DocketNumber: C.A. No. 00-6402
Judges: SILVERSTEIN, J.
Filed Date: 10/26/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Shaw Construction entered into a construction agreement (Agreement) with the State of Rhode Island on or about May 29, 1998 by which Shaw would build a memorial to Rhode Island veterans at the Veterans' Cemetery in Exeter, Rhode Island. According to plans and specifications, the memorial was to have two granite walls similar to the Vietnam Veterans' Cemetery in Washington D.C. Names of Rhode Island veterans were to be engraved on those granite walls.
The Agreement required that the walls be built with Impala granite, but it also set forth the criteria for any change or substitution of materials prescribed for construction. The Agreement stated that any substitute material must be of equal quality to that set forth in the Agreement, and the substitution must be approved for use by the architect, in this case, Susan Bradford (Bradford). (Emphasis added).
On July 21, 1998 Shaw provided a sample of Impala, which was approved by Bradford, an agent of the State hired as an architect for the project. On August 4, 1998 Shaw expressed concern that the Impala supplier, Fletcher, thought that there might be a problem with the "Buy American Act" and an "embargo." (Arbitration Decision at 1). Although no problem developed, on August 11, 1998
Shaw expressed that it was seeking another supplier because it continued to doubt Fletcher's ability to deliver in time for Shaw to complete its performance under the Agreement. On August 14, 1998 Shaw submitted to Bradford two other samples of granite including a sample of Peribonka granite which she subsequently approved for use on the monument on August 18, 1998.
Construction on the monument began in June 1998 and was relatively uneventful until August 1999 when problems with the granite and the pavement became apparent. On August 4, 1999 problems with the granite were discussed at a meeting attended by, among others, Bradford; Waterman Engineering, Inc. (Waterman), the firm hired as project engineer; and Anothony Sciolto (Sciolto), whose business held the contract to engrave the granite panels.
Cracking along the grain line of the granite was observed by the parties only after the granite was installed according to the instructions in the Agreement. Sciolto expressed his unwillingness to engrave upon the granite due to his belief that the granite was construction grade and not suitable for engraving.
On September 30, 1999 the State demanded that Shaw replace the faulty granite or the State would take steps afforded to it under the Agreement to complete the project using a different construction company. Shaw responded on October 13, 1999 stating that the selection of the Peribonka granite was the responsibility of the State through its architect, Bradford. In an effort to complete its performance under the contract, Shaw agreed to replace the faulty granite with Peribonka but would not replace it with Impala without additional compensation.
By October 1999, performance of the Agreement ceased, and the parties presented this grievance to Brown for arbitration in July 2000.1 Brown rendered his decision on November 17, 2000.
"At any time within one year after the award is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant the order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected, as prescribed in §§
10-3-12 —10-3-14 . Notice in writing of the application shall be served upon the adverse party or his or her attorney ten (10) days before the hearing on the application."
Limitation or modification of an arbitration award is pursuant to §
"In any of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in hearing legally immaterial evidence, or refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been substantially prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made."
This Court's "authority to review the merits of an arbitration award is very limited." Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections,
The State also asserts that Shaw wanted to change the granite to Peribonka for its own financial reasons to avoid prepayment to Fletcher for the Impala.
Brown first determined that even if the State's assertions were true, "a contractor is entitled to conduct its business at its best advantage as long as it complies with the plans and specifications [of the Agreement]." (Arbitration Decision at 1). He also concluded that the requirements of this Agreement, specifically that the architect is the approval authority for any changes in the Agreement, were very clear and that Shaw received appropriate approval for the change of granite from Bradford.
With respect to the quality of the granite used by Shaw in construction, Brown considered whether the Peribonka was appropriate as specified in the Agreement. Brown based this decision that it was on evidence that Bradford found the Peribonka to be "equal and suitable for the intended purpose" and also on the fact that no contrary opinion was expressed until July of 1999 when cracks and spalling began to appear after the Peribonka was installed. (Id. at 2). Brown noted that the fact that problems with the granite did not arise until after installation was significant because that subsequent occurrence indicates a design flaw rather than a problem with the granite. The design of the monument neither included any provision for the expansion or contraction of the granite panels, nor provided for water drainage away from the granite panels. These defects were corrected in the State's replacement bid contracts which Brown found indicated the State's culpability regarding the error in the original design. The arbitrator also concluded, from samples of Peribonka presented as evidence, that it engraved very well.
In regard to complaints lodged against Shaw for subsequent defects with the pavement, Brown found that the problems arising from its use were due to a specification error made by the State in the Agreement rather than from any mistake made by Shaw. The complaints alleged included water retention on the pavement, the quality of the pavement and the leaching of a substance from precast capstones. Accordingly, he found that Shaw's use of the concrete was in accordance with the Agreement.
The arbitrator additionally concluded that the Agreement set forth means for both dispute resolution and termination of the Agreement, both of which the State ignored. The State was obligated to follow the "Claim and Disputes" clause of the contract when it took issue with Shaw's performance. (Id. at 3). The State's failure to do this resulted in unfair treatment of Shaw which was not given proper notice of the State's grievance and was thus denied the right to pursue protection under the Agreement.
After thorough review of the arbitrator's decision and consideration of the memoranda submitted by the parties, this Court confirms the arbitration award issued by Brown. This Court finds that Brown's decision "draws its essence" from the Agreement between the parties and is based on a "passably plausible" interpretation of that Agreement. The State has not met its burden of presenting sufficient evidence for this Court to find that Brown "manifestly disregarded" the Agreement, reached an "irrational result," or rewrote the Agreement as the State argues he did. Therefore, Shaw Construction's Petition to Confirm the Arbitrator's Award is granted, and the State's Petition to Vacate the Arbitrator's Award is denied.
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Flynn , 687 A.2d 440 ( 1996 )
Rhode Island Council 94 v. State , 456 A.2d 771 ( 1983 )
Jacinto v. Egan , 120 R.I. 907 ( 1978 )
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State ... , 707 A.2d 1229 ( 1998 )
Bradford Associates v. Rhode Island Division of Purchases , 772 A.2d 485 ( 2001 )
Town of Coventry v. Turco , 574 A.2d 143 ( 1990 )
Taylor v. Delta Electro Power, Inc. , 741 A.2d 265 ( 1999 )
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Grabbert , 590 A.2d 88 ( 1991 )
RI Council 94, Afscme, Afl-Cio v. State , 714 A.2d 584 ( 1998 )