Corcoran, J. v. Corcoran, L., Jr.

J-A20033-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
JANICE M. CORCORAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LARRY D. CORCORAN, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 319 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered February 15, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-2023-00059
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: NOVEMBER 28, 2023
Appellant, Larry D. Corcoran, Jr., appeals from the final order entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County granting the petition
for Protection from Abuse (“PFA”)1 filed by his wife, Janice M. Corcoran, who
is Appellee in the present appeal. We affirm.
The notes of testimony from the February 15, 2023, hearing on Ms.
Corcoran’s PFA petition establish that both parties were represented by
counsel. N.T. 2/15/23, at 2. At the outset of the hearing, counsel for
Appellant informed the trial court that “while [Appellant] denies the
allegations, he is open to having an order of protection issued against him,
providing he is allowed to remove all of his personal items from the home.”
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6122.
J-A20033-23
Id. Upon learning that the parties had not yet discussed, let alone agreed on,
the terms of a prospective PFA order, the trial court ordered a brief recess to
permit them to arrive at an agreement. Id.
When the hearing resumed, counsel for Appellant announced that
Appellant “agreed to everything” after receiving a full explanation of the terms
and conditions, and counsel for the petitioner, Janice Corcoran, likewise stated
that the parties “have an agreement.” N.T. at 3. Specifically, counsel for Ms.
Corcoran elaborated:
Counsel: The agreement is for a PFA for three years.
[Appellant] will be evicted and excluded from the residence where
my client currently is and had been [Appellant’s] residence up until
the filing of the PFA.
[Appellant] will pay the home insurance and the property taxes.
The home – they jointly own the home and [Ms. Corcoran] will
pay all of the other household bills. [Appellant] will make sure
they are all in [Ms. Corcoran’s] name and [Ms. Corcoran] agrees
to list the home for sale after six months. . . . And [Appellant]
will have a full day to retrieve his personal property from the
house.
N.T. at 3-4. Counsel further clarified that the agreement called for Appellant’s
brother to retrieve, on a date agreed upon by the parties, Appellant’s clothing,
personal effects, tools, and anything that belongs to him. N.T. at 4.
The trial court then addressed each party in turn, confirming that each
understood and approved the described agreement, N.T. at 5-6. With that,
the trial court entered a three-year PFA order. N.T. at 6. On February 24,
2023, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 904(a).
-2-
J-A20033-23
“Our standard of review for PFA orders is well settled. ‘In the context
of a PFA order, we review the trial court's legal conclusions for an error of law
or abuse of discretion.’” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super.
2014) (quoting Stamus v. Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Pa. Super.
2007)).
Appellant has filed a pro se brief raising twelve undeveloped, conclusory
issues contesting either the effective assistance of counsel or the validity of
the PFA order. See Brief for Appellant, pp. 1-12b. “When briefing the various
issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant's duty to present
arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must
support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and
with citations to legal authorities. ... [W]hen defects in a brief impede our
ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal
entirely or find certain issues to be waived.” See Commonwealth v. Hardy,
918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Herein, we conclude that Appellant’s briefing deficiencies hamper
meaningful review, and we deny relief on this basis. Nevertheless, even if we
were to reach the merits of Appellant’s truncated, fatally undeveloped issues
on appeal, we would discern no merit to any of them. It is well-settled that,
“[o]rdinarily, a party who consents to, or acquiesces in, a judgment or order
cannot appeal therefrom.” Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Department of Health, 434 A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. 1981) (citing authority
holding that to obtain appellate relief from claimed error a party must first
-3-
J-A20033-23
present it to the court whose determination is challenged on appeal); accord
Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Ry. Co., 916 A.2d 1091, 1097 (Pa. 2007).
The record before us demonstrates that Appellant freely consented in
open court to the agreement after having received the benefit of both
representation by counsel in the formation of the agreement and instruction
by the trial court that the agreement was contingent upon his approval, which
he was free to withhold. The substance of the agreement, moreover, was
uncomplicated and clearly articulated by respective counsel, such that there
simply exists no evidence that one or both parties misconstrued any aspect of
the agreement. For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s appeal
affords him no relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/28/2023
-4-