William J. Nye v. Susan J. Brousseau

Supreme Court
No. 2013-302-Appeal.
(KC 12-1096)
William J. Nye :
v. :
Susan J. Brousseau et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
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notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
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Supreme Court
No. 2013-302-Appeal.
(KC 12-1096)
William J. Nye :
v. :
Susan J. Brousseau et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
October 30, 2014, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The plaintiff, William J. Nye
(plaintiff), appeals pro se from a Superior Court judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s quiet title
claim and granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants—Susan J. Brousseau,
individually and as trustee, Paul G. Brousseau, individually and as trustee (the Brousseaus), and
The Brousseau Family Trust (collectively, defendants)—on the plaintiff’s claims for negligence
and fraud. Additionally, the plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claim to quiet title. Having
considered the arguments advanced by the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown
and that the appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
This case is the parties’ third appearance before this Court in less than five years. The
details of their affairs have twice been set forth by this Court in Nye v. Brousseau, 992 A.2d
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1002 (R.I. 2010) (Nye I) and Nye v. Brousseau, 47 A.3d 335 (R.I. 2012) (mem.) (Nye II).
Accordingly, we shall endeavor to confine our recitation of the facts.
At the center of the dispute is a 325.59-square-foot parcel (judgment parcel) that was
awarded to plaintiff and described in the amended final judgment that entered in Nye I, 992 A.2d
at 1010. However, shortly before final judgment entered in Nye I, the Brousseaus transferred, by
quitclaim deed, property located at 265 Tiffany Avenue in Warwick (the Brousseau Property) to
The Brousseau Family Trust (the trust). The judgment parcel is located within the described
Brousseau Property and abuts plaintiff’s property.
Five months after this Court’s order in Nye II—in which the denial of plaintiff’s motion
to set aside the transfer of the Brousseau Property to the trust was affirmed—plaintiff filed a
complaint in this case, alleging: (1) “Quiet Title”; (2) “Negligence”; and (3) “Fraud.” The
plaintiff argued that the transfer of the Brousseau Property to the trust via quitclaim deed, before
final judgment entered in Nye I, served to render the final judgment a nullity. He is mistaken.
In this case, defendants admitted that all right, title, and ownership in the judgment parcel
belongs to plaintiff, and this judicial admission is binding. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on all counts, and on July 10, 2013, a Superior Court justice issued a written decision
denying summary judgment on count one—quiet title—but granting summary judgment in favor
of defendants on counts two and three. As to the quiet-title count, the trial justice concluded that
“an abstract of the title * * * or any similar report concerning the status of the title from a
reputable source, as specified under [G.L. 1956] § 34-16-2[,]” was “[n]oticeably absent” from
the court file; and, thus, a genuine issue of material fact may exist which precluded the entry of
summary judgment. The Superior Court justice then concluded that “[p]laintiff must first
comply with the mandate of § 34-16-2 before this [c]ourt may adjudicate [p]laintiff’s quiet title
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action on the merits.” On count two, he determined that the facts did not demonstrate that
defendants owed a duty, that defendants breached a duty, or that any cognizable harm from such
a breach existed. With respect to count three, alleging fraud, it was determined that no evidence
existed which demonstrated that defendants made any false representations to plaintiff.
Furthermore, the court determined that plaintiff’s claim of fraud on the court was not supported
by competent evidence.
On August 16, 2013, an order entered that granted defendants’ motion to compel plaintiff
to comply with § 34-16-2. 1 The order required plaintiff to submit the name of a title company or
attorney to complete an abstract within thirty days for approval by the court, and then, after
approval by the court, an additional thirty days for the title company or attorney to submit a title
abstract to the court. The plaintiff failed to comply with this order.
On September 17, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss count one based on
plaintiff’s failure to comply with the August 16 order and plaintiff’s prior statement that he
disavowed any claim based upon § 34-16-2. On October 28, 2013, the motion to dismiss was
heard before a different justice of the Superior Court, and plaintiff continued to advance that
count one was unrelated to any claim under § 34-16-2 of the General Laws. The Superior Court
1
General Laws 1956 § 34-16-2 provides:
“Upon filing his or her complaint, the plaintiff shall thereafter, at his or
her own cost, select, with the approval of the court, a title company or an attorney
familiar with the examination of land titles, which company or attorney shall
proceed to examine the title to the real estate described in the complaint, and
when the examination is completed, shall deposit an abstract of title to the real
estate in the court, together with a report of the status of the title and a list of the
parties found interested therein, and who should, in the opinion of the company or
attorney, be made parties to the action. Upon receipt of the abstract and report, the
court shall order all persons not parties to the action but found by it to be
necessary to the cause to be made parties defendant and shall order notice to be
given to those defendants.”
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justice determined that plaintiff was ordered to, and failed to, comply with § 34-16-2; and, thus,
she dismissed count one and entered final judgment. The plaintiff timely appealed to this Court. 2
Analysis
Initially, we conclude that the Superior Court justice was correct in granting summary
judgment for defendants on counts two and three. The plaintiff utterly failed to set forth any
theory that evidenced that defendants owed him a duty to report the transfer of the property.
Furthermore, no evidence was set forth by plaintiff demonstrating that defendants made false
representations to him or that defendants perpetrated any fraud upon the court. In the absence of
material factual disputes, combined with the determination that defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. See Moore v. Rhode
Island Board of Governors for Higher Education, 18 A.3d 541, 544 (R.I. 2011) (citing Berman v.
Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1043 (R.I. 2010)).
Turning next to the heart of plaintiff’s rambling and confusing argument, we similarly
conclude that the Superior Court justice was correct in dismissing count one. The plaintiff was
required to retain a professional title examiner to prepare a title abstract pursuant to the August
16, 2013 order of the Superior Court. A necessary component to a claim to quiet title on
property under § 34-16-2 is a record showing that title is held by someone other than the
claimant. The plaintiff’s subjective belief that his claim was for some undefined relief and not
an action to quiet title does not negate the fact that his complaint sought to quiet title to the
judgment parcel. Accordingly, it was proper for the Superior Court justice to order him to obtain
an abstract. By electing to disregard this order, plaintiff risked dismissal of the claim. We are
2
Although plaintiff prematurely filed a notice of appeal on August 20, 2013, final judgment
eventually entered; and, accordingly, we considered it ultimately sufficient to consider the issues
before us. See Toegemann v. City of Providence, 21 A.3d 384, 386 n.3 (R.I. 2011).
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satisfied that the court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing count one. See Rule
41(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure (“On motion of the defendant the court
may, in its discretion, dismiss any action for failure of the plaintiff to comply with these rules or
any order of court * * *.”); see also Conti v. Hines, 659 A.2d 117, 118 (R.I. 1995) (dismissing
quiet-title action for failure to obtain title abstract).
Before concluding this saga, we pause to note that the Brousseaus have been forced to
defend against two dubious Superior Court actions. This case is put to rest. Any further
litigation undertaken by the plaintiff against these defendants risks the imposition of sanctions
and attorney’s fees.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The
papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: William J. Nye v. Susan J. Brousseau et al.
CASE NO: No. 2013-302-Appeal.
(KC 12-1096)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: November 19, 2014
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Kent County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Stephen P. Nugent
Associate Justice Allen P. Rubine
Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff: William J. Nye, Pro Se
For Defendants: Michael D. Coleman, Esq.