DocketNumber: No. Civ. 81-0564
Citation Numbers: 550 F. Supp. 1238
Judges: Cerezo
Filed Date: 11/12/1982
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/26/2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action calls for the determination of whether a 1978 amendment to Section 6 of Public Law 81-874, 64 Stat. 1107, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 241 (Section 6) providing that incidents of employment of Section 6 school personnel be “on the same basis” as those granted to school personnel of the District of Columbia (D.C.) means that the former should, besides receiving the same benefits as the latter, also be entitled to obtain their employment benefits by using the same procedures of negotiation as the latter; ergo, through collective bargaining. Plaintiffs are the principals and assistant principals
The 1978 amendment to Section 6 which was prepared by Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner, Baltasar Corrada, incorporated the following language into the statute: “Personnel provided for under this subsection outside of the continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii, shall receive such compensation, tenure, leave, hours of work and other incidents of employment on the same basis as provided for similar positions in the public schools of the District of Columbia....” At the time this amendment was approved, the D.C. school principals had obtained the right to bargain collectively with the D.C. education authorities
A reading of the entire section reveals that the two sentences right before the 1978 amendment refer to the standard of education to be provided at Section 6 schools. In the case of Section 6 schools which are outside of the continental United States, Alaska and Hawaii the educational standard to be met is that the education should be “comparable to free public education provided for children in the District of Columbia.” The next sentence states that “for the purposes of providing such comparable education” the incidents of employment of Section 6 personnel “may be fixed without regard” to several federal employment and civil service acts.
Puerto Rico is the only one of these places where the off-base schools are not suitable for the attendance of children whose families have come from the mainland inasmuch as the off-base schools are overcrowded and their primary language of instruction is Spanish....
Although Section 1 of H.R. 5874 includes all of the territories encompassed in the 1954 amendment to Public Law 81-874, it would apply particularly to Puerto Rico. This is made even more specific in H.R. 5874 by the third condition for eligibility; i.e. that English is not the primary language of instruction in schools in the locality.... 1965 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News, at 1911.
The report indicates that these schools also accommodate certain federal employees
Educational opportunities for children of federal employees who come from the mainland are extremely limited in Puerto Rico. As was mentioned, the public schools of the Island are very much overcrowded and are taught in the Spanish language.
Most of the private schools are taught in Spanish, and the tuition for the few schools taught in English is extremely high. Admittance to private schools conducted in English is uncertain because of long waiting lists and inadequate facilities. Thus, about the only practical way for the children of federal employees residing off base to receive an education comparable to what they would receive on the mainland is through attendance in the schools constructed on base for children of military personnel stationed in Puerto Rico.... Idem, at 1911-1912
The legislative history of the 1978 amendments reveals a special concern with various problems that Section 6 schools, particularly the ones in Puerto Rico, were confronting. One of these was that the division of authority between the military and the U.S. Department of Education resulted in that neither of the agencies was assuming responsibility for the well-being of the schools. As a consequence, the physical conditions of the school buildings had deteriorated to such an extent as to create a dangerous situation for the school-children. The use of construction funds to remodel and rehabilitate the buildings was part of the 1978 amendments. There was also concern with the fact that decisions affecting Section 6 schools in Puerto Rico were made unilaterally by an admiral who was not an educator. Parents and teachers mentioned that this situation had led to unsound decisions affecting the quality of education. The teachers mentioned that the lack of specificity in Section 6 on personnel practices, specially regarding salaries, invited abuse. The House Report indicates:
Unilateral authority rests with the admiral.
According to parents of children attending Fort Buchanan, this situation has led to several unsound decisions to reduce program offerings and ancillary services, decisions which have adversely affected the quality of education and in which parents have had no input. Representatives of the Antilles Consolidated Teachers Association also expressed displeasure with the present arrangement. They concurred with the parents’ suggestion that a multi-member board of education would better suit the interests of the school system. They also pointed out that P.L. 874 invites abuse by not specifying personnel practices, especially regarding salary. Although the legislation suggests that the education in areas outside the mainland U.S. be comparable with education in the District of Columbia, teachers recommended language which would unequivocally align their salaries with those in the District... . 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 5078.
To that effect, the Report indicates that the Committee “adopted an amendment making clear that the compensation, tenure, leave, hours of work and other incidents of employment for personnel in school systems located outside the 50 States must be on the same basis as that provided in the public schools of the District of Columbia.... ” Section 6 was also amended to create an elective school board with authority to oversee the expenditure of funds and operation of the schools. The Commissioner of Education was required to ensure the most efficient expenditure of funds for these schools by conducting an annual accounting and by gathering data on the quality of instruction provided by these schools. The amendments also clarified the prerequisites of eligibility for admission for certain federal employees’ children.
Neither the right of Section 6 personnel to bargain collectively with the Antilles School System nor language from which one can reasonably infer the existence of such right is found in the statute. Neither have we found in the legislative record examined any indication of this. Taken as a
Nevertheless, they refer to two letters written by Commissioner Corrada del Rio which supposedly denote the legislative intention of granting them the right of collective bargaining. We have examined these letters and find that they merely reveal his displeasure with the way the U.S. Department of Education was carrying out the 1978 amendments to Section 6. One of the letters, dated November 27, 1979, and directed to Dr. Mary Berry, Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, essentially addressed two problems: the stringent application of the eligibility requirements of admission to the schools for nonmilitary federal employee’s children and the consultive, rather than working, role that the elective school board had taken. He then observed that if such problems continued he would request hearings on these matters. The Resident Commissioner accompanied copies of the legislative record. The contents of the letter reveals his perceptions of the purpose of the 1978 amendment and his insatisfaction upon perceiving that the same was not being achieved. Yet, nowhere in the letter is there reference to anything which bears a resemblance to that which plaintiffs contend the statute clearly confers upon them. The question that naturally comes to mind then is, why the Resident Commissioner did not mention anything about collective bargaining if this was such a clear remedial purpose of the 1978 amendment?
The other document that plaintiffs claim signals the real meaning of the 1978 amendment is a letter by Mr. Corrada del Rio dated January 24, 1980 in response to one sent by Mr. Peter S. O’Brien, Executive Vice-President of the American Federation of School Administrators, AFL-CIO (Federation). Mr. O’Brien had informed Mr. Corrada del Rio of the Federation’s endorsement of his observations and concerns as voiced in the letter to Dr. Berry. He had also indicated that the Federation had granted an application to the Antilles Council of School Officers (Council) and that this Council “requested recognition and negotiations pursuant to the amended Section 6.” Mr. O’Brien further stated that the Council was seeking “only those rights of collective representation afforded to the same employees in the public schools of the District of Columbia.... ” He offered the testimony of the Council and the Federation at any future hearing to discuss Section 6. Mr. Corrada del Rio’s brief reply was that:
*1243 As I stated in my letter to Dr. Mary Berry, I am gravely concerned with the interpretation which HEW has given to the legislation in P.L. 95-561. Your request for recognition and negotiations is an important step in the resolution of the problems encountered by the Antilles Council of School Officers.
The Resident Commissioner then indicated that no hearings were scheduled but that he would inform Mr. O’Brien should the opportunity arise. Mr. Corrada del Rio also wished to be informed as to the status of the Council’s petition to Admiral Knoizen.
We fail to see any significant relationship between these comments regarding the problems encountered by the Antilles Council of School Officers and plaintiffs’ interpretation of Section 6. At the most, they merely show that the Resident Commissioner personally believed that the Council’s problems may best be solved by its recognition as a union and by negotiations with the admiral. From this statement we cannot jump to the conclusion that the Resident Commissioner believed that the only way to deal with the problems that Section 6 was designed to solve would be through collective bargaining nor that such a means was contemplated in the statute. Plaintiffs’ conclusion requires that we perform some sort of judicial psychoanalysis of Mr. Corrada del Rio’s undefined intentions in order to infer that he believed that the Council's problems were the same problems addressed by Section 6. The truth of the matter is that his answer is merely an uncompromising statement that does not address the matter of plaintiffs’ collective bargaining rights directly nor in a manner that one could reasonably conclude that the author of this legislation manifested his understanding that Section 6 was designed to confer the right of collective bargaining to these school officers.
Even if we concede that this short statement is indicative of the Resident Commissioner’s position on this subject, this is insufficient to conclude that the legislative intent was the same. Although some courts have considered important in analyzing a statute’s meaning to examine comments made by the draftsmen and/or authors of the legislation, American Waterways Operators Inc. v. United States, 386 F.Supp. 799, 804 (D.D.C.) affd. Water Transport Assoc. v. United States, 421 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 2410, 44 L.Ed.2d 675 (1975); Contra: Friedman v. United States, 364 F.Supp. 484, 488 (S.D.Ga.1973), said comments must have been also made before the legislative body that enacted the legislation in order to determine whether the observations by the author or draftsman were incorporated into the final approved bill. See: Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-94, 90 S.Ct. 314, 327-328, 24 L.Ed.2d 345 (1969); American Waterways Operators Inc., at 804; Epstein v. Resor, 296 F.Supp. 214, 216 (N.D.Cal.) affd. 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 398 U.S. 965, 90 S.Ct. 2176, 26 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970). Post passage remarks by legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent, as expressed in the record prior to an act’s approval. Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corps., (Regional Rail Reorganization Cases), 419 U.S. 102, 132, 95 S.Ct. 335, 352, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974); cf.: Parlane Sportswear Co. v. Weinberger, 513 F.2d 835, 837, n. 2 (1st Cir.) cert. denied 423 U.S. 925, 96 S.Ct. 269, 46 L.Ed.2d 252 (1975) (Views of one Congress as to the meaning of statutes enacted by an earlier Congress are entitled to little, if any, weight). Pre-passage remarks by a single legislator, even if made by a sponsor or influential legislator before the legislative body responsible for the act, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history. Consumer Product Safety Comm. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766; Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979); General Electric Co. v. United States, 610 F.2d 730, 734 (Ct.Cl. 1979). If these isolated comments are made after the legislation was enacted and in a private communication, they are of no use to ascertain legislative intent. Rogers v. Frito-Lay Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, Moon v. Roadway Express,. Inc., 449 U.S. 889, 101 S.Ct. 246, 66 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Goolsby v. Blumenthal, 581 F.2d
In the situation before us, an integrated reading of the 1978 amendment with the rest of the statute’s language; see: Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 591, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962); Payne v. Panama Canal Co., 607 F.2d 155, 164 (5th Cir.1979); Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir.) cert. denied 435 U.S. 980, 98 S.Ct. 1630, 56 L.Ed.2d 72 (1978) demonstrates that the central purpose of the statute is to provide quality education at these special schools. Our examination of the legislative record also confirms the concern with education evinced in the statutory language. See: Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1677, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981); Hunt v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 611 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 906,100 S.Ct. 1084, 63 L.Ed.2d 322 (1980); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1343, 1347-1348 (Ct.Cl.1979). There is nothing either in the language of the statute or in the legislative record examined to support plaintiffs’ position. Furthermore, to derive rights of collective bargaining from the silence of the record would not only require an unwarranted exercise of judicial interference with the statute but may also lead to dangerous results that may affect the principal purpose of this legislation in guaranteeing quality education to the children of certain military servicemen and federal employees. The benefits that plaintiffs may obtain by negotiations are necessarily limited by the ones they should be now enjoying according to the clear mandate of the statute.
Problems of a practical nature may also arise should we grant a naked right to bargain collectively without any structural framework of procedure as is generally required to ensure that the delicate process of negotiation is carried on effectively. Plaintiffs state that, once the court grants them the right to bargain collectively, they will
We conclude, therefore, that Section 6 does not confer upon plaintiffs the right to bargain collectively with their employer.
The second part of plaintiffs’ argument, however, falls squarely within the provisions of the statute. If their allegations of unequal employment benefits are proven to be true, then Section 6 clearly grants them the right to obtain equality with their D.C. counterparts. Defendants’ argument as to plaintiffs’ lack of standing because no specific injury in fact which can be remedied by specific relief of a conclusive character has been shown, see: Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-43, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925-1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976), ignores the procedural stage at which we are dealing with this issue. Plaintiffs have alleged that they do not enjoy the same conditions of employment, specifically: grievance procedures, transfers, leaves and job performance evaluation (amended complaint, paragraph 27). The “injury in fact” that defendants contend is missing is precisely this lack of equal employment conditions which is mandated by Section 6. If the court determines that plaintiffs are not enjoying the same benefits as their D.C. counterparts in the manner required by the statute, specific relief ordering defendants to take the necessary steps to ensure equality will ensue. Modern requirements of pleading dictate that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim “unless it
Accordingly, the first claim set forth in the amended complaint requesting the court to enter a declaratory judgment that Section 6(a) of Public Law 95-561, 20 U.S.C. Section 241(a) confers upon plaintiffs the right to bargain collectively their compensation, tenure, leave, hours of work and other incidents of their employment relationship with the Antilles Consolidated School System and further requesting mandatory injunctive relief to enforce such a decree is hereby DISMISSED. The motion to dismiss the alternative claim stated in the amended complaint by virtue of which plaintiffs seek an injunction mandating defendants to extend to the individual plaintiffs the same terms, conditions and other incidents of employment presently enjoyed by members of the Washington, D.C. Council of School Administrators is DENIED.
A status conference shall be set by the U.S. Magistrate to ensure a prompt disposition of plaintiffs’ remaining claim.
SO ORDERED.
. Dennis C. Smith, Andrew Bielecki, Gerard C. Hooley, Ann Weir, Don E. Corbin, Lane Gutsche.
. Local 68 of the American Federation of School Administrators, AFL-CIO.
. Defendants are: John F. Lehman, Secretary of the Navy; Terrel H. Bell, Secretary of Education; Dr. Charles F. Kenney, Superintendent of the Antilles Consolidated School System; Rear Admiral Arthur K. Knoizen, Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces in the Caribbean and Area Coordinator of the Antilles Consolidated School Systems; Rear Admiral K.L. Shugart, Chief of Naval Education and Training, Department of the Navy; William Stormer, Director of the Division of School Assistance in Federally Affected Areas, U.S. Department of Education. They are all sued in their official capacity.
. Plaintiffs were permitted to amend their complaint in view of defendants’ first motion to dismiss which showed the insufficiency of their original allegations as to the union’s capacity to institute the action.
. The Classification Act of 1949, as amended, the Annual Sick Leave Act of 1951, as amended, the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, as amended, the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, as amended, and the Performance Rating Act of 1950, as amended.
. See: S.Rep. No. 2458, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1950) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4014; S.Rep. No. 714, 83rd Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in (1953) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2325; S.Rep. No. 311, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. reprinted in (1965) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1910; H.R.Rep. No. 1137, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 108, reprinted in (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 4971, hereinafter referred to year and page of U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News.
. Whether the employment benefits conferred by the statute are being enjoyed by plaintiffs is, of course, another matter which will be dealt with in the second part of this opinion.
. Plaintiffs hint that the real aim of their collective negotiations may be to free themselves from the standard provided by the statute when they mention:
[I]t should be noted that a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by and between plaintiffs and the Antilles School System would be easier to manage and would be in more tune with local conditions than the granting to plaintiffs of the same incidents of employment of their D.C. counterparts. The latter would entail a constant scramble to implement here in Puerto Rico any changes implemented in D.C.
Paragraph 8, plaintiffs’ Motion filed February 11, 1982.
. Plaintiffs’ withdrawal of their appeal from the FLRA’s decision denying them union status makes it unnecessary to elaborate whether, as federal employees, they may rely on another federal statute to support their alleged'right to bargain collectively. Such appears to be the position suggested by defendants’ interpretation of the Comptroller General’s rulings to the effect that any federal personnel act not expressly excluded by Section 6 applies to these employees, see: 52 Comp.Gen. 291 (1972), 58 Comp.Gen. 430, 434 (1978); Fort Rucker Elementary School Employees, - Comp.Gen. -(1979) File B-192528, April 20, 1979, and by the administrative decision of Department of the Army, Ft. Bragg Schools, 3 FLRA No. 57, June 10, 1980 holding that Section 6 teachers were federal “employees” protected by the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Statute, 5 USC Sec. 7101, et seq. However, plaintiffs’ voluntary decision to abandon the proper channeling of their administrative appeal concludes this matter. See: 5 USC Sec. 7123, National Federation of Federal Employees Local 1263 v. Commandant, Defense Language Inst., 493 F.Supp. 675, 679 (N.D.Cal. 1980).