DocketNumber: PM 2007-4308
Judges: MCGUIRL, J.
Filed Date: 5/2/2008
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
At some later date the federal government instituted removal proceedings against Jorge based on his 1986 nolo contendere plea.3 On August 21, 2007, the petitioner submitted the application for post-conviction relief presently before this Court. Pursuant to that application, the petitioner moves the Court to vacate his 1986 plea on the grounds that it was entered in violation of Rule 11. (Petitioner's Mem. of Law 2.) Specifically, the petitioner claims that the plea colloquy between the trial justice, petitioner, and petitioner's trial counsel does not evidence that the petitioner entered his plea "informed of the crime's elements." Id. 4.
In support of his motion the petitioner submitted an affidavit from his daughter, Sandra I. Jorge ("Ms. Jorge"), the victim of his sexual assault charge. In that affidavit Ms. Jorge states that the petitioner returned to live with his family, including Ms. Jorge, after completing his sentence. (Aff.) She states that "[t]here have been no other incidents of misconduct" since her father's return to the family home.Id. She adds,
*Page 3"My father is a good person who made a terrible decision as a result of his alcoholism. I have long since forgiven him. He stopped drinking many years ago and is a good husband to my mother and a good grandfather to my five children. . . . If he is deported to Portugal, my mother will lose a husband, I will lose my father and my children will lose their grandfather." Id.
The State moves to dismiss petitioner's application for post-conviction relief for three reasons: first, that the petitioner failed to satisfy the procedural requirements imposed by §
The Court is mindful that there is a well-defined standard through which it must examine the State's contention. "The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when . . . there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Section
"The standards for granting a §
10-9.1-6 (c) motion are identical to those utilized in passing on a summary judgment motion. As [s]he does in considering motions for summary judgment, the trial justice must consider the affidavits and pleadings on a motion for summary disposition in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Based upon the affidavits and pleadings, the trial justice must decide whether or not a genuine issue of material fact exists. If not, the moving party is entitled to summary disposition if otherwise entitled as a matter of law."120 R.I. 402 ,387 A.2d 1382 ,1385 (1978).
Two years later our Supreme Court again addressed the proper standard to be used by a trial justice presented with a §
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has characterized summary judgment as an "extreme remedy" that should be "applied cautiously." Golderese v.Suburban Land Co.,
As in any summary judgment context, this Court, in considering the State's §
Summary judgment under Rule 56 and dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief deviate procedurally in one major facet. Unlike the Rule 56(c) summary judgment context which entitles a non-moving party to a hearing and an opportunity to respond to the moving party's claims, Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c), a trial justice considering a §
In the matter presently before the Court, the State contends that the petitioner's initial and amended application for post-conviction relief "fails to state any specific grounds for relief and should be dismissed." (State's Supplemental Mem. 1.) Turning to "the affidavits and pleadings . *Page 7
. . in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made," Palmigiano,
The petitioner clearly pointed to the May 1, 1986 plea colloquy involving the petitioner, his trial counsel, and the trial justice as the basis of his application for post-conviction relief. (Pet'r Mot. to Amend Application for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws, §
The stark contrast between the arguments put forth by the petitioner and the State indicates that there is a factual dispute concerning the plea colloquy. Whether the discussion that occurred on May 1, 1986 satisfied the Rule 11 requirements undoubtedly constitutes "a contested fact [that] has the potential to alter the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant." Smith,
The Supreme Court has identified a two-pronged standard that must be met for the State's successful use of the laches defense. "[T]he State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and that the state is prejudiced by the delay." Id. at 395. "Whether or not there has been unreasonable delay and whether prejudice to the adverse party has been established are both questions of fact, and a determination must be made in light of the circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 396.
To support the first prong of the two-part test the State argues that the petitioner's application, filed twenty-two years after entering his plea, "is just an attempt to avoid deportation. Clearly this would meet the first element of the two-pronged test. . . ." (State's *Page 9 Supplemental Mem. 4.) The State provides no additional explanation to support its contention that the petitioner's delay was unreasonable.
Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the Court determined that the petitioner's delay was unreasonable, the State is still required to show that it is prejudiced by the delay. Raso,
The State's argument that it is prejudiced because the victim has forgiven the petitioner is distinct from situations in which other courts considering the defense of laches in the context of post-conviction relief have found prejudice. In a case cited by our Supreme Court in Raso, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the State was prejudiced because "the only witness who could respond to [the petitioner's] claim is now deceased." Robbins v. People,
As was suggested by the courts which persuaded our Supreme Court inRaso, prejudice is more than mere difficulty in prosecuting a criminal matter. The State's contention that it would be impossible to prosecute the petitioner because the victim appears to have forgiven Jorge is unavailing. Consequently, the defense of laches does not bar the petitioner's application for post-conviction relief. The Court, therefore, proceeds to consider the merits of the petitioner's application.
"[W]hen a defendant enters a plea of nolo contendere, the defendant `waives several federal constitutional rights and consents to judgment of the court.'" State v. Moniz,
To satisfy the constitutional imperatives a trial justice presented with a plea of nolo contendere "must determine that the defendant has entered the plea both voluntarily and intelligently." Moniz,
Accordingly, the Superior Court codified in Rule 11 the procedure for ensuring that the constitutional requirements that a nolo contendere plea be voluntary and intelligent. Rule 11 provides in relevant part that the justice receiving a plea
"shall not accept . . . a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. . . . The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of . . . nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." Super. R. Crim. P. 11.
Echoing the plain text of the rule, the Williams Court explained that Rule 11 "requires only that at the conclusion of the plea hearing, the trial justice should be able to say with assurance that the accused is fully aware of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Williams,
To determine whether the process mandated by the federal constitution and Rule 11 has been satisfied, at the conclusion of the plea hearing the trial justice "should advise and admonish the defendant about the nature of the charges . . . [and] ascertain whether [the] criminal defendant was made aware of the consequences of the plea and the rights that the defendant was giving up." Thomas,
Upon an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim that Rule 11 was not satisfied, a petitioner "bear[s] the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] did not intelligently and understandingly waive [his] rights." State v. Figueroa,
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed applications for post-conviction relief based on claims that the petitioner's plea of guilty or nolo contendere was entered in violation of Rule 11. In a foundational case exploring the requirements imposed by Rule 11, theWilliams Court considered whether the petitioner's guilty plea was entered erroneously.
Rather, the Court took into account four additional factors. First, personal assurances made by the petitioner's trial counsel to the trial justice that the petitioner "read the affidavit carefully with me, very carefully, and very closely, and we have rehashed this and rehashed it again, and rehashed it back and forth, and she has finally agreed, voluntarily, that this is what she wants to do. . . ." Second, the trial justice's own inquiry of the petitioner whether "she had gone over the affidavit with her attorney `word-for-word'" and the petitioner's sworn response
"that she was able to understand everything that she read, that she was satisfied that she had been properly represented by her attorney and that she had had a satisfactory and adequate opportunity to discuss all of the facts of the case with him and had made a complete disclosure to him of all the facts so that he could properly advise her."
Third, the Supreme Court took into account the prosecutor's recitation of the facts that the State was prepared to prove if the case went to trial. Lastly, the Court took notice of the trial justice's personal inquiry of the petitioner to determine whether she understood what the prosecutor had said. Id. Viewing the record as a whole and the circumstances of these six factors in their totality, the Court found that the record evidenced that the petitioner "understood the nature of the offenses charged and their essential elements;" therefore, the petitioner's plea was properly entered. Id.
One year after Williams, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed a petitioner's claim, upon an application for post-conviction relief, that his plea of nolo contendere was entered in violation of Rule 11.Feng,
Repeating its characterization in Williams, the Supreme Court stated that the affidavit used in that case and in Feng has "potential character as a `kind of boilerplate litany' not tolerated byHenderson v. Morgan." Id. at 1268. Consequently, the Court searched the record for more evidence that the plea colloquy satisfied Rule 11.Id. The Court found that
"the questions posed by the [trial] court in this case explored only whether Feng had read the affidavit. The court did not inquire of Feng or his attorney if the attorney had, as stated in the affidavit, explained fully the nature of the charges and the consequences of a nolo plea to Feng. In light of the distinctions between this record and that in Williams, we must examine the record for additional circumstances indicating that an out-of-court explanation of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea did in fact occur." Id.
As a result, the Court took notice of the petitioner's educational accomplishments. According to the Court, "education is an important factor in our assessment of the validity of [petitioner's] nolo pleas."Id. The Court stated that the "ability to read and understand the English language does not invariably indicate" that an individual "will understand without further explanation the legal rights enumerated in the affidavit." Id. However, "a literate defendant with a college education" — as was the petitioner in Feng — "who is willing to swear to such a statement [that his attorney has explained to him the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea] provides the trial court with a reliable indication that the out-of-court explanation, attested to in the affidavit, has actually occurred." Id. at 1268-69. Lastly, the trial justice specifically asked the *Page 16 petitioner if he fully understood the rights identified in the affidavit and appreciated the consequences of pleading nolo contendere.Id. at 1269. The petitioner responded affirmatively. Id. From these facts the Court found that the petitioner understood the nature of the charges and the consequences of his nolo contendere plea when he entered it. Id.
More recently the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered an application for post-conviction relief in a factually similar situation as the matter presently before this Court. In State v. Frazar, the Supreme Court considered the petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was entered in violation of Rule 11.
As the trial justices in Williams and Feng did, the trial justice who presided at Frazar's plea hearing personally questioned the petitioner.Id. at 933. The trial justice asked the petitioner various questions about the facts underlying the charges against him and instructed the petitioner that he was required to respond to the Court's inquiries.Id. For example, the trial justice asked Frazar whether he "possess[ed] a firearm-handgun" on the date alleged; whether he had "a license for possessing that handgun"; whether he "assaulted [the victim] with that handgun"; and whether he "point[ed] it at" the victim. Id. The trial justice then personally *Page 17 informed the petitioner of the rights he was required to waive — the right to trial, the presumption of innocence, the right not to testify or present evidence, the burden upon the State to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront witnesses, and to right to appeal a conviction — and asked whether the petitioner understood the Court's explanation. Id. The trial justice also asked whether the petitioner was "forced or coerced" to plead guilty, to which the petitioner responded "No." Id. at 934. After reviewing these and other factors, the Supreme Court "conclude[d] that the evidence, though sparse, was sufficient to establish that Frazar knowingly and voluntarily gave up his rights." Id. at 936. Therefore, his plea was entered in compliance with Rule 11. Id.
*Page 18"THE COURT: Mr. Cass, apparently the defendant wishes to withdraw a previously entered plea of not guilty to the charge and enter one of nolo contendere, is that correct?
MR. CASS: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Would you ask Mr. Jorge, please, if he signed the document I'm showing? The document contains —
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: The document contains all the rights he's giving up. They were explained to him by Mr. Cass personally and translated by you?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Knowing he's giving up those rights, did he sign the document voluntarily?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
. . .
THE COURT: He understands fully what we're doing here today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
. . .
MR. MCLOUGHLIN: If Your Honor please, if this matter were to go to trial, the state would present evidence to show that on days and dates between the 2nd day of May, 1984 and the 28th day of February, 1985, in Pawtucket, the defendant did engage in sexual contact with Sandra M. Jorge, a child under 13 years of age, in violation of
11-37-8.3 of the General Laws.THE COURT: By pleading nolo contendere to the charge as described to me by Mr. McLoughlin, he's pleading guilty, he's saying he did it; is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Also, you're giving up all the rights which are contained on this document which you explained. Does he have any questions at all about any of them?
THE DEFENDANT: I have none.
THE COURT: All right. They were all fully explained to him and he understands them?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
. . .
THE COURT: And he understands if I do what is suggested, he's giving up his right to a trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: The Court finds the defendant has the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his plea of nolo contendere . . . including but not limited to the waiver of his constitutional rights. . . . The Court therefore finds the plea is made voluntarily, intelligently and with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences."
(Tr. 1-3, 5.)
In sum, the transcript of the plea colloquy reveals that the trial justice engaged the petitioner in a discussion of the plea. The trial justice asked the petitioner whether his attorney explained to him the "all the rights he's giving up," whether "he sign[ed] the document voluntarily," and *Page 19 whether he understood "what we're doing here today." Id. 1, 2. Jorge answered affirmatively to
each inquiry. Id. Presumably the document referenced by the trial justice was the standard plea form used in the Superior Court to enter a plea of nolo contendere or guilty.6 The prosecutor explained the facts that the State was prepared to prove at trial and the trial justice asked the petitioner whether he understood that by entering a nolo contendere plea "he's pleading guilty, he's saying he did it."Id. 3. Jorge responded affirmatively. Id.
This Court must now determine whether the plea colloquy was sufficient to ensure that the petitioner was "fully aware of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Williams,
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the limits of reliance on the explicit contents of similar documents. In Williams andFeng, the Court described the contents of similar forms as "boilerplate litany" that without more was insufficient to satisfy the constitutional *Page 20
requirements implicated by Rule 11. Feng,
Since the contents of the plea form alone are insufficient to satisfy Rule 11, the Court must examine the remainder of the record. The State supports its contention that the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and intelligently by pointing to the petitioner's responses to the trial justice's inquiries about his comprehension of the plea form. (State's Supplemental Mem. 3.) As the State notes, the trial justice directed several questions at the petitioner or the interpreter. Specifically, the trial justice asked the petitioner or the interpreter the following questions related to the petitioner's comprehension of the plea: did "he sign the document"; "did he sign the document voluntarily"; were "all the rights he's giving up. . . . explained to him by Mr. Cass personally and translated by you"; did he "understand fully what we're doing here today"; and was he "pleading guilty . . . saying he did it". (Tr. 1-3, 5.) To all of these questions the *Page 21 petitioner responded affirmatively, all but once by saying "Yes."Id. In addition, the trial justice asked, "[d]oes he have any questions at all about any of them" with regard to the constitutional rights waived in entering a plea. Id. 3. The petitioner responded "I have none." Id.
The Court's duty is to determine whether this interchange was sufficient to ensure that Jorge voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea. In reaching this determination, the Court is guided by the Supreme Court's instruction in Feng that a plea colloquy does not comply with Rule 11 if "[t]he questions posed by the court . . . explored only whether [the accused] had read the affidavit."
Since these questions are similar to the questions that the trial justice asked Jorge during his plea hearing, this Court now follows theFeng Court's instruction that it "must examine the record for additional circumstances indicating that an out-out-of court explanation of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea did in fact occur." Id. In reaching its *Page 22 determination that Rule 11 was satisfied, the Feng Court noted that the fact that Feng, a "college-educated defendant who [wa]s willing to swear" that "his attorney explained to him the charge and the consequences of the plea," was "an important factor." Id. The same cannot be said of Jorge. There is no indication in the record that he received a college education. Indeed, the record is silent as to his education or any other attribute that would "invariably indicate that he will understand without further explanation the legal rights enumerated in the affidavit." Id. Consequently, the Court cannot rely on Jorge's affirmative response to the trial justice's question regarding whether his rights were "fully explained to him and he understands them?" (Tr. 3.) Furthermore, it is significant that there is no assurance to be found in the transcript by Jorge's trial counsel that counsel enumerated these rights to Jorge out-of-court.
Moreover, Jorge does not meet even the minimum criterion set out by the Feng Court for constitutionally sound reliance on the petitioner's affirmative response to questions about his comprehension of a plea form — namely, the "ability to read and understand the English language."
In spite of the court interpreter's translation of the plea form inFrazar, the trial justice in that case did not stop the Court's inquiry of Frazar upon learning of the interpreter's translation, the additional plea form, and the interpreter's statement that Frazar appeared to understand the contents of the form. Id. at 933-34. Rather, the trial justice proceeded to extensively question Frazar about specific facts and constitutional rights. Id. In that case, the trial justice asked Frazar various questions about the facts underlying the charges against him and instructed the petitioner that he was required to respond to the Court's inquiries. Id. at 933. The trial justice then personally informed the petitioner of the rights he was required to waive and asked whether the petitioner understood the Court's explanation. Id. at 934.
The transcript of Jorge's plea colloquy indicates that the matter before this Court is markedly different from the record inFrazar. The trial justice who presided at Jorge's plea colloquy referenced "all the rights which are contained on this document" but only explicitly enumerated one, the right to trial. (Tr. 3, 5.) Importantly, the trial justice did not personally enumerate nor direct anyone else to enumerate any of the other specific constitutional rights waived by a plea. The transcript reveals that at most the trial justice asked the court interpreter whether "all the rights he's giving up . . . were explained to him [Jorge] by Mr. Cass personally and translated by you?" (Tr. 1-2.) To these questions — whether the petitioner's trial counsel explained the rights to Jorge and whether the interpreter translated those rights — the interpreter responded "Yes, Your Honor."Id. 2. Jorge then added, "Yes." Id. It is unclear which of the two questions posed to the court interpreter the petitioner's "Yes" response was intended to answer. This quick exchange — consisting of a mere five lines of the transcript — about the *Page 24
substance of the constitutional rights waived by a Rule 11 plea cannot be said to have satisfied the requirement that the trial justice "should advise and admonish the defendant about the nature of the charges . . . [and] ascertain whether [the] criminal defendant was made aware of the consequences of the plea and the rights that the defendant was giving up." Thomas,
Furthermore, the trial justice did not explain the charges to Jorge nor does the transcript reveal that the trial justice received an assurance that the petitioner's trial counsel adequately explained the charges to him. In Frazar, the trial justice clearly explained to the accused the charge he faced, including the elements of the charge and the facts underlying the charge.
No such explanation or assurances occurred at Jorge's plea hearing. Indeed, the trial justice merely alerted the court interpreter that "Mr. McLoughlin [the prosecutor] briefly will *Page 25 give me some facts which I'll ask you to translate." (Tr. 2.) Immediately thereafter the prosecutor recited the facts that the State was prepared to prove if the matter were to go to trial and provided the statutory citation of the crime charged. Id. 2-3. Later the trial justice reiterated that "Mr. McLoughlin gave me the fact out of which the charge arose. . . ." Id. 3.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Jorge's nolo contendere plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently. Consequently, the petitioner's plea entered on May 1, 1986 is vacated.
This Court does not accept the State's invitation. As the Court has clearly expressed, the petitioner's claim upon an application for post-conviction relief that his plea was entered in violation of Rule 11 involves important constitutional rights. Moniz,
Lastly, the State also alleges that the petitioner "fail[ed] to provide any evidence of how specifically Rule 11 was allegedly violated or how he was prejudiced thereby." (State's Supplemental Mem. 1-3.) Assuming, arguendo, that the State had correctly noted the petitioner's failure to specify a Rule 11 violation, the State's claim that a prejudice requirement exists is wholly without support. The State has not identified a prejudice requirement imposed by the Constitution, statute, or court rule. A mere passing reference to an argument, without meaningful elaboration, will not suffice to merit the Court's consideration. State v. Day,
Smith v. F.W. Morse Co., Inc. , 76 F.3d 413 ( 1996 )
Curtis C. Oliver v. United States , 961 F.2d 1339 ( 1992 )
Salvadore v. Major Electric & Supply, Inc. , 469 A.2d 353 ( 1983 )
State v. Day , 925 A.2d 962 ( 2007 )
Doyle v. State , 122 R.I. 590 ( 1980 )
Wright v. State , 711 So. 2d 66 ( 1998 )
Johnson v. Mullen , 120 R.I. 701 ( 1978 )
Raso v. Wall , 884 A.2d 391 ( 2005 )
Richard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 604 A.2d 1260 ( 1992 )
State v. Frazar , 822 A.2d 931 ( 2003 )
State v. Williams , 122 R.I. 32 ( 1979 )
State v. Feng , 421 A.2d 1258 ( 1980 )
Grissom v. Pawtucket Trust Co. , 559 A.2d 1065 ( 1989 )
Golderese v. Suburban Land Co. , 590 A.2d 395 ( 1991 )
State v. Thomas , 794 A.2d 990 ( 2002 )
Flint v. Sharkey , 107 R.I. 530 ( 1970 )
Carpenter v. State , 796 A.2d 1071 ( 2002 )
Capital Properties, Inc. v. State , 749 A.2d 1069 ( 1999 )
Palmigiano v. State , 120 R.I. 402 ( 1978 )