DocketNumber: C.A. No. 89-7052
Judges: <underline>BOURCIER, J.</underline>
Filed Date: 5/2/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The arbitrator's decision and award was made and delivered to the parties on September 20, 1989.
Thereafter, on December 28, 1989, Union filed a "Miscellaneous Petition" seeking to vacate, modify and correct the arbitrator's decision and award. Also, at the same time, the Union filed a Motion to Vacate, Modify or Correct the arbitrator's decision and award.
On January 4, 1990 the State filed a Motion to Confirm the decision and award.
Although the case file docket shows the Union's Petition and Motion to have been filed on December 28, 1989, and the State's motion to have been filed on January 4, 1990, the case file was not referred to this Justice for decision until March 14, 1991.
For the reasons hereinafter set out, the State's Motion to Confirm the arbitrator's decision and award is granted; the Union's Miscellaneous Petition and its Motion to Vacate, Modify or Correct the arbitrator's decision and award are both denied and dismissed.
(1) Did the State violate the Agreement (Article XXXVI) when it did not give the same medical benefits for retirees to the grievants that were awarded to the Rhode Island State Police in an interest arbitration award March 4, 1983 pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws
28-9.5-9 ? If so, what shall be the remedy?(2) Is the dispute arbitrable?
The arbitrator found that the "State did not violate Article XXXVI Section 36.1 of the parties 1986 to 1989 Agreement" and that the grievance-issue was in fact arbitrable.
In this case setting, the Union has taken the position that its members, State Marshalls, are entitled to the same continued family or individual health care benefits given by the State to retired members of the Rhode Island State Police. The Union's position is premised upon how it reads and interprets Section36.1 in the collective bargaining agreement between the parties to this dispute. That section reads:
36.1 Any new category of fringe benefits negotiated with any other Union will be given to employees covered by this Agreement after July 1, 1983.
On March 4, 1983 the bargaining unit for the State Police and the State were parties to a labor grievance that resulted in an arbitration award providing health care benefits to State Police retirees. The Union here demanded those same benefits pursuant to its Section 36.1 labor contract provision. The State on the other hand in this case took the position that no other state employees enjoyed that continued health care fringe benefit after retirement and that service in the Rhode Island State Police was both distinguishable and unique when compared to other state employment. The arbitrator agreed with the State. The arbitrator distinguished the wording of Section 36.1 in the Union's contract by singling out the words "any new category of fringe benefits negotiated etc.", would become part of its agreement. The State Police retirement benefits, he concluded, were not benefits that had been negotiated. He reasoned that conclusion upon the plain meaning of the word "negotiated" in Section 36.1 absent any evidence that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement intended something other than its plain and ordinary meaning. Negotiation, he reasoned, did not contemplate an interest arbitration award. The Union here of course construes the word "negotiated" differently, and contends that it does contemplate every fringe benefit that any other labor union obtains, from whatever source and by whatever means.
"(1) when the award was procured by fraud.
(2) where the arbitrator or arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
(3) if there was no valid submission or contract, and the objection has been raised under the conditions set forth in §
28-9-13 ."
In light of the clear directions given by §
In that regard, many years ago, Judge Learned Hand made the sagacious comment in Central Hanover Bank Trust Co. v.Commissioner,
"There is no more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language — be it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract — than to read the words literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is meant to secure. Nor is a court ever less likely to do its duty than when, with an obsequious show of submission, it disregards the over-riding purpose because the particular occasion which has arisen, was not foreseen. That there are hazards in this is quite true; there are hazards in all interpretation, at best a perilous course between dangers on either hand; but it scarcely helps to give so wide a berth to Charybdis's maw that one is in danger of being impaled upon Scylla's rocks."
In this case, the burden of proving that the arbitrator's decision and award represented a manifest disregard of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, and in particular, Section 36.1 therein, or that he reached an irrational result, was upon the Union. Coventry teachersAlliance v. Coventry School Committee,
Title 10, Chapter 3, R.I.G.L. has no application whatsoever in collective bargaining agreement matters. That chapter isspecifically not applicable to "collective contracts between employers and employees, or between employers and associations of employees, etc." §
The Union also filed on December 28, 1989 a "Motion toVacate, Modify or Correct Arbitration Award" in accordance with
Thereafter, as previously noted, on December 28, 1989 at 2:47 p.m., the Union filed the Miscellaneous Petition just referred to, and disposed of, by this Court. At the same time the Union also filed its "Motion to Vacate, Modify or Correct" the arbitrator's award. That document appears to also bear the original Superior Court Clerk's filing stamp date of December 28, 1989 at 2:48 p.m. If that be so, then the Motion was filed eight (8) days after the statutory time for filing such a Motion and this Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain same. It appears however from the face of the Motion that the original date of filing has been superimposed with what clearly appears to be a "rolled back" dated clerk's filing stamp to show a filing of the Motion on December 20, 1989, which would have been the very last day for the filing of the Motion pursuant to §
The defendant State of Rhode Island has not, as earlier noted, raised any question concerning the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and decide the Union's Motion to Vacate. That failure is understandable because when one casually reviews the file, the "rolled back" filing date appears more prominent than the original and valid date marking. Such conduct on the part of whoever participated in the restamping of the filing date should not however be overlooked by this Court. Accordingly, "in the interest of orderly judicial procedure", this Court will raise sua sponte, the question of its jurisdiction on the Motion.Providence Redevelopment Agency v. Falcone,
Accordingly, the Union's Motion to Vacate, Modify or Correct the arbitrator's decision and award is dismissed.
Because of the Court's earlier decision on the State's Motion to Confirm, its consideration of the Union's Motion to Vacate is actually moot. However, because of the unusual happening regarding this case in the Court Clerk's Office, this Court believes that such happening should be exposed and not overlooked so as to give warning to whoever participated in such doing that justice is not always blind, and that state employment is a sacred trust, not to be lightly taken or performed.
Counsel will prepare an appropriate judgment for entry by the Court within 10 days.
Central Hanover B. & T. Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev. , 159 F.2d 167 ( 1947 )
American Federation of Teachers Local 2012 v. Rhode Island ... , 477 A.2d 104 ( 1984 )
Coventry Teachers' Alliance v. Coventry School Committee , 417 A.2d 886 ( 1980 )
Town of Coventry v. Turco , 574 A.2d 143 ( 1990 )
La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for ... , 419 A.2d 274 ( 1980 )
Industrial Trades Union v. Dunn Worsted Mills , 131 F. Supp. 945 ( 1955 )