DocketNumber: No. K2-2006-0262A
Judges: RAGOSTA, J.
Filed Date: 8/15/2006
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
When the music stopped, the officer rang the doorbell again. The officer then observed the Defendant retrieve a handgun from a nearby counter and rack the slide backward, thus chambering a round of ammunition. The Defendant proceeded down the stairwell, so the officer took cover behind a rock. The Defendant opened his front door and took a step outside with his left leg, and the officer shouted "Police! Show me your hands!" The officer then observed the Defendant bend down and lower his right hand toward the interior of the home. The Defendant thereafter raised both hands and walked down the front steps of the house. At that point a female, later identified as the Defendant's wife, came to the doorway, partially closed the front door, and disappeared into the house. Moments later, the Defendant's wife exited the house.
Backup police officers arrived, and the Defendant's wife was asked what she did with the gun. She replied "I threw it underneath the bed." Two officers conducted a protective sweep of the home and retrieved a handgun and observed drug paraphernalia and substances believed to be illegal drugs. The Defendant's wife was escorted back into the home and signed a "consent to search" form allowing the police to further search the home for illegal drugs and weapons.
The Defendant was taken to West Warwick Police Station for questioning. During questioning, the Defendant admitted to drinking and smoking marijuana. A subsequent chemical test revealed the Defendant as having a blood alcohol level of .095. The Defendant was charged with a three Count Criminal Information. Count One charged him with carrying a firearm while intoxicated in violation of §
The Defendant notes that any control he had over his firearm was exercised while he was within his residence and thus argues that licensing and other legislative limitations placed upon an individual's right to possess, carry, or transport a firearm warrant stated or implied exemptions when an individual is within one's residence. The Defendant states that these exemptions recognize and preserve the public policy sought by the legislature in protecting the public from firearms being possessed in public spaces, without needlessly carrying the limitations into one's dwelling. The Defendant points to §
In support of his "dwelling house exemption" argument, the Defendant directs the Court's attention to French v. State,
The Court is not persuaded by the Defendant's argument. InFrench, that defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. The Florida statutes contained a provision expressly allowing the carrying of a concealed weapon upon obtaining a permit. In construing its statutes, that court merely waived the permit requirement because the defendant was in his home. That case is clearly distinguishable from the one at bar. Here, there is no exception listed to the crime under which the Defendant is charged. To read in a "dwelling house exemption" would be to create an absurd result.
With respect to statutory construction, the Supreme Court has stated a number of guidelines.
"In construing a statute, [a] court must give effect to all parts of the statute, if reasonably possible, in keeping with its declared purpose. Additionally, the words used must be given their ordinary and customary meaning unless a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute. If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is presumed to be the Legislature's intended meaning and the statute must be interpreted literally." Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett,
411 A.2d 300 ,303 (R.I. 1980).
Furthermore, a court "shall not interpret a statute to include a matter omitted unless the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without the implication." State v. Feng,
The enacted statute the Defendant is charged with violating is clear on its face, and the Legislature chose to include no exceptions to it. It is evident that the Legislature did recognize and consider a person's right to bear arms when drafting the Firearms Act because it specifically included the "dwelling house exemption" to the requirement to obtain a license to possess a firearm. That the Legislature did not include this exemption to the statute under which the Defendant is charged is significant. See e.g., Sycamore Properties, LLC v. TabrizRealty, LLC,
The Defendant further argues that the statute at issue places an unreasonable restriction upon him. As recognized in Mosby,
the Legislature has enacted a number of provisions regulating the possession and use of weapons. These reasonable regulations have even extended into the home where §
This Court finds the statute under which the Defendant is charged to be a reasonable regulation. While the Defendant's interest in possessing a firearm is not attenuated here, as it was in Samuel, the staggering increase in danger to public safety clearly warrants a regulation making it unlawful to carry a firearm while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, independent of where a person is located.
In further support of his motion to dismiss, the Defendant, relying on State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77,79 (R.I. 1981,) argues that the "carrying" element of the statute under which he is charged is analogous to "possession." He therefore maintains that, under Rhode Island law his possession of a firearm while in his home, even while intoxicated, is permitted. The Defendant thus concludes that the sole means by which §
The Defendant's argument is unavailing. The terms "carry" and "possession" are not analogous. As noted in Benevides, "carrying is a form of possession." Id at 79. However, there are many instances of possession, e.g., constructive possession, that do not involve carrying.
Finally, the Defendant argues that the Court must also consider other statutory rights, including the "Castle Doctrine," contained in G.L. 1956 §
While the Defendant correctly notes that the "Castle Doctrine" provides a right to use self-defense while in one's home, that right is not limited by the statute under which he is charged. Section
French v. State , 279 So. 2d 317 ( 1973 )
In Re Samuel P. , 626 A.2d 224 ( 1993 )
State v. Reed , 764 A.2d 144 ( 2001 )
Mosby v. Devine , 851 A.2d 1031 ( 2004 )
Rhode Island Chamber of Commerce v. Hackett , 122 R.I. 686 ( 1980 )
Sycamore Properties, LLC v. Tabriz Realty, LLC , 870 A.2d 424 ( 2005 )
State v. Kryla , 742 A.2d 1178 ( 1999 )
State v. Feng , 421 A.2d 1258 ( 1980 )