DocketNumber: No. 01-4749
Judges: DIMITRI, J.
Filed Date: 10/7/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On Tuesday, May 8, 2001, a public hearing was held on Tin Fort's application. Mr. Robert Berkelhammer, attorney for Tin Fort (Att'y Berkelhammer), first explained to the Board that Applicants were requesting special use permits and a dimensional use variance for relief from parking. Att'y Berkelhammer further explained that there were 29 parking spaces, but the owner of the building, Ms. Forte, had granted to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) by deed 15 of the 29 spaces. Att'y Berkelhammer continued to explain that the 15 parking spaces were deeded to VFW in perpetuity. Additionally, Tin Fort has joint use of those 15 parking spaces. For the purposes of this application, Att'y Berkelhammer stated that because Tin Fort will not have exclusive use of those 15 spots, they could not include these parking spaces in their application to the Board. Atty'y Berkelhammer explained that pursuant to the ordinance requirements, Tin Fort would need 19 spots and currently they have 14 exclusive parking spaces. Att'y Berkelhammer also informed the Board that even though the VFW does not use its parking spots, the possibility exists that if that property were sold to someone else, that person may very well use the parking spots deeded to him or her. (Tr. at 2.) However, Att'y Berkelhammer testified that theatre performances would be held three nights a week, and would be held during evening hours when there is no other use of the building. Thus, it was Att'y Berkelhammer's position that even though Applicants require relief, there is no real parking issue. (Tr. at 3.)
Tin Fort presented an expert witness, Mr. William Denise, a member of the Tin Fort group. Mr. Denise testified that he had a background in architecture and explained the coming together of several displaced artists to create artists lofts, a performance theatre and a café. Mr. Denise further testified that the multi-use building will be successful and that the uses are complementary to the area. (Tr. at 5.) Mr. Denise indicated that there was an issue as to the parking situation in that district. Id. He explained that the West Side Overlay District (WSOD) guidelines permitted a reduction of parking from what is required by the Zoning Ordinance. Id. Mr. Denise continued to explain, that at this point in the application, he or his group was not in a position to start negotiations with neighboring properties to enter in rental agreements for parking spaces. Id. Mr. Denise did note, however, that many of the lots neighboring the property are vacant lots and are not being used in the evening hours. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Denise stated that it is the group's intention to enter into negotiations for parking spaces with the School Department as to have additional parking for the performance theatre. (Tr. at 5-6.) Mr. Denise described the different uses of the building as "off schedule uses" primarily because the uses were primarily for art purposes. (Tr. at 6.) Mr. Denise explained that the theatre would be used during the evening hours, the café would be utilized during the day, and the professional offices would be scheduled for lunch. Id.
Subsequently, the Board opened the floor to people who wished to speak in favor of the Tin Fort's application. Ms. Kari Lang, the Executive Director of the West Broadway Neighborhood Association (WBNA), testified that she was in favor of this application. (Tr. at 10-11.) Specifically, Ms. Lang testified that this application complements the WBNA's vision for the Westminster Street Overlay District. Id.
The Board also heard from two objectors of the aforementioned application. First, Appellant, Mr. Dulgarian, who is the abutting neighbor of the Tin Fort, testified that parking was the primary issue, not the proposed uses. (Tr. at 11.) Mr. Dulgarian noted that as it now exists, without Tin Fort's uses in the building, parking is an issue. Id. Mr. Dulgarian explained to the Board that during the day there is "virtually no place to park." Id. Mr. Dulgarian further explained that his objection was based on his belief that the parking requirements were lower than what was required by the Zoning Ordinance and the Overlay Zone. (Tr. at 13.) Secondly, Mr. Dulgarian stated that the Overlay Zoning requirement that suggests less parking required than what the commercial zone actually requires is, in fact, inaccurate. Id. In Mr. Dulgarian's opinion, there is insufficient parking in the area; thus, Mr. Dulgarian testified, granting a dimensional variance would further reduce the number of spots available to already existing businesses in that area.Id.
Ronald J. Gizzarelli also objected to the application submitted by Tin Fort. (Tr. at 15.) Mr. Gizzarelli testified that he too was concerned about the parking issue. Id. Mr. Gizzarelli stated that his concern was the size of the activity. Id. In particular, he questioned how many people that activity would draw during the hours before 7 p.m. Id. The hours that were of main concern to Mr. Gizzarelli would be between 10 a.m. and 7 p.m. Id. However, Mr. Gizzarelli stated that any activity that would occur after 7 p.m. would be welcomed. Id.
On August 21, 2001, the Board rendered a decision, Resolution No. 8535 (Decision), granting both the special use permit and a dimensional variance requested in the application. The Board's Decision set forth five findings of fact and law, which included the determination that the proposed multi-use building and parking would not be detrimental or injurious to the general health or welfare of the community. Thereafter, Mr. Dulgarian, timely filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking review of the Board's decision.
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning board of review as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the zoning board of review or remand the case for further proceedings, or may reverse of modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because of findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are:
(1) In violation of constitutional, statutory, or ordinance provisions;
(2) In excess of the authority granted to the zoning board of review by statute or ordinance;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
The Superior Court reviews a decision of the zoning board pursuant to §
This Court may, however, reverse the decision of the zoning board if it is in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, was made in excess of statutory authority, made upon unlawful procedure or error of law, was clearly erroneous in view of the evidence, or was arbitrary or capricious. Kaveny,
Mr. Dulgarian challenges the admissibility of a certain offer to compromise and settle the issues between Dulgarian and Tin Fort as to the appeal of the Zoning Board's decision, as well as those portions of Tin Fort's memorandum discussing it. Mr. Dulgarian claims the additional evidence is outside the record and thus should not be considered by the Superior Court on review. Mr. Dulgarian also contends that Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 408 prevents Tin Fort from admitting this evidence.
Tin Fort contends that the evidence is material to Dulgarian's credibility on factual assertions offered at the hearing. Dulgarian argued before the Zoning Board that there would not be sufficient parking, (Tr. at 11-13), but the Zoning Board believed three extra parking spaces would not be a problem. (Tr. at 20-21.) Therefore, if the Zoning Board did not give great weight to Dulgarian's objections in its decision, Tin Fort maintains, presenting additional evidence further questioning Dulgarian's credibility is immaterial.
Second, if the Court believes, during its consideration of the record, that "additional evidence is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter," the Court may take the necessary evidence in open court. Section
This Court has reviewed the contents of the file record: the transcript, evidence, and Decision on the record. Finding the same sufficiently clear to permit a proper review of the Board's Decision, this Court need not receive additional evidence in open court.
"Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution."
This rule applies to cases involving liability for a claim where admissions in settlement negotiations may jeopardize a party's rights. See, e.g., Salter v. R.I.Co.,
For the above reasons, Plaintiff's motion to strike is granted. The material in Tin Fort's memorandum from the last line of page 5 through line 19 of page 6, the material from line 21 of page 17 through line 10 of page 19, and the "Agreement" attached as Exhibit 5 to Tin Fort's memorandum are hereby struck from the record.
Alternatively, Tin Fort argues that the number of required spaces in the underlying commercial (C-2) zone was calculated by the Department of Inspections and Standards. According to this agency, Tin Fort was required to have 36 parking spaces. Tin Fort argues that pursuant to the Section 506.6 (B) of the zoning ordinance, with regards to the WSOD, the number of parking spaces may be reduced by 50%. As such, Tin Fort avers that they were required to have 18 parking spaces. Tin Fort argues that Duglarian's reading of the definition of an overlay district is too restrictive. Tin Fort states that Mr. Dulgarian assumes that the requirements of an overlay district is violated by taking a mathematical view of the issues, in that 18 parking spaces are fewer than 36 parking spaces; therefore, the statute is violated.
The Zoning Ordinance clearly lists the requisite minimum parking spaces for each specified use with a zone. Section 703.2 outlines the number of spaces designated for residential, cultural, entertainment, and other general services. It is undisputed that Tin Fort's lots are located in the West Side Overlay District. Section 506.6 of the ordinance delineates that parking space requirement. It reads in pertinent part:
"Parking and loading requirements of Article VII shall be required, except as provided below:
(B) Space requirements. Parking space requirements may be reduced by a minimum of fifty (50) percent but cannot exceed a maximum of eighty (80) percent of the spaces required by section 703.2. The paved area of a lot shall not exceed the maximum parking required herein."
The Board found that Tin Fort was required to have 18 parking spaces within its zoning district. The Board also found that Tin Fort actually provided 15 parking spaces, relying on the report from the Department of Planning and Development, which stated that 18 parking spaces were required, and that 15 spaces would actually be provided. The Board held that the dimensional variance complied with the conditions set forth in the Zoning Ordinance. The Board further held that that through the testimony provided by Tin Fort, the dimensional variance would "not substantially injure the use and enjoyment of the neighboring properties and would not significantly devalue the neighboring property values," and that "the dimensional variance would not be detrimental of injurious to the general health or welfare of the community." (Board Decision at 2.) Although Tin Fort stated on its application and at the hearing that it could provide 14 of a total of 29 spots, Tin Fort in its memorandum of law stated that it actually possessed 30 spots. The evidence of record indicates that the Department of Inspection and Standards and the Department of Planning and Development found that Tin Fort would provide 15 of 30 spots. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Board's Decision regarding the number of parking spaces required by Tin Fort was not clearly erroneous in light of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record.
In response, Tin Fort argues that the record clearly indicates that it did meet the requirements of proving the need for a dimensional variance. Tin Fort contends that a literal enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance, including the parking requirements of the WSOD, requires that Tin Fort provide 18 parking spaces. Tin Fort argues that given the layout of the parking lot, the rigid application of the WSOD parking requirements would severely hinder the proposed development of Tin Fort's project and "preclude the full enjoyment of the permitted use." Such a strict enforcement of the parking requirements would result in more than a mere inconvenience.
In granting a dimensional variance, the Rhode Island General Laws and the Providence Zoning Ordinance clearly outline the requirements that the applicant must prove. At the time of the application and the August 21, 2001 decision of the Board, Section
The statutory requirements for obtaining a zoning board of review variance are listed in §
"In granting a variance, the zoning board of review requires that evidence to the satisfaction of the following standards is entered into the record of the proceedings:
(1) That the hardship from which the applicant seeks relief is due to the unique characteristics of the subject land or structure and not to the general characteristics of the surrounding area; and is not due to a physical or economic disability of the applicant, excepting those physical disabilities addressed in §
45-24-30 (16);(2) That the hardship is not the result of any prior action of the applicant and does not result primarily from the desire of the applicant to realize greater financial gain;
(3) That the granting of the requested variance will not alter the general character of the surrounding area or impair the intent or purpose of the zoning ordinance or the comprehensive plan upon which the ordinance is based; and
(4) That the relief to be granted is the least relief necessary."
With respect to element 4 — "[t]hat the relief to be granted is the least relief necessary" — Mr. Dulgarian argues that the Board's Decision in granting the dimensional variances was not the "least relief necessary" as required by §
With respect to the parking, it is Tin Fort's contention that the Overlay District definition should be considered in the context of the Enabling Act of 1991, by looking at the purpose of the Enabling Act and coupling those purposes with the goals of the WSOD. Tin Fort contends that the purpose Section 506.6 (B), the parking space reduction, is not for the direct benefit of any particular parcel, bur rather the reduction is for the enhancement of the designated properties within the WSOD and for the promotion of the policies and goals established by the Providence City Council. In Tin Fort's view, the WSOD fully complies with the authority and objectives contained in the Enabling Act.
The record evidences no discussion during the hearing or amongst the Board members to indicate whether reasonable alternatives were even considered in order to meet the parking requirements. The Board members did not discuss reducing the number of uses in the adjacent building. Rather, the discussion between the Board members concluded that Tin Fort should be given an opportunity to obtain further parking from other businesses in the area. It is well settled that the burden is on the applicant to show that the relief to be granted is the least relief necessary. See §
However, there was virtually no discussion as to whether this was the least relief necessary in order to accommodate the uses in the contiguous lot. As Mr. Dulgarian argues, there was no discussion as to whether some of the uses in that building could be altered or diminished so that Tin Fort could meet the requisite number of parking spaces. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court finds that the Board's finding that Tin Fort's request for a dimensional variance is the least relief necessary, is not supported by the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the record.
Mr. Dulgarian further contends that the Board failed to consider §
Alternatively, the Applicants argue that Mr. Dulgarian's assertion that Mr. Denise, the applicant, is attempting to hide behind Ms. Forte, the owner, is erroneous. Tin Fort argues that it was not Ms. Forte, or the Winter Street Trust, that deeded the 15 parking spaces to the VFW, but rather the predecessor owner, Redwood Investments, Inc. Applicants further explain that Winter Street Trust acquired title to the property in issue subject to the pre-existing rights of the VFW. Thus, it is Tin Fort's contention that it was not Ms. Forte, or the Winter Street Trust, or Mr. Denise, who created the hardship because it already existed upon the acquisition of the lots.
To satisfy §
Tin Fort additionally argues that the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling in Newton v. Zoning Board,
Section 204.2 of the Zoning Ordinance permits merger of substandard lots "if two (2) or more contiguous lawfully established lots of record, where one (1) or more of the lots is less than four thousand (4,000) square feet . . . such lots shall be considered to be one lot and undivided for the purpose of this ordinance. . . ." In the instant matter, Tin Fort has two contiguous lots, Lot 129 is 9675 square feet, and Lot 131 is 11,608 square feet. Pursuant to the aforementioned section, these lots under the Zoning Ordinance are not merged. In addition, it is important to note that although a parking lot is a permitted use in the C-2 zoning area, Tin Fort has not attempted to designate this lot as principal use in accordance with Section 702 of the ordinance, and as defined by the ordinance, Section 1000.110,
"[o]ff-street parking of automobiles on one (1) or more lots where parking spaces for more than four (4) automobiles are available for public use whether free, for compensation or to satisfy parking requires of a principal use on separate and noncontiguous lots."
Furthermore, under the WSOD a principal use parking lot is not a permitted use pursuant to Section 506.6 of the Zoning Ordinance. Therefore, Tin Fort is not permitted to use this lot as principal parking under the WSOD.
Section 701 of the Zoning Ordinance provides that accessory parking "shall be located on the same or contiguous lot as the principal structure or use the parking is intended to serve." It is clear from the record that Tin Fort intended Lot 131 as an off-street parking lot that is accessory to Lot 129, the principal building with mixed uses. The Zoning Ordinance, Section 1000.6, defines accessory use as "[a] use of land or a building, or portion thereof, customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the land or building. An accessory use shall not be permitted without the principal use to which it is related." The Zoning Ordinance also defines accessory use parking. Section 1000.109 states that "[o]ff-street parking of automobiles on the same or contiguous lot as a principal use where said parking is established or required in conjunction with the principal use."
With regards to special use permits, Section 902.4 of the Zoning Ordinance authorizes the Board to approve these permits where they are permitted by the use regulations chart pursuant to Section 303. SeeNortheastern Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of New Shoreham,
"A zoning ordinance shall provide for the issuance of special-use permits approved by the zoning board of review. The ordinance shall:
(1) Specify the uses requiring special-use permits in each district;
(2) Describe the conditions and procedures under which special-use permits, of each or the various categories of special-use permits established in the zoning ordinance, may be issued;
(3) Establish criteria for the issuance of each category of special-use permit, that shall be in conformance with the purposes and intent of the comprehensive plan and the zoning ordinance of the city or town;
(4) Provide for public hearing and notification of the date, time, place, and purpose of those hearing to interested parties. Public notice shall be given at least fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or town. Notice of hearing shall be sent by first class mail to the applicant, and to all those who would require notice under §
45-24-53 . The notice shall also include the street address of the subject property. A zoning ordinance may require that a supplemental notice, that an application for a special use permit is under consideration, be posted at the location in question. The posting is for information purposes only and does not constitute required notice of a public hearing. The cost of notification shall be borne by the applicant;(5) Provide for the recording of findings of fact and written decisions; and
(6) Provide that appeals may be taken pursuant to § 45-24-70."
However, with respect to the granting of a dimensional variance in conjunction with a special use permit, the version of §
Thus, at issue is whether a dimensional variance can be granted for an accessory use when for the principal use, there has been granted a special use permit. In Newton v. Zoning Board of Review of City ofWarwick,
After a review of the entire record, this Court finds that the Board's Decision to grant Tin Fort's special use permits and a dimensional variance was in violation of statutory and ordinance provisions, in excess of authority, affected by error of law, and erroneous in view of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record. Substantial rights of Mr. Dulgarian have been prejudiced. Accordingly, the Decision of the Board is reversed. This Court also grants Mr. Dulgarian's Motion to Strike.
Counsel shall submit the appropriate order for entry in accordance with this opinion.
"The ordinance additionally may provide that an applicant may apply for, and be issued, a dimensional variance in conjunction with a special use. If the special use could not exist without the dimensional variance, the zoning board of review shall consider the special use permit and the dimensional variance together to determine if granting the special use is appropriate based on both the special use criteria and the dimensional variance evidentiary standards."
Tarasovic v. Zoning Commission , 147 Conn. 65 ( 1959 )
Steinberg v. Obstetrics-Gynecological & Infertility Group, ... , 260 F. Supp. 2d 492 ( 2003 )
Mongony v. Bevilacqua , 432 A.2d 661 ( 1981 )
Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Board of Review , 875 A.2d 1 ( 2005 )
Northeastern Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham , 534 A.2d 603 ( 1987 )
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co. , 424 A.2d 646 ( 1981 )
Curran v. Church Community Housing Corp. , 672 A.2d 453 ( 1996 )
Newton v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Warwick , 713 A.2d 239 ( 1998 )
DeStefano v. ZONING BD. OF REVIEW, ETC. , 405 A.2d 1167 ( 1979 )
Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich , 733 A.2d 703 ( 1999 )
Madden v. ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW OF CITY OF WARWICK , 151 A.2d 681 ( 1959 )
Sciacca v. Caruso , 769 A.2d 578 ( 2001 )
Bernuth v. Zoning Board of Review , 770 A.2d 396 ( 2001 )
Salter v. Rhode Island Company , 27 R.I. 27 ( 1905 )
Lischio v. Zoning Board of Review of North Kingstown , 818 A.2d 685 ( 2003 )
Mill Realty Associates v. Crowe , 841 A.2d 668 ( 2004 )
Town of North Kingstown v. Albert , 767 A.2d 659 ( 2001 )
Guiberson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence , 112 R.I. 252 ( 1973 )