DocketNumber: C.A. No. 85-4556
Judges: <underline>VOGEL, J.</underline>
Filed Date: 2/14/1996
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
DiLuglio registered as a legislative agent on April 11, 1984. Tr. 5/23/85 at 16. He was paid approximately $5,300 for his work in opposing the bill in question. Tr. 5/23/85 at 34; People's Exhibit I. DiLuglio's efforts included the initiation of telephone conferences with and the preparation of letters of information to state senators regarding opposition to the bill. Tr. 5/23/85 at 17-19. DiLuglio attended Senate sessions during April and May of 1984. Tr. 5/23/85 at 22-23, 24; People's Exhibit III, V. He also arranged at least two dinners between state senators and representatives of the soft drink industry. Tr. 5/23/85 at 21, 22; People's Exhibit IV. These dinners, which were held at the Blue Grotto restaurant, were arranged for the purpose of providing information in opposition to the bill. Tr. 4/11/85 at 76. While DiLuglio performed these tasks, it was Attorney John Capaldi who made the formal presentations before the Senate Finance Committee. Tr. 5/23/85 at 46.
The Conflict of Interest Commission found that DiLuglio violated G.L. 1956 (1984 Reenactment) §
"No person enumerated in §
36-14-2 or any business associate of such person unless otherwise provided by law:. . .
(2) Shall after severing his official position represent himself or any other person or act as an expert witness before the state or municipal agency of which said person was a member or was employed, elected or engaged for one (1) year after he has officially severed his position; Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not pertain to a matter of public record in a court of law."3
The Conflict of Interest Commission concluded that DiLuglio's actions constituted "representation" before a "state or municipal agency" even though he never testified before the full State Senate. Specifically, the Commission stated:
"In our view there are a variety of ways that one can make representations before a governmental body. A governmental body is not simply the physical location which houses the operations of that body. It is in fact comprised of individuals empowered to carry out the duties assigned to the body. Contact with state senators for the purpose of influencing their official actions on pending legislation constitutes representation before the Senate. Where one makes that contact does not change the nature of it."
Decision and Order at 4.
The Commission also noted that the purpose behind the statute was to "prevent public officials from using an `inside track' with the governmental units they serve for anything other than the public interest." Id. at 5. The Commission concluded that DiLuglio's actions violated that policy and ordered him to pay a fine of $5,000.
On October 16, 1985, DiLuglio filed an appeal seeking review of the Commission's Decision and Order under the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L. §
(g) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles,
Where a controversy arises concerning statutory terms, it must be resolved according to legislative intent. Little v.Conflict of Interest Comm.,
Common sense must be used to determine whether appellant should have understood that his actions constituted "representation" as prohibited by the statute. The standard employed to gauge whether a particular statutory term reasonably informs an individual that his conduct is prohibited by statute is whether the disputed verbiage provides adequate warning to a person of ordinary intelligence that his conduct is prohibited by common understanding and practice. State v. Fonseca, No. 95-59-C.A., Slip Op. at 5 (R.I., filed Feb. 8, 1996) (citations omitted). This standard is clearly met, as DiLuglio's conduct constitutes "representation" as the word is commonly understood.
Section
"revolving-door legislation is an effective device by which the public trust may be enhanced. There is a legitimate purpose in abridging the abuse of public office . . . The revolving-door legislation rests on a rational predicate and promotes integrity and public confidence in government."
Id. at 671. While this language affirms the validity of such restrictions, it does little to illuminate the legislative intent and purpose behind the specific statute at issue in the instant case. To accomplish that task, the court may look to similar statutes in other states or a federal cognate, if one exists. SeeIn re Advisory Opinion to the Governor,
The federal government and numerous states have revolving-door statutes. See
"the purpose of `revolving door' provisions such as those at issue here is to prevent former government employees from unfairly profiting from or otherwise trading upon the contacts, associations and special knowledge that they acquired during their tenure at public servants . . . The underlying premise is that former officers should not be permitted to exercise undue influence over former colleagues, still in office, in matters pending before the agencies . . ."
Forti v. New York State Ethics Comm., 555 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237-38 (Ct. App. 1990). Similarly, it has been noted that "[m]any lobbyists are former legislators or former administrative officials. Their position gives them an unusual advantage because of their knowledge of legislative practice, and because of their personal relationships." 1 Singer, Sutherland StatutoryConstruction, § 13.08 at 672 (5th ed. 1994).
Also providing guidance is United States v. Coleman,
The purpose of §
Finally, the court recognizes that the Conflicts of Interest Commission was the administrative agency entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the statute in question. That agency concluded that DiLuglio's actions fell within the parameters of conduct prohibited by the statute. The Commission's interpretation of that statute is entitled to deference. SeePawtucket Power Associates, L.P. v. City of Pawtucket,
Accordingly, the court declines to accept the appellant's view of the §
Counsel shall prepare the appropriate order for entry.
United States v. Anderson J. Coleman , 805 F.2d 474 ( 1986 )
Brennan v. Kirby , 529 A.2d 633 ( 1987 )
Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. , 637 A.2d 1047 ( 1994 )
Carmody v. Rhode Island Conflict of Interest Commission , 509 A.2d 453 ( 1986 )
Newport Shipyard, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human ... , 484 A.2d 893 ( 1984 )
State v. Smith , 662 A.2d 1171 ( 1995 )
DiPrete v. Morsilli , 635 A.2d 1155 ( 1994 )
In Re Advisory From the Governor , 633 A.2d 664 ( 1993 )
Cabral v. Arruda , 556 A.2d 47 ( 1989 )
Pawtucket Power Associates Ltd. v. City of Pawtucket , 622 A.2d 452 ( 1993 )
Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission , 121 R.I. 232 ( 1979 )
Gryguc v. Bendick , 510 A.2d 937 ( 1986 )
In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor , 504 A.2d 456 ( 1986 )
Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council , 434 A.2d 266 ( 1981 )
Berberian v. Department of Employment Security, Board of ... , 414 A.2d 480 ( 1980 )
Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co. , 424 A.2d 646 ( 1981 )
Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles , 543 A.2d 1307 ( 1988 )
Kachanis v. Board of Review, Department of Employment and ... , 638 A.2d 553 ( 1994 )
In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor , 612 A.2d 1 ( 1992 )