Mikail K. Abdul-Karim v. Isaiah Abdul-Karim

Issued May 10, 2019
Corrected May 15, 2019
Supreme Court
No. 2018-214-Appeal.
(KM 17-1067)
Mikail K. Abdul-Karim :
v. :
Isaiah Abdul-Karim et al. :
ORDER
Before us is an appeal from a Superior Court order confirming an arbitration award and
appointing a commissioner to carry out the terms of the award. The need for arbitration arose
out of a dispute involving a joint tenancy—from which the plaintiff appellee Mikail K. Abdul-
Karim (Mikail1 or plaintiff) wishes to separate—in real property located at 13 Boston Street in
Coventry, Rhode Island (the property). The defendants—Karima A. Karim (Karima), Musa
Abdul-Karim (Musa), and Latifa B. Karim (Latifa)—who have been self-represented throughout
these proceedings, argue that they were not afforded a hearing on arbitration and seek a stay of
the property’s sale. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily
decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record,
we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further
briefing or argument. In accordance with the strong public policy in favor of the finality of
arbitration awards, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
1
As some of the central figures in this appeal share the same surname, we shall refer to them by
their first names to avoid any confusion. No disrespect is intended.
-1-
On June 25, 2012, Mikail purchased the property by a warranty deed.2 On September 13,
2012, Mikail signed and recorded a quitclaim deed in the Coventry land evidence records. The
quitclaim deed provided Mikail with a 50 percent interest in the property, Isaiah Abdul-Karim
(Isaiah)3 with a 25 percent interest, Karima with a 12.5 percent interest, and Musa and Latifa
with a share of 12.5 percent interest in the property (collectively, the tenants).
A few days later, on September 15, 2012, the tenants entered into an “Agreement Among
Joint Tenants” (the agreement) regarding the ownership of the property; the agreement was
recorded in the Coventry land evidence records on September 28, 2012. In the event any of the
tenants wished to alienate his or her ownership of the property, the agreement set forth a
procedure to dissolve the joint tenancy. Under the agreement, Mikail had “the first option” to
purchase the separating tenant’s interest. If Mikail declined to purchase the interest of the
separating tenant, the remaining tenants had the option to purchase it in proportion to their
respective equity interest in the property. If Mikail himself wished to separate, or if the other
tenants were “unwilling or unable” to purchase the separating tenant’s interest, then the property
was to be sold at an agreed-upon price. If the tenants were unable to agree on a price, the fair
market value was to be determined by an independent real estate appraiser selected by Mikail.
The proceeds would then be divided in proportion to each tenant’s equity interest. Finally, the
agreement provided that “any disputes between [the tenants] shall be settled by binding
arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect.”
Several years later, on October 6, 2017, Mikail filed an application to confirm an
arbitration award in the Kent County Superior Court. The agreement and the arbitration award
2
Our summary of the facts is taken from both the first and second arbitration awards.
3
Isaiah Abdul-Karim is listed as a defendant on the Superior and Supreme Court dockets. He,
however, does not appear on any of defendants’ filings and does not otherwise appear to be
actively defending this case.
-2-
were attached to Mikail’s application. The arbitration award was signed by an arbitrator and
dated July 7, 2017, and the award indicated that the arbitrator had held a hearing on June 23,
2017 regarding a dispute concerning the enforceability of the agreement.4 According to the
parties, this hearing was conducted over the telephone.
On October 24, 2017, Karima filed a “motion to vacate.”5 The motion briefly stated that
Karima had not been a party to arbitration and that the “judgment” was based on “misleading
and/or incomplete information[.]”
On November 3, 2017, a Superior Court justice (the hearing justice) heard Mikail’s
application to confirm the arbitration award and Karima’s motion to vacate. Convinced by
defendants’ testimony that they had understood the hearing to be a preliminary one—and not an
arbitration hearing—the hearing justice granted Karima’s motion to vacate.
A second or “final hearing” was held by telephone on February 5, 2018 by a different
arbitrator.6 The second arbitrator issued a written award on February 8, 2018.7 The award stated
that Mikail and his attorney were present; Karima, Latifa, and Musa were present; and, Isaiah
was not present. The award further stated that “[t]he parties were notified that this would be a
final hearing on the matter, which occurred via telephone conference with [an American
4
The award details that, on February 20, 2017, Mikail and Isaiah had sent a letter to the other
tenants stating that (1) they wished to dissolve the joint tenancy, (2) the appraised value of the
property was $176,000, and (3) they would sell their interests to the other tenants. Musa, Latifa,
and Karima replied in a March 7, 2017 letter that they were not interested in selling the property.
Pursuant to the agreement, Mikail brought the dispute to arbitration.
5
The motion stated that it was a “motion to vacate judgment” and requested the court to vacate
an October 6, 2017 order. We presume the motion was seeking to vacate the arbitration award,
and the Superior Court treated it as such.
6
According to Mikail’s counsel, the hearing was conducted by telephone because Mikail had a
restraining order against Karima.
7
This award was attached as an exhibit to Mikail’s amended application to confirm the
arbitration award.
-3-
Arbitration Association] Administrator on the call as well. All parties were given the
opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to respond to each side’s contentions.”8
On March 11, 2018, Mikail filed an amended application to confirm the award. On
March 19, 2018, Latifa filed a “motion to vacate and dismiss the judgment,” alleging that there
had been no second arbitration hearing and that the second award was “based on an illegal
‘quitclaim’ [deed] not presented to nor signed by the joint tenants.”
On March 23, 2018, a second Superior Court justice (the second hearing justice) heard
Mikail’s amended application to confirm the second award and Latifa’s motion to vacate.
Mikail’s counsel was present, as were Latifa, Musa, and Karima. At the hearing, Mikail also
sought the appointment of a commissioner “to enforce the award because of the difficulty * * *
[Mikail] has had in listing the property[.]”
The second hearing justice issued a decision, stating that he had considered the
application to confirm the award and its attachments, including the agreement, which he
observed was signed by all parties and notarized. He noted that the award “appears to be a
thoughtful decision.” He explained to defendants that they “got a second opportunity in front of
another arbitrator,” and that “[b]y everything I have in front of me that took place, it was an
appropriate opportunity for you to be heard.” He further stated that he saw “no legal basis to not
confirm the arbitration award[.]” Consequently, the second hearing justice confirmed the
arbitration award and appointed a commissioner to assist in the sale of the property.
An order confirming the arbitration award and appointing a commissioner was entered on
April 2, 2018. Karima, Latifa, and Musa filed a timely notice of appeal on April 10, 2018.
8
The award reached was substantially the same result as the first arbitration award.
-4-
“To preserve the integrity and efficacy of arbitration proceedings, judicial review of
arbitration awards is extremely limited.” Lemerise v. Commerce Insurance Co., 137 A.3d 696,
699 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition Co., Inc., 91 A.3d
830, 834-35 (R.I. 2014)). “Public policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and such
awards enjoy a presumption of validity.” Id. (quoting State Department of Corrections v. Rhode
Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 64 A.3d 734, 739 (R.I. 2013)).
General Laws 1956 § 10-3-12 provides the grounds for vacating an arbitration award.
The limited grounds for a court to vacate are as follows:
“(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue
means.
“(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of
the arbitrators, or either of them.
“(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in hearing
legally immaterial evidence, or refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been substantially prejudiced.
“(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.” Section 10-3-12.
Here, defendants insist that there never was an arbitration hearing, and they argue that the
property is being taken from them by way of fraud and other wrongful acts. They request that
this Court grant them the opportunity to participate in a “true” arbitration hearing, where they
will be “allowed to negotiate remedies[.]”
We review arbitration awards “merely ‘to determine whether the arbitrator has resolved
the grievance by considering the proper sources of the contract but not to determine whether the
arbitrator has resolved the grievance correctly.’” Prospect Chartercare, LLC v. Conklin, 185
-5-
A.3d 538, 544 (R.I. 2018) (brackets and deletion omitted) (quoting Jacinto v. Egan, 120 R.I. 907,
912, 391 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1978)). “Accordingly, ‘only in cases in which an award is so tainted
by impropriety or irrationality that the integrity of the process is compromised should courts
intervene.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Flynn, 687 A.2d 440, 441 (R.I. 1996)). “‘[E]very reasonable presumption in favor of the award
will be made,’ and the party claiming that an arbitrator exceeded his authority ‘bears the burden
of proving that contention.’” Id. (quoting Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC, 91 A.3d at 835).
After a careful review of the defendants’ submissions, we are satisfied that they have not
met the formidable burden necessary to overcome the presumption of validity to which the
arbitration award is entitled. Here, the award states that a “final hearing” was held on February
5, 2018 by means of a telephone conference.9 Indeed, the defendants acknowledge that they
“spoke to [the arbitrator] on the phone February 5th, 2018.” They have failed, however, to
provide any evidence tending to establish any of the factors set forth in § 10-3-12 which would
warrant vacating the award. Accordingly, we perceive no error by the second hearing justice in
confirming the award and appointing a commissioner to oversee the property’s sale.
For the reasons stated in this order, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The record
shall be returned to the Superior Court.
Entered as an order of this Court on this 10th day of May , 2019.
By Order,
/s/
_________________________________
/s/
Clerk
9
Although telephone conferences are permissible under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association, we are of the mind that the practice is to be discouraged when legally
unsophisticated, self-represented parties are involved.
-6-
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Mikail K. Abdul-Karim v. Isaiah Abdul-Karim et al.
No. 2018-214-Appeal.
Case Number
(KM 17-1067)
Date Opinion Filed May 10, 2019
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and
Justices
Indeglia, JJ.
Written By N/A
Source of Appeal Kent County Superior Court
Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Daniel A. Procaccini
For Plaintiff:
John V. McGreen, Esq.
For Defendants:
Attorney(s) on Appeal
Isaiah Abdul-Karim, Pro Se
Musa Abdul-Karim, Pro Se
Karima A. Karim, Pro Se
Latifa B. Karim, Pro Se
SU‐CMS‐02A (revised June 2016)