DocketNumber: NC01-461
Judges: PROCACCINI, J.
Filed Date: 4/22/2002
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
On August 15, 2000, plaintiff was cited by the Newport Board of License Commissioners for having allowed after-hours drinking by employees on the premises. After a public hearing, a $500 fine was imposed, and no appeal was taken.
Approximately four months later, on December 1, 2000, the Newport Police were dispatched to the plaintiff's bar after having received complaints from neighbors about loud music coming from the premises. When the police arrived, they peered through the window of the establishment and observed three men sitting at the bar. In light of the fact that it was after-hours (5:15 A.M.), the police sought and gained access to the bar room. One of the men was an employee of the bar, and the other two were musicians who had played that evening. There were cold draft beers on the bar, leading the police to reasonably conclude that after-hours drinking had occurred.
The police subsequently wandered into the kitchen area where they found an officer and stockholder of Jake and Ella's Corp., apparently in an obvious state of intoxication. The man was behaving in a belligerent fashion and engaging in argument with the officers. At one point, the man made a clumsy and feeble attempt to strike one of the officers. Consequently, the police charged the man with disorderly conduct, eventually resulting in a plea of nolo contendere and filing of the case for one year. Other than this single act of defiance, there were not any other incidents of disorderliness towards the responding officers.
As a result of the aforementioned incident, plaintiff was again cited by the Board of License Commissioners, who after public hearing on January 10, 2001, voted to revoke plaintiff's liquor license. Plaintiff took a timely appeal to the DBR pursuant to G.L. §
Plaintiff raises several arguments on appeal. Firstly, plaintiff argues that the hearing officer committed an error of law when he merely reviewed the local licensing board for errors of law, rather than substituting his judgment for that of the local board in a de novo manner. Plaintiff further argues that the sanction imposed, namely revocation, was unduly harsh, arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of discretion under the particular facts of the case. Finally, plaintiff argues that the transferor of the license maintained an "equitable interest" in the license, even after transfer, thereby making it an error of law to preclude any consideration of the transferor's plight vis a vis the revocation.1 This Court will first address the rights of the transferor.
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency with regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles,
In contrast, the issuing authority enjoys broad discretion when making an initial determination to revoke a license. §
The authority of the DBR to review the issuance, suspension, revocation, or renewal of a liquor license is specifically delegated in §
As such, the DBR can conduct appellate review of the decision of the local board and is not limited solely to de novo review. Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted §
. . . This testimony may be rebutted by competent testimony presented at the hearing held by the director." In light of the enormous discretion bestowed on the DBR, it cannot be said that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law when he conducted review that was partially appellate and partially de novo.3
"(a) Every license is subject to revocation or suspension and a license is subject to fine by the board or official issuing the license, or by the department . . . on its own motion, for breach by the holder of the license of the conditions on which it was issued or for violation by the holder of the license of any rule or regulation applicable, or for breach of any provisions of this section. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, §
"(b) If any licensed person permits the house or place where he or she is licensed to sell beverages under the provisions of this title to become disorderly as to annoy and disturb the persons inhabiting or residing in the neighborhood, or permits any gambling or unlawful gaming to be carried on in the neighborhood, or permit any of the laws of this state to be violated in the neighborhood . . . he or she may be summoned before the board, body, or official which issued his or her license and before the department . . . then the board, body or official may suspend or revoke the license or enter another order. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
As plaintiff concedes in the brief, there can be no doubt that the DBR had the statutory authority to issue the sanction of revocation in the instant case. The question then becomes: was the imposition of a sanction of revocation arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion? As a general matter, the Superior Court is not permitted to decide whether an agency chose the appropriate sanction in a given case. Rocha v. Public Utilities Commission,
The Court in Rocha dealt with the revocation of a towing license on the basis of two pending criminal charges for possession of stolen motor vehicles and twenty four consumer complaints. Furthermore, the division in that case also found a failure to pay an earlier $ 20,000 fine and the use of out of state companies to avoid the authority of the division. The Superior Court had "disagreed" with the sanction of revocation and ordered the license reinstated. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated "It becomes clear from the record that the court, after finding and examining the evidentiary basis that existed for the division's findings, merely disagreed with the sanction decided upon by the division and reversed the division's decision." The Court went on to state "the Superior Court [judge] was not permitted to decide whether the division chose the appropriate sanction but instead to determine whether the division's finding . . . was supported by any competent record evidence." Id.
However, the case at bar, as a matter of degree, is completely distinguishable from the facts of Rocha. The present record, unlike the record of Rocha, is bereft of any circumstances that would justify the revocation of plaintiff's liquor license. This point of difference holds true whether one looks at the violations quantitatively or qualitatively. In fact, while the violations in the case at bar were proven by competent evidence, it cannot be said that the competent evidence reasonably or proportionately places the violations in the sphere of revocation. As such, this Court is not merely "disagreeing" with the DBR, but rather is finding the sanction imposed excessive and disproportionate as a matter of law.
There are times when the sanction imposed by an agency, while permitted by law, is so arbitrary and extreme that it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. When that is the case, the language of the Administrative Procedures Act grants this Court the authority to reverse the lower decision.
Essentially, there are two components to an administrative decision — a determination of the merits of the case, and a determination of the sanction. While the former component is mainly factual, the latter involves not only an ascertainment of the factual circumstances, but also the application of administrative judgment and discretion. Kulkin v. Bergland,
While the nature of the conduct by this liquor license holder is to be neither condoned nor encouraged, sanctions levied for liquor license violations should be reasonably related to the severity of the conduct constituting the violation. The factors to be considered in weighing the severity of the violation should include: the number and frequency of the violations, the real and/or potential danger to the public posed by the violation, the nature of any violations and sanctions previously imposed, and any other facts deemed relevant in fashioning an effective and appropriate sanction.
Applying this analysis to the case at bar, the plaintiff was cited for two violations for after hours incidents, neither incident involved significant public safety issues, and the first violation resulted in a monetary sanction with no suspension. This Court is constrained to find that the sanction of revocation imposed by the hearing officer is clearly harsh, unreasonable, and not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
In Thompson v. Town of East Greenwich,
The Newport City Solicitor argues that the incident was not merely an after-hours drinking incident, but rather that it was an attempted assault on a police officer who was simply doing his job. This argument is not consistent with the underlying charge in this matter, nor does it recognize that the incident consisted only of a drunk man making a motion, which was at most an unconscious and unsuccessful attempt to defy authority.
Revocation of a Class B liquor license essentially functions as the death penalty in the context of license violations. Because it is such a harsh penalty, it should be reserved for only the most severe situations. The implementation of that sanction under the facts of this case was clearly an abuse of discretion, ignoring concepts of proportionality that hearing officers should be expected to apply.
Having established that the imposition of revocation was unwarranted, it must be determined how best to ensure the validity of further agency action. It has been held that once a Court determines that the agency has acted with an abuse of discretion, the Court is not authorized to change the sanction or impose new sanctions. Martin v. U.S.,
Broad Street Food Market, Inc. v. United States , 720 F.2d 217 ( 1983 )
Donald Kulkin, Etc. v. Robert Bergland , 626 F.2d 181 ( 1980 )
james-sims-owner-of-sims-enterprises-v-united-states-department-of , 860 F.2d 858 ( 1988 )
Francisco Collazo, D/B/A Cash & Carry, Inc. v. United ... , 668 F.2d 60 ( 1981 )
William L. Martin v. United States , 459 F.2d 300 ( 1972 )
Aiman Ghattas, Doing Business as a & M Food Shop v. United ... , 40 F.3d 281 ( 1994 )
Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission , 509 A.2d 453 ( 1986 )
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human ... , 484 A.2d 893 ( 1984 )
Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of ... , 414 A.2d 480 ( 1980 )
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co. , 424 A.2d 646 ( 1981 )
Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 543 A.2d 1307 ( 1988 )
Thompson v. Town of East Greenwich , 512 A.2d 837 ( 1986 )
Hallene v. Smith , 98 R.I. 360 ( 1964 )
Samuel's Realty Co. v. McCarthy , 512 A.2d 872 ( 1986 )
In Re Camelot Court, Inc. , 21 B.R. 596 ( 1982 )
Rocha v. State Public Utilities Commission , 694 A.2d 722 ( 1997 )
Sunny Day Restaurant, Inc. v. Beacon Restaurant, Inc. , 103 R.I. 707 ( 1968 )
Baginski v. Alcoholic Bev. C'm's'n. , 62 R.I. 176 ( 1939 )
The Castle v. Mayor of Newport , 63 R.I. 493 ( 1939 )
Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council , 434 A.2d 266 ( 1981 )