DocketNumber: C.A. No. WC 2006-0132
Judges: THOMPSON, J.
Filed Date: 8/25/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Plaintiff in fact brought his car to the shop early on the morning of the 20th. However, when Pat's had disassembled the clutch assembly, they discovered that it was different from the replacement part that they had ordered for Plaintiff's car. The replacement part was the one *Page 2 specified in the factory service manual for a 1995 Subaru Impreza. It appears that Pat's attempted to install the replacement part but that it did not fit onto the transmission in Plaintiff's vehicle as the original clutch assembly was quite a bit larger than the new part. Needless to say, Plaintiff's vehicle was not ready by the afternoon.
Plaintiff contacted multiple Subaru dealers in an attempt to figure out which clutch assembly had been installed in his car. Over the course of several days Plaintiff learned that Subaru did not always install the parts that were specified in the factory's manual, particularly for cars in its 1995 model year. In an apparent move to save money, Subaru sometimes installed parts that it had on hand but were specified for installation in other vehicles. Subaru referred to these internally as "interchangeable parts," but did not inform dealers or repair shops that certain vehicles may contain such parts or provide any sort of cross-referencing information to allow a determination of which part had been installed.
Thus, when the repair shop looked up the part number for Plaintiff's clutch assembly the only information returned was the part number for a clutch assembly for a 1995 Subaru Impreza with front-wheel drive. It took several days before Pat's and Plaintiff were able to determine that the clutch assembly that had been fitted to his car was actually from a 1993 Subaru Impreza with four-wheel drive. It also appears that the entire transmission in Plaintiff's car was from a 1993 four-wheel drive Subaru, which explains why the clutch assembly differed between the vehicles and why it was impossible to install the 1995 clutch assembly in the car. Putting the difficulty in terms of the terminology used by the parties, the transmission (as a whole) from a 1993 four-wheel drive Subaru is an interchangeable part with the transmission from a 1995 two-wheel drive Impreza, but the clutch assembly from the 1993 four-wheel drive transmission is not interchangeable with the clutch assembly on the 1995 front-wheel drive transmission. *Page 3
Plaintiff's vehicle was finally repaired on June 22, 2005. During the time when he was without a vehicle, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered monetary losses in that he was forced to get around by taxi for two days. He also claims that the lease on his apartment was up and he was required to vacate the premises on June 20; thus, he ate several meals at restaurants, and he would not have done this had he been able to go to New York that evening. Plaintiff further alleges that he was unable to make it to a scheduled job interview on Long Island on the evening of June 20 and that he therefore lost an employment opportunity.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint against both Pat's and Subaru. The complaint alleges breach of contract against Pat's because one of the alleged conditions of the agreement was that the work would be completed by the afternoon of June 20. Plaintiff also claims that Pat's misrepresented the price of the clutch assembly. According to Plaintiff, Pat's service manager told Plaintiff that the cost of the part was $360 and that Pat's would charge him $360 for the part, thereby realizing no profit on the sale of the part itself. Plaintiff claims that the actual retail price of the part is $250.
Plaintiff's count against Subaru claims that Subaru installed the incorrect transmission and clutch assembly in his 1995 model-year car out of "non-care" and that Subaru "wrongfully" failed to disclose that a so-called interchangeable part had been installed on his vehicle. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 11, 2006, in which he specifically relies on the RIDTPA, claiming that selling a 1995 model car with running gear from a 1993 vehicle constitutes a deceptive trade practice. (See Amended Complaint, ¶ 1, "Jurisdiction.")
This Court granted Pat's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 16, 2008. The Court deferred ruling on Subaru's Motion in order to give further consideration to the issue of whether *Page 4 Subaru's auto sales are regulated by the Motor Vehicle Code, thereby exempting Subaru's conduct from the RIDTPA.
Subaru next argues that the RIDTPA requires a plaintiff to show that he has suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property and that Plaintiff has failed to do so. Plaintiff has alleged that he suffered the "loss of 50 hours" of his life, that the attempt to get his car repaired was a "traumatic" experience, that he lost the use of his car for three days, and that he lost out on a "business opportunity" in New York. According to Subaru, none of these alleged damages has resulted in an ascertainable monetary loss and, therefore, Plaintiff has no standing. *Page 5
Finally, Subaru argues that it is exempt from the provisions of the RIDTPA because it is regulated by the Rhode Island Motor Vehicle Code. Plaintiff specifically relies on G.L. 1956 §
In rejoinder, Plaintiff asserts that Subaru had already raised these arguments in a motion to dismiss that was heard by another Justice of this Court. The motion justice found that Plaintiff did have standing under the RIDTPA and denied the motion to dismiss. In fact, Plaintiff argues that Subaru's current motion seems to be copied "word by word" from its prior motion to dismiss.
According to Plaintiff, the motion justice found that Plaintiff was not required to have personally bought the vehicle from Subaru in order to have a valid claim under the Act. Plaintiff also argues that the motion justice previously found that Plaintiff had in fact alleged an ascertainable monetary loss due to the allegedly deceptive practice. As an example of his monetary loss, Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to his affidavit wherein Plaintiff states that he paid for several taxi rides during the time in which he was without the use of his car.
This Court first notes that Plaintiff is mostly correct in his contention that Subaru's current motion for summary judgment is nearly identical to Subaru's prior motion to dismiss. Comparison of the motions reveals that Subaru has already argued that Plaintiff has no standing under the RIDTPA because Plaintiff did not purchase the car from Subaru and/or Plaintiff has not suffered any ascertainable monetary losses. The file further reveals that, rather than filing a *Page 6 responsive answer to Plaintiff's complaint, Subaru instead opted to file a motion to dismiss on October 16, 2006. That motion was denied after a hearing on February 19, 2007.
An order prepared and filed by Subaru's attorney on February 22, 2007, and entered on February 28, 2007, stated that Subaru's motion was denied "without prejudice." Nothing in the file indicates why the motion was denied without prejudice, nor has any party submitted a transcript of that hearing. Further examination of the file reveals that Plaintiff prepared an order on February 23, 2007, which stated that Subaru's motion to dismiss was "denied," thereby indicating that such denial was with prejudice. Plaintiff's order was never signed or entered by the Court. Thus, despite the apparent contradiction of the parties' understanding of the motion justice's ruling on February 19, the only order entered denied the motion without prejudice. Subaru, therefore, is not precluded from raising the same arguments in its motion for summary judgment.
Subaru first argues that for conduct to be actionable under the RIDPTA it must be shown that a plaintiff purchased goods from a defendant. Because it is uncontested here that Plaintiff purchased his car from a private party and not from Subaru, Subaru claims that Plaintiff is unable to maintain a cause of action.
The jurisdictional statutory language provides that
*Page 7[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful by §
6-13.1-2 , may bring an action under the Rules of Civil Procedure in the superior court of the county in which the seller or lessor resides, is found, has his or her principal place of business, or is doing business, or in the superior court of the county as is otherwise provided by law, to recover actual damages or two hundred dollars ($200). Section6-13.1-5.2 .
Despite Subaru's assertions, nothing in the plain language of that section requires a direct vendor/consumer relationship before a cause of action may be maintained. Rather, the section is broadly drafted to include "any person who purchases or leases goods primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Significantly, the statutory language referring to the "seller" appears in the context of selecting the proper forum in which the action is to be brought. Nowhere does the section state that only the first purchaser of a good has a cause of action.
While Subaru has cited several cases to support its proposition that a direct consumer/vendor relationship must be established, all of those cases are easily distinguishable. In ERI Max Entertainment, Inc. v.Streisand,
Not only are all of these cases obviously distinguishable from Plaintiff's case, but the Kelley Court stated that in order to have a valid claim "a plaintiff must establish that he or she is a consumer, and the defendant is committing or has committed an unfair or deceptive act while engaged in a business of trade or commerce." Id. Here, Plaintiff is clearly a consumer and there can be no argument that Subaru is not a seller engaged in trade or commerce. Admittedly, although the Plaintiff satisfies the Court's articulation of the standard inKelley, that Court was *Page 8 not presented with a factual situation involving the fourth owner of a motor vehicle. Still, Subaru has not presented this Court with any authority for its interpretation of the RIDTPA requiring a direct vendor/consumer relationship.1 Given the foregoing, this Court concludes that the Plaintiff does have a cause of action even though he is not the vehicle's original purchaser.2
Subaru next argues that Plaintiff does not have standing under the plain language of §
Here, Subaru argues that it is exempt from the RIDTPA pursuant to §
Subaru's argument that it is exempt from the RIDTPA is unavailing because perusal of §
Moreover, our Supreme Court has previously allowed a consumer to proceed with a suit against a motor vehicle manufacturer that is predicated upon a violation of the RIDTPA. The plaintiff consumer inPark v. Ford Motor Company,
The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety because the plaintiff had alleged damages totaling $200, well below the $5,000 amount in controversy requirement. The Supreme Court reversed. While the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's general claims for damages, the Court reinstated the plaintiff's claim under the RIDTPA because the statute's plain language "permits a person who sustains any loss capable of measurement, no matter how large or small . . ." to maintain an action. Park,
On remand, the trial justice once again dismissed the suit after finding that the plaintiff did not meet the numerosity requirement for class certification. Park v. Ford Motor Company,
Granted, our Supreme Court in Park and Park II was not confronted with the question of whether the defendant's car sales activities were exempt from the RIDTPA because they constituted "actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the department of business regulation or other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States." Section
Against this backdrop, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would twice reinstate the plaintiff's cause of action if it would later be found that the very same plaintiff lacked standing on other grounds. Rather, one would expect the Supreme Court to have affirmed the trial justice's dismissal, but on the alternate ground that a motor vehicle manufacturer is exempt from suit under the RIDTPA because sales of motor vehicles are subject to regulation by a state or federal agency. The fact that the Supreme Court did not do so — even after presented with the consumer's claim under the RIDTPA on two occasions — would seem to indicate that allegedly deceptive acts in the realm of consumer motor vehicle sales are not exempted from the RIDTPA. *Page 13
Significantly, the allegations in the matter currently before this Court appear analogous to the allegations in Park. Just as thePark plaintiff had bought a Ranger that Ford represented was equipped with a certain security system, Plaintiff here purchased a vehicle that Subaru had represented to be a 1995 two-wheel drive Impreza, leading Plaintiff to reasonably believe that a transmission for a 1995 two-wheel drive Impreza had been installed in the vehicle. Plaintiff later discovered that the vehicle was not equipped with a transmission for a 1995 two-wheel drive Impreza, similar to the Park plaintiff's discovery that his Ford Ranger did not have the advertised security system installed. Therefore, it appears the same analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Park should apply to this case. Because our Supreme Court implicitly found that the allegedly deceptive conduct in that case was not exempt from the RIDTPA, neither is the similar alleged conduct by Subaru.
It should be noted that Subaru has cited Federal case law in support of its claim that it is exempt from the RIDTPA. In In re New MotorVehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation,
That case also appears to be distinguishable on its facts as the allegations involved a supposed conspiracy at the dealer level that resulted in harm to the ultimate consumers. Thus, the general conduct in that case appears to involve the relationship between motor vehicle manufacturers and their franchisees, which is clearly governed by the Motor Vehicle Code §
Finally, it should be noted that even if this Court were inclined to accept Subaru's argument that §
*Page 15[n]otwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any agreement or franchise or the terms or provisions of any waiver, any consumer who is injured by a violation of this chapter, or any party to a franchise who is so injured in his or her business or property by a violation of this chapter relating to that franchise, or any person so injured because he or she refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be in violation of this chapter, may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further violations, and to recover the actual damages sustained by that person together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Section
31-5.1-13 (a) (emphases added).
Although the statutory language providing this cause of action does appear to contemplate only actions between and among manufacturers and dealers as causing injury to a consumer, if the Court accepts Subaru's argument that this chapter applies and preempts any action under the RIDTPA, then Plaintiff is clearly provided with a private cause of action to address any alleged violations of §
Even if the Court were to accept Subaru's argument that the alleged conduct is not subject to the RIDTPA because it is governed by the Motor Vehicle Code §
Counsel shall submit an appropriate order for entry in accordance with this Decision on or before September 10, 2008.
In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust ... , 350 F. Supp. 2d 160 ( 2004 )
Krivitsky v. Town of Westerly , 823 A.2d 1144 ( 2003 )
State of Rhode Island v. Piedmont Funding Corp. , 119 R.I. 695 ( 1978 )
Park v. Ford Motor Co. , 928 A.2d 469 ( 2007 )
McKinnon v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank , 713 A.2d 245 ( 1998 )
State v. Nordstrom , 529 A.2d 107 ( 1987 )
Kelley v. Cowesett Hills Associates , 768 A.2d 425 ( 2001 )
Lynch v. Conley , 853 A.2d 1212 ( 2004 )
Park v. Ford Motor Co. , 844 A.2d 687 ( 2004 )
ERI Max Entertainment, Inc. v. Streisand , 690 A.2d 1351 ( 1997 )
State v. Froais , 653 A.2d 735 ( 1995 )
Sakonnet Point Marina Ass'n v. Bluff Head Corp. , 798 A.2d 439 ( 2002 )
Magnum Defense, Inc. v. Harbour Group Ltd. , 248 F. Supp. 2d 64 ( 2003 )