DocketNumber: C.A. Nos. P2-1997-3061A, P2-2000-2368A
Judges: CARNES, J.
Filed Date: 5/6/2009
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
The Defendant completed his term of incarceration on case number P2-1991-1454A and was released from the ACI in April of 1997. However, Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with breaking and entering into a dwelling on July 26, 1997. As a result, the State filed a motion for revocation of probation as to case number P2-1991-1454A pursuant to Super. R. Crim. P. 32(f) ("Rule 32(f")).2 On September 12, 1997, Defendant offered one plea of nolo contendere on case number P2-1997-3061A arising from the breaking and entering incident that occurred on July 26, 1997. After accepting this plea, the Court imposed the following sentence: ten years incarceration with three years to serve and seven years suspended with seven years of probation. Significantly, the sentence imposed on September 12, 1997 on case number P2-1997-3061A did not contain any language indicating that it was to run concurrently with or consecutively to any other sentence, including the sentence imposed in P2-1991-1454A. *Page 3 At the time of the plea in case number P2-1997-3061A, the Superior Court justice continued Defendant on the same sentence imposed in case number P2-1991-1454A. The Defendant was confronted with a potential maximum often years of incarceration on case number P2-1997-3061 A.
After the Defendant completed his time to serve on case number P2-1997-3061 A, he was released from the ACL. However, on June 21, 2000, Defendant was once again arrested and charged with breaking and entering into a dwelling. As a result, on or about July 18, 2000, the State filed a motion for revocation of probation as to both P2-1991-1454A and P2-1997-3061A pursuant to Rule 32(f). Thereafter, a justice of the Superior Court found Defendant to be a violator of the sentence imposed on P2-1991-1454A and ordered the suspension removed from count one of that sentence, thereby committing Defendant to serve six years of the nine year suspended sentence remaining in that case.
With regard to case number P2-1997-3061 A, which was also listed on the State's Rule 32(f) notice, the hearing justice continued Defendant on the same sentence, thereby leaving the remaining seven-year suspended sentence intact. As will be made clear, it is this particular action that Defendant alleges is problematic at this time.
As to the incident of breaking and entering giving rise to the June 21, 2000 probation violation, Defendant originally offered a plea of not guilty on case number P2-2000-2368A. After receiving six years as a violator, the new case was continued for trial. However, Defendant subsequently changed his mind and was allowed to withdraw his plea and offer a plea of nolo contendere to this charge. On October 9, 2001, the Court accepted Defendant's plea and sentenced him as follows: fifteen years incarceration with six years to serve and nine years suspended with nine years of probation. Significantly, *Page 4 there is no indication that this particular sentence was concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence. By its own terms, the probationary period of this particular sentence was set to expire on October 9, 2016.
Upon his release from the ACI, Defendant was again arrested and charged with breaking and entering on July 1, 2006. On or about July 5, 2006, the State filed a motion for revocation of probation as to case number P2-1997-3061A and case number P2-2000-2368A pursuant to Rule 32(f). Defendant received a hearing on the issue of whether he failed to keep the peace and remain of good behavior before a magistrate of the Superior Court. On December 13, 2006, upon a finding that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation, the magistrate removed the suspended sentence in case number P2-1997-3061 A, thereby committing Defendant to serve all seven years of the suspended sentence in that particular case. The magistrate continued Defendant on the same sentence with regard to the other case on which he was presented as a violator, namely, case number P2-2000-2368A.3
Following the magistrate's removal of the suspension in case number P2-1997-3061A, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35, asking this Court to correct what he now characterizes as an illegal sentence or, in the alternative, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. A review of the official docket sheet in case number P2-1997-3061A *Page 5 indicates that Defendant first filed his motion on July 2, 2007. It was continued numerous times while Defendant's appeal was pending in the Supreme Court and also thereafter once the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's adjudication of probation violation. This Court is satisfied that Defendant's Rule 35 motion is timely.4
While this Court agrees with Defendant's contention that timeshould have been deducted from the sentences imposed in both P2-1991-1454A and P2-1997-3061 A — particularly since Defendant was presented as a violator of both sentences in the State's Rule 32(f) motion for revocation of probation — the operative question is whether the time imposed on P2-1991-1454A must be simultaneously deducted from P2-1997-3061 A.
The Reporter's Notes for Rule 35 provide, in pertinent part:
For purposes of this rule, an "illegal sentence" is one which has been imposed under a valid conviction but is not authorized under the law. It includes e.g., a sentence in excess of that provided by statute, imposition of an unauthorized form of punishment, or a judgment that does not conform to the oral sentence. See 2 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, at 552-53 (1969).
Significantly, in Studman, our Supreme Court appeared to expand the holding in Pelliccia. Whereas in Pelliccia the sentencing justice imposed two sentences to be run concurrently on the same day,Pelliccia,
[W]hether a sentencing justice imposes several sentences at the same time or is aware of prior sentences imposed by another justice, he or she is in the position to exercise the choice of imposing consecutive or concurrent sentences. That choice under the principle of Pelliccia is thereafter binding upon the justice who later revokes the suspension. Id., at 920.
Based on the foregoing, it appears that when Defendant was presented as a violator of both P2-1991-1454A and P2-1997-3061A in July of 2000, the six years to serve imposed on the 1991 sentence should properly have been imposed against the 1997 sentence. It follows that when the magistrate adjudicated Defendant in violation of his probation on case number P2-1997-3061A in December of 2006, only one year of the suspended sentence on the 1997 sentence remained because of the six years imposed on the 1991 sentence. Accordingly, this Court finds that the seven years to serve imposed on case number P2-1997-3061A constitutes an illegal sentence, as the magistrate had the option of imposing only one year of incarceration on that particular sentence.
The Reporter's Notes to Rule 35 provide in pertinent part that:
a sentence illegally imposed is one that does not conform to the procedures required by these rules for imposition of sentence — for example, failure to accord a defendant his right of allocution under Rule 32. The provision permitting reduction of a valid sentence is intended to provide the court with an opportunity during a limited period after sentencing to exercise leniency in the event that the court, for some reason, determines that the sentence imposed was unduly severe or a shorter sentence would be desirable.
Given the demonstrated consequences of a failure to apply any time to serve against all of the sentences upon which Defendant had been presented as a violator, 7 as well as the requirements ofStudman and Pelliccia, supra., this Court finds that the six years previously imposed against the sentence imposed in case number P2-1991-1454A must also be applied to the sentence imposed in case number P2-1997-3061 A, leaving only one year to serve on the 1997 sentence. Since the Defendant is still imprisoned some twenty-eight (28) months after the magistrate sentenced him in December of 2006 to serve the full seven years of the suspended sentence imposed on case number P2-1997-3061 A, this Court agrees that under Defendant's alternate theory, this amounts to a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. However, the analysis under either of Defendant's theories does not end here. *Page 11
"When the conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free . . . to reconstruct the sentencing architecture . . . within applicable constitutional and statutory limits . . . to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal." Goncalves,
In Christodal, the defendant had been charged with three counts, including malicious injury to property, disorderly conduct, and simple assault as a basis for the Superior Court violation. Id. at 812. Evidence adduced at the violation hearing before the Superior Court justice demonstrated that the defendant had been involved in a confrontation with several teenagers, challenged some of them to a fight, and had thrown a handful of rocks at one while standing some five to ten feet away. Id. at 813. The evidence further demonstrated that some of the rocks missed the intended target and hit a car window, while other rocks struck one of the complaining witnesses in the back of her head causing several "bumps" in the affected area. Id.
At the time of the violation hearing, the defendant inChristodal had nine years of probation and suspended sentence exposure on his previous sentence. Id. at 815. While the State recommended three years to serve after the hearing justice found a violation, the hearing justice imposed five years to serve after seriously considering imposing the entire nine years. Id. Factors considered by the hearing justice in arriving at his decision included the fact that the defendant had some thirty contacts with law enforcement and some thirteen convictions on his record. Id. The hearing justice was also aware of the fact that the incident was not the first time that the defendant had appeared before the *Page 13 Superior Court as an alleged violator. Id. Furthermore, the hearing justice also gave some weight to the gravity of the offense, noting that the potential for great harm was present. Id.
This Court is also mindful that even where the new charge that triggers a violation hearing is subsequently dismissed, a hearing justice or magistrate is not precluded from finding that the defendant has failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior on the day that the violation hearing occurs. See State v. Jackson,
Most relevant for any hearing justice or magistrate are previous convictions for the same or similar offenses. Here, Defendant had been previously convicted of seven other counts of breaking and entering between 1979 and 2006. While our Supreme Court ultimately found that the hearing magistrate was justified in finding that Defendant had failed to keep the peace, Defendant now asks this Court to reconsider the seven years to serve originally imposed by the magistrate in light of the State's dismissal of the July 1, *Page 15
2006 charge of breaking and entering into a dwelling. The Defendant argues that given the fact that the breaking and entering into a dwelling was later dismissed by the State before trial, this Court, in hindsight, should reconsider the magistrate's imposition of seven years to serve on P2-1997-3061A "within applicable constitutional and statutory limits . . . to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal." State v. Goncalves,
Re-bundling, however, allows the Court to review the entire sentencing package in order to "preserve the intent of [the] original sentencing scheme." Goncalves,
The Defendant was originally presented as a violator of two distinct sentences in July of 2006. The State filed a motion for revocation of probation as to case number P2-1997-3061A and case number P2-2000-2368A pursuant to Rule 32(f). The sentence in case P2-2000-2368A appeared to run to October 9, 2016, leaving Defendant with at least nine possible years of exposure on that particular sentence at the time he was presented as *Page 16 a violator in 2006. The Defendant previously had been convicted of seven other counts of breaking and entering between 1979 and 2006. Given the wide latitude afforded a justice or magistrate who sentences a defendant upon a finding of violation, and given Defendant's criminal record at the time of sentencing in 2006, this Court is reluctant to second-guess a magistrate with many years of experience hearing and deciding criminal matters.
Having reviewed the entire sentencing package and the State's filing of a Rule 48 A dismissal motion as to the newest charge of breaking and entering into a dwelling on April 3, 2007, this Court will exercise its Rule 35 authority to achieve the same result that was originally intended by the hearing magistrate — seven years to serve. As of December 13, 2006, Defendant had a nine year suspended sentence with nine years probation on case number P2-2000-2368A. Accordingly, this Court revokes a seven year portion of the nine year suspended sentence in case number P2-2000-2368A and imposes seven years of incarceration on that case. The balance of Defendant's sentence in that case will remain in full force and effect (on case P2-2000-2368A) upon his release and Defendant will be given credit for all time served since he was first incarcerated for the violation
Counsel shall prepare and submit an appropriate Order for entry in accordance with this decision.
The court shall not revoke probation or revoke a suspension of sentence . . . except after a hearing at which the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed. . . . Prior to the hearing the State shall furnish the defendant and the court with a written statement specifying the grounds upon which action is sought under this subdivision of Rule 32.
Whenever any person has been sentenced to incarceration for violation of a deferred sentence by reason of the alleged commission of a felony and the grand jury has failed to return any indictment or an information has not been filed on the charge which was specifically alleged to have constituted the violation of the deferred sentence, the sentence to incarceration for the alleged violation of the deferred sentence shall, on motion made to the court on behalf of the person so sentenced, be quashed, and incarceration shall be immediately terminated, and the deferred sentence shall have same force and effect as if no sentence to incarceration had been imposed.
In 2008, the General Assembly purported to amend the above statute to include violations of both suspended sentences or probationary periods.See 2008 H7495 sub A. However, the bill was vetoed by the Governor on July 1, 2008. In 2009, a similar House bill — 2009 H5050 — was held for further study on May 4, 2009 by the House Committee on the Judiciary. A similar Senate bill — 2009 S0086 — has not been heard in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as of April 20, 2009. *Page 1
United States v. Juan Pimienta-Redondo, United States of ... , 874 F.2d 9 ( 1989 )
State v. Elliott , 2006 R.I. LEXIS 100 ( 2006 )
State v. Studman , 1983 R.I. LEXIS 1122 ( 1983 )
Pelliccia v. Sharkey , 110 R.I. 319 ( 1972 )
State v. Texieira , 2008 R.I. LEXIS 34 ( 2008 )
State v. Heath , 1995 R.I. LEXIS 156 ( 1995 )
State v. Tucker , 2000 R.I. LEXIS 53 ( 2000 )
State v. Bouffard , 2008 R.I. LEXIS 43 ( 2008 )
United States v. Richard Martenson , 178 F.3d 457 ( 1999 )
State v. Traudt , 679 A.2d 330 ( 1996 )
State v. Murray , 2001 R.I. LEXIS 267 ( 2001 )
State v. Chabot , 1996 R.I. LEXIS 233 ( 1996 )
State v. Christodal , 2008 R.I. LEXIS 55 ( 2008 )
State v. Jackson , 966 A.2d 1225 ( 2009 )