Angel Navarro v. State of Rhode Island

Supreme Court
No. 2016-143-Appeal.
(PM 09-5227)
Angel Navarro :
v. :
State of Rhode Island. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2016-143-Appeal.
(PM 09-5227)
Angel Navarro :
v. :
State of Rhode Island. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The applicant, Angel Navarro,1 appeals from a
postconviction-relief judgment in favor of the State of Rhode Island and against Navarro. In
those proceedings, Navarro challenged the trial court’s acceptance of his nolo contendere plea on
a second-degree murder charge. Navarro’s plea was “capped” at sixty years, with forty years to
serve and twenty years suspended with probation following his release, and the maximum
sentence was imposed. This matter came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order
directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing
the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and we proceed to decide the appeal at
this time. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Procedural History
On August 19, 1999, Alfred C. Moon, M.D., was found dead inside his residence. From
1999 to 2004, police investigated Dr. Moon’s mysterious death, to no avail. Then, on June 23,
1
Mr. Navarro is also identified in the record as Victor Medina, an apparent alias.
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2004, after police received information about a potential suspect, Navarro was arrested. On July
8, 2005, a grand jury indicted Navarro for murder in violation of G.L. 1956 §§ 11-23-1 and 11-
23-2. On November 16, 2006, Navarro entered into a plea agreement, whereby he pled nolo
contendere to an amended charge of second-degree murder, and his sentence was “capped” at
sixty years, with forty years to serve and the twenty-year balance suspended with probation.
The plea proceedings began with the state’s motion to amend the charge to second-degree
murder, which the hearing justice granted. Next, the hearing justice asked if Navarro understood
that by entering his plea he would be giving up the rights contained in the plea form; to which
Navarro responded, “Yes.” The hearing justice then asked Navarro if he had reviewed the plea
form with his attorney (trial counsel). Navarro again responded in the affirmative. At this point,
trial counsel asked the hearing justice for an opportunity to speak with Navarro about “a
question” regarding, as the attorney described it, “the back end of the number which I did not go
over with [Navarro].” Then, trial counsel and Navarro conferred off the record.
Subsequently, the hearing justice informed Navarro that he was giving up his right to a
trial and explained to Navarro what it meant to give up that right. The hearing justice then asked
Navarro if he had any questions, to which Navarro responded, “No, your Honor.” Following
Navarro’s acceptance of the prosecution’s statement of the facts as true, the hearing justice
informed Navarro that the plea was capped and agreed upon by Navarro, the state, and trial
counsel. The hearing justice further explained that the sentence could be no more than sixty
years with forty years to serve and asked Navarro: “If I accept your plea and cap that sentence
with those years, you can’t change your mind later on about this. Do you understand?” Navarro
responded that he understood. The hearing justice indicated that the sentencing was to be held at
a separate hearing, at which time the court would consider a presentence report and the
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recommendations of the state and trial counsel. The hearing justice further informed Navarro
that he would also have an opportunity to address the court.
Again, the hearing justice said to Navarro: “If the maximum sentence is imposed that can
be imposed under this agreement, you could end up spending [forty] years in prison. Do you
understand that?” Navarro replied, “Yes.” The hearing justice then warned Navarro that during
the entire sixty-year sentence, if imposed, he would have to abide by the terms of his probation,
to which Navarro again responded that he understood. Lastly, the hearing justice asked Navarro
if he had any questions, to which Navarro replied, “No.”
On December 13, 2006, the same justice conducted Navarro’s sentencing hearing. At
that time, Dr. Moon’s colleague, his two sons, and his daughter addressed the court. Navarro’s
mother and wife2 also addressed the court, as did Navarro. In his statement, Navarro apologized
to Dr. Moon’s family and expressed remorse.
During the sentencing hearing, trial counsel made a sentence recommendation on
Navarro’s behalf. He stated that “[Navarro] is sincere when he says that his only wish and
prayer would be to reverse the events of August 17, 1999 that led to such a tragedy” and that
Navarro “has admitted to being responsible for the death of Dr. Moon.” Trial counsel described
Navarro’s difficult upbringing and pointed out that the totality of his criminal past was
nonviolent and related to his challenges with addiction. Trial counsel chronicled the events that
occurred on the night of the murder from Navarro’s perspective and provided a very detailed
recitation of the circumstances that led to Dr. Moon’s death. He noted that Navarro had been
released from prison three days prior to Dr. Moon’s murder, after serving time for heroin
2
We note that the transcript of the sentencing hearing is missing three pages that we presume
include part of Navarro’s wife’s statement to the court.
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possession. Earlier that day, Navarro had “sniffed” two bags of heroin and had been drinking
heavily.
Additionally, trial counsel cited to his research on sentences in other second-degree
murder cases, which revealed terms of less than five years to up to forty years to serve. He
further noted that the average sentence of the thirty-six cases he examined was fifty years with
twenty-seven years to serve. He distinguished the instant case from others, arguing that in this
case “[t]here was a degree of provocation and an element of self-defense.” He further argued
that Navarro’s sentence should be reduced because he had taken responsibility for Dr. Moon’s
death, showed genuine remorse, and demonstrated “a true sense of trying to right his wrongs.”
Furthermore, trial counsel explained that Navarro had “assisted the prosecution in the
United States District Court for charges that occurred while [Navarro] was serving at the [Adult
Correctional Institutions] and witnessed an alleged crime.” In summation, trial counsel
recommended that Navarro be sentenced to forty years with fifteen to twenty years to serve, and
trial counsel also recommended that Navarro participate in treatment for anger management and
substance abuse.
After reviewing the facts of the case, the hearing justice noted that, for four years while
law enforcement worked to solve Dr. Moon’s murder, Navarro failed to take responsibility and
remained at large. In addition, the hearing justice noted the severity of the attack, Navarro’s
criminal history, his likelihood of rehabilitation, and trial counsel’s research on sentencing in
second-degree murder cases. The hearing justice sentenced Navarro to the maximum sentence
under the capped plea agreement: sixty years imprisonment, with forty years to serve and twenty
years suspended with probation following Navarro’s release.
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On September 11, 2009, Navarro filed a pro se application for postconviction relief.
Navarro sought to have his sentence vacated pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1. He essentially
asserted two arguments in support of his application for postconviction relief: (1) ineffective
assistance of counsel and (2) failure by the hearing justice to adequately explain to Navarro his
waiver of constitutional rights when he pled nolo contendere. On October 23, 2009, the state
filed its answer and a motion to dismiss Navarro’s application for postconviction relief. On
September 21, 2010, Navarro’s court-appointed counsel for his postconviction-relief application
(postconviction counsel) entered an appearance on his behalf.
Prior to the postconviction-relief hearing, postconviction counsel filed a motion to
withdraw in accordance with the procedures outlined in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I.
2000). See also Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 455-56 (R.I. 2012) (indicating that in Shatney,
we set forth a mechanism that allows “an attorney * * * appointed to represent an indigent
applicant [to] withdraw from that representation when it becomes clear, after a reasonable
investigation, that some or all of the applicant’s claims lack merit”).
On October 20, 2011, a justice of the Superior Court heard the parties on Navarro’s
application for postconviction relief. The postconviction-relief justice noted that “[t]he [c]ourt
* * * appointed an attorney to investigate the petitioner’s claim to determine if there was any
merit to the same.” Navarro’s postconviction counsel indicated that he had been “appointed in
this case to represent Mr. Navarro in his [postconviction-relief] petition.” Postconviction
counsel reported to the justice that, after he obtained the case, he met with Navarro
approximately four times. In addition, postconviction counsel stated that he reviewed all
pertinent exhibits and transcripts. He also spoke with trial counsel “at length at least four times
regarding the actual plea.” Postconviction counsel then submitted to the justice that, based on
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his review of the case, Navarro understood the ramifications of his plea. Moreover,
postconviction counsel stated: “In my professional opinion, there is no reasonable avenue by way
of [postconviction] [r]elief that Mr. Navarro could gain through this petition.” Therefore, he
asked the justice for permission to withdraw as Navarro’s counsel. In response to his counsel’s
request to withdraw, Navarro stated that he agreed with postconviction counsel’s summary of the
facts relating to what postconviction counsel had done in his case.
At that point during the proceedings, the postconviction-relief justice told Navarro, “[I]t’s
my responsibility * * * after I receive a report from an attorney * * * to kind of go through the
facts myself to make sure that I think he’s covered everything. And I’m satisfied there is an
accurate record to substantiate what he’s just said before the [c]ourt.” The justice further
indicated that she “had a couple of opportunities” to review the record. She reviewed the plea
form, the transcript of the plea hearing, the transcript of the sentencing hearing, postconviction
counsel’s memorandum, and, in particular, the section in which postconviction counsel
summarized his conversations with trial counsel.
The postconviction-relief justice found, after reviewing the entire record, that Navarro
entered his plea “with knowledge, consent, voluntarily, understanding what was happening, the
nature of the plea, [and] the consequences of it” and that Navarro’s trial counsel provided “more
than adequate representation.” The justice also agreed with postconviction counsel’s conclusion
that Navarro’s claims lacked merit and, accordingly, decided that she was “going to allow
[postconviction counsel] to withdraw.” No order was entered as to either decision at that time.
Upon issuing her decision orally, the postconviction-relief justice informed Navarro that
he had a right to further pursue the matter pro se. Navarro responded that he did not wish to
pursue the matter, but instead he sought to file a motion for modification of his sentence. In
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response, the justice scheduled a future status date and indicated that Navarro could utilize the
time prior to his next court date to consider his strategy moving forward. Navarro again
informed the justice that he did not want to pursue his postconviction-relief application;
however, the justice persisted in scheduling the matter for a further court date. She noted that the
future date would give Navarro the opportunity to “talk to [postconviction counsel] about the
sentencing issue * * *.” The justice further informed postconviction counsel that, after he spoke
with Navarro, he would be allowed to withdraw as Navarro’s postconviction counsel.
In a letter dated October 29, 2011, Navarro wrote to an attorney (former counsel) who
had represented him prior to his representation by trial counsel. In the letter, Navarro asked
former counsel to send him the name of the prosecutor who had offered a plea deal that
purportedly would have given Navarro assistance with his sentence if he provided testimony in
an unrelated case. Former counsel sent a letter in response, wherein he provided Navarro with
the prosecutor’s name and explained that the prosecutor did in fact consider Navarro’s testimony
and that the prosecutor’s consideration resulted in a proposed thirty-two-year sentence. Former
counsel further explained in the letter that, because Navarro decided not to take the thirty-two-
year offer and instead retained a new attorney, Navarro would have needed to raise the
previously proposed plea agreement at his sentencing hearing.
The matter was again before the postconviction-relief justice on March 16, 2012. At that
time, Navarro discussed the letter that he had received from his former counsel regarding the
offer of a thirty-two-year sentence. Navarro argued that the letter was “proof [he] was getting
[thirty-two] years.” The postconviction-relief justice concluded, as former counsel stated in the
letter, that Navarro had no plea agreement with the state and had not raised the state’s offer at his
sentencing. She further informed Navarro that he needed to put forth “something different”
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because in the prior hearing she had already decided that Navarro did not receive ineffective
assistance from his trial counsel. Navarro responded by expressing his intention to file an appeal
with this Court. The justice then instructed Navarro to speak with postconviction counsel about
the timing of his appeal. In addition, the justice asked postconviction counsel to prepare an order
that indicated she had accepted postconviction counsel’s Shatney memorandum, that Navarro
had “nothing new to offer other than what [the postconviction-relief justice] discussed before,”
and that Navarro intended to file an appeal.
On April 18, 2012, Navarro filed a pro se notice of appeal to this Court. During an
August 1, 2012 status conference, Navarro stated: “I just wanted to appeal to the Supreme
Court.” The postconviction-relief justice indicated that an order was to be entered in the case at
the end of the week. The postconviction-relief justice then confirmed orally on the record that
Navarro’s application for postconviction relief was denied; however, no order was entered at that
time. On April 27, 2016, judgment entered on Navarro’s application for postconviction relief in
favor of the state and against Navarro.3 On October 4, 2017, Navarro filed a motion for the
appointment of counsel, which this Court granted.
II
Standard of Review
Under Rhode Island law, a defendant can seek postconviction relief pursuant to
§ 10-9.1-1. Postconviction relief “is available to a defendant convicted of a crime who contends
that his original conviction or sentence violated rights that the state or federal constitutions
secured to him.” Bell v. State, 71 A.3d 458, 460 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Chapdelaine v. State, 32
A.3d 937, 941 (R.I. 2011)). “Accordingly, in all criminal prosecutions, one who alleges the
3
This Court has not been made aware of the reason for the delay in the entry of judgment.
-8-
infringement of his or her constitutional Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel may
avail his or herself of the postconviction-relief process.” Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I. 2012).
“‘[T]he burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such [postconviction] relief
is warranted’ falls on the applicant.” Motyka v. State, 172 A.3d 1203, 1205 (R.I. 2017) (quoting
Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012)). “This Court will not disturb a [hearing]
justice’s factual findings made on an application for post[]conviction relief absent clear error or a
showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in arriving at
those findings.” Chapdelaine, 32 A.3d at 941 (quoting Gordon v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473 (R.I.
2011)). In addition, we will not disturb a hearing justice’s credibility determinations unless the
applicant shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the hearing justice was clearly wrong.
Guerrero v. State, 47 A.3d 289, 299 (R.I. 2012). “We will, however, ‘review de novo any
post[]conviction[-]relief decision involving questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact
pertaining to an alleged violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights.’” Bell, 71 A.3d at 460
(quoting Chapdelaine, 32 A.3d at 941). “Even when applying the de novo standard of review to
such issues, however, ‘we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and
inferences drawn from those facts, great deference * * *.’” Jolly v. Wall, 59 A.3d 133, 138 (R.I.
2013) (quoting Anderson, 45 A.3d at 601).
III
Analysis
On appeal, Navarro essentially asserts the same arguments that he raised in Superior
Court, albeit now with greater clarity. He contends that he received ineffective assistance from
his trial counsel and that the hearing justice committed judicial error. Pursuant to his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel argument, Navarro contends that he signed the plea form, which he
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maintains was blank at the time, only because trial counsel informed him and his family that the
sentence would be fifteen years or, at most, seventeen years. He further cites to a section of the
plea transcript where his trial counsel asked the hearing justice for an opportunity to confer with
Navarro about “the back end of the number * * *.” It is at that point in time, Navarro contends,
that trial counsel informed him “not to worry about the number [forty] [because he] was going to
serve in the teens.”
Navarro similarly supplements his judicial-error argument on appeal. He avers that the
hearing justice failed to ask Navarro “if anybody made threats or promises” to him during the
plea negotiations. He maintains that he would have responded in the affirmative to such an
inquiry.
A
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Judicial Error
“This Court adheres to the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), when
evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Chapdelaine, 32 A.3d at 941 (quoting
Rodriguez v. State, 941 A.2d 158, 162 (R.I. 2008)). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, an applicant must satisfy two criteria. Id. “First, the applicant must
demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, to the point that the errors were so serious
that trial counsel did not function at the level guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting
Rodriguez, 941 A.2d at 162). “This prong can be satisfied only by a showing that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 941
A.2d at 162). In our evaluation of counsel’s performance, “a strong presumption” exists “that an
attorney’s performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance and sound
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strategy * * *.” Rivera v. State, 58 A.3d 171, 180 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Rice, 38 A.3d at 17).
“Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 610 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 522
(R.I. 1999)). “‘When evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a plea situation,
the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, he or she
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial’ and, importantly, that
the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Id. at 610-11 (quoting State v. Figueroa, 639
A.2d 495, 500 (R.I. 1994)).
As noted above, at the conclusion of postconviction counsel’s presentation of his findings
contained in his no-merit Shatney memorandum, the postconviction-relief justice informed
Navarro that “it’s my responsibility at this point after I receive a report from an attorney * * * to
kind of go through the facts myself to make sure that I think he’s covered everything.” The
justice did not address the state’s motion to dismiss and instead proceeded to decide the matter
on the merits. The justice indicated that she “had a couple of opportunities” to review the record
of the case, in addition to her review of postconviction counsel’s memorandum, the plea form,
the transcript of the plea hearing, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Specifically, the
postconviction-relief justice reviewed the portion of postconviction counsel’s no-merit
memorandum regarding his conversations with trial counsel related to the plea. Additionally,
she acknowledged the statements by Navarro’s mother and wife at the sentencing hearing
explaining Navarro’s background, his issues with addiction, how their lives would be impacted if
Navarro was incarcerated for a long period of time, and their belief that Navarro was prepared to
rehabilitate himself. The postconviction-relief justice also noted that Navarro and trial counsel
both signed the plea form and that the hearing justice discussed the plea with Navarro, including
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his attendant rights. Moreover, she took note of Navarro’s statement to the court at the
sentencing hearing.
The postconviction-relief justice also considered trial counsel’s representation of Navarro
during the plea proceedings, including his “strong argument” on behalf of Navarro at the
sentencing hearing; his “very impassioned” sentence recommendation; his argument that
Navarro’s criminal past was only related to his addiction issues; his presentation of Navarro’s
recollection of the events that took place on the night of the murder; and his research on
sentences in second-degree murder cases, which trial counsel “discussed at length,” together with
his conclusion that the average sentence was “far less” than the maximum sentence of forty years
to serve under Navarro’s capped plea. Bearing in mind her thorough review of the entire record,
we conclude that the postconviction-relief justice did not overlook or misconceive material
evidence in concluding that trial counsel’s representation was not deficient and did not “f[a]ll
below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Chapdelaine, 32 A.3d at 943 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
In light of our determination that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable, we need not
address the second prong of Strickland requiring that “counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defense in this case.” Neufville, 13 A.3d at 614 (concluding that a court should
only reach the second prong of the Strickland test when it has determined that the attorney’s
representation was deficient).
Additionally, Navarro contends that the hearing justice erred when he failed to ask
Navarro “if anybody made threats or promises” to him during the plea negotiations. Specifically,
in regard to the purported previous plea agreement, Navarro maintains that, had he known he
would serve forty years, he would have taken the offer of thirty-two years to serve from former
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counsel, “but [trial counsel] told [Navarro] that he can get [him] less time to serve that’s why
[he] hired [trial counsel.]” “It is well settled in this state that ‘[g]uilty pleas are valid only if
voluntarily and intelligently entered, and the record must so affirmatively disclose’ facts
pertaining to those requirements.” Rodrigues v. State, 985 A.2d 311, 314 (R.I. 2009) (quoting
Figueroa, 639 A.2d at 498). A defendant’s plea “will be vacated unless the record shows that
the court has conducted an on-the-record examination of the defendant before accepting [the]
plea [in order] to determine if the plea is being made voluntarily with an understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.” State v. Frazar, 822 A.2d 931, 935 (R.I.
2003) (quoting Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I. 2001)).
In her review of the proceedings, the postconviction-relief justice acknowledged the
extended nature of the sentencing hearing. In addition, she thoroughly studied the transcript of
the plea proceeding and concluded that the hearing justice who presided over said proceeding
was “very clear” to Navarro as to “what the plea was—what the cap of the plea was.” She
further found that the hearing justice informed Navarro of his rights in relation to the plea. She
considered the hearing justice’s explanation to Navarro regarding the nature of the capped plea,
as well as the hearing justice’s warning to Navarro that once he accepted the plea, he could not
change his mind. She cited to the hearing justice’s statement to Navarro that if the maximum
sentence was in fact imposed, he would have to serve forty years in prison; she also cited to the
hearing justice’s follow-up question asking Navarro if he understood and Navarro’s affirmative
answer. The postconviction-relief justice also took note of the hearing justice’s inquiry to
Navarro as to whether he had any questions, to which Navarro replied, “No.” She further
considered the hearing justice’s explanation to Navarro regarding the upcoming sentencing
hearing. She also noted that, although trial counsel may have made a sentence recommendation
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to the hearing justice during the sentencing proceedings that Navarro should serve between
fifteen and twenty years, the hearing justice was nevertheless “very clear” at the plea hearing that
Navarro “could very well end up serving [forty] years in jail.”
After her thorough review of the record, the postconviction-relief justice concluded that
Navarro entered into the plea agreement “with knowledge, consent, voluntarily, understanding
what was happening, the nature of the plea, [and] the consequences of it.” We agree; and we
conclude that, in making her determination, the postconviction-relief justice did not overlook or
misconceive material evidence, nor did she clearly err in her denial of Navarro’s postconviction-
relief application.
B
Shatney Proceedings
We note that at the outset of the postconviction-relief proceedings in Superior Court, the
justice mischaracterized postconviction counsel’s role in Navarro’s case as an investigator
appointed by the court to determine if Navarro’s claims had merit, as opposed to Navarro’s
counsel in pursuit of postconviction relief. We have previously clarified that neither Shatney v.
State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000)
“nor its progeny contemplates the appointment of an objective or
independent lawyer who does not represent the applicant,’ and that
‘[g]enerally, Shatney considerations should arise after counsel has
been appointed in accordance with § 10-9.1-5 and the applicant has
been provided with a meaningful discussion with counsel about the
issues that may or may not be suitable grounds for postconviction
relief.” Ramirez v. State, 89 A.3d 836, 840 (R.I. 2014) (quoting
Campbell, 56 A.3d at 456).
Despite the postconviction-relief justice’s mistaken description of postconviction
counsel’s role, postconviction counsel properly represented Navarro pursuant to the requirements
set forth in Shatney. Postconviction counsel described his role as being appointed to represent
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Navarro in his postconviction-relief application. Postconviction counsel appropriately conducted
his representation of Navarro by meeting with Navarro’s trial counsel “at least four times
regarding the actual plea.” In addition, he met with Navarro four times and reviewed all the
transcripts and exhibits that he deemed pertinent. Notwithstanding the brevity of postconviction
counsel’s Shatney memorandum—only four pages—we conclude that his investigation of
Navarro’s claims was reasonable under Shatney. Campbell, 56 A.3d at 455-56 (noting that
according to Shatney, an attorney “may withdraw from * * * representation when it becomes
clear, after a reasonable investigation, that some or all of the applicant’s claims lack merit”).
Furthermore, we are satisfied that the postconviction-relief justice was cognizant of this
Court’s concerns with the Shatney procedures and made concerted efforts to ensure that Navarro
understood his rights in the Shatney context. See Motyka, 172 A.3d at 1206 (recognizing that,
when the court permits counsel to withdraw pursuant to Shatney, it must “advise the applicant
that he or she shall be required to proceed pro se, if he or she chooses to pursue the application”)
(quoting Shatney, 755 A.2d at 135). The postconviction-relief justice asked Navarro three times
if he wanted an evidentiary hearing or to pursue the matter pro se, and each time he responded in
the negative. Moreover, the justice brought Navarro into court on three separate occasions, and
each time he was given an opportunity to be heard. On the third and final court date, August 1,
2012, the postconviction-relief justice noted that since the last court date:
“[O]ur Rhode Island Supreme Court had entered or filed a case on
post[]conviction relief and my understanding from that case is that
I need to be very specific with you, sir, as to what you wanted to
do after [postconviction counsel] finished and presented his
Shatney memo. I gave you an opportunity to refile it and to argue
it again if you wish to. You told me you did not wish to do that. I
guess—I think I need to be clearer with you and indicate to you
that if you wish to produce any witnesses or have an evidentiary
hearing on the issues that you have raised in your post[]conviction
relief, you have the right to do that and proceed on this on your
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own. * * * Do you want to have—produce evidence or have an
evidentiary hearing on the issues that you have raised?”
In response, Navarro replied: “I just wanted to appeal to the Supreme Court.”
We note that, after the postconviction-relief justice reviewed all the evidence, agreed with
postconviction counsel that Navarro’s postconviction-relief application was without merit,
accepted postconviction counsel’s no-merit Shatney memorandum, and indicated that she was
“going to allow him to withdraw[,]” postconviction counsel’s representation of Navarro should
have ceased. Instead, however, subsequent to her Shatney determination, the postconviction-
relief justice informed Navarro that postconviction counsel could advise him on his plans to file
a motion for “[s]entence modification.”
Recently, in Motyka, we questioned whether the proceedings in that case met the
requirements set forth in Shatney. Motyka, 172 A.3d at 1207. We expressed concern when the
applicant’s postconviction counsel appeared to be advising the applicant during the Shatney
hearing while simultaneously arguing in support of his no-merit memorandum. Id. at 1207, 1207
n.3. Additionally, we took issue in that case with the justice’s statement that she found
postconviction counsel’s no-merit memorandum “justified” and “therefore” the applicant’s
postconviction-relief application was denied and dismissed. Id. We clarified that a justice’s
grant of a postconviction counsel’s motion to withdraw under Shatney is not determinative of the
merits of an applicant’s postconviction-relief application. Id.
Here, the postconviction-relief justice asked postconviction counsel to continue to advise
Navarro in the matter, specifically with respect to his appeal, while postconviction counsel
concurrently offered his opinion that Navarro’s postconviction-relief application lacked merit.
We reiterate that, in a Shatney proceeding, counsel may indeed seek to withdraw his or her
representation “when it becomes clear, after a reasonable investigation, that some or all of the
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applicant’s claims lack merit.” Campbell, 56 A.3d at 455-56. In this case, once the
postconviction-relief justice made her decision to grant the Shatney motion, postconviction
counsel should no longer have been expected or allowed to represent Navarro at the subsequent
two court dates. We note, however, that this case was heard by the postconviction-relief justice
prior to a number of cases decided by this Court that clarify the requirements under Shatney.
See, e.g., Motyka, 172 A.3d at 1208; Ramirez, 89 A.3d at 839-40; Campbell, 56 A.3d at 455-56.
In addition, notwithstanding the postconviction-relief justice’s comments on the record that seem
to conflate her Shatney review with her review of the merits of Navarro’s postconviction-relief
application, she nevertheless conducted a thorough and independent review of the record in
support of her denial of Navarro’s postconviction-relief application. Therefore, it is our opinion
that any Shatney-related issues were cured.
IV
Conclusion
For all the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment denying
Navarro’s application for postconviction relief. The papers in this case may be remanded to the
Superior Court.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Angel Navarro v. State of Rhode Island.
No. 2016-143-Appeal.
Case Number
(PM 09-5227)
Date Opinion Filed June 22, 2018
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Justices
Indeglia, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Susan E. McGuirl
For Applicant:
Carl J. Ricci, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal For State of Rhode Island:
Christopher R. Bush
Department of Attorney General
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2016)