DocketNumber: C.A. No. 00-0286
Judges: GIBNEY, J.
Filed Date: 1/16/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
On October 4, 1991, the complainant filed a charge with the Commission alleging unlawful discrimination. The Preliminary Investigating Commissioner found probable cause to believe that the appellant had unlawfully denied employment to the complainant on the basis of her sex pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
In its decision entered on August 4, 1995, the Commission found that the appellant had "discriminated against the complainant with respect to hire because of her sex." The Commission also found that the reasons proffered by appellant for not hiring the complainant were a pretext for discrimination. Although the Commission found that the selected applicant had more experience in carpentry, it determined that, based on the complainant's status as a female and an internal applicant, she was a better qualified applicant than the selected applicant. The Commission found that the appellant had committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of G.L. 1956 §
On August 30, 1995, the appellant filed an appeal from the Commission's decision pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
Subsequently, the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the complainant's petition for writ of certiorari and remanded the matter to the Commission.
Upon remand, the Commission held a hearing on the reassessment of damages. After hearing from the parties on whether the record should be reopened, the Commission, over appellant's objection, allowed the complainant's testimony in support of her claim for emotional distress. The complainant testified that she felt hurt by the appellant's actions and that the hurt became anger and rage, which affected her performance on job interviews. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission instructed the parties to submit memoranda on the issue of damages. The Commission, in its Decision and Order on the Reassessment of Damages entered on December 21, 1999 (Decision), awarded the amount of $15,000 to the complainant as compensation for her pain and suffering.
On January 18, 2000, the appellant filed the subject appeal from the Commission's decision.
The appellant contends that the Commission's conduct on remand exceeded this Court's manifest intent in remanding the case. Specifically, the appellant asserts that this Court directed the Commission to reassess damages and did not direct the Commission to reopen the evidentiary hearings which had concluded in 1994. According to the appellant, the reopening of the evidentiary hearings "so far after the fact is presumptively prejudicial and unfair." The appellant further argues that the complainant waived her right to compensatory damages by failing to introduce evidence of pain and suffering at the previous hearings. The appellant also contends that even if the appellant did not waive her right to compensatory damages, the evidence presented was legally and factually insufficient to support the award of compensatory damages.
"(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
When reviewing a decision of an agency, a justice of the Superior Court may not substitute his or her judgment for that of the agency board on issues of fact or as to the credibility of testifying witnesses, Mercantum Farm Corp. v. Dutra,
Legally competent evidence is "marked `by the presence of `some' or `any' evidence supporting the agency's findings.'" State v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board,
In the instant matter, after this Court affirmed the Commission's decision which found that the appellant had engaged in a discriminatory practice, the case was remanded to the Commission for reassessment of damages. The Commission interpreted "the Superior Court Order to require the Commission to determine the amount of damages, again." (Decision at 3.) Because the award of damages was "to be determined anew," the Commission reasoned that it was appropriate to allow the parties to present additional evidence on damages, and that the "[a]dditional evidence [would] help . . . to untangle the issues." See Id. Additionally, the Commission acknowledged that its own Rules and Regulations allow for the reopening of any proceeding after the parties have been afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard.1 (Decision at 3-4.) The Commission therefore concluded that it was authorized by the court, its own rules and regulations, and the Administrative Procedures Act to take additional evidence on the issue of damages. See Id. at 5.
Rhode Island General Laws §
Although this Court's remand order did not explicitly state that the Commission should hear and consider new evidence, this Court's decision evidences that intent. The matter was remanded because, through no fault of the complainant, the Commission based its award of damages upon its erroneous determination that the appellant had engaged in "pretext" rather than "mixed motive" discrimination.
Because the evidence adduced at the original hearing concerned "pretext" — type remedies designed to bring the complainant to the position which she would have occupied but for the appellant's illegal act, the issue of pain and suffering was not addressed. See Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc.,
Pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 54(c), a final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings." More specifically, pursuant to the Fair Employment Practices Act, "both the commission and the Superior Court possess the power to award the employee remedies in lieu of or in addition to those remedies specifically requested." FUD's Inc. v. State,
Although this Court vacated the damages initially awarded to the complainant, she may have been entitled to compensatory damages pursuant to G.L. 1956 §
Additionally, the Commission is authorized to reopen a record pursuant to its own Rule 13. At the hearing on the reassessment of damages, the parties were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether the record should be reopened to receive additional evidence related to the complainant's emotional distress. After considering the respective positions of the parties, the Commission determined that the presentation of additional evidence was in the interest of justice since it would help to "untangle the issues." (Decision at 3.) On remand, the agency may determine both whether a hearing would be `productive' and whether additional evidence would be "helpful." Charles Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 8.31 at 523 (1997) (citing Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. I.C.C.,
Accordingly, this Court finds that the Commission's decision to reopen the record did not constitute an error of law or abuse of discretion, and was not made upon unlawful procedure. Substantial rights of the appellant have not been prejudiced.
This Court may not reverse factual conclusions of an administrative agency unless they are totally devoid of any competent evidentiary support in the record. Santini v. Lyons,
Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v. United States,
"The adequacy of damages for pain and suffering, however, is determined by an exercise of [the Commission's] judgment and an application of . . . experience in the affairs of life and [the] knowledge of social and economic matters." Kelaghan v. Roberts,
After considering the evidence before the Commission, this Court cannot find that the Commission misconceived or overlooked material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. It is undisputed that the Commission, having found that the appellant engaged in discrimination, had the authority to award compensatory damages. Even though complainant's testimony lacked evidence of physical manifestations of pain and suffering or counseling intervention, the Commission determined that the amount of $15,000 sufficiently compensated the complainant for her emotional distress. The Commission stated that the complainant "testified that the discrimination left her hurt, which led to anger, that the anger still continue[d], that she found the emotions to be `almost paralyzing,' that she was still working to regain her confidence, and that the discrimination `cut [her] off at the knees.'" (Decision and Order of the Commission at 6.) The complainant further testified that she was unable to appear for several scheduled job interviews, and also that when she actually attended an interview, she "went in with fear." (Tr. of 3/3/98 at 13.) Accordingly, the Commission's finding that the complainant was entitled to compensation for the pain and humiliation caused by the appellant's discriminatory act and its determination of compensatory damages based on said evidence before it was not clearly erroneous.
After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Commission's award of compensatory damages was not clearly erroneous, and was supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record. Accordingly, the Commission's award of compensatory damages is affirmed.
Counsel shall prepare the appropriate judgment for entry in accordance herewith.
Mary Jane Kerr SELGAS, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AMERICAN ... , 104 F.3d 9 ( 1997 )
Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce ... , 934 F.2d 327 ( 1991 )
Kelaghan v. Roberts , 433 A.2d 226 ( 1981 )
Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros , 710 A.2d 680 ( 1998 )
Environmental Scientific Corp. v. Durfee , 621 A.2d 200 ( 1993 )
Fud's, Inc. v. State , 727 A.2d 692 ( 1999 )
Lemoine v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, R. & HOSP. , 320 A.2d 611 ( 1974 )
Trainor v. Town of North Kingstown , 625 A.2d 1349 ( 1993 )
Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare , 122 R.I. 583 ( 1980 )
Leviton Manufacturing Co. v. Lillibridge , 120 R.I. 283 ( 1978 )
Whitelaw v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF DEPT. EMP. SEC. , 185 A.2d 104 ( 1962 )
State v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board , 694 A.2d 24 ( 1997 )
Troutbrook Farm, Inc. v. Mary DeWitt , 611 A.2d 820 ( 1992 )
Birchwood Realty, Inc. v. Grant , 627 A.2d 827 ( 1993 )
Mercantum Farm Corp. v. Dutra , 572 A.2d 286 ( 1990 )
Quince v. State , 94 R.I. 200 ( 1962 )
Santini v. Lyons , 448 A.2d 124 ( 1982 )
Baker v. Department of Employment & Training Board of Review , 637 A.2d 360 ( 1994 )
DePetrillo v. Department of Employment Security, Board of ... , 623 A.2d 31 ( 1993 )
Robert E. Derecktor of Rhode Island, Inc. v. United States , 762 F. Supp. 1019 ( 1991 )