DocketNumber: C.A. Nos. PC99-5926, PC02-2594
Judges: <bold><underline>RAGOSTA, J.</underline></bold>
Filed Date: 10/2/2003
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
The two subject sections of the Mobile and Manufactured Homes Act provide in relevant part:
"All terms and conditions of occupancy must be fully disclosed by the mobile and manufactured home park owner to any prospective resident in a written lease and at a reasonable time prior to the rental or occupancy of a space or lot. The disclosures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
(1) The licensee shall agree at all times during the tenancy to:
(vii) Maintain all utilities provided to mobile and manufactured homes within the park up to and including the connection to the individual mobile/manufactured home, and all water and sewage lines and connections in good working order, and in the event of any emergency, make necessary arrangements possible for the provision of service on a temporary basis. There shall be no additional charge for the use of water because a resident has children;" R.I. Gen. Laws §
31-44-7 (1)(vii)."If the park owner or management implements a rule or regulation prohibiting pets, the new rule or regulation does not prevent residents from keeping the pets they had prior to the new rule or regulation, as long as those pets conform with previous park rules or regulations. If the pet dies, the resident has the right to replace it, notwithstanding the new rule or regulation." R.I. Gen. Laws §
31-44-3 (11) (2000 reenactment).1
Appellant's Park regulations at issue state:
"SEWAGE AND PLUMBING
1. . . .
2. The Lessee/resident shall be responsible for the cost of pumping or maintaining Lessee/resident's septic system if the Lessee/resident has a washing machine, dishwasher or garbage disposal unit in lessee's mobile home, pre-existing the date of these Rules and Regulations and lease. Lessor shall be responsible for the cost of routine pumping and acid treatment for the septic systems in this mobile home park on a routine treatment basis, except for those costs incurred by Lessee/residents having a pre-existing washing machine, dishwasher, or garbage disposal unit in Lessee's mobile home. Any septic system for a mobile home having a washing machine, dishwasher or garbage disposal unit which needs pumping shall be immediately pumped and acid treated within twenty-four (24) hours of notice that the same needs to be done. The cost of said pumping and acid treatment shall be at the sole cost and expense of the Lessee/resident. The septic system for any mobile home which is being sold or removed from the park shall be pumped and treated with acid within one (1) week of said sale or removal. The cost of said pumping and acid treatment shall be at the sole cost and expense of the Lessee/resident. The septic system for the premises are not approved for the use of washing machines, dishwasher or garbage disposal units. No Lessee/resident shall install any new washing machine, dishwasher, or garbage disposal unit in Lessee's mobile home or on Lessee's premises.
3. In no case shall any sinks, tubs, or other plumbing equipment drain directly onto the ground. All plumbing discharges shall go into the septic system only. Sewer and water pipes located above the ground are the personal property of the Lessee/resident and are the Lessee/resident's responsibility."
"ANIMALS: One neutered, I.D. tagged, collared cat, and also one parakeet or parrot, is allowed per family. No dogs are allowed after December 1989. Anyone keeping a dog in the park, whether they own the dog or not, will be evicted. Anyone owning a dog previous to December 1989, shall be allowed to keep the dog as allowed by law, provided it does not disturb the neighbors and is kept on a leash when in the park. All pets must be registered with the manager. Please take your cats when you move out. Cats starve when abandoned."
With respect to said notices of denial of license renewal, Appellant sought an administrative hearing. Additionally, on November 18, 1999, Appellant filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief with this Court, challenging the Provisions' constitutionality.
A Department of Business Regulation hearing officer heard Appellant's cases on February 15, 2000 and May 1, 2001. Appellant argued that tenants with washing machines, dishwasher, or garbage disposal units overuse the septic system and must therefore pay for the additional septic pumping. Appellant reasoned that such payment is fair, and tenants appear satisfied with these requirements. Appellant also argued that charging costs related to pumping the system are not akin to requiring tenants to "maintain" the system as the law provides. Regarding the sewer and water pipes, Appellant argued that aboveground pipes are often under the mobile home and difficult to access due to skirting and cinderblocks. Therefore, Appellant reasoned that the Agency's requiring it to maintain such pipes — or an interpretation of the statute to require such — is unreasonable, arbitrary, and exceeds the state's police power.
With regard to pets, Appellant argued that dogs are a nuisance in a mobile home park and that allowing previous dog owners to replace their deceased dog is unfair because new tenants and those who did not previously own a dog are not allowed to own dogs. Appellant finally submitted constitutional arguments, contending that the statutory provisions exceed state authority, deny equal protection and due process, and are arbitrary, absurd, and vague.
The Department's position was that Appellant's regulations violate R.I. Gen. Laws §
The hearing officer issued a Decision in favor of the Department on April 24, 2002. The Decision ordered Appellant to cease violating the statutes, amend its regulations to conform to the Provisions, inform tenants of the change in regulations, submit its amended regulations to the Department for approval, and pay a $2000 administrative penalty. The instant appeal of that decision is now before this Court, along with Appellant's November 18, 1999 petition for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Department submits a memorandum of law in support of the agency's Decision, while the Attorney General's office of Rhode Island submits a brief in support of the constitutionality of R.I. Gen. Laws §§
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by other error or law; (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
When reviewing determinations of an administrative agency, this Court sits as an appellate court with a limited scope of review. Therefore, the Superior Court justice does not weigh evidence and the credibility of witnesses as to questions of fact. Center for Behavioral Health v.Barros,
When the decision of an agency is based upon a question of law, however, the Court reviews those findings de novo. Johnston AmbulatorySurgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan,
In reviewing the Department's Decision, this Court considers a number of legislative interpretation principles. For example, the Court must effectuate the Legislature's intent by examining the Provisions in their entirety and give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Town ofEast Greenwich v. O'Neil,
With respect to legislative intent, the Department found that:
"[I]t is clear that the legislature intended to afford mobile home owners significant statutory protection with respect to their relationship with mobile home park owners. . . . Among the statutory protections in the Act are: (i) specific requirements for Rules and Regulations; (ii) specific conditions on the sale of mobile and manufactured homes; (iii) protection to mobile home residents from reprisals from park owners; (iv) detailed and specific terms required in leases; and (v) the right of mobile home owners to peaceably assemble — right to communicate. These very specific statutory protections were apparently deemed necessary by the legislature because of the inherent unequal relationship which exists between the mobile home park owner and the mobile home owner. That is, the mobile home tenant (often an individual with low to moderate income or on a fixed income) . . . would be at the mercy of the mobile home park owner. . . . Thus it is clear from the statutory scheme in the Act that the legislature has determined that the mobile and manufactured housing residents should be afforded certain legal rights and protections." Department Decision at 8-9.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has noted that with mobile home parks, "special circumstances" exist and unequal bargaining power may lead to abuses by the park owner. Kingston Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick,
With respect to pipes underneath mobile homes enclosed by skirting and cinderblocks, it is within the Department's discretion to determine whether such pipes are "indoors" and therefore not to be maintained by the park owner under §
Therefore, per the statute and the Department Decision, Appellant must maintain all pipes and connections unless they are considered "indoors" by the Department, despite being aboveground or underneath a mobile home. The Department's interpretation of §
In the instant case, Appellant contends that the Rhode Island General Assembly lacks the authority to require mobile home park owners to (1) maintain all sewage utilities despite some tenants' alleged additional use, (2) maintain all sewer and water pipes not within the mobile home, and (3) provide residents with grandfathered pets the right to replace those with similar pets when they die. Appellant lists an assortment of reasons why the Provisions are "unconstitutional"; however, Appellant is in fact arguing why the Provisions are harsh, burdensome, or unwise from its perspective. See Morrison 65 A.2d at 222 (no legislative act may be set aside on grounds that its policy may be harsh or unwise). For example, Appellant argues that dogs are a nuisance in a mobile home park; tenants with certain appliances overuse the septic system and should be required to pay for its maintenance; and it is more appropriate to make tenants responsible for aboveground, outdoor pipes and connections that are underneath the mobile home. However, if the legislature has the power to enact legislation, "the wisdom or prudence of it is beyond our province. If it is not wise or prudent, then the people and not this court, have the power to apply the necessary corrective." Morrison, 65 A.2d at 223 (quoting Floyd v. Quinn,
The Appellant claims that the Provisions are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable; bear no reasonable or substantial relation to any legitimate governmental interest; exceed the state's lawful authority; bear no rational relationship to public health, safety, or welfare; and infringe on the freedom to contract and pursue a lawful business objective. The Appellant, however, neglects to explain how the Provisions violate these principles. Other than citing cases for general constitutional principles, Appellant does not cite any authority in support of its position. Therefore, Appellant's argument fails. See RhodeIsland Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Brown,
Regarding Appellant's substantive due process rights, the United States Supreme Court has not invalidated socioeconomic regulations of the type Appellant challenges since the 1937 judicial crisis. In re AdvisoryOpinion to the House of Representatives
Here, the General Assembly sought to afford mobile park residents with certain legal protections due to unequal bargaining power and past abuses. See supra. Appellant has not shown the absence of a rational connection between these Provisions, requiring park owners to maintain sewage utilities and permit residents with grandfathered pets to replace those pets, and the Legislature's aim to protect the welfare of park residents. Conversely, a rational relationship especially exists in this case because the General Assembly considers mobile homes a vital source of affordable housing in need of special protection. See Kingston MobileHome Park, 774 A.2d at 853, 855-56 (finding that with mobile home parks, "special circumstances" exist and unequal bargaining power may lead to abuses by the park owners). Requiring park owners to maintain sewage utilities and permit residents with grandfathered pets to replace those pets is therefore rationally connected to the state's aim of protecting mobile home residents. Appellant's substantive due process rights are not violated simply because the Provisions burden the Appellant. See PFZProperties, Inc. v. Rodriguez,
Counsel shall submit the appropriate judgment for entry.
"[i]f the park owner or management of a mobile and manufactured home park implements a rule or regulation prohibiting residents from keeping pets in the park, the new rule or regulation shall not apply to prohibit the residents from continuing to keep the pets currently in the park if the pet otherwise conforms with the previous park rules or regulations relating to pets. However, if the pet dies, the resident shall have the right to replace the pet."
"`1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.'" In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives,
519 A.2d 578 , 583 (1987) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,220 U.S. 61 , 78-79 (1911)).
Pfz Properties, Inc. v. Rene Alberto Rodriguez, Etc. , 928 F.2d 28 ( 1991 )
Brennan v. Kirby , 529 A.2d 633 ( 1987 )
Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v. Brown , 659 A.2d 95 ( 1995 )
Center for Behavioral Health, Rhode Island, Inc. v. Barros , 710 A.2d 680 ( 1998 )
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun , 662 A.2d 40 ( 1995 )
Kingstown Mobile Home Park v. Strashnick , 774 A.2d 847 ( 2001 )
In Re Advisory Opinion to House of Representatives Bill 85-... , 519 A.2d 578 ( 1987 )
Bunch v. Board of Review, Rhode Island Department of ... , 690 A.2d 335 ( 1997 )
Pawtucket Power Associates Ltd. v. City of Pawtucket , 622 A.2d 452 ( 1993 )
Simeone v. Charron , 762 A.2d 442 ( 2000 )
City of Warwick v. Aptt , 497 A.2d 721 ( 1985 )
Town of East Greenwich v. O'NEIL , 617 A.2d 104 ( 1992 )
Turner v. Department of Employment Security, Board of Review , 479 A.2d 740 ( 1984 )
Floyd v. Quinn , 24 R.I. 147 ( 1902 )
Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan , 755 A.2d 799 ( 2000 )
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co. , 424 A.2d 646 ( 1981 )
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Berry , 620 A.2d 1255 ( 1993 )
Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg , 118 R.I. 596 ( 1977 )
RI Pub. Tel. Auth. v. RI Labor Rel. Bd. , 650 A.2d 479 ( 1994 )
Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor , 822 A.2d 164 ( 2003 )