Com. v. Vega, N.

J-A20033-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
NOEL VEGA :
:
Appellant : No. 1981 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 14, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0005092-2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 06, 2019
Appellant, Noel Vega, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions
for two counts of aggravated assault and one count of resisting arrest.1 We
affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to
restate them.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT APPELLANT OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND
RESISTING ARREST?]
[WHETHER APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3) and 5104, respectively.
J-A20033-19
ASSAULT AND RESISTING ARREST WERE AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?]
[WHETHER THE COURT IMPOSED A MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE, WHERE IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
APPELLANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY, BACKGROUND, AND
EFFECT OF UNDERLYING OFFENSES ON VICTIMS?]
(Appellant’s Brief at 2-5).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable M. Theresa
Johnson, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
(See Trial Court Opinion, filed March 21, 2019, at 5-17) (finding: (1) evidence
was sufficient to convict Appellant of aggravated assault; that police officers
did not seek medical treatment or miss time from work is immaterial in light
of other trial evidence indicating Appellant caused injury to officers while they
were performing their law enforcement duties; further, Appellant did not raise
insanity defense at trial, so evidence that one or more officers knew of
Appellant’s mental illness is irrelevant and inadmissible; to extent Appellant
asserts evidence was insufficient to convict him of aggravated assault because
he did not do anything to officers until one officer pushed him, it appears
Appellant attempts to argue he acted in self-defense; Appellant, however,
failed to raise self-defense claim at trial; additionally, record belies Appellant’s
assertion that he did not consciously intend to cause or attempt to cause injury
to officers; evidence demonstrated Appellant attempted to cause and caused
-2-
J-A20033-19
bodily injury to Officers Federico and Lower while in performance of their
duties as police officers; evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of
resisting arrest; during altercation with police who were attempting to detain
Appellant, Appellant attempted to injure and did injure Officers Federico and
Lower; officers had to use substantial force to overcome Appellant’s
resistance; Appellant also repeatedly failed to comply with officers’
instructions to place his hands behind his back; officers requested backup due
to Appellant’s resistance; (2) as set forth in analysis of Appellant’s sufficiency
claim, verdict was not contrary to evidence; verdict was consistent with
evidence and did not shock one’s sense of justice; (3) with benefit of PSI,
court sentenced Appellant within parameters of guidelines to standard range
sentences on all charges; court’s application of sentencing guidelines was
reasonable; record belies Appellant’s claims that sentencing court failed to
consider certain factors; court considered all factors that Appellant claims
court did not consider). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court
opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/6/2019
-3-
Circulated 08/15/2019 03:29 PM
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF BERKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
vs.
No. CP-06-CR-0005092-2017
NOEL VEGA Assigned to: Judge M. Theresa Johnson
Michael D. Dautrich, Esquire
Attorney for Appellant
Alisa R. Hobart, Esquire
Attorney for the Commonwealth!Appellee
Memorandum Opinion March 21, 2019 M. Theresa Johnson, J.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The defendant in the above-captioned case, Noel Vega ("Vega"), was charged with six
counts of aggravated assault, 1 six counts of simple assault.i six counts of harassment3 and one
count of resisting arrest or other law enforcement4 arising from an incident alleged to have
occurred on October 17, 2017. On October 30, 2018, a jury found Vega guilty of two counts of
aggravated assault' and the sole count of resisting arrest or other law enforcement. The
Commonwealth withdrew all counts of simple assault and this court dismissed three counts of
aggravated assault" on judgment of acquittal. This court found Vega guilty of all six counts of
harassment.: Prior to sentencing, the Commonwealth withdrew all the counts of harassment. On
November 14, 2018, this court imposed a cumulative sentence on Vega of 42 months to 8 years
in a State Correctional Facility. Appellant was given credit for the 49 days he had previously
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(2) (3 counts) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §]797(75 A.3d 497, 500 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner and drawing all
proper inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have determined that
all of the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. The facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible
with the defendant's innocence, but the question of any doubt is for the jury unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can
be drawn from the combined circumstances. Commonwealth v. Smith, 848 A.2d 973, 977
(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
An appellate court "may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as
the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates
5
"
,...
0'1 the respective elements of a defendant's crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's
convictions will be upheld." Rahman, 75 A.3d at 501.
Sufficiency of the Evidence - Aggravated Assault
Vega alleges that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to
establish the crime of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(3). In support of his
claim, Vega argues that 1) the Officers did not receive medical treatment for their injuries; 2) the
Officers continued with their work schedules with no time lost from work; 3) there were no
photographs of the Officers' injuries entered into evidence; 4) one or more of the Officers had
notice that Vega suffered from mental health issues; 5) Vega did not take action against the
Officers until he was pushed; and 6) it was not Vega's conscious object to cause or attempt to
cause injury to the officers.
An individual is guilty of aggravated assaultunder 18 Pa.GS.A. §2702(a)(3) ifhe or she
"attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the officers,
agents, employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of duty."
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2702(a)(3). A police officer is a person enumerated in subsection (c). 18
Pa.C.S.A. §2702(c)(l). Bodily injury is defined as the "impairment of physical condition or
substantial pain." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2301.
The only differences between assaults under§ 2701(a)(l) and§ 2702(a)(3) are that the
latter applies when the assault is committed upon one of the persons enumerated in§
2702(c) in the performance of their duties and the latter does not allow for a mens rea of
recklessness .. Consequently, for purposes of defining the bodily injury component of
these provisions, whether the assault is characterized as "simple" or "aggravated" has no
bearing.on our interpretation. Calling a simple assault upon a police officer aggravated
6
·..�·
'"
()') merely reflects the legislature's intent to punish this assault more severely than one
1:i')
committed upon a layperson, which is accomplished by grading the offense as a felony of
the second degree rather than a misdemeanor of the second degree. Commonwealth v.
Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1182-1183 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted).
"[I]n a prosecution for aggravated assault on a police officer the Commonwealth has no
obligation to establish that the officer actually suffered a bodily injury; rather, the
Commonwealth must establish only an attempt to inflict bodily injury, and this intent may be
shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to cause injury."
Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original). "The finder of fact is free to conclude that the accused intended the natural and
probable consequences of his actions to result therefrom." Commonwealth v. Rosado, 684 A.2d
605, 608 (Pa. Super. 1996) ( citation omitted).
In this case, Vega argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of
aggravated assault as the Officers did not receive medical treatment for their injuries or lose time
from work. An identical claim was rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195 (Pa. Super. 1994}. In Richardson, a police officer
responded to a radio call for a disturbance and, while on scene, was punched in the face by the
appellant. Richardson, 636 A.2d at 1196. The appellant's punch broke the officer's glasses,
· caused the officer to stumble.backwards, and resulted in pain for a few days. Id. However, the
officer did not seek medical treatment or miss work. Id. The appellant was convicted of simple
assault after a bench trial. Id. at 1195. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the officer "did not
suffer bodily injury because he did not receive any medical treatment or miss any work as a
result of the blow to the face." Id. at 1196. The Superior Court responded as follows:
7
Such a claim is frivolous. Appellant cites no authority which states that such
consequences are necessary to sustain a simple assault conviction. [The officer] testified
that [a]ppellant's punch broke his glasses, caused him to stumble backwards, and caused
pain for the next few days. Such testimony was sufficient to sustain a finding that
[a]ppellant actually caused bodily injury to [the officer].
Id. Therefore, in accordance with Richardson, Vega's claim that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of aggravated assault because the Officers did not seek medical treatment or miss
time from work is frivolous and should be denied.
Vega next claims that the evidence was insufficient because there were no photographs
introduced into evidence to demonstrate any of the injuries that the Officers sustained during the
altercation. Vega's claim that there were no corroborating photographs of the Officers' injuries
is more properly characterized as a weight of the evidence challenge and is addressed below.
Vega next argues that the evidence was insufficient because at least one or more of the
officers were on notice that Vega had mental health issues and those issues were the reason his
wife called 9-1-1. However, "under Pennsylvania law, mental illness is not a defense to criminal
liability unless the mental illness rises to the level oflegal insanity under Section 314( c)(2)."
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 158 A3d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2017). Furthermore, the Superior
Court has held that evidence of mental iilness may only be introduced "in conjunction with a
defense of insanity." Commonwealth v. Hatfield, 579 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. Super. 1990). In the
absence of an insanity defense, "evidence of mental illness is irrelevant and therefore,
inadmissible." Id. In this case, Vega did not raise a defense of insanity. As a result, the
evidence that one.or more of the Officers knew of Vega's mental illness was irrelevant and
inadmissible. Vega's claim should be denied.
8
Vega next argues that the evidence was insufficient because he did not do anything to the
Officers until he was pushed by one of them. Vega appears to be arguing that he was acting in
self-defense in response to the physical contact initiated by Officer Federico. However, this
issue was not raised at trial. The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure state that "[i]ssues
not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."
Pa.R.A.P. §302(a). "Since [Vega] did not raise the issue of self-defense at trial, the
Commonwealth had no burden to disprove it. Nor can [Vega] argue self-defense for the first
time on appeal; the claim is waived." Commonwealth v. Butler, 647 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. Super.
1994) (citation omitted). Vega's claim should be denied.
Vega claims that the evidence was insufficient because it was not his conscious object to
cause or attempt to cause injury to the Officers. However, as set forth below, the record belies
Vega's assertion.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the general requirements of culpability in Section
302. Specifically, regarding intentional acts, the Crimes Code states:
(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the
existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §302(b)(l).
"[Ijintent may be shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest that a defendant intended to
cause injury." Commonwealth v. Richardson, 636 A.2d 1195, 1196 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation
omitted).
9
The Crimes Code also sets forth the definition of a criminal attempt in Section 901. "A
person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §901(a).
When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence
was sufficient to convict Vega of aggravated assault against Officer Federico. The testimony
presented by the Commonwealth established that Vega threw a punch at Officer Federico's head.
Although Vega missed with his punch, he clearly attempted to cause bodily injury to Officer
Federico. Also, during the Officers' altercation with Vega, Vega "hammer punched" Officer
Federico in the groin which caused him substantial pain. Officer Federico testified to a pain
level of" 10" on a scale of 1-10 as a result of this punch. It is clear that Vega attempted to cause
and also caused bodily injury to Officer Federico while in the performance of his duties as a
police officer. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Vega's conviction for
aggravated assault on Officer Federico.
The evidence was also sufficient to convict Vega of aggravated assault against Officer
Lower. The testimony presented by the Commonwealth established that Vega kicked Officer
Lower in her shin, knee and upper groin area during his altercation with the Officers. Officer
Lower suffered black and blue marks on those areas. Vega attempted to cause and was
successful incausing bodily injury to Officer Lower while in the performance of her duties as a
police officer. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
jury could have determined that the elements of aggravated assault had been established beyond
a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support Vega's conviction for
aggravated assault against Officer Lower.
10
.....
','U'
Sufficiency of the Evidence- Resisting Arrest or other Law Enforcement
,,..
()�
Vega alleges that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to
establish the crime of resisting arrest or other law enforcement. Vega claims that 1) a person
cannot commit resisting arrest unless he creates a substantial risk of bodily injury; 2) Vega did
not resist by merely attempting to run away from the officers or scuffling with them; 3) the
evidence demonstrated nothing more than a scuffle in a confined space; and 4) it was not Vega's
conscious object to cause or attempt to cause injury to the Officers.
An individual is guilty of resisting arrest or other law enforcement "if, with the intent of
preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the
person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs
means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §5 l 04;
See Commonwealth v. Soto, 2018 WL 6816969, *11 (Pa. Super. 2018) (appellant's attempt to
punch a police officer and remove his taser was sufficient to convict appellant of resisting arrest).
Even the "use of passive resistance requiring substantial force to overcome [will provide]
sufficient evidence for upholding [a] resisting arrest conviction." Commonwealth v. Thompson,
922 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. 2007).
In this case, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to convict Vega
ofresisting arrest or other law enforcement. Although Vega characterizes the altercation as a
"scuffle in a confined space" and an attempt "to run away", it was during this "scuffle" that Vega
not only created a substantial risk of bodily injury to the Officers but actually inflicted bodily
injury upon them. As set.forth above, Vega threw a punch at Officer Federico's head and
"hammer punched" him in the groin which caused him substantial pain. Vega kicked Officer
. Lower on her body resulting in black and blue marks. Officer Trythall was elbowed in his rib
11
..
,,..
()") cage and struck on his leg/groin with a ceramic coffee cup. Officer Trythall had abdominal pain
and leg/groin pain following the altercation. The Officers were also required to use substantial
force to overcome Vega's resistance. During the altercation, Vega was instructed to place his
hands behind his back, but he kept his arms in front of him. The Officers used pressure points
and deployed their taser in an effort to subdue Vega. Even after Vega was taken to the ground,
he continued to keep one arm tucked underneath him. Vega only gave up his arm after Officer
Federico kneed him twice in the back. Additional backup was requested by the Officers due to
Vega's resistance. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the jury could have determined that the elements of resisting arrest or other law
enforcement had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the evidence was
sufficient to support Vega's conviction.
Weight of the Evidence
Vega claims that his convictions on each offense were against the weight of the evidence
for the same reasons he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
"A true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to
sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed." Commonwealth v. Charlton,
902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted),
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is free to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibiiity of the witnesses. An
appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may
only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's
sense of justice. Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below> an
appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is
12
against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim. Commonwealth v.
Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, Vega claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
However, as set forth above in this court's analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence, the verdict
was not contrary to the evidence as the jury was presented with a case upon which to convict
Vega. The jury evaluated the evidence, determined the credibility of witnesses and, when
assessing the weight of the evidence, believed the evidence presented by the prosecution and
rendered a guilty verdict. Therefore, the verdict was consistent with the evidence presented and
did not shock anyone's sense of justice.
Vega's Sentence
Vega claims that this Court's cumulative sentence imposed on Vega of 42 months to 8
years in a State Correctional Facility was manifestly excessive under the circumstances. Vega
raises the follow issues: 1) although Vega had a prior record score of 5 he had not been involved
in the criminal justice system for over fifteen years; 2) Vega's prior crimes were non-violent
offenses; 3) Vega had a history of mental health issues that he was seeking help for and his
wife's call to 9-1-1 was due to those issues; 4) Vega suffered an injury in 2015 and was receiving
neck and back treatment; 5) none of the Officers sustained a substantial injury that prohibited
them from working.
"When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42
Pa.C .. S. § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, gravity ofoffense in relation to impact on
victim and community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. And, of course, the court must
13
,,..
'II'
consider the sentencing guidelines." Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. Super.
2015) (alterations and citation omitted).
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a
sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this
context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the
appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill
will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892
A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
"There is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the discretionary aspect of a
sentence. Rather, an appeal is permitted only after this Court determines that there is a
substantial question that the sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing code."
Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (alterations, quotation marks
and citations omitted). "An appellant making an excessiveness claim raises a substantial
question when he sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence violates either a
specific provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process." Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244,
1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court
with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but
applied the guidelines erroneously;
14
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves
circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is
unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sentencing
court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §978l(c).
A trial court's standard-range sentence will only be reversed "if the sentence is clearly
unreasonable when viewed in light of the four statutory factors outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. §9781(d)."
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). Specifically,
the appellate court evaluates (1) [t]he nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) [t]he opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation; (3) [t]he findings upon which the sentence
was based; [and] (4) [t]he guidelines promulgated by the commission. 42 Pa.C.S. §9781(d).
When imposing a sentence, a court is required to consider the particular circumstances of
the offense and the character of the defendant. In particular, the court should refer to the
defendant's prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his potential for
rehabilitation. Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation
report ("PSI"), we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with
mitigating statutory factors. Further, where a sentence is within the standard range of the
guidelines, Pennsyivania law views the sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing
Code. Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937-938 {Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
15
.. In the case at bar, this court sentenced Vega within the parameters of the sentencing
iYi
,,..
guidelines! and, therefore, Vega must demonstrate that the application of those guidelines would
be clearly unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9781(c)(2). Upon review of the factors as set forth in 42
Pa.C.S. §9781 (d), this court's application of the sentencing guidelines was clearly reasonable.
Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault and resisting arrest after a jury trial. As the
trial judge, this court was familiar with the nature and circumstances of the offenses committed
by Vega and was able to observe Vega during the trial and sentencing. N.T.S. at 9. Vega's PSI
was available and reviewed by this court at sentencing which provided with court with, inter
alia, information on Vega's characteristics and his prior record. N.T.S. at 2, 4, 6, 7, 10. This
court considered that Vega was under mental distress on the day of the altercation and that it
took place in a small area. N.T.S. at 9. This court also considered that the Officers were able to
finish their shifts and did not seek medical treatment. N.T.S. at 10. The Commonwealth
presented, and this court considered, the sentencing guidelines and sentenced Vega to a standard
range sentence on all charges. N.T.S. at 3-4, 14.
Vega argues that this court failed to consider certain factors but his assertions are
contradicted by the record. Through the PSI, this court was made aware of Vega's high prior
record score and that Vega's most recent conviction was on December 13, 2002. This
information was also provided by the Commonwealth and by Vega's attorney at sentencing.
N .T .S. at 3, 6. A review of the PSI also revealed that Vega had not been convicted of any violent
crimes. This information was also placed on the record by Vega's attorney at sentencing. N.T.S.
8 At sentencing, Vega had a prior record score of 5. Notes of Testimony, Sentencing Hearing, November 14, 2018
(''N.T.S.") at 3. The offense gravity score for count 4, aggravated assault, and count 5, aggravated assault, is 6
resulting in a standard range of21-27 months plus or minus 6. N.T.S. at 3;204PAADC §303.15; 204 PA ADC
§303.16(a). Vega was sentenced to serve a standard range sentence twenty-one months to four years on count 4
followed by another standard range sentence of twenty-one months to four years on count 5. The offense gravity
score for count 7, resisting arrest or other law enforcement, is 3 resulting in a standard range of 6-16 months plus or
minus 3. N.T.S. at 3-4; 204 PA ADC §303.15; 204 PA ADC §303.16(a). Vega was sentenced to serve a standard
range sentence of one to two years concurrent with count 4.
16
at 6. This court was made aware of and considered Vega's mental health issues at sentencing.
N.T.S. at 7-13. The PSI indicated that Vega suffered from major back problems. Finally, as set
forth above, this court considered that the Officers did not seek medical treatment and that they
were able to finish their shifts. This court considered all of the factors raised by Vega within his
concise statement and sentenced him to standard range sentences on all charges. Therefore,
Vega's claim must fail as it is contradicted by the record.
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that Vega's Appeal be DENIED and
his sentence AFFIRMED.
17
<;:OMMONWEAL ri, JF PENNSYLVANIA DOCKET: �P- 06 - CR - 5092-2017
v.
NOEL VEGA DATE: March 21, 2019
Defendant
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