Gary V. Jenkins v. City of East Providence

June 6, 2023
Supreme Court
No. 2022-130-Appeal.
(PC 22-890)
Gary V. Jenkins :
v. :
City of East Providence et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email: opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any
typographical or other formal errors in order that
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Supreme Court
No. 2022-130-Appeal.
(PC 22-890)
Gary V. Jenkins :
v. :
City of East Providence et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court
on February 23, 2023, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show
cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The
plaintiff, Gary V. Jenkins, appeals pro se from the denial of his petition for writ of
mandamus and dismissal of his complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.1 After reviewing the parties’
memoranda, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues
raised by this appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth herein,
we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
1
Because the plaintiff elected not to appear for oral argument, this case is decided
on the basis of the briefs.
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Facts and Travel
The plaintiff was employed by the City of East Providence (the City) for over
twenty-four years. Sometime in 2018, plaintiff’s employment with the City ended.
Following plaintiff’s termination, plaintiff and the City signed a Memorandum of
Agreement (the agreement). The agreement contained various provisions, including
plaintiff’s retirement benefits, the issuance of a corrected W-2 to reflect plaintiff’s
injured-on-duty status, and a provision explaining that enforcement of the agreement
was subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. The plaintiff attempted to rescind the agreement, and the City
subsequently filed a petition to enforce the agreement in the Superior Court. After
a six-day bench trial, the trial justice found that a valid, binding, and enforceable
agreement was reached between the parties, and judgment was entered in favor of
the City. The plaintiff appealed the judgment, but the appeal was dismissed as
untimely.2
The plaintiff then initiated the instant case by filing a complaint and a petition
for writ of mandamus against the City and the East Providence Firefighters, IAFF,
AFL-CIO, Local 850 (the Union), on February 14, 2022, asking the Superior Court
2
The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed because it was not filed within twenty days of
the date of the entry of judgment as required under Article I, Rule 4(a) of the
Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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to abrogate the agreement regarding the period of his injured-on-duty status.3 The
plaintiff also requested corrected tax documentation reflecting his injured-on-duty
benefits.
The Union objected to the petition for writ of mandamus and filed a motion
to dismiss. The Union argued that the Superior Court previously decided that
plaintiff was bound by the agreement, and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to
relief under any set of conceivable facts. The Union further maintained that, even if
plaintiff was not provided with proper tax documentation, only the City may furnish
tax documentation, and, as a result, plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of
action against the Union.
The City joined in the Union’s objection and also filed a motion to dismiss.
The City argued that these issues had been previously adjudicated, and further, that
the City did in fact produce an amended W-2 to reflect plaintiff’s injured-on-duty
status. It is the content of these W-2s that is at issue in this case.
A hearing was held on March 4, 2022, on plaintiff’s petition for writ of
mandamus and defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial justice explained that
because the agreement mandated that enforcement was subject to grievance and
arbitration procedures, the court lacked the authority to proceed. The trial justice
3
The defendants represented, and the trial justice noted, that plaintiff has filed, in
total, seven separate civil actions presenting the same issues that are raised in this
case.
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also concluded that plaintiff failed to establish the three required elements that would
entitle him to a writ of mandamus and denied the petition. As a result, the trial justice
granted defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1). The trial justice,
relying on the doctrine of res judicata, also granted defendants’ motion to dismiss
based on Rule 12(b)(6). The plaintiff appealed.
Standard of Review
“[T]he sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint.” Narragansett Electric Company v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274, 277 (R.I.
2011) (quoting Laurence v. Sollitto, 788 A.2d 455, 456 (R.I. 2002)). “In passing on
a Rule 12(b) dismissal, this Court applies the same standard as the trial justice.” Id.
at 278. “We thus are confined to the four corners of the complaint and must assume
all allegations are true, resolving any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.” Id. “A motion to
dismiss may be granted only ‘if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff
would not be entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts[.]’” Id. (quoting
Estate of Sherman v. Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 473 (R.I. 2000)).
“[A] motion under Rule 12(b)(1) questions a court’s authority to adjudicate a
particular controversy before it.” Barnes v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority,
242 A.3d 32, 36 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259, 270 (R.I.
2012)). “This Court reviews de novo whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction
over a particular controversy.” Id. (quoting Long v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1074, 1078
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(R.I. 2009)). “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court is not limited to the face
of the pleadings. A court may consider any evidence it deems necessary to settle the
jurisdictional question.” Id. (quoting Boyer, 57 A.3d at 270).
“A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy.” Muschiano v. Travers, 973 A.2d
515, 520 (R.I. 2009) (quoting New England Development, LLC v. Berg, 913 A.2d
363, 368 (R.I. 2007)).
“This Court clearly and repeatedly has established the
requirements for issuing such a writ: it ‘will be issued only
when: (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief
sought, (2) the respondent has a ministerial duty to
perform the requested act without discretion to refuse, and
(3) the petitioner has no adequate remedy at law.’” Id.(quoting Berg, 913 A.2d at 368).
We “will not disturb the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury in a civil
matter unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice
misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do
substantial justice between the parties.” Id. at 521 (quoting Union Station Associates
v. Rossi, 862 A.2d 185, 193 (R.I. 2004)).
Analysis
We note at the outset that although plaintiff has submitted a memorandum of
law to this Court, he has not provided any meaningful discussion of the issues on
appeal as required by Article I, Rule 12A of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate
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Procedure.4 “This Court has consistently held that ‘[s]imply stating an issue for
appellate review, without a meaningful discussion thereof or legal briefing of the
issues, does not assist the Court in focusing on the legal questions raised, and
therefore constitutes a waiver of that issue.’” Barnes, 242 A.3d at 36-37 (quoting
Fisher v. Applebaum, 947 A.2d 248, 252 (R.I. 2008)). Furthermore, this Court “will
not search the record to substantiate that which a party alleges.” Riley v. Stone, 900
A.2d 1087, 1098 n.14 (R.I. 2006). Although we have repeatedly recognized that
“litigants have the right to represent themselves as pro se litigants, ‘the courts of this
state cannot and will not entirely overlook established rules of procedure * * *.’”
Berard v. Ryder Student Transportation Services, Inc., 767 A.2d 81, 84 (R.I. 2001)
(quoting Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I. 1987)). Both sides
have a legitimate expectation of a level playing field.
In the case at bar, plaintiff has failed to present any argument grounded in
specific facts or law to support his claim that the trial justice erred in denying his
petition for writ of mandamus and dismissing his complaint. The plaintiff asserts
that: “[j]udicial error may have occurred due to Rule 9(c) CONDITIONS
4
Article I, Rule 12A(1) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
an appellant to “file a statement of the case and a summary of the issues proposed to
be argued * * *.”
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PRECEDENT and Rule 9(d) OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OR ACT * * *.”5 However,
plaintiff fails to develop this argument beyond this conclusory assertion.
Furthermore, plaintiff avers that “[r]es [j]udicata is not applicable to precedent
condition,” but he once again fails to provide any legal or factual support for this
assertion. Additionally, a review of the record reveals that these arguments were not
raised in the trial court, and are therefore deemed waived.
As we have explained previously, “we will not give life to arguments the
plaintiff has failed to develop on his own.” McMahon v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Company, 131 A.3d 175, 176 (R.I. 2016). Given the cursory nature of
plaintiff’s Rule 12A Statement, and its failure to inform this Court of the issues
argued on appeal, we deem these issues waived. Furthermore, although the
plaintiff’s papers are less than clear, it is undisputed that this case is barred by res
judicata.6 The issues raised in this case have been finally adjudicated and have been
laid to rest.
5
Rule 9 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure governs pleading special
matters. Rule 9(c) states, “[i]n pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made
specifically and with particularity.” Rule 9(d) states, “[i]n pleading an official
document or official act it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued, or the
act done in compliance with law.”
6
Res judicata is a legal doctrine which “makes a prior judgment in a civil action
between the same parties conclusive with regard to any issues that were litigated in
the prior action, or that could have been presented and litigated therein.” ElGabri v.
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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the order of the Superior Court is
affirmed. The papers may be returned to the Superior Court.
Justice Long did not participate.
Lekas, 681 A.2d 271, 275 (R.I. 1996). “In order for res judicata to apply in a
subsequent proceeding, four elements must be met: (1) identity of the parties; (2)
identity of the issues; (3) identity of the claims for relief; and (4) finality of the
judgment.” Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1138 (R.I. 2001).
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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case Gary V. Jenkins v. City of East Providence et al.
No. 2022-130-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 22-890)
Date Opinion Filed June 6, 2023
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Linda Rekas Sloan
For Plaintiff:
Gary Jenkins, pro se
Attorney(s) on Appeal For Defendants:
Matthew T. Oliverio, Esq.
Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)