DocketNumber: Appellate Case No. 2012-209727
Citation Numbers: 403 S.C. 461, 744 S.E.2d 503
Judges: Beatty, Hearn, Kittredge, Pleicones, Toal
Filed Date: 5/8/2013
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/17/2022
Michael E. Hamm (Hamm) seeks a writ of habeas corpus and a declaratory judgment with regard to his civil commitment to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health's Sexually Violent Predator Treatment Program (SVPTP) for long term control, care, and treatment pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 44-48-10 et seq. (the SVP Act). We deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motions to amend or correct the petition, and decline to issue a declaratory judgment.
Hamm seeks habeas relief on the ground that the plea judge and plea counsel were ineffective for failing to inform Hamm that he was subject to the SVP Act as a direct consequence of pleading guilty. Hamm argues that in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010),
Habeas corpus is available only when other remedies, such as post-conviction relief (PCR), are inadequate or unavailable. Gibson v. State, 329 S.C. 37, 41, 495 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1998); see also Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008) (stating “a writ of habeas corpus is reserved for the very gravest of constitutional violations which, in the setting, constitute[] a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice”); McWee v. State, 357 S.C. 403, 406, 593 S.E.2d 456, 457 (2004) (stating habeas relief will only be granted under “unique and compelling circumstances”); Butler v. State, 302 S.C. 466, 468, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (1990) (“[N]ot every intervening decision, nor every constitutional error at trial will justify issuance of the writ.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Hamm failed to file a PCR application raising any issue related to Padilla within one year of that decision, issued March 31, 2010, as required by section 17-27-45 of the South Carolina Code. S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-45(B) (2003). Because Hamm failed to exhaust all other remedies, he is
However, were we even to reach Hamm’s Padilla claim, he is not entitled to relief. Commitment pursuant to the SVP Act does not automatically flow from the conviction, rather a civil proceeding occurs where the defendant is evaluated before confinement is certain;
We further find that classification of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-15-140 as a non-violent offense in the criminal code, but a violent offense for purposes of the SVP Act does not violate double jeopardy, due process, or separation of powers.
. In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court (USSC) determined that as a matter of law, Padilla’s plea counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his deportation. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478. Although the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Padilla’s ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the risk of deportation was a collateral matter of which counsel did not
. See Page v. State, 364 S.C. 632, 636-37, 615 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2005) (finding any possible civil commitment pursuant to the SVP Act does not flow directly from a defendant's guilty plea, but rather from a separate civil proceeding in which testing, evaluation, a probable cause hearing, and a trial by either the court or jury occurs).
. In Chaidez v. U.S., - U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013), the USSC re-emphasized the underlying rationale in Padilla that deportation is unique and such a detrimental and drastic consequence it should be treated differently than other collateral consequences. See Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1110. Thus, Padilla does not broadly apply to other potential consequences of a guilty plea, such as civil confinement under the SVP Act.
. In holding Padilla does not apply retroactively, the USSC observed that under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), when a new rule of criminal procedure is announced, a person whose conviction is already final may not benefit from the decision in a collateral proceeding. Chaidez, 133 S.Ct. at 1107. The USSC noted that "a case does not announce a new rule when it is merely an application of the principle which governed a prior decision to a different set of facts.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). However, the USSC held Padilla did something more than simply apply the test in Strickland to the factual situation of deportation advice because answering the preliminary question of whether Strickland applied at all required the adoption of a new rule. Id. at 1108. Specifically, the USSC noted it found deportation was "unique;" a particularly severe penalty that is intimately related to the criminal