State v. Boatwright

Moore, Justice:

This is an estreatment case. Appellant (Fallaw) appeals the order of the circuit court finding that defendant (Boatwright) violated the terms of his bond and ordering that one-half of the bond be estreated to the State. We affirm.

FACTS

In December 1990, Boatwright was rested in Aiken County for forgery and parole violation. He was released on an appearance bond with Fallaw signing as surety for $2500. In January 1991, an arrest warrant for a parole violation was issued for Boatwright in Georgia. Boatwright subsequently was arrested in Aiken for criminal domestic violence (CDV). He pled guilty to CDV, waived extradition, and was released to Georgia authorities on March 13.

On March 18, Boatwright failed to appear when his forgery case was called in General Sessions Court in Aiken. A rule to show cause was issued and an affidavit of non-service on Boatwright states that he was incarcerated in Georgia on April 5. Fallaw was served with the rule to show cause and appeared at the estreatment hearing.

Based on his findings that Fallaw failed to show cause why he should not be held liable on the bond, the circuit court judge estreated one-half of the bond amount. The judge also ordered restitution be paid to the forgery victim from the State’s portion, and dismissed the forgery charge.

ISSUE

Did the circuit court judge err in ordering partial estreatment?

DISCUSSION

South Carolina Code Ann § 17-15-20 (1985) states that an appearance bond carries certain conditions, including the defendant’s appearance in court and his good behavior. South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-15-90 (1985) provides that a person who has been released on bond who willfully fails to appear in court shall, in addition to other penalties, forfeit his bond. If bond is forfeited because of ignorance or unavoidable impediment rather than willful default, the trial court may, on affidavit showing cause or excuse, remit the forfeiture in full or in part. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-180 (1985).

Fallaw contends that the State should be estopped from es-treating any part of the bond because the release of Boatwright to Georgia prevented Boatwright from appearing in court. Fallaw argues the circuit court judge erred in es-treating a portion of the bond because Boatwright’s failure to appear was not willful.

This Court has not previously addressed a situation in which a defendant who has been released on bond is subsequently extradited to another state. Because bond is contractual in nature, estoppel may operate against the State or the surety in a bond arrangement. State v. Simring, 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E. (2d) 9 (1956). When extradition is accomplished, the surety is no longer able to perform his obligation under the contract to deliver the defendant to court. Accordingly, the surety should be released from liability when estreatment is ordered for nonappearance after defendant has been extradited.

Nevertheless, it is the contract that provides the basis for the State’s right to bond estreatment. State v. McIntyre, — S.C. —, 415 S.E. (2d) 399 (1992). Here, the record reflects that the circuit judge found, as Fallaw conceded, that Boatwright breached the condition of good behavior. This condition was clearly set forth in the standard bond form that Fallaw signed. Our disposition of this case is therefore different than it would be if Boatwright’s nonappearance were the basis for the es-treatment.

Estreatment for a violation of the good behavior condition is proper. State v. Workman, 274 S.C. 341, 263 S.E. (2d) 865 (1980) (appeal bond). Boatwright pled guilty to criminal domestic violence; it is beyond dispute that he breached the condition of good behavior. Id. As a professional bondsman, Fallaw is certainly aware that an appearance bond carries conditions beyond the defendant’s presence in court.

Relief from bond forfeiture is in the discretion of the trial court. Id.; State v. Holloway, 262 S.C. 552, 206 S.E. (2d) 822 (1974). Although Boatwright’s failure to appear was not found to be willful, the judge held and Fallaw agreed that Boatwright otherwise breached the conditions of his bond. The order clearly reflects that the effect of the State’s extradition of Boatwright was that the judge decreased the forfeiture by half. We cannot say that the judge abused his discretion by ordering a partial estreatment, and accordingly, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.

We do not reach the propriety of the judge’s sua sponte dismissal of the charges against Boatwright, or his order of restitution, as those questions are not properly before the Court.

Affirmed.

Harwell C.J., concur. Chandler, A.J., concurs in separate opinion. Finney and Toal, JJ., dissent in separate opinion.