Stroud v. Murphy

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Margaret Stroud and D5 Citizens Ensuring the
Implementation of the Referendum, Inc., Respondents,
v.
Kim Murphy, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2011-202407
Appeal from Richland County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge
Memorandum Opinion No. 2013-MO-017
Heard May 14, 2013 – Filed June 12, 2013
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Robert Guild, of Columbia, Katie R. Parham, of The
Parham Law Firm, of Irmo, and Jerry Jay Bender, of
Baker, Ravenel & Bender, LLP, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Todd R. Ellis, of Law Office of Todd Ellis, P.A., of Irmo,
for Respondents.
Kenneth L. Childs, John Marshall Reagle, and Tyler
Ryan Turner, of Childs and Halligan, P.A., of Columbia,
for Amicus Curiae, School District Five of Lexington and
Richland Counties, Scott Thomas Price, of Columbia, for
Amicus Curiae, South Carolina School Boards
Association.
PER CURIAM: Margaret Stroud, and D5 Citizens Ensuring the
Implementation of the Referendum, Inc. filed this action alleging abuse of process
by Kim Murphy, a member of the District 5 school board, and requesting an
injunction preventing her from challenging or appealing actions related to permits
for construction projects authorized by the school district and funded by the 2008
Referendum. Murphy moved to dismiss, and the circuit court denied her motion
and issued a temporary restraining order.
We reverse pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following
authorities: ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 380 S.C. 191, 198, 669 S.E.2d 337,
341 (2008) (internal citations omitted) ("[A] taxpayer lacks standing when he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.") Sea Pines Ass'n
for the Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 600, 550
S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001) (internal citations omitted) (noting that to have standing a
party must have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit and have a
"real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as opposed
to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the action"); Id. at 601, 550
S.E.2d at 291 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61
(1992)) (internal quotations omitted) ("In order to establish standing, a party must
satisfy three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.").
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for dismissal by the circuit court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ.,
concur.