Judges: Withers
Filed Date: 5/15/1847
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/18/2024
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When the prisoner’s case was before this Court in December last, every question was then considered and adjudged which arose on the second trial on ike circuit, and which is presented or urged in the present appeal, except that which alleges now the inadmissibility of the prisoner’s confession, because it was made through inducements held out to the prisoner in the presence of one in authority, who did not administer a caution and warning; and because the prisoner’s hopes and fears were excited in part and operated upon, immediately preceding the confession, by the officer having him in custody.
These suggestions all related to the question, debated by the prisoner and the two gentlemen mentioned, as to how a confession would be likely to operate in regard to the pardoning power; and it does not appear that any thing else was said, in the presence of the jailer, embracing matter touched by the grounds of appeal now under consideration.
Conceding that Willbanks was such “person in authority” as is contemplated by the rule of law urged upon us here, did he directly offer, in the single allusion made by him, or by his presence sanction, in the two observations made by another, such inducements to the prisoner’s hopes, or such alarm to the prisoner’s fear, as to exclude the confession made to two private persons an hour or more afterwards?
Numerous are the cases in which confessions made to persons in authority have been received; and various of them may be found condensed by Joy on Confessions, sections 1 and 3. This opinion will not be encumbered b}^ a minute specification of them. But it will be seen that the nature and effect of the inducement was the subject of consideration in those as in other cases. Though the same words uttered in the presence of one who has power over his prisoner, either in controlling the prosecution or in securing his person, may add to that force which they would carry when proceeding from a private person in swerving the accused from a proper equanimity, yet we cannot perceive how the suggestions specified in this case could, when proceeding from any body having no control over the pardoning power, and from those affecting to have no control, produce any undue effect upon the hope of the prisoner, or shake his mind from its propriety through any other impulse. But a very material consideration is yet to be added.
What effect did any thing, said in his preliminary conversation, have upon his mind, when the confession was made at a subsequent time? This inquiry was enough to carry the whole matter to the jury; and being before that tribuna!, the
A confession is admissible, (says Mr. Greenleaf in the 1st volume of his Evidence, sec. 239.) though it is elicited by questions, whether put to the prisoner by a magistrate, officer, or private person; and the form of the question is immaterial to its admissibility, though it assumes the prisoner’s guilt. In all these cases the evidence may be laid before the jury, however little it may weigh under the circumstances, and however reprehensible may be the mode in which in some of them, it may be obtained. According to recent decisions by some of the English Judges, a knowledge by the prisoner that the government itself has offered a pardon and a reward, will not exclude his confession, unless it appears that it was made under the influence of a hope of pardon held out by authorized parties; and though, where that is urged, the Judge may exclude the confession when such influence is manifest, it is unquestionably for the jury when the fact is doubtful; (see Regina v. Boswell, et al., 41 Eng. C. L. Rep., 584; same v. Dingby, et al, 47 ib., 637.
It does not appear, therefore, that the Circuit Court violated the rule in question, whether we look to the reason of it in general, the interpretation of it elsewhere, or in the former well considered judgment pronounced in this cause.