DocketNumber: No. 98-4263
Judges: GIBNEY, J.
Filed Date: 4/25/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
On April 1, 1997, one of Industrial's water pipes burst causing approximately one million gallons of water to escape. As a result, the adjacent road was severely flooded, and sand was washed into a nearby wetland area. The agreed stipulation of facts submitted by the parties stated: "[i]t was surmised but never established that the electrical lines fell onto the street, burned through the pavement, and ultimately caused the water main to burst." Furthermore, an insurer's field investigator noted, on April 18, 1997, that she met with Mr. Kerns, plaintiff's representative, who believed that the following sequence of events took place:
"Mother nature left a 2' snowstorm. A tree and/or branch fell on the power line, which snapped. The voltage caused heat to melt the asphalt. Electricity arched into the water line, causing sand to form `glass.' The burned piece of water line exploded or blew apart. Water for the industrial park drained, washing out the road."
Following the incident, the plaintiff incurred a number of costs to repair the affected area: it hired contractors to fix the pipe; it paid the Town of Smithfield — per the town's request — for the damage caused to the road; it reimbursed the North Smithfield Fire Department for the emergency water pumping that was performed; and it retained an engineering firm to develop a plan to remediate the damaged wetlands pursuant to the Department of Environmental Management's ("DEM") request.2
On April 4, 1997, Industrial informed CNA of the incident. The plaintiff had not obtained CNA's approval prior to retaining any contractors or paying any bills associated with the flood. Subsequently, following an investigation, CNA denied the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement. The insurer maintained that it was not liable under its policies with Industrial because the incident was caused by an "Act of God," Industrial was never legally obligated to pay for the loss, and Industrial violated the voluntary payment provision of the policy.
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Superior Court on August 24, 1998, alleging that the defendant wrongfully denied the claim under the CGL policy, willfully breached its obligation to the plaintiff, and engaged in bad faith settlement practices. CNA denied the allegations and brought a counterclaim, pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
Eventually, after years of discovery, various motions, and miscellaneous delays, in November 2004, the parties submitted an agreed stipulation of facts and memoranda of law presenting their respective positions. On February 9, 2005, the Court issued a written decision. The Court determined that the plaintiff was not covered for any loss under the Commercial Property Coverage policy because the incident did not involve any "covered property" as defined by the policy. Alternatively, under the CGL policy, this Court found CNA liable for the cost of the remediation of the wetland.
The CGL policy stated that CNA would "pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of `bodily injury' or `property damage' to which [the] insurance applies." Furthermore, the policy set forth that the defendant would "have the right and duty to defend any `suit' seeking those damages." This Court found that the policy was ambiguous as to the definition of "legally obligated to pay" and, ultimately, refused to read into the policy a requirement that a judgment be entered before a "legal obligation" arises. It was determined that Industrial was strictly liable for the damage to the wetland and, therefore, CNA had a legal obligation to pay for the remediation of the wetland. With regard to the other costs for which the plaintiff sought reimbursement, this Court found that Industrial had no legal obligation to pay because the incident was the consequence of an "Act of God." As a result, the plaintiff could not be liable under either a public nuisance or negligence theory.
On January 30, 2006, Industrial filed a motion requesting that this Court reconsider its February 9, 2005 Decision. Industrial suggests that the defendant failed to meet its burden in proving that the incident was the result of an Act of God. In addition, the plaintiff asserts that the Court erred by finding that a public nuisance theory is not applicable to the case at hand. Industrial notes that it has not yet received any payment from CNA for the remediation of the wetlands and requests that this Court order such payment to be made promptly. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that prejudgment interest should be added to the Court's award of remediation costs.
In opposition, CNA maintains that it presented sufficient evidence to show that the rupture of the water pipe was caused by an Act of God. The defendant claims that the Court was correct in finding that Industrial was not legally obligated to pay any claims other than for the remediation of the wetland and that, even if it were, it would first have the right and duty to defend the suit pursuant to the terms of the policy. Finally, CNA asserts that it should not have to pay the plaintiff for the remediation of the wetlands because the plaintiff has not incurred any expenses and there is no indication that Industrial is being held, or will be held, legally responsible to perform said work.
The Court heard argument on the plaintiff's motion on February 27, 2006.
Under Rule 60(b), a motion to vacate must be brought within a reasonable time and not more than one year after the judgment when the moving party is claiming either (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; or (3) fraud. Flynn v. Al-Amir,
In the case at hand, because the plaintiff fashioned its motion as a "motion for reconsideration," the Court is left to determine the grounds under which the plaintiff's arguments fall within the purview of Rule 60(b). Industrial suggests that the Court erred by (1) determining that the flood was caused by an "Act of God," given the defendant's failure to present evidence sufficient to meet its burden of proof on the issue, (2) allowing CNA to continually change its legal theories regarding its liability under the CGL policy, (3) misconstruing the Act of God doctrine, and (4) creating a remedy that encourages insurance companies to deny valid claims. In summary, the plaintiff maintains that the Court committed multiple errors of law in rendering it previous decision and mandated an inequitable remedy. Under Rule 60(b), Industrial's arguments — essentially, that the Court committed multiple errors of law and issued an unjust remedy — can only conceivably fall into three of the categories warranting the filing of a motion to vacate: either mistake, that the judgment is void, or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
With respect to Rule 60(b)(1), our Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "a mistake of law is not the kind of `mistake' that is included within the coverage of that term as it is used in Rule 60(b)(1)." Jackson v. Medical Coaches,
Additionally, although Rule 60(b)(6) vests the Superior Court with broad power to vacate judgments when appropriate, "[t]he discretion therein . . . is not without limitations and the clause is not intended to constitute a catchall." The BendixCorp. v. Norberg,
Accordingly, this Court denies the plaintiff's motion to vacate. The plaintiff's arguments that this Court committed errors of law in rendering its previous decision are not grounds for a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b). Moreover, the inadequate remedy issue raised by Industrial does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance meriting the vacation of this Court's judgment, under Rule 60(b)(6), in the underlying matter. SeeMorris v. Travisono,
Hoult v. Hoult , 57 F.3d 1 ( 1995 )
Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University , 850 A.2d 912 ( 2004 )
Sarni v. Meloccaro , 113 R.I. 630 ( 1974 )
McBurney v. Roszkowski , 875 A.2d 428 ( 2005 )
Allstate Insurance v. Lombardi , 773 A.2d 864 ( 2001 )
Pleasant Management, LLC v. Carrasco , 870 A.2d 443 ( 2005 )
DeFusco v. Giorgio , 440 A.2d 727 ( 1982 )
Flynn v. Al-Amir , 811 A.2d 1146 ( 2002 )
Bendix Corp. v. Norberg , 122 R.I. 155 ( 1979 )
Jackson v. Medical Coaches , 734 A.2d 502 ( 1999 )