Vindancar, LLC v. First American Title Ins. Co.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
VINDANCAR, LLC, TRAP : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ENTERPRISES, LLC, VINCENT : PENNSYLVANIA
TRAPASSO, CHINLA, LLC :
:
:
v. :
:
:
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE : No. 2715 EDA 2022
COMPANY, JOSEPH P. HANYON, :
ESQUIRE, MERWINE HANYON & :
KASPSZYK, LLC AND PENN REALTY :
SETTLEMENT SERVICES, INC. :
:
:
APPEAL OF: VINDANCAR, LLC, TRAP :
ENTERPRISES, LLC, VINCENT :
TRAPASSO, CHINLA, LLC, CHARLIE :
TRAPASSO :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
005564-CV-2016
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 1, 2023
Vindancar, LLC, Trap Enterprises, LLC, Chinla, LLC, Vincent Trapasso
and Charlie Trapasso (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the order entered
in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in
favor of First American Title Insurance Company (First American) and Joseph
P. Hanyon, Esquire (Hanyon), Merwine Hanyon & Kaspszyk, LLC (MHK), and
Penn Realty Settlement Services, Inc. (PRSS) (collectively, Hanyon
Defendants), in this action seeking damages for legal malpractice, breach of
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contract, and negligence in connection with the purchase of real property. On
appeal, Appellants argue the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of both First American and the Hanyon Defendants on Appellants’
claim that the defendants failed to clear clouds on the title to the property,
regardless of the validity of the underlying judgments. We are constrained to
conclude, however, that Appellants waived their claims on appeal when they
filed an untimely court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained on appeal. Thus, we affirm.
The relevant facts underlying this dispute are summarized by the trial
court as follows:
[Appellants] bought several contiguous parcels of real property
along Pa. Route 611 in Pocono Township, Monroe County in 2007.
. . . [Appellants] hired Hanyon and MHK to represent them in the
transactions. PRSS issued the title insurance policy in the
transaction on behalf of . . . First American. In or about December
2014, [Appellants] learned of an alleged title issue [a]ffecting the
real property at [the] time of entering into an agreement of sale
with a Mr. Desai to purchase part of the real property for the
development of a hotel. The Hanyon Defendants were made
aware of the title issues and . . . First American, by letter to Desai’s
title insurer, agreed to indemnify and insure over any title issue.
. . . The agreement of sale was eventually terminated by Mr.
Desai in 2015. The parties dispute the reasons . . . why Mr. Desai
terminated the agreement of sale.
In or about July 2016, while attempting to obtain financing
from [a bank] to further develop the real property themselves,
[Appellants] were advised . . . there was a title issue[, and]
Stewart Title Insurance Co. would not issue title insurance for the
loan. The title issue raised in both 2014 and 2016 is alleged to be
liens that were of record against the real property. [Hanyon] gave
assurances the liens no longer existed and/or were resolved. . . .
First American then undertook steps to clear the alleged title issue
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by filing an action to quiet title. That action resolved any
remaining claimed title issues within seven months. . . .
Trial Court Op. (Hanyon Defendants), 9/29/22, at 3-4.
On September 15, 2016, Appellants filed a complaint against the
Hanyon Defendants and First American insisting the property was burdened
by two unsatisfied judgments, of which, they allege, neither the Hanyon
Defendants nor First American informed them at the time of their purchase.
Appellants’ Complaint, 9/15/16, at ¶¶ 30-32. They insisted that due to these
“existing judg[]ments,” they were unable to “move forward” with certain
projects and suffered damages as a result. Id. at ¶ 33; see also id. at ¶¶
34-36. Based on these factual averments, Appellants asserted six causes of
action ─ (1) claims of legal malpractice/breach of contract, legal
malpractice/negligence, negligent supervision, and negligence against the
Hanyon Defendants (Counts I-IV); and (2) claims of breach of contract and
negligent misrepresentation against First American (Counts V-VI). See id. at
¶¶ 42-91.
Both the Hanyon Defendants and First American filed motions for
summary judgment. The Hanyon Defendants argued they were entitled to
relief because neither of the purported outstanding judgments were “valid or
enforceable” and that Appellants could not establish causation or damages.
See Hanyon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/15/22, at ¶¶ 61,
80, 82, 119. First American argued that it did not breach the parties’ contract
in 2007 because the policy required Appellants to provide formal written
“notice of a claim[,]” and, when Appellants did provide notice of the issue in
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July of 2016, it resolved the claim “within several months.” First American’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, 2/15/22, at ¶¶ 26-27, 79. With regard to the
negligent misrepresentation claim, First American averred that Appellants’
allegations were “based on representations made in the policy itself rather
than anything First American said to” Appellants. Id. at ¶ 92.
Appellants filed responses to both motions on March 18, 2022, and,
thereafter, all parties filed briefs in support of their positions. On May 16,
2022, the trial court entered two separate orders, each accompanied by an
opinion, denying the motions for summary judgment filed by the Hanyon
Defendants and First American. See Orders, 5/16/22.
Both the Hanyon Defendants and First American filed motions for
reconsideration on June 14, 2022. The trial court subsequently granted the
motions for reconsideration, vacated the May 16th order, and, following
argument, issued two orders and opinions in September of 2022, granting the
motions for summary judgment. See Order, 6/15/22; Orders, 9/29/22.
With respect to the Hanyon Defendants, the trial court determined that
it had failed to properly consider the fact that the purported judgment liens
on the property were not valid ─ one mortgage lien was extinguished by
operation of law prior to Appellants’ purchase of the property, and the other
judgment lien was “not a lien on the real property” affecting the title because
it was against only one of the prior property owners, and the property was
held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entireties. See Trial Ct. Op.
(Hanyon Defendants), 9/29/22, at 5-6. Therefore, the trial court concluded
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that because the liens were “no longer enforceable as having any legal effect
on the real property[,] there was no duty breached, and no misrepresentations
. . . made, . . . and [Appellants] received good title.” Id. at 10. For the same
reasons, the trial court determined there was no title issue with regard to the
property “negat[ing] any collateral claims against First American.” See Trial
Ct. Op. (First American), 9/29/22, at 5. This timely appeal follows.
Appellants present one issue on appeal for our review:
Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion and committed an
error of law by granting [the Hanyon Defendants’ and First
American’s] motion[s] for summary judgment and concluding that
there was no duty incumbent upon [them] or their agents to act
to remove clouds, whether valid or not, when evidence showed
[the Hanyon Defendants and First American] were aware that
clouds continued to appear on the title searches performed, and
were interfering with [Appellants’] use of their land[?]
Appellants’ Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).
Before we may address Appellants’ substantive claim, we must first
consider whether Appellants properly preserved their issues in a timely-filed,
court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The Pennsylvania Supreme has
held that Rule 1925 is a “bright-line rule” and the “failure to comply with the
minimal requirements of [Rule] 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of
the issues raised.” Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa.
2005) (emphasis added).1 See also Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d
____________________________________________1 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Schofield, Rule 1925 was
amended; however, those amendments have no bearing on our present case.
See Commonwealth v. Hopfer, 965 A.2d 270, 272-73 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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775, 780 (Pa. 2005); Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle
Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 224 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
In the present case, the trial court entered an order on October 25,
2022, directing Appellants to file a Rule 1925(b) statement “no later than 21
days after the entry of [the o]rder.” Order, 10/25/22. The certified record
includes a “Notice” that entry of the order was provided to the parties pursuant
to Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2) that same day.2 See Notice of Entry of Order,
10/25/22. See also Docket Entry, 10/25/22. Thus, Appellants’ Rule 1925(b)
statement was due on or before November 15, 2022.
However, Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) statement is time-stamped and
docketed November 18th, three days late. Moreover, there is no indication in
the certified record that Appellants attempted to file the statement prior to
the November 15th deadline, or requested and were granted an extension of
time from the trial court. Therefore, we must conclude that the Rule 1925(b)
statement was untimely filed, and Appellants have waived their claims on
appeal.
____________________________________________
(explaining amendments to Rule 1925 after Schofield allows trial court to
grant extension of time or, in “extraordinary circumstances,” nunc pro tunc
relief, and provides for “automatic remand” when counsel in criminal case
fails to file timely, court-ordered statement) (citations & emphasis omitted).
2 Rule 236 requires the prothonotary to “immediately give written notice of
the entry of . . . any . . . order . . . to each party’s attorney of record[, and]
include a copy of the order[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2).
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While we recognize that the trial court appears to have accepted
Appellants’ untimely statement and addressed the claims on their merits,3 this
does not excuse the untimely filing. This Court’s en banc decision in Greater
Erie is dispositive.
In Greater Erie, like here, the appellant filed a court-ordered Rule
1925(b) statement three days after the court-imposed deadline. See
Greater Erie, 88 A.3d at 226. However, the trial court ignored the untimely
filing and addressed the appellant’s issue on the merits. See id. at 224.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Castillo and its progeny, the en
banc panel concluded that it was not permitted to ignore the timeliness issue:
Stated simply, it is no longer within this Court’s discretion to
review the merits of an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement based
solely on the trial court’s decision to address the merits of those
untimely raised issues. Under current precedent, even if a trial
court ignores the untimeliness of a Rule 1925(b) statement
and addresses the merits, those claims still must be
considered waived: “Whenever a trial court orders an appellant
to file a concise statement of [errors] complained of on appeal
pursuant to Rule 1925(b), the appellant must comply in a timely
manner.” Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 803 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citing Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780) (emphasis in
original); see Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 940 (Pa.
Super. 2011).
Id. at 225 (some emphasis added).
The Greater Erie Court did recognize that there were still some
“operative exceptions” to Rule 1925(b)’s timeliness requirements ─
specifically, when the trial court’s Rule 1925 order does not sufficiently
____________________________________________
3 See Statements Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 11/18/22.
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conform with the requirements of the Rule, since “it is the trial court’s order
that triggers an appellant’s obligation” to file a concise statement. Greater
Erie, 88 A.3d at 225 (citations & quotation marks omitted). Notably, the Rule
requires that the trial court’s order: (a) specify the number of days after entry
of the order within which the Rule 1925(b) statement must be filed and
served; (2) direct that the statement must be filed of record, and served on
the trial court; (3) provide both the place where the statement may be served
in person and the address to which it may be mailed; and (4) inform the
appellant that “any issue not properly included the Statement timely filed and
served pursuant to [the Rule] shall be deemed waived.” See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(3)(i)-(iv). The order entered by the trial court in the present case
complies in all respects with the requirements of Rule 1925(b)(3). See Order,
10/25/22.
Because Appellants failed to comply with the trial court’s October 25,
2022, order to file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement, we are constrained to
conclude they have failed to preserve any issues for our review. See
Schofield, 888 A.2d at 774; Castillo, 888 A.2d at 780; Greater Erie, 88
A.3d at 224. Thus, we have no option but to affirm the order on appeal.
Order affirmed.
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Date: 12/1/2023
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