DocketNumber: C.A. Nos. 95-6605, 95-6889
Judges: <bold><underline>HURST, J.</underline></bold>
Filed Date: 1/30/1997
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Each plaintiff is a categorically needy recipient of Medical Assistance benefits in the State of Rhode Island. Each plaintiff suffers from incontinence; that is, the inability to retain or control urination due to a medical condition. Bristol underwent a radical perineal prostatectomy, surgical excision of the prostate gland, for treatment of prostatic carcinoma on April 15, 1994, which resulted in permanent urinary incontinence. His urinary incontinence requires management with multiple adult diaper changes on a daily basis. His treatment duration is indefinite, and his prognosis is poor. Additionally, the prostate surgery and its required treatment, including the diaper pads for his incontinence, have adversely affected his emotional health leaving him feeling discouraged, hopeless, and embarrassed by some of the treatments which include having to wear a diaper pad.
Doe, currently sixty years of age, underwent rectal surgery for excision of a large fecalith in 1987. Her sphincter tone never returned after the surgery resulting in permanent bowel incontinence. The required treatment for Doe includes the daily use of "adult diapers" for the remainder of her life.
Both plaintiffs requested Medical Assistance coverage for adult incontinence pads from the DHS and submitted evidence from their respective treating physicians documenting their underlying conditions and their subsequent medical need for the supplies. Both plaintiffs were denied coverage, and each plaintiff thereafter filed a separate appeal with the agency. Separate hearings were held for each plaintiff resulting in similar decisions denying Medical Assistance coverage. The DHS's denials concluded that "incontinence supplies [adult diapers] are not covered under the scope of services" under Rhode Island's Medical Assistance Plan. Decision of Hearing Officer, Docket No. 95-844, dated November 16, 1995. The DHS's policy manual cites examples of various items for which there is no provision for payment "since they do not meet the definition of Durable Medical Equipment, Surgical Appliances or Prosthetic Devices . . ." DHS Agency Policy Manual, Section 0300; Medical Assistance Program — Scope of Services. An example provided for which there is no provision for payment is "disposal diapers."
The plaintiffs each filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court. The two cases were consolidated and are now before this Court. The sole issue presented is whether DHS's undisputed policy to exclude incontinence supplies from its discretionary scope of services, regardless of the medical necessity of those supplies, is arbitrary or capricious. For the following reasons, the agency decisions are reversed.
§
42-35-15 . Judicial review of contested cases."(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon lawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles,
The state of Rhode Island is a willing participant in the MA program which was established to ensure that eligible persons "receive adequate medical care and treatment in time of need." G.L. 1956 §
The second optional category is defined in
". . . other . . . preventive and rehabilitative services, including any medical or remedial services (provided in a facility, a home, or other setting) recommended by a physician . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional level."
The state of Rhode Island offers both of these options. See DHS "Medical Assistance Manual," § 330.20.05; Rhode Island Medical Assistance State Plan.
"[t]he committee's bill provides that the physician is to be the key figure in determining utilization of health services — and provides that it is a physician who is to . . . order tests, drugs, and treatments." (Citing) Senate Report No. 404, 89th Congress, 1st session, U.S. Code Admin. News 1965, p. 1986.
The Court further stated that:
[t]he decision of whether or not certain treatment . . . is `medically necessary' rests with the individual recipient's physician and not with clerical personnel or government officials." Pinneke at 550.
Clearly, the Act creates a presumption in favor of the medical judgment of the attending or treating physician. Pinneke at 549.
When a participating state's limits have the dire effect of denying medically necessary treatment or supplies, courts often find them to have run afoul of the Act, frequently citing Beal v.Doe,
The record reveals that the incontinence supplies requested in the case at bar are the only available treatment for the plaintiffs' conditions. Their physicians have thoroughly documented medical necessity of the incontinence supplies as the only available treatment. Neither party disputes the fact that each plaintiff suffers a physiological condition which causes medically-determinable incontinence. Plaintiff Bristol may eventually require an artificial sphincter, and plaintiff Doe has a permanent loss of sphincter tone as a result of an operation. Again, the incontinence supplies are necessary due to a medical condition, and both plaintiffs' physicians have prescribed these supplies and have documented their medical necessity. A review of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record shows nothing to the contrary. The defendant agency has not overcome the presumption in favor of the physicians' medical judgment.
These incontinence supplies fall well within the federal definition of "optional categories of service." under 42 U.S.C. § 1369d(a)(13). As previously stated, this optional category of services, which Rhode Island participates in, includes "preventive and rehabilitative services . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional level."
The Department of Human Services' blanket exclusion of coverage of incontinence supplies is an unreasonable standard inconsistent with the purposes of the Medical Assistance program, and, therefore, contrary to
The agency decisions in these two consolidated cases are wholly inconsistent with the purposes of the Rhode Island Medical Assistance statute: to ensure that eligible persons will receive adequate medical care and treatment in time of need. R.I.G.L. §
An agency policy which does not and cannot respond to medical need is arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record is that these incontinence supplies required by these two plaintiffs are a reasonable and viable treatment alternative and are medically necessary. The agency decision is clearly erroneous in light of the competent evidence in the whole record.
Additionally, the plaintiffs have asked for an award of attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. G.L. 1956 §
Counsel shall submit the appropriate judgment for entry.
verna-pinneke-v-victor-preisser-commissioner-of-iowa-department-of-social , 623 F.2d 546 ( 1980 )
Allen v. Mansour , 681 F. Supp. 1232 ( 1986 )
Taft v. Pare , 536 A.2d 888 ( 1988 )
Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission , 509 A.2d 453 ( 1986 )
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human ... , 484 A.2d 893 ( 1984 )
Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of ... , 414 A.2d 480 ( 1980 )
Beal v. Doe , 97 S. Ct. 2366 ( 1977 )
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co. , 424 A.2d 646 ( 1981 )
Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 543 A.2d 1307 ( 1988 )
Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council , 434 A.2d 266 ( 1981 )