DocketNumber: No. 03-0508
Judges: THOMPSON, J.
Filed Date: 1/31/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In compliance with §
Finally, the Appellees argued that the operation of a bed and breakfast would not alter the character of the neighborhood. In support of this argument, the Appellees testified that two other bed and breakfasts and a law office operate on the same street, but do not negatively impact the character of the neighborhood.
After the Appellees' testimony, two local property owners raised objections to the proposal. First, Timothy More, the owner of property located at 135 Benefit Street, suggested that the current trend in the neighborhood was a move toward owner-occupied housing rather than rooming houses. To evidence this trend, he stated that other rooming houses in the neighborhood established in the 1970s had since been converted to owner-occupied condominiums. Mr. More also opined that a request for seven rooms was excessive. He argued that such an excessive request would result in added traffic and congestion in the neighborhood.
Second, Appellant John Terry, who owns the property located at 40 North Court Street, also objected to the requested variance. Relying on the fact that the proposal would, in effect, double occupancy, he echoed the concerns raised by Mr. More regarding the increased traffic and congestion. In addition, he suggested that an increase in the number of tourists would cause instability in the neighborhood, because tourists would not possess the same concern for the neighborhood as permanent residents.
Under the authority conferred by §
On January 15, 2003, the Board issued its written approval of the plan via Resolution 8630. As required by §
Pursuant to §
While the motion to dismiss was pending, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued its decision in Jeff Anthony Properties v. Zoning Bd. of Review,
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are:
(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions;
(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
When conducting an appellate review of a zoning board decision, "the Superior Court may not substitute its judgment for the zoning board of review concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." MillRealty Associates v. Crowe,
"(a) Whenever an aggrieved party appeals a decision of a zoning board of review to the superior court pursuant to the provisions of §
45-24-69 , the aggrieved party shall also give notice of the appeal to those persons who were entitled to notice of the hearing set by the zoning board of review. The persons entitled to notice are set forth and described in §45-24-53 .(b) Notice of the appeal shall be mailed to those parties described in §
45-24-53 within ten (10) business days of the date that the appeal is filed in superior court not counting Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays. Notice shall be sent by first class mail, postage prepaid, and the cost of the notice shall be borne by the aggrieved party filing the appeal in superior court."3
In Jeff Anthony Properties, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the effect of an appellant's failure to comply with §
"Although the Legislature clearly stated that zoning appeals are to be `governed' by §§
45-24-69 and45-24-69.1 , it did not go so far as to denominate the notice provisions of §45-24-69.1 as conditions precedent to jurisdiction. Absent clear statutory language that the ten-day notice requirement is jurisdictional, we conclude that a party's failure to so comply does not automatically require that it forfeit its right to appeal an adverse decision of a zoning board. We do not believe that the Legislature intended such a draconian result." Jeff Anthony Properties,853 A.2d at 1231-32 .
Despite its refusal to classify compliance with §
In both their memoranda and their oral argument before the Court in support of their motion to dismiss, the Appellees failed to articulate any concrete prejudice caused by the delayed notice. The Appellees' only attempt to show prejudice was their "lag in time" argument. They suggested that the Appellants' failure to obtain an updated address list of property owners prior to sending notice may have caused prejudice to people who acquired property between the August 20, 2002 public hearing and the notice issued on February 19, 2004.
However, the facts do not support the Appellees' argument. The Appellants sent notice to forty-two (42) interested parties. Of these forty-two notices, only eight were returned as undeliverable. Of the eight, the Appellants' counsel addressed one notice to the former owner of 40 North Court Street. Since Appellant John Terry is the current owner of the property located at 40 North Court Street, clearly, no prejudice occurred.4 Five of the eight notices were identical to notices returned regarding the public hearing. Another notice was returned for lack of postage. Yet another notice was sent to the former address of the Providence Public Building Authority. Consequently, only one of the forty-two notices poses a potential problem. The Court is not persuaded that one returned notice out of forty-two constitutes prejudice.
Furthermore, §
The Court finds the Appellees' argument in support of its motion to dismiss to be speculative at best. In the instant case, prejudice would have resulted from an interested party's inability to intervene in the instant appeal. However, Judge Procaccini cured any possible prejudice caused by the Appellants' failure to timely comply with the notice provisions by giving the Appellants a ten-day period with which to comply. Given that the Appellees have failed to show that the delay in the receipt of the notice caused any prejudice, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to dismiss the instant appeal. Therefore, the Appellees' motion to dismiss is hereby denied.
The Appellants advance three primary arguments challenging the Board's decision to grant the use variance requested by the Appellees. First, the Appellants argue that the Board made no finding of hardship as to the Appellees' use of the property. Second, they contend that the Appellees have not met their burden of establishing economic impossibility of the existing use under Almeida v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of Tiverton,
In response, the Appellees state that the Board arrived at a decision and related findings of fact after carefully weighing the evidence presented at the public hearing. As such, the Appellees suggest that the Court should defer to the Board's particular knowledge of the area and local zoning conditions. Additionally, the Appellees maintain that they sought a use variance to improve the Property and maintain the standards of the neighborhood, not merely to realize financial gain.
A use variance is intended to remedy the operation of a zoning ordinance which deprives an owner of all beneficial use of his land. Seee.g., Northeastern Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of New Shoreham,
In order to obtain a variance, a party must satisfy the four-prong standard set forth under §
"(1) That the hardship from which the applicant seeks relief is due to the unique characteristics of the subject land or structure and not to the general characteristics of the surrounding area; and is not due to a physical or economic disability of the applicant. . . . (2) That the hardship is not the result of any prior action of the applicant and does not result primarily from the desire of the applicant to realize greater financial gain; (3) That the granting of the requested variance will not alter the general character of the surrounding area or impair the intent or purpose of the zoning ordinance or the comprehensive plan upon which the ordinance is based; and (4) That the relief to be granted is the least relief necessary."
This standard is also adopted in the Ordinance as § 902.3.
The first prong requires that the hardship to the applicant that would result from the denial of the application for a use variance be due to the unique characteristics of the property. Such a hardship arises when a literal application of the zoning ordinance completely deprives the owner of all beneficial use of the property. Almeida v. Zoning Bd. of Review ofTiverton,
In addition to the Legislature's unequivocal statement in §
A review of the record reveals not only that the Appellees made no showing of hardship whatsoever, but also that the Board never even inquired as to what hardship the Appellees were claiming. Given the fact that the Appellees purchased the Property with full knowledge of its location in an R-2 zone, the only discernible hardship that would result from the Board's denial of the use variance would be the resultant inability to increase the profitability of the Property. However, increased financial gain is not a hardship which merits zoning relief. Consequently, the record evidence fails to even minimally support the Board's finding that increased financial gain was not the sole motivation for the requested zoning relief.
In the instant case, the denial of the requested relief would clearly not deprive the Appellees of all beneficial use of the Property. The Appellees retain the ability to continue to live in one of the four apartments and rent the other three to tenants. Because the record lacks any indication that denial of the requested use variance would deprive the Appellees of all beneficial use, the Board's decision violated the statutory requirements set forth in §
As to the second prong, the applicant must demonstrate that the hardship is not the result of any prior action on the part of the applicant and does not result primarily from the applicant's desire for greater financial gain. Given the Court's determination that the Appellees failed to show any valid hardship that would result from the denial of their requested relief, the Court's analysis of the second prong is unnecessary.
Even assuming the Appellees had established a valid hardship, they would still have to satisfy the remaining prongs of the standard. To satisfy the third prong, the applicant must show that the new use will not alter the character of the surrounding area. With respect to the third prong, §
In order to evaluate the Appellants' argument that the Board violated §
"MR. CARNEVALE: Does Providence need bed and breakfasts?
CHAIR: Yes, they advertise on the internet. There is a great need especially on the East side. We gave it to Judge Pettine's place, four (4) rooms and we gave it to the place, Dr. Harrington on Hope Street.
MR. DETTORE: Give them five (5) and the apartment. (Zoning Bd. Tr. at 18).
This portion of the transcript shows that the Board impermissibly relied on the existence of other non-conforming uses in the neighborhood as a basis to conclude that the requested variance would not detrimentally affect the character of the neighborhood. The fact that neighboring property may constitute a non-conforming use bears no relationship to the present application before the Board.
In addition, with the exception of the reduction in the number of guest rooms, the Board failed to address the numerous concerns raised at the public hearing regarding the potential effects of the requested relief on the character of the neighborhood. These concerns included the effect of the transient nature of guests at a bed and breakfast on the stability of the neighborhood and the increased congestion and traffic. Citing familiarity with the Property and the surrounding neighborhood, the Board summarily stated that the variance would not detrimentally affect the character of the neighborhood. Beyond the Board's "familiarity" with the area, the record lacked any reliable evidence to support such a conclusion.
To satisfy the fourth prong, the Appellees must demonstrate that the relief provided by the variance is the least relief necessary to alleviate the hardship. G.L. §
Although the relief granted was somewhat less than the relief requested, the Board's decision to reduce the number of guest rooms from seven to five is not supported by any related rationale. The record fails to establish how the Board determined what would constitute an appropriate number of guest rooms. In the absence of any tangible explanation, the Court finds the reduction completely arbitrary, because it was not supported by any reliable, probative, or substantial evidence of record.
"[The court] must decide whether the board members resolved the evidentiary conflicts, made the prerequisite factual determinations, and applied the proper legal principles. Those findings must, of course, be factual rather than conclusional, and the application of legal principles must be something more than the recital of a litany." (citing Irish P'ship v. Rommel,
518 A.2d 356 ,358-59 (R.I. 1986)).
"[T]here should be something in the decision to inform [the reviewing court] of the grounds and basis [of the decision.]" Del Toro v. ZoningBd. of Review of Bristol,
In Resolution 8630, the Board made numerous hollow findings of fact, including:
"(2) That the relief requested is the least relief necessary in order to establish the bed and breakfast.
(3)The Board further finds that the hardship is not the result of any prior action of the Applicant and does not result primarily from the desire of the Applicant to realize greater financial gain. No testimony or evidence was received by the Board to refute this assertion." Despite the Board's statement that it based these "findings" on the inspection of the property and surrounding neighborhood, as well as the testimony offered at the public hearing, the resolution was entirely devoid of any substantive evidentiary support. As such, the findings are nothing more than an attempt to give lip service to the statutory requirements necessary to obtain a use variance.
The best evidence in the record to support the Court's conclusion is found in the transcript of the Board deliberations following the public hearing:
"CHAIR: Who am I to say I think [six guest rooms and one apartment] is [too many units] and the question is did they establish the standard that they cannot use their house. . . .
MRS. CASTRO: Give them five [guest rooms].
MR. CATAURO: Five (5) [guest rooms] and one (1) [apartment].
MR. CARNEVALE: It should be denied because they didn't establish the standard. It's up to you.
CHAIR: Well, it is an R-2 zone, but it's also a neighborhood that has a need for that kind of use." (Zoning Bd. Tr. at 16.)
The Board's deliberations reveal that the members recognized that the Appellees had not met the statutory requirements to obtain a use variance for the Property. Nevertheless, the Board unanimously granted the use variance based on the respective members unsubstantiated opinions that the neighborhood had a need for the proposed non-conforming use. Unfortunately, the standard for granting a use variance does not factor "need" into the analysis.
After a review of the entire record, including the Board's written decision and the incorporated findings of fact, the Court finds that the Board's decision merely regurgitates the standard of review and wholly lacks any meaningful analysis of that standard. Additionally, the Court holds that the granting of the use variance was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of the Zoning Board's discretion.
Given that the Board ignored the fact that the Appellants did not satisfy the relevant standard and unanimously granted the use variance, the Board's decision was not only a violation of the statutory standard, but also clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence in the whole record. See G.L. 1956 §
Northeastern Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham , 534 A.2d 603 ( 1987 )
Reynolds v. Zoning Board of Review , 96 R.I. 340 ( 1963 )
DeStefano v. ZONING BD. OF REVIEW, ETC. , 405 A.2d 1167 ( 1979 )
Apostolou v. Genovesi , 120 R.I. 501 ( 1978 )
R. D'Ordine & Son, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Review , 79 R.I. 489 ( 1952 )
Mill Realty Associates v. Crowe , 841 A.2d 668 ( 2004 )
Matteson v. Zoning Board of Review , 79 R.I. 121 ( 1951 )
Arc-Lan Co. v. Zoning Board of Review , 106 R.I. 474 ( 1970 )
OK PROPERTIES v. Zoning Bd. of Review , 601 A.2d 953 ( 1992 )
Gaglione v. DiMuro , 478 A.2d 573 ( 1984 )
Melucci v. Zoning Board of Review , 101 R.I. 649 ( 1967 )
Almeida v. Zoning Board of Review , 606 A.2d 1318 ( 1992 )
Irish Partnership v. Rommel , 518 A.2d 356 ( 1986 )
Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review , 770 A.2d 396 ( 2001 )
Jeff Anthony Properties v. Zoning Board of Review of the ... , 853 A.2d 1226 ( 2004 )
Standish-Johnson Co. v. Zoning Board of Review , 103 R.I. 487 ( 1968 )
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. East ... , 444 A.2d 862 ( 1982 )
Consolidated Realty Corp. v. Town Council , 513 A.2d 1 ( 1986 )