Teamer v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Nathaniel Teamer, Respondent,
v.
State of South Carolina, Petitioner.
Appellate Case No. 2013-001303
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Appeal from Spartanburg County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Post-Conviction Relief Judge
Memorandum Opinion No. 2016-MO-013
Submitted October 15, 2015 – Filed April 13, 2016
REVERSED
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Alicia A. Olive and Assistant Deputy
Attorney General Suzanne H. White, all of Columbia, for
Petitioner.
C. Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter. Respondent
Nathaniel Teamer was convicted of murder and assault and battery with intent to
kill (ABWIK) and sentenced to consecutive terms of life without parole and twenty
years, respectively. Following the court of appeals' dismissal of Respondent's
direct appeal, Respondent filed a PCR application. The PCR court granted
Respondent relief on three grounds. We granted the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari to review the PCR court's decision. We reverse and reinstate
Respondent's convictions and sentences.
I.
On the night of February 2, 2006, Mike Proctor and Tony Hunter were shot
multiple times while riding in Proctor's SUV, which was stopped at a stop sign on
Chester Street at Theodosia Drive in Spartanburg County. Hunter died from three
gunshot wounds in the back of the head; however, Proctor was able to jump from
the driver's seat and escape, despite suffering four gunshot wounds himself.
Proctor ran to a nearby house and asked the residents to call 9-1-1. Police were
dispatched to the scene at 8:46 p.m.
Proctor testified he and Hunter were looking for drugs on the night of the murder,
and to that end, he and Hunter had picked up one of Hunter's friend's (who Proctor
had never seen before) in front of a home on South Center Street just before the
shooting. This home was later identified as Respondent's girlfriend's house.
Proctor testified the man got in the backseat of the SUV and instructed him where
to drive, and upon reaching the stop sign at the end of Chester Street, the man
opened fire. Proctor did not know the man or his name, but Proctor worked with a
sketch artist to develop a drawing of the suspect.
Respondent's DNA was found on a cigarette butt police recovered from the
backseat of Proctor's SUV. Thereafter, Respondent was charged with murder and
ABWIK, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to consecutive terms of life without
parole and twenty years, respectively.
On direct appeal, the court of appeals dismissed Respondent's appeal pursuant to
Anders v. California.1 State v. Teamer, Op. No. 2010-UP-062 (S.C. Ct. App. filed
Jan. 28, 2010) (Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled Apr. 21, 2010). Thereafter,
Respondent filed a PCR application raising a host of allegations of ineffective
1
386 U.S. 738 (1967).
assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the PCR court granted Respondent
relief as to three grounds. The parties filed cross-petitions for a writ of certiorari;
this Court granted the State's petition and denied Respondent's petition.
II.
The State argues the PCR court erred by finding counsel was ineffective for failing
to request a continuance, failing to provide the trial court with a jury instruction on
third-party guilt, and failing to object to a jury charge instructing the jury that its
duty is to return a verdict that is "just" or "fair." We agree and address each issue
in turn.
A.
Specifically, the State argues the PCR court erred in finding Respondent's trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a continuance to accommodate an
alibi witness who allegedly fell ill on the day she was to testify. We agree.
The State argued that Respondent committed the murder and ABWIK shortly
before 8:46 p.m. when police were dispatched to the scene of a shooting. At trial,
Respondent's girlfriend, Osia Feaster, testified that Respondent was at her house
when she returned home around 8:15 p.m. and remained with her at the house until
9:00 p.m. At the PCR hearing, Osia's mother, Daisy Feaster, who lived at the same
house, stated that she would have testified at Respondent's trial, but she fell ill the
day she was supposed to testify. Daisy stated she would have testified that
Respondent called the house around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. to say he was waiting
outside for Osia to arrive. Daisy would have further testified that Respondent was
at the house when she left to go shopping "about 8:00 something" and when she
returned around midnight; however, Daisy could not recall exactly what time she
left to go shopping.
We find the PCR court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, the proffered
testimony established an alibi. "To be successful, [a defendant's] alibi must cover
the entire time when his presence was required for accomplishment of the crime."
State v. Robbins, 275 S.C. 373, 375, 271 S.E.2d 319, 320 (1980) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). "[S]ince an alibi derives its potency as a defense from
the fact that it involves the physical impossibility of the accused's guilt, a purported
alibi which leaves it possible for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at
all." Id. (citation omitted).
Proctor testified that he picked up the shooter in front of the Feasters' house, which
was less than two miles from the scene of the shooting. Therefore, it was not
physically impossible for Respondent to have been at the Feasters' house at the
time Daisy left to go shopping "about 8:00 something" and to have committed the
shootings just before 8:46 p.m. As Daisy's testimony would not have made
Respondent's guilt physically impossible, it was not an alibi at all; trial counsel was
therefore not deficient for failing to move for a continuance to allow Respondent to
present that testimony.
Furthermore, Respondent was not prejudiced by trial counsel's actions. There can
be no prejudice from trial counsel's failure to request a continuance unless the trial
court's refusal to grant the continuance would have been an abuse of discretion.
See Morris v. State, 371 S.C. 278, 282–83, 639 S.E.2d 53, 56 (2006). As already
noted, Respondent presented Osia as an alibi witness. "Because [Respondent] was
not prevented from presenting an alibi defense, and since any testimony by
additional alibi witnesses would have been cumulative, the trial judge [would] not
[have] abuse[d] his discretion in denying [Respondent's] motion for a
continuance." State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989).
B.
The State next argues the PCR court erred in finding Respondent's trial counsel
ineffective for failing to suggest a jury instruction on third-party guilt. We agree.
At trial, Respondent presented a witness who testified that someone else admitted
to shooting Hunter and Proctor. Before the trial court charged the jury,
Respondent's counsel asked the court if it had a third-party guilt instruction. The
trial court responded that it did not, and Respondent's counsel neither suggested
one nor objected to the court's failure to provide one. Relying on an opinion from
the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the PCR court concluded that this constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
As evidenced by the PCR court's reliance on a Connecticut opinion, there is no
case law in South Carolina that supports the proposition that a trial court must
charge the jury on third-party guilt as a standalone defense. Trial counsel therefore
could not have been deficient for failing to request the jury charge, as it has never
before been required in South Carolina. See McKnight v. State, 378 S.C. 33, 49–
50, 661 S.E.2d 354, 362 (2008) (concluding that counsel in a homicide-by-child-
abuse trial was not ineffective for failing to request a particular jury charge, as
South Carolina courts have never held that defendants are entitled to that charge).
Moreover, Respondent has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by trial
counsel's failure to request a specific third-party guilt instruction. Respondent has
not shown that the trial court would have included such an instruction had trial
counsel proposed one. See State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578,
583 (2010) ("The trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law
of South Carolina." (citing Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462,
472 (2004))). Respondent has also failed to show that the outcome of the trial
would have been different had the trial court given such an instruction, as
Respondent was able to present his evidence of third-party guilt and the jury
charge properly conveyed the State's burden of proving its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. See McKnight, 378 S.C. at 50–51, 661 S.E.2d at 362–63
(footnote omitted) (holding that there could be no prejudice, and therefore trial
counsel could not be ineffective, "[w]hen read as a whole, the [jury] instructions
adequately conveyed the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
corresponding absence of any such burden for [the defendant]").
C.
Finally, the State argues the PCR court erred in finding Respondent's trial counsel
ineffective for failing to object to a portion of the trial court's jury instructions
because no case law existed at the time of Respondent's trial that would have made
the instruction objectionable. Again, we agree.
The trial court's charge to the jury included the following instruction: "Your sole
objective is to simply reach the truth in the matter, and by doing that you will have
fulfilled your obligations as jurors, and that is to simply give both the [S]tate and
[Respondent] a fair and impartial trial." Nearly five years after Respondent's trial,
this Court criticized a similar instruction: "This court is of the confirmed opinion
that whatever verdict you reach will represent truth and justice for all parties that
are involved in this case." State v. Daniels, 401 S.C. 251, 254, 737 S.E.2d 473,
474 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court ordered
trial judge[s] to remove any suggestion from [their] general sessions
charges that a criminal jury's duty is to return a verdict that is "just" or
"fair" to all parties. Such a charge could effectively alter the jury's
perception of the burden of proof, substituting justice and fairness for
the presumption of innocence and the State's burden to prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, to a lay
person, the "all parties involved" in a criminal case may well extend
beyond the defendant and the State, and include the victim. These
inaccurate and misleading charges risk depriving a criminal defendant
of his right to a fair trial.
Id. at 256, 737 S.E.2d at 475.
The PCR court found trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial
court's instruction, even though Daniels had not yet been decided, because if trial
counsel had made an objection, the issue would have been preserved for appellate
review. The PCR court also found Respondent was prejudiced because the jury
likely "relieved the State of its burden of proof."
We disagree and hold that the PCR court erred in finding trial counsel ineffective
for failing to object to the jury instruction when no case law existed rendering the
instruction improper per se. This Court has previously held that reasonable
representation does not require trial counsel to foresee successful appellate
challenges to novel questions of law. E.g., Gilmore v. State, 314 S.C. 453, 457,
445 S.E.2d 454, 456 (1994) ("We have never required an attorney to be clairvoyant
or anticipate changes in the law . . . ." (citing Thornes v. State, 310 S.C. 306, 309–
10, 426 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1993))), overruled on other grounds by Brightman v.
State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999); Thornes, 310 S.C. at 309–10, 426
S.E.2d at 765 ("This Court has never required an attorney to anticipate or discover
changes in the law, or facts which did not exist, at the time of the trial."). As trial
counsel's performance was not deficient, the PCR court erred in granting relief on
this ground.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the PCR court's grant of relief to Respondent is
reversed. Respondent's convictions and sentences are hereby reinstated.
REVERSED.
BEATTY, Acting Chief Justice, KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ. and Acting
Justice Jean H. Toal, concur. PLEICONES, C.J., not participating.