Gillespie v. FORD

Baker, Chief Justice

(dissenting).

In this case the opinions of Justices Stakes and Taylor correctly state the cause of action of the appellant, and I think in this action there can be no question but that the negligence of appellant’s wife is imputable to him.

I regret that I cannot concur in either opinion. I have read the testimony of Mrs. Gillespie upon the trial of this case, and the only difference in her testimony in her suit and in the present case is that she testified in the present case that she at all times drove to the right of the center of the highway in the direction in which she was traveling, whereas in her case against the respondents here, appellants there, she testified that she may have been driving to the left of the center of the highway at the intersection. See Gillespie v. Ford, 222 S. C. 46, 71 S. E. (2d) 596. However, she still admitted that after looking to her left, the direction from which the respondent Ford was approaching the intersection of the highways, at approximately 100 feet before she reached the intersection, and not then seeing any traffic to her left, she looked no more in that direction but kept her eyes to the front and proceeded serenely at whatever speed she was traveling, the same being at the rate of approximately thirty miles per hour. While it was incidentally mentioned in said opinion that Mrs. Gillespie was driving slightly to the left of the center line, yet -it is clear that the reversal of the judgment was bottomed upon her negligence in failing to again look before entering upon the intersection.

In the light of the opinion in Gillespie v. Ford, supra, I do not see how the trial Judge could have done other than grant the motion for a nonsuit. But if the Court is going to hold otherwise, then the case above referred to should be directly and not indirectly overruled.

If the Court is going to hold that this case should have been submitted to the jury, then I think it should have been submitted only as to Ford and the automobile, and not as against the respondent Liberty Life Insurance Company, and I, therefore, will concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Taylor in so far as it relates to the respondent insurance company.