State v. Curtis Maxie

November 2, 2020
Supreme Court
No. 2019-112-C.A.
(P1/14-1880A)
State :
v. :
Curtis Maxie. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
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made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2019-112-C.A.
(P1/14-1880A)
State :
v. :
Curtis Maxie. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The defendant, Curtis Maxie, appeals
from the denial of his motion for a new trial. The defendant maintains that the trial
justice erred by denying his second motion for a new trial and in finding that he had
failed to present newly discovered evidence that would have entitled him to a new
trial. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and
reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case
may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
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I
Facts and Travel
The underlying facts in this case are set out in State v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330(R.I. 2018), in which this Court vacated defendant’s conviction for sex trafficking
of a minor in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-67-6 and conspiring to do so,1 and affirmed
defendant’s conviction for three counts of first-degree sexual assault. Maxie, 187
A.3d at 331. At trial, the complaining witness, Emily,2 testified over the course of
three days regarding the events that allegedly took place in defendant’s apartment in
April 2014.3
On June 18, 2014, a grand jury indicted defendant on three counts of
first-degree sexual assault, counts 1, 2, and 3; one count of sex trafficking of a minor,
count 4; and one count of conspiracy to commit the crime of sex trafficking of a
minor, count 6. The defendant was then served with an habitual offender notice.
On November 18, 2015, defendant filed a motion to dismiss count 4 on the
basis that the statute under which defendant was charged was defective. The
1
This Court found that G.L. 1956 § 11-67-6 was fatally defective by the absence of
language setting forth a crime; at the time the issue initially reached this Court,
chapter 67 of title 11 of the general laws had been repealed by the Legislature. State
v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330, 331 (R.I. 2018); see P.L. 2017, ch. 232, § 1 (July 18, 2017);
P.L. 2017, ch. 260, § 1 (July 19, 2017).
2
We use a pseudonym to protect the privacy of the minor victim.
3
For purposes of this opinion, a precise recitation of the sordid details of the acts
allegedly committed by defendant is not necessary. Although the testimony was
extensive, we do not deem it vital to delve into the details at this juncture.
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defendant later moved to dismiss count 6 on the same basis. These motions were
denied by the trial justice, and the case proceeded to trial.
On April 20, 2016, defendant was found guilty by the jury on all counts. On
May 2, 2016, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and argued at the hearing on
the motion again that, as to counts 4 and 6, the statute under which he was convicted
was defective. The trial justice denied the motion.
On the first-degree sexual assault convictions, defendant was sentenced to
three concurrent terms of forty-five years to serve at the Adult Correctional
Institutions; on the sex trafficking conviction, defendant was sentenced to serve forty
years at the ACI, to run consecutively; on the conspiracy conviction, defendant was
sentenced to serve ten years at the ACI, to run concurrently with the sex-trafficking
sentence but consecutively to the sexual assault sentences; and, as an habitual
offender, defendant was sentenced to an additional fifteen years to serve at the ACI,
consecutively to the other sentences. A judgment of conviction entered on
September 13, 2016.
The defendant appealed his conviction to this Court. On appeal, defendant
argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to dismiss as to counts 4 and
6 of the indictment. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 336. We agreed with defendant and vacated
his conviction as to counts 4 and 6; we also affirmed the judgment of conviction in
all other respects. Id. at 341, 344.
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On June 30, 2018, defendant filed a second motion for a new trial. The
defendant believed that the vacatur of his convictions on count 4 and count 6
constituted newly available evidence, allowing him to file this motion. The
defendant argued that, because counts 4 and 6 did not constitute crimes, the jury was
improperly instructed to hear evidence regarding those counts. Thus, defendant
asserted that the evidence that was admitted as to those counts was so prejudicial
that defendant did not receive a fair trial on the sexual assault counts.
The trial justice determined that all of the evidence regarding “how [Emily]
got to Mr. Maxie’s apartment, the circumstances surrounding her appearance in his
apartment, all of that background information * * * is factually connected to all of
it.” Further, the trial justice decided that these surrounding facts went to the element
of force or coercion as to the sexual assault counts. Thus, the trial justice denied
defendant’s second motion for a new trial. The defendant then filed a timely notice
of appeal.
II
Standard of Review
“When passing on a motion for [a] new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a
thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses
and on the weight of the evidence.’” State v. Cerda, 957 A.2d 382, 385 (R.I. 2008)
(quoting State v. Bergevine, 942 A.2d 974, 981 (R.I. 2008)). “The trial justice must
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(1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2) independently assess the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and then (3) determine
whether he or she would have reached a result different from that reached by the
jury.” State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 902 (R.I. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting
State v. Schloesser, 940 A.2d 637, 639 (R.I. 2007)). “Because a trial justice, when
deciding a motion for a new trial, is in an especially good position to evaluate the
facts and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, on appeal, this Court’s review is
deferential.” State v. McDonald, 157 A.3d 1080, 1089 (R.I. 2017) (quoting State v.
Watkins, 92 A.3d 172, 191 (R.I. 2014)). Thus, this Court “will not overturn the trial
justice’s decision absent an indication that he or she overlooked or misconceived
relevant and material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong.” State v. Drew, 79
A.3d 32, 37 (R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Price, 66 A.3d 406, 418 (R.I. 2013)).
III
Discussion
Generally, a motion for a new trial must be made within ten days after a
verdict or guilty finding. Super. R. Crim. P. 33. However, a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence can be made “within three (3) years after the
entry of judgment by the court[.]” Id. “The time limit set forth in Rule 33 is
jurisdictional and cannot be waived.” State v. Champion, 873 A.2d 92, 94 (R.I.
2005).
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When trial courts consider a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence pursuant to Rule 33, they utilize a two-pronged test. Drew, 79 A.3d at 38.
“The first prong encompasses a four-part inquiry,
requiring that the evidence is (1) newly discovered since
trial, (2) not discoverable prior to trial with the exercise of
due diligence, (3) not merely cumulative or impeaching
but rather material to the issue upon which it is admissible,
(4) of the type which would probably change the verdict
at trial.” Id. (quoting Price, 66 A.3d at 417).
If the first prong is satisfied, the trial justice then turns to the second prong and
“determine[s] if the evidence presented is credible enough to warrant a new trial.”
Id. (quoting Price, 66 A.3d at 417).
A
Timeliness of the Motion for a New Trial
The defendant was found guilty by the jury on April 20, 2016, and the
judgment of conviction entered on September 13, 2016. The defendant filed the
motion at issue here on June 30, 2018. Thus, this motion for a new trial was only
timely filed if it was based on newly discovered evidence. See Super. R. Crim. P.
33. The defendant argues that our holding in Maxie—vacating his conviction on
counts 4 and 6—constitutes newly discovered evidence.
This Court now addresses, for the first time, whether or not the vacating of a
conviction on other counts of an indictment constitutes “evidence” for the purpose
of newly discovered evidence under Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
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Procedure. When faced with this question, other courts have determined that a
disposition on direct appeal is not “new evidence” justifying a new trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 899 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that “[t]his
argument cannot be seriously entertained. It is patently absurd to regard disposition
on direct appeal as ‘new evidence’ that would justify a new trial”); see also United
States v. King, 735 F.3d 1098, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that a change in the
law does not constitute newly discovered evidence for purposes of Rule 33); State
v. Gatcomb, 478 A.2d 1129, 1130 (Me. 1984) (adopting a strict definition of “newly
discovered evidence” as evidence solely “which bears on the guilt or innocence of
the accused”).
Generally, “evidence” is defined as “[s]omething (including testimony,
documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an
alleged fact[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 697 (11th ed. 2019). This Court has
addressed a variety of evidence regarded as the kind that may justify a new trial if
newly discovered. See State v. Messa, 593 A.2d 957, 959-60 (R.I. 1991) (testimony
of a witness who allegedly heard the complaining witnesses discussing faking the
crime of which the defendant was accused was newly discovered evidence that
necessitated the granting of the motion for a new trial); see also Putnam v. MacLeod,
23 R.I. 373, 378, 50 A. 646, 647 (1901) (relying solely on “transactions which have
taken place since the trial of the case, tending to show a compromise and settlement
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of the matter in litigation” was not newly discovered evidence); Johnson v.
Blanchard, 5 R.I. 24, 26 (1857) (concluding that a post-trial recollection by a trial
witness is not a discovery of new evidence).
The defendant has been unable to direct us to any case wherein we, or any
other court, have regarded a disposition on direct appeal as “new evidence” under
Rule 33; we decline to do so now. Dispositions on direct appeal are unlike the types
of evidence we have considered to be newly discovered under Rule 33. Our prior
decision in Maxie did not uncover facts or circumstances regarding the guilt or
innocence of the defendant as to counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment. See Gatcomb,
478 A.2d at 1130. This “evidence” of a disposition on direct appeal is not of the
kind that would bring those facts within the purview of Rule 33 as “newly discovered
evidence.” Therefore, this motion for a new trial was filed outside of the ten-day
time limit set forth in Rule 33, which cannot be waived. See Champion, 873 A.2d at
94. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the defendant’s second motion for a
new trial.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The
record shall be returned to the Superior Court.
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Curtis Maxie.
No. 2019-112-C.A.
Case Number
(P1/14-1880A)
Date Opinion Filed November 2, 2020
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel
For State:
Owen Murphy
Attorney(s) on Appeal Department of Attorney General
For Defendant:
George J. West, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2020)