Paschal v. Lott

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Kay F. Paschal, Respondent,
v.
Leon Lott, the Duly Elected Sheriff of Richland County,
South Carolina, Petitioner.
Appellate Case No. 2018-000978
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appeal from Lexington County
William P. Keesley, Circuit Court Judge
Memorandum Opinion No. 2019-MO-045
Heard November 21, 2019 – Filed December 18, 2019
AFFIRMED
Andrew F. Lindemann, Lindemann, Davis & Hughes, PA,
of Columbia; and Patrick John Frawley, Davis Frawley,
LLC, of Lexington, for Petitioner.
S. Jahue Moore, John Calvin Bradley Jr., and Stanley
Lamont Myers Sr., Moore Taylor Law Firm, PA, of West
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Kay Paschal filed this lawsuit against Richland County Sheriff
Leon Lott alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligence,
and civil conspiracy. Only the malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims
were submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Paschal and
awarded her $1.6 million in actual damages, which the trial court later reduced to
$300,000, consistent with the monetary cap set by the South Carolina Tort Claims
Act. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -222 (2005 & Supp. 2019).
Sheriff Lott appealed the trial court's denial of his directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) motions. In an unpublished opinion issued
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, the court of appeals affirmed. Paschal v. Lott,
Op. No. 2018-UP-080 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 7, 2018). We granted Sheriff Lott's
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We affirm.
In asking us to reverse the court of appeals, Sheriff Lott raises four issues. The first
issue concerns the trial court's treatment of section 22-5-110 of the South Carolina
Code (Supp. 2019). Sheriff Lott argues the trial court improperly allowed the jury
to interpret the section as it applies to a law enforcement officer's authority to seek
a warrant outside of his or her jurisdiction. We agree. We find the trial court's failure
to explain the meaning of section 22-5-110 to the jury permitted the jury to
improperly interpret the statute and draw its own conclusions as to how the statute
applied to Lieutenant Heidi Scott's actions in seeking the arrest warrants against
Paschal in Lexington County. While the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on
the meaning of the statute amounted to an error of law, see Sparks v. Palmetto
Hardwood, Inc., 406 S.C. 124, 128, 750 S.E.2d 61, 63 (2013) ("The interpretation
of a statute is a question of law."), we do not reverse on this basis because we find
the trial court's erroneous charge had little impact on the jury's verdict.
In the second issue raised by Sheriff Lott, he argues probable cause existed as a
matter of law to arrest Paschal for criminal activity related to the purchase of the
handicapped van, and therefore, the trial court erred in submitting the malicious
prosecution claim to the jury.1 See Pallares v. Seinar, 407 S.C. 359, 367, 756 S.E.2d
128, 132 (2014) ("Whether probable cause exists is ordinarily a jury question, but it
may be decided as a matter of law when the evidence yields only one conclusion.").
We disagree probable cause existed as a matter of law in this case. "Probable cause
in this context . . . turn[s] . . . upon whether the facts within the prosecutor's
knowledge would lead a reasonable person to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the
crimes charged." 407 S.C. at 367, 756 S.E.2d at 131 (citation omitted). Reviewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Paschal, we find the jury heard ample
evidence from which it could have concluded that facts within Scott's knowledge
would not have led a reasonable person to believe Paschal was guilty of any criminal
activity related to the purchase of the handicapped van. Paschal presented evidence
demonstrating Scott's criminal investigation into the van purchase was incomplete:
Scott's telephone conversation with Tim Peterson regarding Paschal's involvement
in the transaction was limited to yes or no questions; Scott did not review the
documents involved in the transaction before seeking the arrest warrants against
Paschal; and Scott knew a Lexington County officer investigated the circumstances
of the transaction and found no probable cause to arrest Paschal for her involvement
in the purchase of the van.
Third, Sheriff Lott contends Paschal failed to prove the criminal charges terminated
in her favor, another element required to maintain her claim for malicious
prosecution. Sheriff Lott argues Paschal failed to satisfy this element because she
failed to prove the magistrates court's dismissal of Paschal's charges at the
preliminary hearing "implied or were consistent with her innocence," which Sheriff
Lott argues Paschal was required to prove pursuant to this Court's holding in
McKenney v. Jack Eckerd Co., 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887 (1991). However, in
McKenney, the narrow issue before this Court was whether a prosecutor's dismissal
of a criminal charge—as opposed to a judicial dismissal—was sufficient to prove a
criminal proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's favor in order for the plaintiff to
maintain an action for malicious prosecution. 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 887. We
held a prosecutor's dismissal of a charge is sufficient if the accused can demonstrate
the charge was dismissed "for reasons which imply or are consistent with
1
The elements for a malicious prosecution claim are: "(1) the institution or
continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the
defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in
instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or
damage." Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 435, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006)
(citations omitted).
innocence." 304 S.C. at 22, 402 S.E.2d at 888. Contrary to the position taken by
Sheriff Lott, this Court has never extended our holding in McKenney to apply "to
any preliminary dismissal of a criminal charge," Pet'r Br. 32 (emphasis added),
including preliminary dismissals by magistrates courts. Therefore, Paschal's
evidence of the dismissal of the charges by the magistrates court was sufficient under
South Carolina law to prove the criminal proceedings terminated in her favor. See
Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, 566, 220 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1975) (holding
a magistrate's dismissal of a disorderly conduct charge was a termination of the
proceedings in favor of the plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action); Mack v.
Riley, 282 S.C. 100, 102, 316 S.E.2d 731, 732 (Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he discharge of
the accused by a magistrate on a preliminary investigation is a sufficient termination
as will sustain [a malicious prosecution] action." (citing Harrelson v. Johnson, 119
S.C. 59, 60, 111 S.E. 882, 882-83 (1922), overruled on other grounds by McKenney,
304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887; Ruff, 265 S.C. at 566, 220 S.E.2d at 651; Jennings v.
Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 507-08, 172 S.E. 870, 873-74 (1934))),
overruled on other grounds by McKenney, 304 S.C. 21, 402 S.E.2d 887.
Fourth, with respect to Paschal's abuse of process claim, Sheriff Lott argues there is
no evidence in the record to support a finding that he or his deputies had an ulterior
purpose or committed an improper willful act in seeking Paschal's arrest. See
Pallares, 407 S.C. at 370, 756 S.E.2d at 133 ("The essential elements of abuse of
process are (1) an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process that
is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding."). We find Paschal's
testimony that interactions between Scott and the Wallace children were
unprofessional, and the other circumstantial evidence surrounding the timing of
Scott's searches and Paschal's arrest were sufficient for the trial court to submit the
abuse of process claim to the jury.
AFFIRMED.
KITTREDGE, Acting Chief Justice, HEARN, FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting
Justice Stephanie Pendarvis McDonald, concur.