DocketNumber: C.A. No. 91-3326
Judges: <underline>GIBNEY, J.</underline>
Filed Date: 7/26/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On May 7, 1991, the plaintiff filed a complaint with this court alleging that the defendant violated the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws §
In contrast, the defendant claims that the "Whistleblowers Protection Act" created a very narrow class of employers who are subject to its provisions. In particular, the defendant claims that because they are a private corporation a suit for damages cannot be instituted against them pursuant to the "Whistleblowers Protection Act," even for a retaliatory discharge. In support of their position the defendant points to § 36-15-2(2) which defines an employer as follows:
"Employer" means any department, agency, commission, committee, board, council, bureau, or authority or any subdivision thereof state or municipal government.
At the outset the court notes that a dismissal of a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) is a harsh remedy and is proper only where plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any conceivable set of facts that might be proved in support of his claim.Salvadore v. Major Electric Supply, Inc.,
The general rules of statutory construction state that the court must give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Roadway Express Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission forHuman Rights,
Section 36-15-3 prohibits an employer from discharging an employee because the employee either reports to a public body a violation of the law, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation of the employer for potential violations of the law. However, a review of § 36-15-2(c) reflects that the legislature was only speaking to governmental bodies when it defined employer within the act. Therefore, only those employers who are governmental bodies are constrained by the mandates of the "Whistleblowers Protection Act." The language of this statute is free of ambiguity and conveys a definite and sensible meaning which does not contradict an evident legislative purpose. The Court must therefore give literal effect to its terms. Reardon v. Hall,
Accordingly, this Court finds that the defendant, which is a private corporation, does not fall within the statutory definition of employer within the "Whistleblowers Protection Act." Consequently, the plaintiff's complaint for damages pursuant to the act must be dismissed because it fails to set forth the elements of a claim upon which relief can be granted. Counsel are directed to prepare an order in conformity with this decision.
Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett , 122 R.I. 686 ( 1980 )
Dutson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance , 119 R.I. 801 ( 1978 )
Berberian v. Town of Westerly , 119 R.I. 593 ( 1978 )
Salvadore v. Major Electric & Supply, Inc. , 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1111 ( 1983 )
Reardon v. Hall , 104 R.I. 591 ( 1968 )
Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc. , 102 R.I. 8 ( 1967 )
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human ... , 1980 R.I. LEXIS 1659 ( 1980 )