Com. v. Grove, G.

J-A23045-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
GIL SCOTT GROVE :
:
Appellant : No. 685 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 3, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0000727-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: DECEMBER 11, 2023
Gil Scott Grove, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered May 3, 2023, in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County following
his convictions for DUI-General Impairment; DUI-Highest Rate; Driving While
Operating Privilege is Suspended or Revoked; Carrying and Exhibiting Driver’s
License on Demand; Registration Card to be Signed and Exhibited on Demand;
Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic; Prohibiting Text-Based
Communications; and Careless Driving.1 Appellant contends that the
suppression court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress, which
challenged the basis of the traffic stop. We conclude that the stop was legal
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c); 75 Pa.C.S.§
1543(b)(1.1)(ii); 75 Pa.C.S. § 1511(a); 75 Pa.C.S. § 1311(b); 75 Pa.C.S. §
3309(1); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3316(a); and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(a).
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because the troopers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Appellant was
DUI. Accordingly, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On January 3,
2022, Pennsylvania State Troopers Vincent Morgan and Collin Reber initiated
a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle leading to his arrest. Prior to trial, Appellant
filed a motion to suppress claiming that the troopers did not possess the
requisite probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of
Appellant's vehicle. Pre-Trial Motion, 4/12/22, at 3. A hearing on the motion
was held on July 26, 2022 at which the Commonwealth played footage of the
traffic stop, and Trooper Morgan and Trooper Reber testified.
Trooper Morgan testified that he has been employed with the
Pennsylvania State Police for six and a half years. Notes of Testimony of
Suppression Hearing, 7/26/23, (hereinafter “N.T.”), at 4. He testified that he
observed a GMC Yukon cross over the lanes of traffic multiple times traveling
southbound on U.S. 222 in Berks County. N.T. at 4. The vehicle then switched
lanes without timely activating its turn signal. N.T. at 5. The Trooper indicated
that these were violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, particularly section
3309(1), and that he activated his emergency lights after these observations.
N.T. at 6. He also testified that his vehicle was close enough to Appellant’s
vehicle that he could observe the violations with his natural vision, and that
he had to accelerate to close the distance between the two cars in initiating
the stop. He did not observe Appellant speeding. N.T. at 10. Trooper Morgan
testified that based on the totality of the circumstances at the time he
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conducted the traffic stop, he had suspicion that the vehicle was being
operated by a drunk driver. N.T. at 18. Trooper Morgan identified Appellant
as the driver of the vehicle stopped. N.T. at 5.
Trooper Reber testified that he has been employed with the
Pennsylvania State Police for about seven years and has handled multiple DUI
cases. N.T. at 19, 21. He stated that on the night of the traffic stop in question,
he observed Appellant’s vehicle cross over the center dash line, cross over it
again, and then “weave” back across the right side where it crossed over the
fog line. N.T. at 19. He observed the vehicle change lanes and not activate its
turn signal until it was in the middle of changing between lanes. N.T. at 20.
Trooper Reber indicated that these were violations of the Motor Vehicle Code,
particularly section 3309(1), and that the “very abrupt weave across the
center line” further raised his suspicions that the driver of the vehicle was DUI
of alcohol or narcotics. N.T. at 21; N.T. at 22, 24, 25. In his experience, drivers
swerve in that way when trying to overcompensate for a “lack of ability to
maintain their lane” when under the influence of a substance. N.T. at 21. On
cross-examination, Trooper Reber estimated that the distance between
Appellant’s vehicle and the Troopers’ vehicle was 300-500 feet upon observing
the first violation and 150-200 feet upon observing the second. The troopers
were traveling approximately fifty-five miles per hour and did not observe
Appellant speeding. N.T. at 22. After the hearing, the suppression court denied
Appellant's motion.
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On February 16, 2023, a bench trial was held in which the parties
stipulated, inter alia, that Appellant’s BAC was 0.264% within two hours after
having operated his vehicle on January 3, 2022; that this was Appellant’s third
DUI within ten years; that Appellant was driving at a time where his operating
privilege was suspended; that Appellant did not possess a license or
registration; and that he was using his cell phone while driving to send text
messages. Stipulations of Fact, 2/16/23, at 1-2. Following the bench trial,
Appellant was convicted on all charges and sentenced to fifteen months to
seven years’ incarceration. Appellant then filed this appeal raising the
following questions for our review:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion
to suppress physical evidence based upon the officer's lack of
reasonable suspicion of suspected driving under the influence
to base the traffic stop of the Appellant’s vehicle?
(2) Whether the court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion
to suppress physical evidence based upon the officer’s lack of
probable cause that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code had
occurred that justified the traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle?
Appellant’s Br. at 4.
Our standard for reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress is
well established. In reviewing a suppression court's denial of a suppression
motion,
we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record,
we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's
legal conclusions are erroneous. . . . Nonetheless, we exercise
plenary review over the suppression court's conclusions of law.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 107 A.3d 52, 93 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
Appellant's questions concern the quantum of cause required in order
for a law enforcement officer to stop a vehicle for an alleged violation of the
Vehicle Code. The relevant statutory authority is 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b), which
states:
(b) Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is
engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring
or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal,
for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of
financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information
as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (bold in original).
This Court has stated,
Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal
activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory
purpose. . . . Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle
stop when the driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory
purpose relevant to the suspected violation.
Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
omitted). Further, this Court has held that an officer must have probable cause
“for a stop based on an observed violation of the vehicle code or another non-
investigable offense.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1009 (Pa.
Super. 2017). “Thus, [section] 6308(b) requires only reasonable suspicion in
support of a stop for the purpose of gathering information necessary to
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enforce the Vehicle Code violation.” Commonwealth v. Venable, 200 A.3d
490, 498 (Pa. Super. 2018).
[W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable
cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the
nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary
to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code
has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the
vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to
further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer
need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI.
If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a
vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the
speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a
highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code
violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.
Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
omitted).
Thus, since different crimes under the vehicle code require different
levels of suspicion, in order to determine if reasonable suspicion or probable
cause was required to be possessed by the troopers, it is necessary to
determine what the suspected violation was, and if the stopping of the vehicle
and the detention of Appellant served a stated investigatory purpose to the
suspected violation.
Our review reflects that the troopers stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to
their suspicion of DUI. While both troopers testified to having observed several
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Motor Vehicle Code violations of the nature that would not require further
investigation, those violations led to the suspicion that Appellant was DUI.
Trooper Morgan suspected at the time, “we may be dealing with a drunk
driver.” N.T. at 18. Trooper Reber stated that he activated his MVR because
“we were under suspicion that we may have a DUI in front of us, someone
who was possibly driving his vehicle under the influence of alcohol or
narcotics.” N.T. at 21. Trooper Reber also stated that in his training and
experience, abrupt swerving like he observed from Appellant’s vehicle
“indicates someone who's compensating because of lack of ability to maintain
their lane because of being under the influence of some substance.” N.T. at
21. Finally, Trooper Reber stated, “we felt that the operator of the vehicle may
have been under the influence of a substance, whether alcohol or narcotics or
drugs, that we wanted to make a stop to investigate to prevent him, if he was,
from possibly crashing his vehicle and harming someone else or himself.” N.T.
at 25. Therefore, the nature of the violation being investigated was a DUI.
As discussed above, a vehicle stop for suspicion of DUI may generally
be based on reasonable suspicion, because such a stop may require further
investigation. See Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. 2008)
(stating that “[e]xtensive case law supports the conclusion [that] a vehicle
stop for DUI may be based on reasonable suspicion, as a post-stop
investigation is normally feasible.”). There is a “distinction between the
investigative potential of a vehicle stop based on a reasonable suspicion of
DUI as compared to other suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.”
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Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 423 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
Since the troopers stopped Appellant’s vehicle due to a suspicion of DUI,
a violation which requires further investigation, they only needed to possess
reasonable suspicion that Appellant was DUI in order to initiate a legal stop.
See Chase, 960 A.2d at 116; Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291. In determining
whether Trooper Morgan and Trooper Reber possessed reasonable suspicion,
“we must accord due weight to the specific reasonable inferences that [they
are] entitled to draw from the facts in light of [their] experience.”
Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 272 (Pa. Super. 2005). Reasonable
suspicion requires an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 95 (Pa. 2011).
This Court has held that reasonable suspicion of DUI is formed when a
qualified officer observes a vehicle weaving and drifting over the fog line. See
Commonwealth v. Walls, 206 A.3d 537, 543 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also
Sands, 887 A.2d at 272 (reasonable suspicion of DUI present where driver
drifted over fog line by three feet three times on straight section of highway);
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908 A.2d 924, 927-28 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(reasonable suspicion of DUI where defendant's vehicle swerved outside of his
lane of travel twice in one mile); Commonwealth v. Masters, 737 A.2d
1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 1999) (reasonable suspicion of DUI where defendant's
vehicle repeatedly changed lanes for no reason). Trooper Morgan and Trooper
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Reber were therefore justified in stopping Appellant’s vehicle to investigate
further to confirm or deny their suspicion.
Here, in explaining its ruling that reasonable suspicion of DUI supported
the stop, the suppression court had the opportunity to view the testimonial
and video evidence. The court concluded that Appellant's vehicle drifted back
twice cross over the dash lines of the left and right lanes of travel and that it
changed lanes two times without timely signaling the change. Tr. Ct. Op.,
6/2/23, Exhibit A, at 2. The court also stated how the “very abrupt weave”
across the center line created suspicion of DUI justifying a traffic stop to
permit further investigation necessary to substantiate the suspicion. Id. at 2-
3. The court, therefore, properly denied Appellant's suppression motion.
Applying the applicable standard of review and considering comparable
decisional law, we conclude that the record supports the court's factual
findings and legal conclusion that reasonable suspicion of DUI supported
Trooper Morgan and Trooper Reber’s traffic stop of Appellant.
Appellant argues that because he was not charged with a violation of 75
Pa.C.S. § 3334, Turning Movements and Required Signals, it must be assumed
that Appellant’s tardiness in using his turn signal did not rise to the level of a
chargeable offense, and thus, no probable cause existed for the vehicle stop.
Appellant’s Br. at 15. However, the fact of Appellant’s tardiness in using his
turn signal is relevant to the analysis for reasonable suspicion of DUI.
Appellant further argues that since 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1), Roadways Laned for
Traffic, requires only that an individual drive “as nearly as practicable entirely
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within a single lane” and his crossing of the traffic lines was minor, no probable
cause existed for a stop of the vehicle. Appellant’s Br. at 18. Whether probable
cause existed sufficient to stop the vehicle for a violation of that section
becomes irrelevant because the nature of the violation being investigated was
a DUI, and Appellant’s movement between lanes of traffic is relevant to the
analysis for reasonable suspicion of DUI.
Because we find that the troopers had sufficient reasonable suspicion of
DUI, and the stop of Appellant’s vehicle would have been legal if the troopers
had either reasonable suspicion of DUI or probable cause of another Motor
Vehicle Code violation, we will not address Appellant’s second issue. Because
the troopers’ reasonable suspicion of DUI was proved by the Commonwealth
at the suppression hearing, we will not reverse the trial court’s conclusion of
law that the stop of Appellant’s vehicle was legal. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/11/2023
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