Darren Gomes v. State of Rhode Island

June 8, 2017
Supreme Court
No. 2015-306-Appeal.
(PM 13-4203)
Darren Gomes :
v. :
State of Rhode Island. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst,
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island
02903, at Tel. 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2015-306-Appeal.
(PM 13-4203)
Darren Gomes :
v. :
State of Rhode Island. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Flaherty, for the Court. The applicant, Darren Gomes, appeals from the
Superior Court’s denial of his application for postconviction relief. This case came before the
Supreme Court for oral argument on March 30, 2017, pursuant to an order directing the parties to
appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided.
After carefully considering the record and the parties’ written and oral submissions, we conclude
that cause has not been shown and shall proceed to decide the appeal without further briefing or
argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior
Court.
I
Facts and Travel
In January 2004, Gomes was indicted by a grand jury as follows: count 1, assault in a
dwelling house with intent to murder while armed with a dangerous weapon; count two, assault
with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a pistol; count 3, use and discharge of a firearm causing
permanent incapacity while committing a crime of violence; and count 4, carrying a pistol on or
-1-
about his person without a license. In September of that year, he disposed of the charges against
him by pleading nolo contendere to counts 1 and 4. In return, the state dismissed counts 2 and 3
in accordance with Rule 48(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. On count 1,
Gomes was sentenced to thirty years at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), twelve years to
serve and eighteen years suspended, with eighteen years’ probation. On count 4, he was
sentenced to ten years at the ACI, suspended, with ten years’ probation to run concurrently with
count 1.
According to Gomes, he was released from the ACI on parole on July 1, 2009. In March
2013, while he remained on parole and after an incident with his ex-girlfriend, he was arrested
and charged with domestic assault 1 and failure to relinquish a telephone.
Unfortunately for Gomes, that was neither his first nor his only scrape with the law
during his parole; an incident that had occurred in February 2013, a few weeks before the March
incident, caused an arrest warrant to be issued against him. This incident resulted in a new
charge of breaking and entering. His ex-girlfriend, the mother of his son, was the complaining
witness in both complaints.
Probation Violation Hearing
Based upon the two separate incidents involving his ex-girlfriend, the state filed a notice
of violation against Gomes pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure. A hearing on the violation was held on May 23, 2013, in which Gomes was
represented by private counsel. 2 It appears from the record that Gomes was under the impression
that the complaining witness, his ex-girlfriend, would not testify against him at the violation
1
Gomes was represented by a public defender on the assault charge. That charge was dismissed
on April 24, 2013, when the complaining witness failed to appear for trial.
2
Gomes now contends that this privately retained attorney was ineffective.
-2-
hearing because she had not appeared for trial on the simple assault charge. To his dismay,
however, and to Gomes’s visible distress, she did appear and she was on the witness stand ready
to testify. Before the state began its direct examination of the witness, as a result of Gomes’s
emotional state, the state declared, “Your Honor, maybe the defendant needs a minute. I think he
needs a minute. Do you think maybe he should be brought in the back?” In response, the
hearing justice instructed Gomes to “control [him]self.”
After this brief interruption, the witness’s testimony proceeded. However, as soon as the
witness began reading from her prior recorded handwritten statement describing the incident,
Gomes’s attorney asked for a sidebar conference. Following the sidebar conference, the hearing
justice asked the witness to step down because he was unsure whether the hearing would
continue or not. Gomes’s attorney then asked if he could “have one moment with [Gomes] just
to explain[.]” Shortly thereafter, Gomes’s attorney articulated that he had “informed [his] client
that he ha[d] a right to a violation hearing[, and that] [a]t that hearing, the judge of this court
would have to be reasonably satisfied that he did not keep the peace or be of good behavior while
he was out.” Gomes’s attorney then indicated that Gomes “wishe[d] to forego that hearing and
would like to admit violation.” Next, the hearing justice asked Gomes to come forward and the
following colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: * * * Mr. Gomes, did you hear what your
lawyer just told me?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: And is it true, sir, that you are prepared to
admit to me that you violated the terms and conditions of your
probation --
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: -- knowing, sir, that you have a right to a
hearing before me where the State would be required to prove to
my reasonable satisfaction that you did not keep the peace and be
of good behavior?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
-3-
“THE COURT: And at that hearing, Mr. Gomes, you
would have a right to confront and cross-examine the State’s
witnesses against you and to present evidence on your own behalf
if you chose to do so?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: And you would have a further right to
appeal any adverse findings to our Rhode Island Supreme Court. It
is my understanding, Mr. Gomes, that you want to waive that
hearing and admit to me that you violated your probation; is that
correct, sir?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: Are you doing this freely and voluntarily?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: I find the defendant admits violation, and I
declare him to be a violator.”
After this colloquy, Gomes was sentenced to serve nine years of his previously-suspended
eighteen year sentence, with the remaining nine years suspended, with probation.
Application for Postconviction Relief
In August 2013, Gomes filed an application for postconviction relief. In that application,
he alleged, among other things, that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at the
violation hearing and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily admit a violation
of probation. 3 A hearing on his postconviction relief application was held in August 2014.
Postconviction Relief Hearing
At the postconviction-relief hearing, Gomes testified that, after he engaged his attorney,
he met with him on three occasions. 4 While they were discussing the breaking and entering
charge, Gomes said that he informed his attorney that the residence on file with the parole board
3
The court first appointed a public defender to represent Gomes on his application for
postconviction relief; however, a private attorney was subsequently appointed. This second
court-appointed lawyer then filed a motion to withdraw in accordance with this Court’s holding
in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), opining that Gomes’s application for
postconviction relief was without merit. The motion to withdraw was granted and a third
attorney was appointed to represent Gomes.
4
The meetings occurred on April 30, 2013, May 7, 2013, and May 14, 2013.
-4-
as his place of abode was the same place at which the incident leading to his arrest had occurred.
Gomes maintained that, if his attorney spoke to the parole board and the landlord of the property,
it “would show [his] innocence, that [he] didn’t do the breaking and entering on [his] own
house” because the landlord had given him permission to live there by including his name on the
lease. He also relayed to his attorney that he did not believe that his ex-girlfriend would appear
at the violation hearing and he asked the attorney to contact her. 5 Gomes said that, at subsequent
meetings, his attorney told him that “he was playing phone tag with” his ex-girlfriend. Gomes
also said that his attorney informed him that he had not spoken to any of the other witnesses that
Gomes had asked him to contact.
When Gomes’s attorney testified at the postconviction-relief hearing, he admitted that he
had not reached out to the witnesses to whom Gomes had directed him. However, he maintained
that he believed that Gomes had “bigger issues” than whether or not he lived at the house where
the incident took place and that “[t]hat was not going to make or break [his] case.” His attorney
testified that there were other “witnesses that were going to testify, if believed, per the police
report, that [Gomes] assaulted [his ex-girlfriend] not just on the B and E date but on the simple
assault date. Him [sic] living in that house had no bearing, in [the attorney’s] opinion, on that
case.”
Gomes further testified at the postconviction-relief hearing that his attorney had not
communicated any offers to him that might resolve the probation violation. According to
Gomes’s attorney, however, both a twelve-year offer to “wrap” 6 and the nine-year offer in return
5
Gomes testified at the postconviction-relief hearing that he wanted to proceed with a violation
hearing because he did not think his ex-girlfriend would show up. His testimony is corroborated
by his attorney’s testimony that it was Gomes’s decision to proceed with a violation hearing.
6
In a probation violation context, when there is a new charge leading to a probation violation,
the old charge and the new charge may be resolved together, or “wrapped.”
-5-
for an admission to the probation violation were conveyed to him on May 8. He first testified
that he made Gomes aware of those offers on May 14, 7 but when asked later in his testimony, he
acknowledged that he did not remember when he communicated the offer to Gomes. He then
conceded that he communicated the offer to Gomes in the cellblock on the day of the violation
hearing.
Gomes testified that, by the time he arrived at the cellblock on the day of his violation
hearing, he did not know whether his attorney had spoken to any of the three witnesses he had
asked him to contact. He also testified that, before the violation hearing began, his attorney
visited him in the cellblock and informed him that his ex-girlfriend had indeed appeared for the
hearing. Gomes testified that it was at that time that he asked his attorney to “try to get [him] a
deal.” However, according to Gomes, his attorney told him, “We’re going to play like we’re
doing the violation hearing. When [the ex-girlfriend] starts to testify, I’m going to stop the
hearing.”
According to Gomes, he “lost it” as he entered the courtroom; he testified that he had an
“emotional breakdown, a panic attack” and that he began to sob. He maintained that he was
distraught because he was “under intense pressure” and he knew that his attorney had not done a
proper investigation before the violation hearing. When asked if he was thinking clearly at that
point, he responded that he was not, due to his “emotional state.”
Gomes also testified that, shortly after his ex-girlfriend commenced her testimony, his
attorney stopped the hearing and asked for a sidebar conference with the hearing justice. 8
Gomes testified that, after the sidebar conference, his attorney approached him and told him to
7
Although he said he could not be certain, Gomes’s attorney testified that he “definitely would
have told [Gomes about the offer] at the prison because [he] saw him after [the] offer was made.”
8
It is noteworthy that Gomes’s attorney testified that it was Gomes’s decision to stop the
hearing.
-6-
take the nine year offer. This, according to Gomes, was the first time during the entire pendency
of his violation hearing that any offer had been conveyed to him.
After hearing testimony and the arguments of the parties, the hearing justice issued a
bench decision. She found that Gomes was generally credible on many points and that his
attorney was “credible enough.” Notwithstanding such credibility determinations, the hearing
justice, assuming the inadequacy of the attorney’s performance, remained unpersuaded that
Gomes had suffered any prejudice, thereby not satisfying the second prong of the test
annunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 9
The hearing justice concluded that she was not convinced that Gomes would have
prevailed at the violation hearing or that he would have obtained a materially different outcome
had he continued with the hearing, even if represented by different counsel. Rather, she found
that there was ample evidence to support a finding of violation. She articulated that both
Gomes’s ex-girlfriend and her neighbor were present and prepared to testify at the hearing. The
hearing justice further determined that, even assuming his ex-girlfriend and the other witnesses
were found to be not credible or had been successfully impeached, she easily could have been
reasonably satisfied that Gomes had failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior.
Significantly, Gomes did not deny that he broke down the door to the residence and he admitted
to confiscating his ex-girlfriend’s cell phone during one of their arguments. The hearing justice
was also not persuaded that Gomes would have done any better than the nine-year incarceration
disposition that his attorney was able to negotiate on his behalf.
9
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an applicant must prove, first,
that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
-7-
With respect to Gomes’s contentions that his attorney failed to contact the landlord and
the parole board or to obtain evidence confirming his legal residence at the ex-girlfriend’s
apartment, the hearing justice found it to be of no assistance to Gomes. She indicated that, even
though he could not have been convicted of breaking and entering into his own home, there was,
nevertheless, evidence that he had assaulted his ex-girlfriend. Furthermore, she found that it was
of no assistance to Gomes that his attorney may have failed to earlier communicate the offer of
nine years to him, because he ultimately agreed to and received that sentence, and, therefore, that
he had not suffered any prejudice arising from any alleged failure to communicate that offer to
him.
Additionally, the hearing justice analyzed Gomes’s claim that the violation hearing
justice had violated Rule 11 10 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 11 The
postconviction-relief hearing justice reasoned that the violation hearing justice made appropriate
inquiry as soon as he was informed by defense counsel that Gomes had made a decision to admit
to the violation. The violation hearing justice brought Gomes forward so that he could observe
him more closely and he asked him direct and clear questions. Gomes was able to discuss the
plea with his attorney and he appeared to be calm while answering all of the violation hearing
10
Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that:
“The court * * * shall not accept [a plea of guilty] or a plea of nolo
contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. * * *
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the
plea.”
11
The state’s Rule 12A statement indicates that the Superior Court incorrectly analyzed this
claim pursuant to Rule 11. However, the state points out that Gomes, on appeal, “appears to
properly recognize that his probation-violation admission is unassailable so long as it was ‘made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.’”
-8-
justice’s questions. Finally, the postconviction-relief hearing justice concluded that “[t]he
colloquy between the two g[ave] no indication that Mr. Gomes, despite a previous display of
emotion, did not understand what he was doing or did not mean what he said when he responded
to the Magistrate’s questions.” After the hearing justice denied his application for postconviction
relief, Gomes timely appealed to this Court.
II
Standard of Review
Under Rhode Island law, postconviction relief is set forth in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1(a)(1).
See Perkins v. State, 78 A.3d 764, 767 (R.I. 2013). “[P]ost-conviction relief is available to a
defendant convicted of a crime who contends that his original conviction or sentence violated
rights that the state or federal constitutions secured to him.” Torres v. State, 19 A.3d 71, 77 (R.I.
2011) (quoting Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 2010)). “An applicant who files an
application for postconviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that such relief is warranted.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 179 (R.I. 2013) (quoting
Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012)).
When reviewing an appeal arising from the denial of an application for postconviction
relief, “[t]his Court will not impinge upon the fact-finding function of a hearing justice * * *
‘absent clear error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material
evidence in arriving at those findings.’” Anderson, 45 A.3d at 601 (quoting Chapdelaine v.
State, 32 A.3d 937, 941 (R.I. 2011)). “However, when a decision regarding postconviction relief
‘involv[es] questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged violation
of an applicant’s constitutional rights,’ this Court’s standard of review is de novo.” Id. (quoting
State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I. 2011)). Nevertheless, “[e]ven when the de novo
-9-
standard is applied to issues of constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s
findings of historical fact, and inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting
our review.” Id. (quoting Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I. 2012)).
III
Analysis
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
This Court has held that “[a] defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel
at a probation-violation hearing at which the defendant’s liberty is at stake.” State v. Gilbert,
984 A.2d 26, 30 (R.I. 2009) (citing Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 380 (R.I. 2001)). In
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is well established that this Court
adheres to “the familiar two-pronged test announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 * * * (1984).” Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 654
(R.I. 2016).
Under this framework, an applicant for postconviction relief “must demonstrate both that
‘counsel’s performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’ and that ‘such deficient performance was so prejudicial to the defense and the
errors were so serious as to amount to a deprivation of the applicant’s right to a fair trial.’”
Perkins, 78 A.3d at 767 (quoting Hazard v. State, 64 A.3d 749, 756 (R.I. 2013)).
When addressing the performance prong, “[c]ourts evaluate counsel’s performance ‘in a
highly deferential manner,’ * * * employing ‘a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the permissible range of assistance[.]’” Reyes, 141 A.3d at 654-55 (quoting Bido v. State,
56 A.3d 104, 111 (R.I. 2012)). “To satisfy the prejudice prong, ‘[t]he [applicant] must show that
- 10 -
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.’” Id. at 655 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Assuming without deciding that Gomes has met the performance prong of the Strickland
test, we will focus our analysis, as did the hearing justice, on the prejudice prong. Gomes argues
that “[t]here is no question that if [his attorney] had investigated and confirmed that * * * Gomes
had a valid defense to the breaking and entering charge, [he] would not have ever been faced
with that many years to serve.”
In his Rule 12A statement, Gomes cites to State v. Pires, 525 A.2d 1313, 1314 (R.I.
1987), for the proposition that “[w]hile judges at violation hearings are ‘guided principally by the
first offense,’ this Court has ‘never held that the trial justice must completely ignore the nature of
the second offense when imposing a sentence’ for a violation.” Although defendant has
accurately quoted Pires, it should be noted that this Court in Pires vacated the sentence and held
that the trial justice had overlooked this Court’s holding in State v. Fortes, 114 R.I. 161, 174, 330
A.2d 404, 411-12 (1975), in which we said:
“[the violation] hearing was not held for the purpose of punishing
[the] defendant for the new offense. Although the latter is the
precipitating cause for the revocation hearing, it should play no
part in determining the extent of the penalty to be imposed on the
charge on which sentence had formerly been deferred. Punishment
for the new offense must await the disposition of the case in which
the new offense is charged.”
Based on that reasoning, we concluded in Pires that the trial justice erred when he imposed the
maximum sentence on the original charge specifically because the second offense was so serious.
Pires, 525 A.2d at 1314. But here, the violation hearing justice did not impose a harsher
sentence on the original charge because the new charge of breaking and entering was so serious;
- 11 -
rather, the nature of the original conviction itself was very serious in that it involved a violent act
while applicant was armed with a firearm.
Furthermore, the standard at a probation violation hearing “is whether or not the
defendant has breached a condition of his or her probation by failing to keep the peace or remain
on good behavior.” State v. Beaudoin, 137 A.3d 726, 731 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Prout,
116 A.3d 196, 202 (R.I. 2015)). Consequently, “the state must only show that ‘reasonably
satisfactory evidence supports a finding that the defendant has violated his or her probation.’”
Gilbert, 983 A.2d at 29 (quoting State v. Tetreault, 973 A.2d 489, 491-92 (R.I. 2009)). 12 “[T]he
reasonably satisfied standard should not be applied to the narrow question of [the] defendant’s
guilt with regard to the new charges but rather, the standard should be applied to whether [the]
defendant maintained the conditions of his probation.” State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1156
(R.I. 2003) (quoting State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I. 2003)).
The postconviction-relief hearing justice appropriately determined that any failure by
Gomes’s attorney to further investigate the merits of the breaking and entering charge had no
bearing on the outcome of the violation case because there was ample evidence in the record for
the hearing justice to satisfy the low burden of proof at a violation hearing and find Gomes to be
in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. Gomes’s ex-girlfriend and her neighbor
were present at the violation hearing and prepared to testify. Moreover, Gomes did not deny that
he broke down the door to his ex-girlfriend’s residence. Gomes also admitted to taking her cell
phone during one of their arguments. Because of this evidence, the postconviction-relief hearing
justice determined that Gomes was unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a
12
The state’s burden articulated in Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
was amended to a fair preponderance of the evidence on June 21, 2016. However, applying the
new standard would not change our holding in this case.
- 12 -
competent attorney would have been successful at the violation hearing and that, had Gomes
been competently represented, the violation hearing justice would not have found him to be a
violator. We agree with her determination.
Significantly, the postconviction-relief hearing justice determined that it was of no
assistance to Gomes that his attorney may have failed to communicate the offer of nine years to
him because he ultimately agreed to and received that shorter sentence. He was, after all, in
jeopardy of having the entire eighteen years of his original sentence imposed. We have
previously held that “when counsel has secured a shorter sentence than what the defendant could
have received had he gone to trial, the defendant has an almost insurmountable burden to
establish prejudice.” Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 614 (R.I. 2011) (citing Rodrigues v. State,
985 A.2d 311, 317 (R.I. 2009)). Because he has failed to meet that burden, it is our opinion that
Gomes has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for any deficient
performance on the part of his attorney, the result of the violation hearing would have been
different. Therefore, any alleged deficient performance by Gomes’s attorney was not so
prejudicial as to amount to a deprivation of Gomes’s right to a fair trial.
Knowing and Voluntary Nature of Admission
“Although a defendant in the probation violation context is not entitled to the full panoply
of due process rights afforded to [the] defendants in criminal proceedings, he or she is
nonetheless entitled to ‘minimum due process protections[,]’ [one of which is] ‘the opportunity
to be heard * * *.’” State v. Brown, 140 A.3d 768, 783 (R.I. 2016) (quoting State v. Bernard,
925 A.2d 936, 938 (R.I. 2007)). Nevertheless, a defendant may waive his right to a probation
violation hearing. See 2 Neil P. Cohen, The Law of Probation and Parole § 25.11 at 25-13 (West
Group 2nd ed. 1999). “Because of the significance of this waiver, the hearing [justice] should
- 13 -
ensure that it is made knowingly and intelligently, without coercion.” Id. “[A] waiver will be
deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when the record demonstrates that the parolee’s
rights concerning the hearing and the effect of his waiver were explained to him.” 2 Neil P.
Cohen, § 25.11 at 125-26 (Supp. 2016); see also United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18, 23
(1st Cir. 2003) (“[N]otwithstanding the requirement that waivers of procedural rights with
respect to revocation hearings must be knowing and voluntary, such waivers need not be
accompanied either by any magic words or by a formal colloquy of the depth and intensity
required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11[.]”).
Our review of the record before us reveals that the postconviction-relief hearing justice
found that, at the violation hearing, the Superior Court engaged in an appropriate colloquy with
Gomes before the violation hearing justice determined that he had violated his probation. After
allowing Gomes and his attorney to discuss the plea, the violation hearing justice asked Gomes
to approach the bench so that he could observe him and he asked him several questions, the
answers to which were direct and clear. Only after Gomes responded affirmatively to all the
hearing justice’s questions, including whether he was admitting to violation “freely and
voluntarily,” was the violation hearing justice satisfied that Gomes was waiving his right to a
hearing voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The postconviction-relief hearing justice
appropriately concluded that “[t]he colloquy between the two g[ave] no indication that Mr.
Gomes, despite a previous display of emotion, did not understand what he was doing or did not
mean what he said when he responded to the Magistrate’s questions.” Although it is clear that
Gomes was distraught at the beginning of the violation hearing, we agree with the
postconviction-relief hearing justice that there is no evidence, other than Gomes’s own
assertions, that he was emotional to an extent that rendered his understanding of an admission a
- 14 -
nullity. Indeed, the record clearly demonstrates that Gomes’s rights concerning the hearing and
the effect of his waiver were adequately explained to him and his admission was made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record
shall be remanded to that court.
- 15 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Darren Gomes v. State of Rhode Island.
No. 2015-306-Appeal.
Case Number
(PM 13-4203)
Date Opinion Filed June 8, 2017
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Justices
Indeglia, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Francis X. Flaherty
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Patricia A. Hurst
For Applicant:
Megan F. Jackson
Office of the Public Defender
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For State:
Aaron L. Weisman
Department of Attorney General
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2016)