DocketNumber: Nos. K1-03-654A, K1-03-655A
Judges: DARIGAN, J.
Filed Date: 10/21/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
"Subpoena. — * * *
(c) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys."
Discretion to allow a pretrial subpoena belongs to the trial court, as the inquiry is often fact-intensive. Diprete,
"(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general `fishing expedition.'" Diprete,
698 A.2d at 225 (citing United States v. Nixon,418 U.S. 698 ,699-702 (1974)).
The initial hurdle of relevancy is shown when there is a "sufficient likelihood" that the documents requested will be relevant to the offense charged. Nixon,
Defendants' theory that notice should be implied in the statute is explained in Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss. (10-22.) Defendants claim the language of the foam statute creates no punishable offense. The Defendants assert: "the language of the statute was phrased entirely in the passive voice and speaks to the nature of the material encompassed within the statute and not to the conduct of any individual. . . . There is nothing in the statute that identifies or describes any criminal act, nor is there any penalty provision set forth in the statute itself." (Motion to Dismiss at 15). The Defendants further reason that the statute must only be a guideline for local inspectors to follow, not a requirement that building owners or lessees can be prosecuted.2 Allegedly, the subpoenas would support the Defendants' contention that the penalty statute cannot result in prosecution of the foam statute without prior notice.
"Decorative and acoustical material to be flame resistant —
(a) All combustible decorative and acoustical material including curtains, but not including floor coverings shall be rendered and maintained flame resistant in accordance with subsection (d). This regulation shall not be construed to prohibit the use of wall or ceiling covering affixed directly to the wall or ceiling, which meet the requirements of subsection (e). Furnishing or decorations of an explosive or highly flammable character shall not be used.
. . .
(d)
. . .
(2) When a doubt exists as to the fire retardant quality or the permanency of the treatment, material shall be subject to the field check test as provided in subsection (d)(3).
. . .
(e) Interior finish in all places of assembly shall be as regulated or modified by the provisions of the description of interior finish in §
23-28.1-5 and shall not exceed the following classifications for the locations indicated:(1) In all means of egress Class A.
(2) In all other rooms or spaces Class C." 23-28.6-15 (1997) (repealed 2004).
Section
"Violations of chapter or codes — Any building owner or lessee who violates or fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of this chapter, the Fire Safety Code, chapters 28.1 — 28.39 of this title, or any code adopted by the board, or any lawful order of authority having jurisdiction shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or shall be imprisoned for not exceeding six (6) months, or both so fined and imprisoned for each offense, and each day the violation, omission, failure, or refusal continues shall be deemed a separate offense; provided that any person who shall knowingly make, give, or produce any false statements or false evidence, under oath to the authority having jurisdiction or to the fire safety board, shall be guilty of perjury. It shall be the authority having jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this chapter." Section
23-28.3-9 .
When read together, the plain, unambiguous language of the penalty statute indicates that violation of the foam statute is a misdemeanor. If the legislature had not intended chapter 28.61-5 (the foam statute) to be included with this penalty provision, they would not have provided the span of "28.1-28.39" in the text of the statute. "[I]n enacting a statute the Legislature is presumed to have intended that every word, sentence, or provision has some useful purpose and will have some force and effect." State v. Benoit,
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that when a statute has a plain, clear, and unambiguous meaning, no judicial interpretation is required, and the words will be given full effect in accordance with the plain expressed intent. E.g. StateDepartment of Corrections v. Rhode Island State LaborRelations Board,
The Defendants cite State v. Cluley to support their request subpoenas.
The Defendants also cite Martone v. Johnston SchoolCommittee, in which the court deferred to the definition of "suspension" held by the Commissioner of Education because two conflicting statutory sections were in effect.
Besides the speculation that no documented prosecution of the Fire Safety Code exists without notice, the Defendants point to a 1977 opinion of Attorney General Michaelson and three similar formal interpretations which deal with the procedures for enforcement.5 These documents specifically address how inspection procedures should be handled by local enforcing officers. The Defendants cite to the portion of the Attorney General opinion that states
"It would appear that an enforcing officer investigates and assumes responsibility for enforcing the fire safety code by making investigation and seeking voluntary compliance. If such compliance is not effected by the local enforcing officer, the state fire marshal is to be notified and must take appropriate action to prosecute the offender." Opinion of Attorney General, 1977 R.I.A.G. Lexis. 36.
These statements simply highlight that local officials cannot prosecute an offender, as it is the sole responsibility of the State Fire Marshal to prosecute pursuant to the statute. The result of the limited enforcement authority is that local officials are charged with the responsibility of seeking voluntary compliance; the State Fire Marshal is notified when the local officials fail to obtain compliance. This procedure does not imply the State Fire Marshal and his authorized representatives are powerless to prosecute a violation absent efforts of a local official to obtain compliance. If anything, this procedure explains why prosecutions are often preceded by notice and failure to comply. It is clearly the legislative intent in enacting a panoply of safety-oriented statutes across a spectrum of Rhode Island regulated businesses and industries that compliance with the standards in the statutes be obtained. Except when violations are not discovered until after a fire incident, the procedure for obtaining compliance would probably work most effectively when prosecution and criminal sanctions are only employed after reasonable compliance efforts have been made at the local level and have proved unsuccessful.
No Rhode Island statute or agency regulation has been presented to the Court which would require that notice must be given to potential offenders prior to prosecution.6 There has also been no case cited by either party that would require dismissal of any criminal prosecution under these statutes for failing to give express or implied notice before criminally charging the offender pursuant to the statutes. To hold such a position under the Rhode Island statute would produce absurd results, as in the instant case where the cited violations were determined after a fire incident and without prior inspection by state or local officials preceding the fire. To prohibit prosecution for violations of the fire codes under these circumstances would be inappropriate under the statutes and defeat the very purpose for their enactment in the first instance.7
The Defendants' assertion that local official's enforcement customs which encourage voluntary compliance is irrelevant to the question of the Fire Marshal's responsibility for prosecution under the statute. Information discovered through the 17(c) motion would have no affect on the State Fire Marshal's ability to prosecute the foam statute and other sections of the Fire Safety Code. As the foam and the penalty statute are clear on its face, and because the result of the subpoenas would only show the habits of local enforcement officials, the Court rules the documents are irrelevant for purposes of evidence presented at trial.8
Finally, the Court notes the burdensome nature of the request. Such a request would create great expense and time sacrificed on limited state and local resources. In any event, document destruction policies, as well as limited and non-uniform information reporting, would not paint a clear picture of all past prosecutions.
United States v. Samuel J. Concemi, United States of ... , 957 F.2d 942 ( 1992 )
Commonwealth v. Porrazzo , 25 Mass. App. Ct. 169 ( 1987 )
Martone v. Johnston School Committee , 824 A.2d 426 ( 2003 )
State v. Cluley , 808 A.2d 1098 ( 2002 )
Local 400, International Federation of Technical & ... , 747 A.2d 1002 ( 2000 )
State v. Benoit , 650 A.2d 1230 ( 1994 )
State Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island State Labor ... , 703 A.2d 1095 ( 1997 )
State v. Reis , 430 A.2d 749 ( 1981 )