DocketNumber: C. A. No. 98-1652
Judges: SILVERSTEIN, J.
Filed Date: 3/20/2000
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
In 1986, before Orabona's purchases, the City Council adopted Ordinance 1986, chapters 86-1 and 86-38, subsequently codified as § 17-125, which states, "No city employee shall be allowed to buy back time for pension purposes without the express approval of the city council, with the exception of purchasing military service." The record contains no evidence that the City Council, pursuant to § 17-125, expressly approved Orabona's purchases of service credit.2 The City Council, however, has approved or disapproved the applications of many employees seeking purchase(s) of service credit.
On April 3, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court against defendants Vincent A. Cianci, in his capacity as Mayor of Providence; Joseph Chiodo, in his capacity as Controller of the City of Providence; Charles Mansolillo, in his capacity as Solicitor of the City of Providence; and the City of Providence, by and through its Treasurer, Stephen Napolitano (collectively, defendants or City) subsequent to a decision of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which matter arose of out essentially the same facts as those of the subject suit.3 The instant complaint seeks injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus, and damages.
Orabona petitioned for a Writ of Mandamus ordering that the City pay. Orabona his contractual pension benefits and moved for a hearing date. The defendants objected to plaintiffs Petition and shortly thereafter moved for summary judgment to which the plaintiff objected. The matter was heard on November 18, 1999. The dispositive motion for summary judgment shall be addressed first.
Orabona essentially argues that his purchases of service credit were proper and correctly endorsed by the Retirement Board vote because the subject ordinance is unenforceable, or alternatively, not applicable to him.
The City Council has expressly legislated that "No city employee shall be allowed to buy back time for pension purposes without the express approval of the city council ..." § 17-125. The Retirement Board, like all city departments, is subject to the legislative power of the City Council delineated in the City's Home Rule Charter. Retirement Board ofthe Employees' Retirement System of the City of Providence v. CityCouncil of Providence,
Alternatively, Orabona contends that the City is precluded from enforcing the ordinance against him. When the Retirement Board acted on Orabona's application, Orabona argues, no one, including the City Solicitor's representative, mentioned the illegal purchases of service credit. Orabona argues that he relied on representations made at various times by representatives of the Retirement System regarding his pensionable status and that the City is estopped from denying payment of his pension.
Although "[a] municipality may, when acting within its authority, be estopped from denying that its acts induced another's detrimental reliance, [s]uch an estoppel cannot be applicable when the municipality's acts were clearly ultra vires." Technology Investors v. Town ofWesterly,
Orabona refers to the quasi-judicial capacity of the Retirement Board and its authority to apply the facts before it to the appropriate law. Citing Connelly v. City of Providence Retirement Board, Orabona argues that the Retirement Board relied on the evidence before it and therefore, the City has no basis in fact to contradict the conclusion reached by the Retirement Board. Connelly v. City of ProvidenceRetirement Board,
The illegality underlying the Retirement Board's approval of Orabona's pension cannot be legitimized by this Court. The instant fact pattern is not analogous to that of the Connelly case, on which Orabona relies.Connelly involved a retirement board's improperly denying accidental-disability retirement benefits to a firefighter. Despite the firefighter's making a requisite showing for said benefits and there being unopposed medical evidence, the retirement board inappropriately exercised discretion in contravention of a "statutorily mandated conclusion." Id. at 501. However, in the instant matter, as in Connelly,
legislative compliance is required. Here the operant ordinances and statutes could have been judicially noticed by the Retirement Board.Toohey v. Kilday,
Orabona also contends that he met the requirements for service after his purchases of service credit in 1989 and that his pension then became vested, a contractual right. He further argues the Retirement Board ratified his purchases in 1995. However, Orabona's rights to a pension would not be secure until he met the minimum service or other requirements established in the plan. See McGrath v. Rhode IslandRetirement Board,
Orabona also argues that the City has singled him out from other persons similarly situated, noting specifically that a pension has not been withheld from others whose pension application received Retirement Board approval despite illegal purchase of service credit. He contends that the City's unprecedented, politically motivated action of withholding his pension violates his equal protection rights. Orabona's claim that he is the only one to whom the 1986 ordinance was made applicable, is belied by evidence, as noted in the March 27, 1998 transcript of the United States District Court. That transcript reflects that the city solicitor:
"raised the point with at least two others. There's a dearth of evidence in this case. What happened with the hundred or so other people who were in the same category we don't know. ... There's no evidence from which I can make a determination that anyone approaches him in the purchase of these kinds of credits. There's simply no equal protection claim here based on the evidence." (Tr. at 32).
Additionally, if the City had permitted a pension to be granted to another applicant similarly situated to Mr. Orabona, the City lacked that authority to do so pursuant to ordinance. Further,
"[m]ere failure to prosecute other offenders is not a basis for finding a denial of equal protection.' To put it another way, "equal protection does not require that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.' If that were the case, every law that is not perfectly administered would be unenforceable." Felice v. Rhode Island Board of Elections,
781 F. Supp. 100 , 106 (D.R.I. 1991) (citations omitted).
Finally, Orabona argues that the City's withholding of his pension, pursuant to the City Solicitor's counsel, without prior notice or hearing, denies his procedural due process guaranty. Orabona further contends that the applicable retirement ordinance contains no rules for appeal. Here the City Solicitor, who is "the chief legal advisor and attorney for the city and all boards, [and] officers...," which include the Retirement Board and the City Controller, did not need to exercise his own initiative, for suitable process" after rendering his opinion regarding the illegality of the Retirement Board's action and directing the Controller to withhold payment. See City of Providence Charter, § 603(b). The Controller heeded the legal advice of its attorney. Orabona is now before this Court pursuing available remedies, including mandamus. Having such opportunity "to challenge the propriety of the [C]ity's action," this Court believes, satisfies any relevant requirements of procedural due process. Trembley v. City Council ofCentral Falls, 480 A.2d 1359, 1365 (R.I. 1984). Even the Administrative Procedures Act, to which Orabona incorrectly alludes for its standard of review, provides for review of its agency actions in this Superior Court.
To prevail against the motion for summary judgment, Orabona must set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. This Court, finding no such issue and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, grants defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Here Orabona moves this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the City to pay his pension which relies on service credit purchased in violation of ordinance. Orabona has not made and cannot make the requisite showing of a clear legal right. Accordingly, this Court in any event would deny plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus.
Counsel shall submit an appropriate order and judgment for entry.
"[Powers and duties.] The powers and duties of the city solicitor shall be without limitation, the following: ...
(2) To be the chief legal advisor of and attorney for the city and all departments, boards, commissions, bureaus and officers thereof in matters relating to their official powers and duties;" Section 813(b) of the Charter provides, in relevant part,
"The powers and duties of the city controller shall include, without limitation, the following: ...
(4) To audit before payment of all bills, invoices, payroll and other claims, demands or charges against the city, and approve the same only if proper, legal and correct;"
McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Board , 88 F.3d 12 ( 1996 )
City of Elmhurst Ex Rel. Mastrino v. City of Elmhurst , 208 Ill. Dec. 673 ( 1994 )
Donnelly v. Almond , 695 A.2d 1007 ( 1997 )
Technology Investors v. Town of Westerly , 689 A.2d 1060 ( 1997 )
Rotelli v. Catanzaro , 686 A.2d 91 ( 1996 )
Manning Auto Parts, Inc. v. Souza , 591 A.2d 34 ( 1991 )
Trembley v. City of Central Falls , 480 A.2d 1359 ( 1984 )
Sullivan v. Town of Coventry , 707 A.2d 257 ( 1998 )
Betz v. Paolino , 605 A.2d 837 ( 1992 )
Connelly v. City of Providence Retirement Board , 601 A.2d 498 ( 1992 )
McPhillips v. Zayre Corp. , 582 A.2d 747 ( 1990 )
PROVIDENCE RETIREMENT BD. v. City Council of Providence , 660 A.2d 721 ( 1995 )
Golderese v. Suburban Land Co. , 590 A.2d 395 ( 1991 )
Visconti & Boren Ltd. v. Bess Eaton Donut Flour Co. , 712 A.2d 871 ( 1998 )
Toohey v. Kilday , 415 A.2d 732 ( 1980 )
Felice v. Rhode Island Board of Elections , 781 F. Supp. 100 ( 1991 )