DocketNumber: C.A. No. 91-7403
Judges: <underline>GIBNEY, J.</underline>
Filed Date: 5/29/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In their seven (7) count complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants pay or paid, to certain individuals, retirement benefits which are significantly more generous than the benefits plaintiffs and other members of their class1 receive or received, that there exists no rational basis for said preferential payments, and that said payments violate
Defendant, Edward R. DiPrete moves this Court to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) all counts against him, specifically counts IV through VII. Defendants Solomon, Hickey and Reilly join defendant DiPrete in his motion to dismiss and also, by way of their own motion, move to dismiss the claims against them individually (counts IV through VII) on the additional grounds presented in their motion.2
Neither defendant DiPrete, nor any other defendant moves to dismiss counts I through III of the complaint. In fact, defendant DiPrete in his motion invites this Court to strike any bills granting preferential pensions which are unjustified or unconstitutional. In essence, counts I through III allege that private laws conferring special benefits on certain favored individuals, without any rational basis therefore, deny plaintiffs the rights of equal protection and due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth (14th) amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 2 of Article I of the R.I. Constitution. Defendants assert that the State of Rhode Island is the proper defendant under these counts, and that such allegations have been answered and are not the subject of the present motion.
The court in Jones v. State of Rhode Island, 724 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.R.I. 1989) discussed the standard for a court's considering a motion to dismiss on a § 1983 complaint:
[w]e require more than conclusions or subjective characterizations. We have insisted on at least the allegation of a minimal factual setting. It is not enough to allege a general scenario which could be dominated by impleaded facts . . . Therefore, although we must ask whether the `claim' put forth in the complaint is capable of being supported by any conceivable set of facts, we insist that the claim at least set forth minimal facts, not subjective characterizations, as to who did what to whom and why. Citing, Dewey v. University of New Hampshire,
694 F.2d 1 , 3 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied 103 S.Ct. 2121 (1983).
Relying on Dewey, the court in Jones held that a § 1983 plaintiff must aver objectively and with particularity the facts that support plaintiff's civil rights claim, must demonstrate personal liability, and must state specifically how each defendant was involved in the deprivation.
The instant complaint fails to set forth "minimal facts" as to what the individual defendants did or failed to do in their alleged personal capacities that caused plaintiffs' alleged deprivation. The mere allegation that the individual defendants "implemented" the payment of certain retirement benefits pursuant to legislative directives does not constitute a well-pleaded cause of action under § 1983. Nor does the averment regarding unspecified "administrative actions" meet the minimal factual requirements. Under the particularity requirement of § 1983, "the plaintiff must state specifically how each defendant was personally involved in the deprivation." Jones v. State of RhodeIsland,
In addition to the particularity requirement, the Court must determine whether the individual defendants are "persons" within the meaning of the statute. In Will v. Michigan,
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974), the court denied a motion to dismiss a claim against the individual defendant involving a plaintiff who explicitly alleged that the individual defendant acted either outside the scope of his respective office or if within, in an arbitrary manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of office, and where plaintiffs asserted facts to support their allegations. Likewise, inJones, the court found that a complaint sets forth sufficient allegations of personal conduct when the complaint alleges with particularity the factual predicate which demonstrates that each of the individual defendants acted willfully, knowingly, purposefully and with malice to deprive the victim of his constitutional rights. Furthermore, the court in Jones found the complaint sufficient where it stated explicitly that each of the defendants acted outside the scope of his authority.
In the instant case, plaintiffs assert no facts that demonstrate that they are seeking to impose individual or personal liability on the individual defendants for the alleged deprivation. Plaintiffs use the term "administrative action" and "implementation of the Retirement System" as conclusory characterization without specifications as to how defendants used their powers generally with respect to various governmental bodies to plaintiffs' prejudice. The words "administrative actions" and "implementation of retirement system" presented as they are here without additional factual information, connote the carrying on of official responsibilities. The complaint lacks any factual allegations of personal conduct. The complaint neither states nor demonstrates by way of factual background, how or whether any of the individual defendants acted either outside the scope of their respective offices or, if within the scope, acted in an arbitrary manner, grossly abusing the lawful powers of office.
Accordingly, based on the findings above, counts IV and V are dismissed.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not to be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief no matter what state of facts could be proved in support of his claim. Gagnon v. State,
Upon a reading of count VI with the other allegations in the complaint, this Court is satisfied that plaintiffs have stated a proper cause of action under Section 2 of Article I of the Rhode Island Constitution, namely that administrative actions by the individual defendants were in contravention of the Section 2 of Article I requirement that all burdens of the State be fairly distributed among its citizens. In so finding, this Court rejects defendants' argument that no such cause of action exists under the Rhode Island Constitution and that if such action did exist, defendants are protected by the immunity defenses.
While the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether such a private cause of action exists under Section 2 of Article I of the Rhode Island Constitution, this Court finds it illogical to conclude that such a cause of action does not exist. The court in Jones v. State of Rhode Island,
The Court is well aware that a Bivens cause of action is subject to numerous limitations.4 However, here, as inJones, there is no § 1983 type state statute under which plaintiffs may seek relief. Furthermore, there exists no state law prohibiting a cause of action to be implied directly from a provision in the Rhode Island Constitution nor "any special factors counseling hesitation in this area."
Defendant DiPrete's contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity for his legislative actions is correct. However, the Court agrees with plaintiffs' argument that absolute immunity does not apply to defendant DiPrete's or the other defendants' administrative actions. Count VI specifically alleges administrative actions on the part of the individual defendants.
With respect to the defense of qualified immunity, the parties refer the Court to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982). In Harlow the court stated that ". . . government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow at 2738." Defendants argue that Harlow and its progeny require that insubstantial claims against government officials not proceed to discovery or trial. While Harlow does stand for this proposition, the court in Harlow conditioned this requirement on the resolution of whether "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights" were violated. This Court, being mindful of its duties under Rule 12(b)(6), finds that the complaint states sufficient allegation that, if proven, violate clearly established constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. Therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss count VI is denied.
Richard Dewey v. The University of New Hampshire , 694 F.2d 1 ( 1982 )
Marta Carbonell v. Louisiana Dept. Of Health & Human ... , 772 F.2d 185 ( 1985 )
Bethlehem Rebar Industries, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. ... , 582 A.2d 442 ( 1990 )
Menzies v. Sigma Pi Alumni Ass'n of Rhode Island , 110 R.I. 488 ( 1972 )
Ellis v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority , 586 A.2d 1055 ( 1991 )
Signore v. City of McKeesport, Pa. , 680 F. Supp. 200 ( 1988 )
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police , 109 S. Ct. 2304 ( 1989 )
Palazzo v. Big G Supermarkets, Inc. , 110 R.I. 242 ( 1972 )
Gagnon v. State , 570 A.2d 656 ( 1990 )
Scheuer v. Rhodes , 94 S. Ct. 1683 ( 1974 )
Carlson v. Green , 100 S. Ct. 1468 ( 1980 )
Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 102 S. Ct. 2727 ( 1982 )
You Vang Yang v. Sturner , 728 F. Supp. 845 ( 1990 )
Jones v. State of RI , 724 F. Supp. 25 ( 1989 )
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents , 91 S. Ct. 1999 ( 1971 )