DocketNumber: No. WC 01-0373
Judges: RUBINE, J.
Filed Date: 1/5/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In light of these payments, Defendants Coppe and Pawtucket Valley Prescription and Surgical Center, Inc., in their respective answers, asserted an affirmative defense relating to the applicability of the provisions of §
Plaintiffs have notified the Attorney General pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24(d), of the constitutional challenge. The Attorney General, by letter dated November 1, 2004, has advised the Plaintiffs and the Court that he will not intervene at this time relative to the constitutional issues.
The Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to make a motion to strike a defense raised in any pleading. The rule provides:
"Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon the party or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(f).
Motions to strike a defense under Rule 12(f) are generally not favored.See Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards,
It appears from these pretrial pleadings that it is the intention of the Defendants, at trial, to make the statutory election permitted by §
In 1986, the collateral source statute was amended to add the language which provides that whenever the plaintiff's award is reduced by the collateral source payment "the lien of any first party payor who had paid such benefit against the judgment shall be foreclosed and the plaintiff shall have no legal obligation to reimburse the payor." The effect of such amendment is that, to the extent a medical malpractice plaintiff is precluded by the statute from recovering sums paid by a collateral source, the collateral source is also prohibited from enforcing a lien against the plaintiff's recovery, or otherwise seeking to enforce as against the plaintiff a legal obligation to reimburse the collateral source.6
"When a statute involves neither a suspect classification, nor a fundamental right, nor a gender-based classification, the proper standard of review is minimal scrutiny." Dowd,
Such a rational basis review "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choice." Heller v. Doe,
There is no claim here that the classification of medical malpractice plaintiffs is subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. This statutory classification is not based on race, alienage, national origin, or gender. Nor is the classification subject to heightened scrutiny because of its effect upon a fundamental constitutional right. Rather, because it is a statutory classification applied solely to social or economic legislation, the statute passes constitutional scrutiny "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification." FCC v. Beach Communications,
Although the legislature in 1986 articulated some of the reasons for its enactment, the legislature need not actually articulate the reasons which it believes support a particular statutory classification. It is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the legislative classification, as long as there is some conceivable rationale, in this instance, to distinguish between medical malpractice claims and other tort claims. "[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data." FCC v. Beach Communications,
Although not specifically articulated in the statute, it appears to the Court that the legislature was attempting to put in place a measure that, in some fashion, would have the effect of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance and/or make medical malpractice more available to physicians and medical providers. In addition, although the statute renders the plaintiff unable to recover certain benefits he or she received from collateral sources, the collateral sources are likewise unable to collect the sums paid from any recovery the plaintiff may obtain. Accordingly, some part of the damages sustained by a victim of medical malpractice is shifted to the collateral source, who is statutorily precluded from recovering certain benefits paid to or on behalf of the plaintiff from the plaintiff's tort recovery. Thus, by shifting or spreading some of the financial risk for medical malpractice claims to the collateral sources, it is certainly conceivable that the cost of insurance to medical providers might thereby be reduced.
This Court need not hold hearings or take evidence to take judicial notice that the issue of tort reform in general, and medical malpractice tort reform in particular, is a matter of current public and legislative debate. Whether this Court would, as a matter of public policy, take one side or the other in this debate is irrelevant. Once the Court finds a "conceivable" rational basis to justify the legislature's distinction between medical malpractice claims and other claims, the Court's limited role is over. The General Assembly is the proper forum wherein the debate must continue and reach resolution. This Court need not, and will not, engage in a process to determine if reform of the collateral source rule in medical malpractice actions is the wisest or fairest manner within which to achieve the desired result of reducing the cost of malpractice coverage. It is the role of the legislature to engage in the type of legislative fact-finding necessary to decide among competing methodologies to achieve a desired legislative result. Our Supreme Court has noted that the "rational basis" standard for testing the viability of legislative classifications is a "relatively relaxed standard reflecting [an] awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one. Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor necessary." Powerv. City of Providence,
The Court is mindful that another justice of this Court has taken a different view of the collateral source legislation and its constitutionality under a "rational basis" analysis. See Reilly v.Kerzer, 2000 WL 1273998 (R.I. Super. 2000); Maguire v. Licht, 2001 WL 1006060 (R.I. Super. 2001). With due respect to my colleague, this Court believes that judicial restraint is necessary when the legislative branch has attempted to address a matter of public policy in the arena of economic and social reform. See FCC v. Beach Communications,
The Court in Reilly and Maguire limited its review to an analysis of whether the stated legislative purpose of promoting the stability of the Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association was achieved by the collateral source statute. This Court believes that the rational basis inquiry is broader, and includes whether or not the statute in question might conceivably contribute to mitigating the financial burden of medical malpractice claims on physicians in Rhode Island, and the insurers who underwrite such risks. Having answered that question in the affirmative, the Court finds that the statute in question, §
In Boucher v. Sayeed,
More recently, in Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft,
It appears to this Court that the challenge herein is controlled by theFlanagan decision, rather than the Boucher decision. For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiffs' motion to strike is denied, and the Court determines in limine that the Defendants may at trial introduce evidence of payments received by the Plaintiff which are defined as collateral sources in accordance with §
The parties shall present an appropriate order consistent with this decision.
"In the event the defendant so elects, in a legal action based upon a cause of action arising after January 1, 1987, for [medical malpractice], the defendant may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the personal injury pursuant to any state income disability or workers' compensation act, any health, sickness or income disability insurance, accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage, and any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the cost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health care services. . . . When such evidence is introduced, the jury shall be instructed to reduce the award for damages by a sum equal to the difference between the total benefits received and the total amount paid to secure the benefits by the plaintiff or the court may ascertain the sum by special interrogatory and reduce the award for damages after verdict. Whenever an award is so reduced, the lien of any first party payor who has paid such a benefit against the judgment shall be foreclosed and the plaintiff shall have no legal obligation to reimburse the payor."
WHEREAS, As a result, the Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association has recently experienced an accelerated negative financial position resulting in a fund deficit as of December 31, 1985; and
WHEREAS, Insolvency of said Association would have an adverse financial effect upon the citizens of Rhode Island who purchase liability insurance of any type as their premiums would increase in order to offset the deficit or, alternatively, such insolvency would adversely affect all the taxpayers of Rhode Island; and . . .
WHEREAS, The General Assembly finds that a significant number of medical and dental malpractice claims have been filed against a relatively few health care providers; and . . .
WHEREAS, the General Assembly acting within the scope of its police power finds the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to be an adequate and reasonable remedy now and into the foreseeable future." 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 350.
Reid v. Williams , 964 P.2d 453 ( 1998 )
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale ... , 677 F.2d 1045 ( 1982 )
Barme v. Wood , 37 Cal. 3d 174 ( 1984 )
RHODE ISLAND INSURERS'INSOLVENCY FUND v. Leviton ... , 716 A.2d 730 ( 1998 )
Dowd v. Rayner , 655 A.2d 679 ( 1995 )
Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System , 567 A.2d 358 ( 1989 )
Vance v. Bradley , 99 S. Ct. 939 ( 1979 )
Boucher v. Sayeed , 459 A.2d 87 ( 1983 )
Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft , 765 A.2d 1203 ( 2001 )
Gelsomino v. Mendonca , 723 A.2d 300 ( 1999 )
Power v. City of Providence , 582 A.2d 895 ( 1990 )
McGowan v. Maryland , 81 S. Ct. 1101 ( 1961 )
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia , 96 S. Ct. 2562 ( 1976 )
Votolato v. Merandi , 747 A.2d 455 ( 2000 )
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, ... , 113 S. Ct. 2096 ( 1993 )