Williams v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Detrick Williams, Petitioner,
v.
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2014-002100
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Appeal from York County
J. Ernest Kinard, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-017
Submitted April 15, 2016 – Filed April 27, 2016
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for
Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General James Rutledge Johnson, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This Court granted petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari
from an order of the post-conviction relief court finding petitioner was not entitled
to a belated review of his direct appeal issue pursuant to White v. State, 263 S.C.
110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974). Upon reviewing petitioner's direct appeal issue, we
affirm his conviction and sentence pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the
following authorities: Clark v. South Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377,
382–83, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2005) (holding this Court will reverse the trial
court's ruling on a directed verdict motion only where there is no evidence to
support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by error of law (citing Hinkle v.
National Cas. Ins. Co., 354 S.C. 92, 96, 579 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2003))); State v.
McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003) (noting a defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict when the State fails to produce evidence of the offense
charged); see also State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2011)
("Although it is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that penal statutes
should be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the defendant, State v.
Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991), courts must
nevertheless interpret a penal statute that is clear and unambiguous according to its
literal meaning" (citing State v. Mills, 360 S.C. 621, 624, 602 S.E.2d 750, 752
(2004))); In re Vincent J., 333 S.C. 233, 235, 509 S.E.2d 261, 262 (1998) (finding
under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a
clear and unambiguous statute (citations omitted)); Paschal v. State Election
Comm'n, 317 S.C. 434, 436, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995) (stating where the
statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite
meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no
right to impose another meaning (citation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.