DocketNumber: P1-2004-2127
Judges: LANPHEAR, J.
Filed Date: 4/5/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
The statute of limitations was not extended until May 14, 1981 when the legislature enacted R.I.G.L. §
Mr. Gagnon argues that the reforms in 1979 shortened the statute of limitations for child molestation. Prior to 1979, the statute of limitations for the common law crime of rape was set by R.I.G.L. §
Mr. Gagnon contends crimes that would be properly charged as first degree sexual assault were subjected to a three-year statute of limitations if they occurred between May 9, 1979 and May 14, 1981. This may severely limit the prosecution of the within action. This interpretation would prohibit prosecution of Counts I through VII against Mr. Gagnon, and may prohibit prosecution of all counts in the indictment.1
The State offers three reasons why a strict three-year statute of limitations should not be applied. The Court will address each one in turn.
First, the State argues that the statutes were solely intended to increase the penalties for child molestation. While that may be true, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated time and time again that it is the function of a court in construing a statute to give words their plain and ordinary meaning.2 The State relies upon Justice Kelleher's review of the statute inState v. Babbitt,
Second, the State argues that this Court should infer legislative intent to expand the statute of limitations for the new crime of first degree sexual assault. The State argues that by correcting the statute of limitations in 1981, it inferentially intended to expand the statute of limitations for all prosecutions that were pending within the prior three years. Defendant's memorandum at page 5, citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law 29. However, the State can point to no explicit language within the revised statute of limitations establishing that the intent of the General Assembly was to expand the statute of limitations for pending cases. The state produced no records of legislative proceedings to support this claim.
Generally, statutes and their amendments are to operate prospectively unless it appears by clear, strong language or necessary implication that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive effect. Theta Properties v. Ronci Realty Co, Inc.,
814 A.2d 907 ,915 (R.I., 2003).
Hence this court will not imply or infer that a statute of limitations applies retroactively.
Third and finally, the State relies upon the reasoning applied in State v. Brown,
[E]ven if Brown had raised this defense at trial, he would not have succeeded on the merits of his statute-of-limitations defense. As the state correctly notes, the General Assembly did not designate "child molestation" as a separate and distinct crime until 1984 with the passage of §
11-37-8.1 . Therefore, counts 1 through 3, which covered the period from July 1, 1979, to May 3, 1984, charged Brown not with child molestation but with first-degree sexual assault in violation of §11-37-2 . There has never been a statute of limitations for first-degree sexual assault. Section12-12-17 . Brown v. State,841 A.2d 1116 ,1121 (R.I. 2004).
Hence, the issue has already been decided by the Supreme Court. In following the principles of stare decisis3 one must conclude that there has never been a statute of limitations for first degree sexual assault.
The Marion Court reasoned that the statute of limitations provided a means to guard against the prejudice resulting from the passage of time between the crime and the indictment. "There is thus no need to press the Sixth Amendment into service to guard against the mere possibility that pre-accusation delays will prejudice the defense in a criminal case since statutes of limitation already perform that function." Id. at 323,
In Marion the Court stated
No actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them. Id. at 325,
92 S.Ct. at 466 ,30 L.Ed.2d at 481-82 .
Just six years later in United States v. Lovasco,
Thus Marion makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. Id. at 790,
97 S. Ct. at 2048-49 ,52 L.Ed.2d at 759 .
Our Supreme Court reasoned:
In light of Marion and Lovasco, it is clear that in order for defendants to prevail on a due-process claim, they must demonstrate not only that the preindictment delay caused them actual prejudice but additionally that the prosecution intended such delay in order to gain some tactical advantage. State v. Vanasse,
593 A.2d 58 ,63-64 (R.I. 1991), citing United States v. Acevedo,842 F.2d 502 , 504 (1st. Cir. 1988); United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez,816 F.2d 823 , 831 (1st Cir. 1987).
A thorough review of the record fails to demonstrate whether Mr. Gagnon suffered any actual prejudice from the pre-indictment delay.4 Mr. Gagnon has neither demonstrated nor alleged that the prosecution intended such delay in order to gain some tactical advantage. In fact, there is simply no explanation of why the delay occurred. See State v. Holley,
With no prejudice yet shown and no rights clearly inuring to Mr. Gagnon before the indictment, his general due process claims fail.
To determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, Rhode Island courts consider the four factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo,
However, the Barker v. Wingo analysis does not apply, and the right to a speedy trial does not inure, unless the suspect has been arrested United States v. Marion,
Of course a significant factor is whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial aggressively enough "to constitute the equivalent of a `banging on the courthouse doors.'", State v. Perez,
No right to a speedy trial has not been infringed.
We begin our consideration of the pertinent statutory language with a restatement of some basic principles.
As we have often noted, "[i]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Accent Store Design,Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc.,
The plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent. Martone v. Johnston School Committee,
Moreover, in approaching a statute, it is axiomatic that "this Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute." Simeone v. Charron,
United States v. Gildardo F. Acevedo, United States of ... , 842 F.2d 502 ( 1988 )
united-states-v-jose-luis-lebron-gonzalez-aka-tito-camaro-aka-tito , 816 F.2d 823 ( 1987 )
Theta Properties v. Ronci Realty Co., Inc. , 814 A.2d 907 ( 2003 )
State v. Holley , 604 A.2d 772 ( 1992 )
State v. Lambrechts , 585 A.2d 645 ( 1991 )
Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan , 755 A.2d 799 ( 2000 )
Martone v. Johnston School Committee , 824 A.2d 426 ( 2003 )
State v. DiCicco , 707 A.2d 251 ( 1998 )
State v. Santos , 870 A.2d 1029 ( 2005 )
State v. Wheaton , 528 A.2d 1109 ( 1987 )
Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor , 822 A.2d 164 ( 2003 )
In Re Denisewich , 643 A.2d 1194 ( 1994 )
Hathaway v. Hathaway , 52 R.I. 39 ( 1931 )
State v. Duggan , 15 R.I. 403 ( 1886 )
Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc. , 674 A.2d 1223 ( 1996 )
State v. Babbitt , 457 A.2d 1049 ( 1983 )
State v. Werner , 865 A.2d 1049 ( 2005 )
Brown v. State , 841 A.2d 1116 ( 2004 )
State v. Vanasse , 593 A.2d 58 ( 1991 )