and again in 2015 and
now again in 2016. She has yet to successfully complete a
parenting program, a drug and alcohol program, nor is she
receiving regular mental health treatment. The fact that the
[C]hildren have been out of the home for a year and the fact
that Mother is again needing parenting classes support this
[c]ourt's finding that the conditions that led to removal cannot
be remedied by the [m]other. These four children are placed
together and are happy and bonded with their foster family.
They all have special needs which are being provided for by the
foster family. The [C]hildren recognize their [m]other and have a
bond with her, but it is not a close one. None of the [c]hildren
have [sic] expressed a desire to live with her; in fact, they
specifically expressed to the CASA [Court-Appointed Special
Advocate] a desire not to be with her. She has been reportedly
mean to them during visits, getting frustrated and yelling. The
[C]hildren have been out of their home for over a year. They
express a desire to remain in their current foster care home.
They have a strong attachment to the foster parents who desire
to adopt them and have shown a clear ability to parent them in a
positive nurturing manner, dealing with their behavior and
emotional issues appropriately. The [c]ourt finds that there will
be no negative effect on the [C]hildren by severing the bond
between the [m]other and the [C]hildren and that the
termination best serves the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren.
For the reasons set forth above, the [c]ourt finds that CYS has
established by clear and convincing evidence that the [m]other’s
rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(1), (2) and (5) and that[,] pursuant to §2511(b), the
termination of the Mother’s rights will best serve the needs and
welfare of the [C]hildren.
The [f]ather similarly has not acted with requisite swiftness in
order to have his children returned to him. While he has been
successful in drug and alcohol treatment since September of
2015, he has just recently restarted the parenting program and
is waiting to begin an anger management program. He had
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completed much of the parenting program with the [C]hildren
when the [m]other was in Florida. When she returned, however,
Father backed off and essentially abandoned his efforts of being
reunited with his children. He has had stable housing only since
February of 2016. The conditions that led to the removal of the
[C]hildren have not been remedied.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/16, at 5-9.
In another opinion, the trial court stated as follows:
The [C]hildren were adjudicated dependent in April 30, 2015 and
it was clear that the Father’s (and Mother’s) incapacity, neglect
or refusal caused the children to be without essential parental
care, thus satisfying the first two elements. The issue was
whether this incapacity, neglect or refusal could be remedied by
the [f]ather. As stated, the [C]hildren were removed due to drug
and alcohol issues, domestic conflict, inadequate parenting
abilities and poor housing. At the time of the filing of the
petition, CYS was working with the family for over a year before
the petitions to terminate were filed. There was a previous
involvement with the family when the [C]hildren were placed in
foster care and eventually returned to the parents. (T.T. Vol. I,
p. 17) The [f]ather’s efforts to remedy all of the conditions that
led to the removal of the [C]hildren were insufficient. He did not
do anything for four months except visit with the [C]hildren;
then he began a drug treatment program which was ongoing and
began a Suboxone treatment program in early 2016. At the time
of the hearings, Father had yet to complete a parenting program
or an anger management program. The [f]ather obtained
housing just weeks before the petition was filed and just
reconciled with Mother. The incapacity of the [f]ather caused the
[C]hildren to be placed in foster care for extended periods of
time in these children’s young lives. The [c]ourt found that
providing Father with additional time was not likely to remedy
the condition and causes of his incapacity.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 7-8.
The termination of Father’s parental rights to the Children is warranted
pursuant to subsection (a)(2), as Father lacks parental capacity, and the
evidence showed that he will be unable to remedy that situation within a
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reasonable period of time, if ever. As there is competent evidence in the
record that supports the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations,
we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in finding that Father’s
parental rights should be terminated under § 2511(a)(2).
Next, we address § 2511(b). We have explained that the focus in
terminating parental rights under subsection (a) is on the parent, but it is on
the child pursuant to subsection (b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956
A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in
support of termination under subsection (b), our Supreme Court stated the
following:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of
the child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481,
485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the
child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
In its opinion, the trial court stated the following with regard to
subsection (b):
The issue of [§]2511(b) is more difficult. The [C]hildren have a
bond with their father. Credible testimony has been offered that
the [f]ather and the [C]hildren interact well with each other
during the visits. The [f]ather is able to direct them; he
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recognizes their behavior and emotional issues and deals with
them appropriately. However, the strength of that bond has
diminished over time. Ms. Gorman, the CASA, testified credibly
that the [C]hildren want to live with their foster parents, that
their mom and dad were mean and did not want to live with
them. The [f]ather did not participate in the interactional
evaluation that was set up specifically to address this issue.
While Father offered an excuse of sleeping in and failing to
confirm his need for transportation, he also expressed mistrust
of the use of a psychologist selected by CYS. The [c]ourt finds
that[,] while a bond exists, severing the bond will not cause
significant harm as the [C]hildren have already experienced that
loss. The [C]hildren desire to remain with the foster family. The
Guardian ad Litem supports the termination as to all of the
parents.
In conclusion, the [c]ourt finds that CYS has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the [f]ather has failed to perform his
parental duties for at least six months ([§2511(a)(1)]), that the
[f]ather has shown an incapacity which has caused the
[C]hildren to be without essential parental care ([§2511(a)(2)])
and that the best interest of the [C]hildren will be served by the
termination of his parental rights (§2511(b)).
Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/16, at 9-10.
In another opinion, the trial court stated the following:
The [C]hildren have a bond with their father. Credible testimony
was offered that the Father and the [C]hildren interact well with
each other during the visits. The [f]ather was able to direct
them; he recognized their behavior and emotional issues and
dealt with them appropriately. However, the strength of that
bond has diminished over time. Ms. Gorman, the Court
Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), testified credibly that the
[C]hildren want to live with their foster parents, their mom and
dad were mean and they did not want to live with them. (T.T.
Vol. II, pp. 89-90) The [f]ather did not participate in the
interactional evaluation that was set up specifically to address
this issue. While Father offered an excuse of sleeping in and
failing to confirm his need for transportation, he also expressed
mistrust of the use of a psychologist selected by CYS. (T.T. Vol.
IV, p. 114) The [c]ourt found that while a bond existed, severing
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the bond would not cause significant harm as the [C]hildren
already experienced that loss. The [C]hildren desired to remain
with the foster family. The Guardian ad Litem supported the
termination as to Father. (Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law filed by Attorney Renee Colbert [GAL] on July
14, 2016)
***
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the [c]ourt found
that CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
[f]ather failed to perform his parental duties for at least six
months [§2511(a)(1)], that the [f]ather showed an incapacity
which has caused the [C]hildren to be without essential parental
care [§2511(a)(2),] and that the best interest of the [C]hildren
was served by the termination of his parental rights (§2511(b).)
Trial Court Opinion, 12/2/16, at 8-9.
When evaluating a parental bond, the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, subsection (b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it part of
the certified record, “[t]here are some instances … where direct observation
of the interaction between the parent and the child is not necessary and may
even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this
analysis:
concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
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reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent … Nor
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in [and] of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent,
to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety
needs of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763-764 (affirming the
involuntary termination of the mother’s parental rights, despite the existence
of some bond, where placement with the mother would be contrary to the
child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother would be fairly
attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost constantly, for
four years).
Our Supreme Court has observed that the mere existence of a bond or
attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a
termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often
harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” In re: T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535). The Supreme
Court instructed, “[t]he continued attachment to the natural parents, despite
serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure to correct
parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the children cannot be
misconstrued as bonding.” In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting In re
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Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M., 839 A.2d 410, 418 (Pa. Super.
2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting)).
We have explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection
for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. See In re
Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Further, this Court has stated: “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of … her child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill … her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well-settled that “we will not toll the
well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of
C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the
hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.”)).
After a careful review of the record in this matter, we find the record
supports the trial court’s factual findings, and the court’s conclusions are not
the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See In re Adoption
of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. There was sufficient, competent evidence in the
record for the trial court to find the grounds for termination of parental
rights under § 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied. There was also sufficient, competent evidence in the record for
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the trial court to find that the Children’s best interests are served by their
foster parents, and that no bond exists between the Children and Father
such that the Children would suffer permanent emotional harm from the
termination of Father’s parental rights. We, therefore, affirm the orders
terminating Father’s parental rights with regard to the Children under §
2511(a)(2) and (b).
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/18/2017
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