Estate of Richard J. Deeble v. Rhode Island Department of Transportation

Supreme Court
No. 2014-235-Appeal.
(PC 13-618)
Estate of Richard J. Deeble :
v. :
Rhode Island Department of :
Transportation.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2014-235-Appeal.
(PC 13-618)
Estate of Richard J. Deeble :
v. :
Rhode Island Department of :
Transportation.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on
January 21, 2016, after a justice of the Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of the
defendant, the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT). The plaintiff, the Estate of
Richard J. Deeble (plaintiff or estate), appealed the trial justice’s determination that the estate is
not entitled to a right of first refusal to repurchase land condemned for highway purposes under
article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the
trial justice erred in failing to conclude that the preemptive right passed to the estate of the
original condemnee, Richard J. Deeble (Richard),1 upon his death. After careful consideration of
the parties’ arguments, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
The facts underlying this action are not in dispute. In January 2001, RIDOT acquired a
31,502-square-foot parcel of real property located at 480 Benefit Street in Providence, Rhode
Island (condemned property) through eminent domain in connection with the relocation of
1
To distinguish Richard Deeble from his wife, Virginia, we refer to the Deebles by their first
names. We intend no disrespect.
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Interstate Route 195. At the time of the acquisition, the condemned property was owned by
Richard and his wife, Virginia (the Deebles), as tenants by the entirety. Virginia passed away on
April 16, 2006. Richard died three years later, on July 7, 2009, and his will was admitted to
probate in Coventry, Rhode Island.
RIDOT utilized a portion of the condemned property in furtherance of the relocation of
Interstate Route 195. Upon completion of the project, approximately 24,601 square feet of the
condemned property remained (surplus property). However, in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 37-
5-8(b), RIDOT was “directed, authorized[,] and empowered to sell, transfer[,] and convey” the
surplus property to the State of Rhode Island I-195 Redevelopment District Commission.2
On February 5, 2013, plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against RIDOT in
the Providence County Superior Court, asserting that, should RIDOT seek to sell or lease the
condemned property, the estate must be offered the opportunity to repurchase or lease the land in
accordance with article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution. The estate contended
that, when Richard died, the right of first refusal that was vested in him by virtue of article 6,
section 19 passed to his heirs, successors, and assigns. RIDOT countered that the preemptive
right was personal to Richard and died with him. On April 26, 2013, the parties entered into a
consent order, in which RIDOT agreed to refrain from selling or encumbering the surplus
property pending resolution of this litigation.
On June 16, 2014, the Superior Court justice issued a written opinion in which he found
that the clear and unambiguous language of article 6, section 19 restricted rights set forth in the
provision to the original condemnee. Consequently, the Superior Court justice held that the
2
The State of Rhode Island I-195 Redevelopment District Commission “oversee[s], plan[s],
implement[s], and administer[s] the development” of surplus land made available as a result of
the relocation of Interstate Route 195. G.L. 1956 § 42-64.14-5(b); see also G.L. 1956 § 37-5-
8(a); § 42-64.14-2(a).
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provisions of article 6, section 19 did not pass to the estate. A judgment entered on July 1, 2014,
and the estate filed this timely appeal.
Standard of Review
This Court applies a deferential standard of review in passing on the grant or denial of
declaratory relief. See Town of North Kingstown v. International Association of Firefighters,
Local 1651 AFL-CIO, 107 A.3d 304, 312 (R.I. 2015). The decision will withstand appellate
review “unless the record demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion or the trial justice committed
an error of law.” Id. (quoting Hagenberg v. Avedisian, 879 A.2d 436, 441 (R.I. 2005)).
However, this Court considers questions of constitutional construction on a de novo basis. State
v. Matthews, 88 A.3d 375, 384 (R.I. 2014).
Analysis
In this case of first impression, we are called upon to decide whether the rights set forth
in article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution terminate upon the death of the original
condemnee. Article 6, section 19 reads:
“The general assembly may authorize the acquiring or taking in fee
by the state, or by any cities or towns, of more land and property
than is needed for actual construction in the establishing, laying
out, widening, extending or relocating of public highways, streets,
places, parks or parkways; provided, however, that the additional
land and property so authorized to be acquired or taken shall be no
more in extent than would be sufficient to form suitable building
sites abutting on such public highway, street, place, park or
parkway. After so much of the land and property has been
appropriated for such public highway, street, place, park or
parkway as is needed therefor, the remainder may be held and
improved for any public purpose or purposes, or may be sold or
leased for value with or without suitable restrictions, and in case of
any such sale or lease, the person or persons from whom such
remainder was taken shall have the first right to purchase or lease
the same upon such terms as the state or city or town is willing to
sell or lease the same.” (Emphasis added.)
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Our focus in this case centers on the phrase “the person or persons from whom such remainder
was taken” and requires us to determine whether article 6, section 19 may encompass the heirs,
successors, and assigns of the condemnee after his or her death.
When words within a constitutional provision are clear and unambiguous, this Court will
not look beyond their “plain, ordinary, and usually accepted meaning.” Woonsocket School
Committee v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 788 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Viveiros v. Town of Middletown,
973 A.2d 607, 610 (R.I. 2009)). Words are clear and unambiguous if, read within the context in
which they appear, they give rise to but a single rational interpretation. Cf. State v. Hazard, 68
A.3d 479, 485 (R.I. 2013) (“[A]mbiguity exists when a word or phrase in a statute is susceptible
of more than one reasonable meaning.” (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v.
Neighborhood Health Plan of Rhode Island, 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011))); Andrukiewicz v.
Andrukiewicz, 860 A.2d 235, 238 (R.I. 2004) (“[A] contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably
susceptible of different constructions.” (quoting Flynn v. Flynn, 615 A.2d 119, 121 (R.I. 1992))).
So long as the plain language of a constitutional provision lacks ambiguity and does not lend
itself to an “absurd result,” this Court need not assume the arduous task of delving into the
thought processes of the legislators who drafted the amendment or the voters who enacted it.
McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 232 (R.I. 2005).
“In construing a constitutional provision, this [C]ourt properly consults extrinsic sources,
including the proceedings of constitutional conventions and any legislation related to the
constitutional provision that was enacted at or near the time of the adoption of the constitutional
amendment.” City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995). The Court “must look
to the history of the times and examine the state of affairs as they existed when the constitution
was framed and adopted.” Id.-4-
Article 6, section 19 has been with us for a century and harkens back to a period when
vehicles and the highways over which they traveled were markedly different. The amendment
traces its origins to a time when the law so narrowly interpreted the term “public use” that
municipalities were liable in trespass if, in the course of constructing a highway or railroad, its
agents caused entry upon the property of an abutting landowner. Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d
1340, 1347-48 (R.I. 1983). To avoid liability, public-works activities were restricted to the
roadbed, a practice that impeded the quality and efficiency of the construction process. Id. at
1348. To resolve the issue, the General Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment that is
now article 6, section 19 of the Rhode Island Constitution,3 Griffin, 463 A.2d at 1348, which the
Rhode Island electorate adopted in 1916 by a margin of 31,709 to 6,786.4 The constitutional
provision thus allowed public agencies to seize, by eminent domain, surplus land necessary for
purposes of construction but excess upon completion of the project. See Wood v. City of East
Providence, 811 F.2d 677, 680 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Griffin, 463 A.2d at 1347-48). Once the
land was no longer needed, the property owner at the time of the condemnation had the
constitutionally-protected right to repurchase or lease any remaining land in accordance with
article 6, section 19. Wood, 811 F.2d at 680.
This Court has previously had the occasion to interpret the meaning of the term “place”
within article 6, section 19. See Wood v. City of East Providence, 504 A.2d 441, 443 (R.I.
1986); Lapre v. Flanders, 465 A.2d 214, 216 (R.I. 1983); Griffin, 463 A.2d at 1347-48. In
3
The provision originally was added to the Rhode Island Constitution by Article of Amendment
XVII in 1916. Annotated Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
24 (Helin State Law Library 1988), available at http://helindigitalcommons.org/lawarchive/26. It
became article 6, section 19 following the 1986 Constitutional Convention, although the text
itself remained unaltered. See id. at 23-24.
4
Annotated Constitution of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 24.
-5-
Griffin, 463 A.2d at 1347, we were faced with the question of whether a port facility qualified as
a “place” in the context of the application of article 6, section 19 to “public highways, streets,
places, parks or parkways.” We held that it did not, and we narrowly construed the term to
signify “a court or square or short street.” Griffin, 463 A.2d at 1347. We concluded that the
General Assembly, “if it had so desired, could have expressly included a reference to port
facilities in the language of the amendment,” and that such omission “consequently evidences an
intent not to include such facilities within its ambit.” Id. at 1348. Subsequently, we have held
that the term “place” does not encompass an airport, Lapre, 465 A.2d at 216, or a school, Wood,
504 A.2d at 443.
We turn to the language of article 6, section 19 that is the subject of the present dispute—
“the person or persons from whom such remainder was taken.” The estate argues that this
language merely identifies those in whom the preemptive right is vested and that, by its plain and
ordinary meaning, should not be construed as terminating upon the death of the original
condemnee. We disagree. Had the General Assembly intended for the right of first refusal to
transcend the death of the original condemnee, it would have expressly included such language
within article 6, section 19. It did not. The contention that the right is vested not only in “the
person or persons from whom such remainder was taken” but also in their heirs, successors, and
assigns is inconsistent with the plain language of the provision. To hold otherwise would add
language to the constitution, an exercise in which we will not engage.
The estate argues that the predecessor to article 6, section 19 would not have passed with
“such widespread support from voters * * * if the General Assembly intended, and the voters
understood,” that the right of first refusal would be extinguished upon the death of the original
condemnee. As we previously have stated, “[w]hat matters in the end is what the amendment
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says.” McKenna, 874 A.2d at 232 n.14. Here, article 6, section 19 simply does not include
language that the right of first refusal passes to the heirs, successors, and assigns of the original
condemnee upon death. Since the Deebles were the owners of the property at the time of the
taking, only they had the power to exercise the preemptive right. When the Deebles died, the
right of first refusal under article 6, section 19 was extinguished.
Since this Court is satisfied that the plain language of article 6, section 19 is
unambiguous, we need not address the estate’s alternative arguments that a comparison between
G.L. 1956 § 37-7-4—which tracks the language of article 6, section 19—and other statutes
demonstrates that the framers of the constitutional provision intended for the preemptive right to
pass to the heirs, successors, and assigns of the original condemnee.5
Accordingly, we conclude that the rights guaranteed by article 6, section 19 of the Rhode
Island Constitution do not extend beyond the original condemnee’s lifetime. The term “the
person or persons from whom such remainder was taken” connotes the original condemnee only,
and not his or her heirs, successors, and assigns upon death.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. The papers shall be returned to the
Superior Court.
5
The estate does not claim a separate right of first refusal under G.L. 1956 § 37-7-4.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S
OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Estate of Richard J. Deeble v. Rhode Island Department of
Transportation.
CASE NO: No. 2014-235-Appeal.
(PC 13-618)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: March 24, 2016
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff: Robert Clark Corrente, Esq.
Christopher Nicholas Dawson, Esq.
For Defendant: Richard B. Wooley
Department of Attorney General